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* - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/18 11:43:53djm2012-06-201-2/+2
| | | | | [jpake.c] correct sizeof usage. patch from saw at online.de, ok deraadt
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/09/20 04:54:07djm2010-09-241-1/+2
| | | | | [jpake.c] missing #include
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/09/20 04:50:53djm2010-09-241-1/+7
| | | | | | | [jpake.c schnorr.c] check that received values are smaller than the group size in the disabled and unfinished J-PAKE code. avoids catastrophic security failure found by Sebastien Martini
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 23:13:16djm2010-07-161-2/+2
| | | | | | [auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c packet.c] [ssh-rsa.c] s/timing_safe_cmp/timingsafe_bcmp/g
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 11:52:06djm2010-07-161-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | [auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c] [packet.c ssh-rsa.c] implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/03/05 07:18:19djm2009-03-051-168/+13
| | | | | | | [auth2-jpake.c jpake.c jpake.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h schnorr.c] [sshconnect2.c] refactor the (disabled) Schnorr proof code to make it a little more generally useful
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/04 08:22:13djm2008-11-051-0/+604
[auth.h auth2.c monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h] [readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh2.h ssh_config.5] [sshconnect2.c sshd_config.5 jpake.c jpake.h schnorr.c auth2-jpake.c] [Makefile.in] Add support for an experimental zero-knowledge password authentication method using the J-PAKE protocol described in F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008. This method allows password-based authentication without exposing the password to the server. Instead, the client and server exchange cryptographic proofs to demonstrate of knowledge of the password while revealing nothing useful to an attacker or compromised endpoint. This is experimental, work-in-progress code and is presently compiled-time disabled (turn on -DJPAKE in Makefile.inc). "just commit it. It isn't too intrusive." deraadt@