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authordjm <djm>2005-11-05 04:19:35 +0000
committerdjm <djm>2005-11-05 04:19:35 +0000
commit8400dfc2c8dac8a0f15249d979f2731316279d14 (patch)
treefcd62eda3f055ad43c119e4bcb70e1b0b0d6faa9 /kex.c
parent5d2500c83e4f64b4c28d7300c462da5992a07896 (diff)
downloadopenssh-8400dfc2c8dac8a0f15249d979f2731316279d14.tar.gz
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/11/04 05:15:59
[kex.c kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c] remove hardcoded hash lengths in key exchange code, allowing implementation of KEX methods with different hashes (e.g. SHA-256); ok markus@ dtucker@ stevesk@
Diffstat (limited to 'kex.c')
-rw-r--r--kex.c36
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index 5dce335f..cd71be9c 100644
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.64 2005/07/25 11:59:39 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.65 2005/11/04 05:15:59 djm Exp $");
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
@@ -294,13 +294,17 @@ choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
fatal("no kex alg");
if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DH1) == 0) {
k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1;
+ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
} else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DH14) == 0) {
k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1;
- } else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DHGEX) == 0) {
+ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+ } else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DHGEX_SHA1) == 0) {
k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1;
+ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
} else
fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
}
+
static void
choose_hostkeyalg(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
{
@@ -404,28 +408,28 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
}
static u_char *
-derive_key(Kex *kex, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, BIGNUM *shared_secret)
+derive_key(Kex *kex, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+ BIGNUM *shared_secret)
{
Buffer b;
- const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
EVP_MD_CTX md;
char c = id;
u_int have;
- int mdsz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
+ int mdsz;
u_char *digest;
- if (mdsz < 0)
- fatal("derive_key: mdsz < 0");
- digest = xmalloc(roundup(need, mdsz));
+ if ((mdsz = EVP_MD_size(kex->evp_md)) <= 0)
+ fatal("bad kex md size %d", mdsz);
+ digest = xmalloc(roundup(need, mdsz));
buffer_init(&b);
buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
/* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */
- EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, kex->evp_md);
if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY))
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, hash, mdsz);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, hash, hashlen);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, &c, 1);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
@@ -436,10 +440,10 @@ derive_key(Kex *kex, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, BIGNUM *shared_secret)
* Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn
*/
for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) {
- EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, kex->evp_md);
if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY))
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, hash, mdsz);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, hash, hashlen);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, digest, have);
EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest + have, NULL);
}
@@ -455,13 +459,15 @@ Newkeys *current_keys[MODE_MAX];
#define NKEYS 6
void
-kex_derive_keys(Kex *kex, u_char *hash, BIGNUM *shared_secret)
+kex_derive_keys(Kex *kex, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, BIGNUM *shared_secret)
{
u_char *keys[NKEYS];
u_int i, mode, ctos;
- for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++)
- keys[i] = derive_key(kex, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, shared_secret);
+ for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++) {
+ keys[i] = derive_key(kex, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, hashlen,
+ shared_secret);
+ }
debug2("kex_derive_keys");
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {