This commit was manufactured by cvs2svn to create branch 'BRANCH_VMS_64BIT'.

32 files changed, 5631 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/certs/demo/ca-cert.pem b/certs/demo/ca-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bcba68aefa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/certs/demo/ca-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIC5TCCAk6gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBcMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTET
+MBEGA1UECBMKUXVlZW5zbGFuZDEaMBgGA1UEChMRQ3J5cHRTb2Z0IFB0eSBMdGQx
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+sleGpgB4j8cG2SVCz7V2MNZNK+d5QCnR7A==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
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+XfhqXkTzbU13RX9JJ/NZ8vQN9Vm2NhxRGJocQkmcdVtJ
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/certs/demo/dsa-ca.pem b/certs/demo/dsa-ca.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9eb08f3ddd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/certs/demo/dsa-ca.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,C5B6C7CC9E1FE2C0
+
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+MVqOsYxGCb+kez0FoDSTgw==
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+C1Q=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
diff --git a/certs/demo/dsa-pca.pem b/certs/demo/dsa-pca.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e3641ad47e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/certs/demo/dsa-pca.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,F80EEEBEEA7386C4
+
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+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
diff --git a/certs/demo/nortelCA.pem b/certs/demo/nortelCA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..207f34ab3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/certs/demo/nortelCA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
diff --git a/certs/demo/pca-cert.pem b/certs/demo/pca-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9d754d460d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/certs/demo/pca-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
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+hhu5l77WnnZOQ9vvhV5u7NPCUF9nhU3jh60qWWO8mkc=
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/certs/demo/timCA.pem b/certs/demo/timCA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c8d5bf9c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/certs/demo/timCA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+Tims test GCI CA
+
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+TfdbFZtAAD2Hx9jUtY3tfdrJOb8= 
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
diff --git a/certs/demo/tjhCA.pem b/certs/demo/tjhCA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..67bee1b200
--- /dev/null
+++ b/certs/demo/tjhCA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIICVjCCAgACAQAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwgbUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkFVMRMwEQYD
+VQQIEwpRdWVlbnNsYW5kMREwDwYDVQQHEwhCcmlzYmFuZTEaMBgGA1UEChMRQ3J5
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+WzQVWO31KTgi5vTK1U+3h46fgUWqQ0h+6rU=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/certs/demo/vsigntca.pem b/certs/demo/vsigntca.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..05acf76e66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/certs/demo/vsigntca.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+subject=/O=VeriSign, Inc/OU=www.verisign.com/repository/TestCPS Incorp. By Ref. Liab. LTD./OU=For VeriSign authorized testing only. No assurances (C)VS1997
+notBefore=Mar  4 00:00:00 1997 GMT
+notAfter=Mar  4 23:59:59 2025 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIICTTCCAfcCEEdoCqpuXxnoK27q7d58Qc4wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwgakxFjAU
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+ToLEMaUojc3DuNXHG21PDG8=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/certs/expired/RegTP-4R.pem b/certs/expired/RegTP-4R.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6f2c6abccd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/certs/expired/RegTP-4R.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+issuer= CN=4R-CA 1:PN+0.2.262.1.10.7.20=#130131,O=Regulierungsbeh\C3\88orde f\C3\88ur Telekommunikation und Post,C=DE
+notBefore=Jan 21 16:04:53 1999 GMT
+notAfter=Jan 21 16:04:53 2004 GMT
+subject= CN=4R-CA 1:PN+0.2.262.1.10.7.20=#130131,O=Regulierungsbeh\C3\88orde f\C3\88ur Telekommunikation und Post,C=DE
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIICZzCCAdOgAwIBAgIEOwVn1DAKBgYrJAMDAQIFADBvMQswCQYDVQQGEwJERTE9
+MDsGA1UEChQ0UmVndWxpZXJ1bmdzYmVoyG9yZGUgZsh1ciBUZWxla29tbXVuaWth
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+5gxwQXrOcPinE6qu1t/3PmECBMAAAAGjEjAQMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIBBjAKBgYr
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+JjfEOEmSnNe0+opuh4FSVOssXblXTE8lEQU0FhhItgDx2ADnWZibaxLG4w==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/certs/expired/factory.pem b/certs/expired/factory.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8e28b391b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/certs/expired/factory.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIICTTCCAbagAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBMMQswCQYDVQQGEwJHQjEM
+MAoGA1UEChMDVUNMMRgwFgYDVQQLEw9JQ0UtVEVMIFByb2plY3QxFTATBgNVBAMT
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+S7ELuYGtmYgYm9NZOIr7yU0=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/certs/expired/rsa-cca.pem b/certs/expired/rsa-cca.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..69f5c1c84c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/certs/expired/rsa-cca.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+subject=/C=US/O=RSA Data Security, Inc./OU=Commercial Certification Authority
+issuer= /C=US/O=RSA Data Security, Inc./OU=Commercial Certification Authority
+notBefore=941104185834Z
+notAfter =991103185834Z
+-----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE-----
+
+MIICIzCCAZACBQJBAAAWMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUAMFwxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSAw
+HgYDVQQKExdSU0EgRGF0YSBTZWN1cml0eSwgSW5jLjErMCkGA1UECxMiQ29tbWVy
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+touPmbZiImDd298ggrTKoi8tUO2UMt7gVY3UaOLgTNLNBRYulWZcYVI4HlGogqHE
+7yXpCuaLK44xZtn42f29O2nZ6wIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUAA34AdrW2EP4j
+9/dZYkuwX5zBaLxJu7NJbyFHXSudVMQAKD+YufKKg5tgf+tQx6sFEC097TgCwaVI
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+MJhCKLVLU7tDCZJAuqiqWqTGtotXTcU=
+-----END X509 CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/certs/expired/vsign2.pem b/certs/expired/vsign2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d8bdd8c812
--- /dev/null
+++ b/certs/expired/vsign2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+subject=/C=US/O=VeriSign, Inc./OU=Class 2 Public Primary Certification Authority
+notBefore=Jan 29 00:00:00 1996 GMT
+notAfter=Jan  7 23:59:59 2004 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIICPTCCAaYCEQC6WslMBTuS1qe2307QU5INMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUAMF8xCzAJ
+BgNVBAYTAlVTMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5WZXJpU2lnbiwgSW5jLjE3MDUGA1UECxMuQ2xh
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+BgkqhkiG9w0BAQIFAAOBgQC2AB+TV6QHp0DOZUA/VV7t7/pUSaUw1iF8YYfug5ML
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+G6S7x3ggKLKi3TaVLuFUT79guXdoEZkj6OpS6KoATmdOu5C1RZtG644W78QzWzM9
+1Q==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/certs/wellsfgo.pem b/certs/wellsfgo.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2ba88cdda7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/certs/wellsfgo.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIID5TCCAs2gAwIBAgIEOeSXnjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADCBgjELMAkGA1UEBhMC
+VVMxFDASBgNVBAoTC1dlbGxzIEZhcmdvMSwwKgYDVQQLEyNXZWxscyBGYXJnbyBD
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+33ZwmVxwQ023tqcZZE6St8WRPH9IFmV7Fv3L/PvZ1dZPIWU7Sn9Ho/s=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..ee02ded463
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1798 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary
+# forms are granted according to the OpenSSL license.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# Version 3.1.
+#
+# You might fail to appreciate this module performance from the first
+# try. If compared to "vanilla" linux-ia32-icc target, i.e. considered
+# to be *the* best Intel C compiler without -KPIC, performance appears
+# to be virtually identical... But try to re-configure with shared
+# library support... Aha! Intel compiler "suddenly" lags behind by 30%
+# [on P4, more on others]:-) And if compared to position-independent
+# code generated by GNU C, this code performs *more* than *twice* as
+# fast! Yes, all this buzz about PIC means that unlike other hand-
+# coded implementations, this one was explicitly designed to be safe
+# to use even in shared library context... This also means that this
+# code isn't necessarily absolutely fastest "ever," because in order
+# to achieve position independence an extra register has to be
+# off-loaded to stack, which affects the benchmark result.
+#
+# Special note about instruction choice. Do you recall RC4_INT code
+# performing poorly on P4? It might be the time to figure out why.
+# RC4_INT code implies effective address calculations in base+offset*4
+# form. Trouble is that it seems that offset scaling turned to be
+# critical path... At least eliminating scaling resulted in 2.8x RC4
+# performance improvement [as you might recall]. As AES code is hungry
+# for scaling too, I [try to] avoid the latter by favoring off-by-2
+# shifts and masking the result with 0xFF<<2 instead of "boring" 0xFF.
+#
+# As was shown by Dean Gaudet <dean@arctic.org>, the above note turned
+# void. Performance improvement with off-by-2 shifts was observed on
+# intermediate implementation, which was spilling yet another register
+# to stack... Final offset*4 code below runs just a tad faster on P4,
+# but exhibits up to 10% improvement on other cores.
+#
+# Second version is "monolithic" replacement for aes_core.c, which in
+# addition to AES_[de|en]crypt implements AES_set_[de|en]cryption_key.
+# This made it possible to implement little-endian variant of the
+# algorithm without modifying the base C code. Motivating factor for
+# the undertaken effort was that it appeared that in tight IA-32
+# register window little-endian flavor could achieve slightly higher
+# Instruction Level Parallelism, and it indeed resulted in up to 15%
+# better performance on most recent µ-archs...
+#
+# Current ECB performance numbers for 128-bit key in CPU cycles per
+# processed byte [measure commonly used by AES benchmarkers] are:
+#
+#		small footprint		fully unrolled
+# P4[-3]	23[24]			22[23]
+# AMD K8	19			18
+# PIII		26			23
+# Pentium	63(*)			52
+#
+# (*)	Performance difference between small footprint code and fully
+#	unrolled in more commonly used CBC mode is not as big, 4% for
+#	for Pentium. PIII's ~13% difference [in both cases in 3rd
+#	version] is considered tolerable...
+#
+# Third version adds AES_cbc_encrypt implementation, which resulted in
+# up to 40% performance imrovement of CBC benchmark results. 40% was
+# observed on P4 core, where "overall" imrovement coefficient, i.e. if
+# compared to PIC generated by GCC and in CBC mode, was observed to be
+# as large as 4x:-) CBC performance is virtually identical to ECB now
+# and on some platforms even better, e.g. 56 "small" cycles/byte on
+# senior Pentium, because certain function prologues and epilogues are
+# effectively taken out of the loop...
+
+push(@INC,"perlasm","../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"aes-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$s0="eax";
+$s1="ebx";
+$s2="ecx";
+$s3="edx";
+$key="edi";
+$acc="esi";
+
+$small_footprint=1;	# $small_footprint=1 code is ~5% slower [on
+			# recent µ-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
+			# I favor compact code to minimize cache
+			# contention and in hope to "collect" 5% back
+			# in real-life applications...
+$vertical_spin=0;	# shift "verticaly" defaults to 0, because of
+			# its proof-of-concept status...
+
+# Note that there is no decvert(), as well as last encryption round is
+# performed with "horizontal" shifts. This is because this "vertical"
+# implementation [one which groups shifts on a given $s[i] to form a
+# "column," unlike "horizontal" one, which groups shifts on different
+# $s[i] to form a "row"] is work in progress. It was observed to run
+# few percents faster on Intel cores, but not AMD. On AMD K8 core it's
+# whole 12% slower:-( So we face a trade-off... Shall it be resolved
+# some day? Till then the code is considered experimental and by
+# default remains dormant...
+
+sub encvert()
+{ my ($te,@s) = @_;
+  my $v0 = $acc, $v1 = $key;
+
+	&mov	($v0,$s[3]);				# copy s3
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$s[2]);			# save s2
+	&mov	($v1,$s[0]);				# copy s0
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$s[1]);			# save s1
+
+	&movz	($s[2],&HB($s[0]));
+	&and	($s[0],0xFF);
+	&mov	($s[0],&DWP(1024*0,$te,$s[0],4));	# s0>>0
+	&shr	($v1,16);
+	&mov	($s[3],&DWP(1024*1,$te,$s[2],4));	# s0>>8
+	&movz	($s[1],&HB($v1));
+	&and	($v1,0xFF);
+	&mov	($s[2],&DWP(1024*2,$te,$v1,4));		# s0>>16
+	 &mov	($v1,$v0);
+	&mov	($s[1],&DWP(1024*3,$te,$s[1],4));	# s0>>24
+
+	&and	($v0,0xFF);
+	&xor	($s[3],&DWP(1024*0,$te,$v0,4));		# s3>>0
+	&movz	($v0,&HB($v1));
+	&shr	($v1,16);
+	&xor	($s[2],&DWP(1024*1,$te,$v0,4));		# s3>>8
+	&movz	($v0,&HB($v1));
+	&and	($v1,0xFF);
+	&xor	($s[1],&DWP(1024*2,$te,$v1,4));		# s3>>16
+	 &mov	($v1,&DWP(0,"esp"));			# restore s2
+	&xor	($s[0],&DWP(1024*3,$te,$v0,4));		# s3>>24
+
+	&mov	($v0,$v1);
+	&and	($v1,0xFF);
+	&xor	($s[2],&DWP(1024*0,$te,$v1,4));		# s2>>0
+	&movz	($v1,&HB($v0));
+	&shr	($v0,16);
+	&xor	($s[1],&DWP(1024*1,$te,$v1,4));		# s2>>8
+	&movz	($v1,&HB($v0));
+	&and	($v0,0xFF);
+	&xor	($s[0],&DWP(1024*2,$te,$v0,4));		# s2>>16
+	 &mov	($v0,&DWP(4,"esp"));			# restore s1
+	&xor	($s[3],&DWP(1024*3,$te,$v1,4));		# s2>>24
+
+	&mov	($v1,$v0);
+	&and	($v0,0xFF);
+	&xor	($s[1],&DWP(1024*0,$te,$v0,4));		# s1>>0
+	&movz	($v0,&HB($v1));
+	&shr	($v1,16);
+	&xor	($s[0],&DWP(1024*1,$te,$v0,4));		# s1>>8
+	&movz	($v0,&HB($v1));
+	&and	($v1,0xFF);
+	&xor	($s[3],&DWP(1024*2,$te,$v1,4));		# s1>>16
+	 &mov	($key,&DWP(12,"esp"));			# reincarnate v1 as key
+	&xor	($s[2],&DWP(1024*3,$te,$v0,4));		# s1>>24
+}
+
+sub encstep()
+{ my ($i,$te,@s) = @_;
+  my $tmp = $key;
+  my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
+
+	# lines marked with #%e?x[i] denote "reordered" instructions...
+	if ($i==3)  {	&mov	($key,&DWP(12,"esp"));		}##%edx
+	else        {	&mov	($out,$s[0]);
+			&and	($out,0xFF);			}
+	if ($i==1)  {	&shr	($s[0],16);			}#%ebx[1]
+	if ($i==2)  {	&shr	($s[0],24);			}#%ecx[2]
+			&mov	($out,&DWP(1024*0,$te,$out,4));
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[1];				}##%eax
+			&movz	($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
+			&xor	($out,&DWP(1024*1,$te,$tmp,4));
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],&DWP(0,"esp"));	}##%ebx
+	else        {	&mov	($tmp,$s[2]);
+			&shr	($tmp,16);			}
+	if ($i==2)  {	&and	($s[1],0xFF);			}#%edx[2]
+			&and	($tmp,0xFF);
+			&xor	($out,&DWP(1024*2,$te,$tmp,4));
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],&DWP(4,"esp"));	}##%ecx
+	elsif($i==2){	&movz	($tmp,&HB($s[3]));		}#%ebx[2]
+	else        {	&mov	($tmp,$s[3]); 
+			&shr	($tmp,24)			}
+			&xor	($out,&DWP(1024*3,$te,$tmp,4));
+	if ($i<2)   {	&mov	(&DWP(4*$i,"esp"),$out);	}
+	if ($i==3)  {	&mov	($s[3],$acc);			}
+			&comment();
+}
+
+sub enclast()
+{ my ($i,$te,@s)=@_;
+  my $tmp = $key;
+  my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	&mov	($key,&DWP(12,"esp"));		}##%edx
+	else        {	&mov	($out,$s[0]);			}
+			&and	($out,0xFF);
+	if ($i==1)  {	&shr	($s[0],16);			}#%ebx[1]
+	if ($i==2)  {	&shr	($s[0],24);			}#%ecx[2]
+			&mov	($out,&DWP(1024*4,$te,$out,4));
+			&and	($out,0x000000ff);
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[1];				}##%eax
+			&movz	($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
+			&mov	($tmp,&DWP(1024*4,$te,$tmp,4));
+			&and	($tmp,0x0000ff00);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],&DWP(0,"esp"));	}##%ebx
+	else        {	mov	($tmp,$s[2]);
+			&shr	($tmp,16);			}
+	if ($i==2)  {	&and	($s[1],0xFF);			}#%edx[2]
+			&and	($tmp,0xFF);
+			&mov	($tmp,&DWP(1024*4,$te,$tmp,4));
+			&and	($tmp,0x00ff0000);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],&DWP(4,"esp"));	}##%ecx
+	elsif($i==2){	&movz	($tmp,&HB($s[3]));		}#%ebx[2]
+	else        {	&mov	($tmp,$s[3]);
+			&shr	($tmp,24);			}
+			&mov	($tmp,&DWP(1024*4,$te,$tmp,4));
+			&and	($tmp,0xff000000);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+	if ($i<2)   {	&mov	(&DWP(4*$i,"esp"),$out);	}
+	if ($i==3)  {	&mov	($s[3],$acc);			}
+}
+
+&public_label("AES_Te");
+&function_begin_B("_x86_AES_encrypt");
+	if ($vertical_spin) {
+		# I need high parts of volatile registers to be accessible...
+		&exch	($s1="edi",$key="ebx");
+		&mov	($s2="esi",$acc="ecx");
+	}
+
+	# allocate aligned stack frame
+	&mov	($acc,"esp");
+	&sub	("esp",20);
+	&and	("esp",-16);
+
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$key);		# save key
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"esp"),$acc);		# save %esp
+
+	&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));		# xor with key
+	&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+	&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+	&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(240,$key));		# load key->rounds
+
+	if ($small_footprint) {
+	    &lea	($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
+	    &lea	($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
+	    &mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),$acc);	# end of key schedule
+	    &align	(4);
+	    &set_label("loop");
+		if ($vertical_spin) {
+		    &encvert("ebp",$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		} else {
+		    &encstep(0,"ebp",$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		    &encstep(1,"ebp",$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+		    &encstep(2,"ebp",$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+		    &encstep(3,"ebp",$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+		}
+		&add	($key,16);			# advance rd_key
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+	    &cmp	($key,&DWP(8,"esp"));
+	    &mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$key);
+	    &jb		(&label("loop"));
+	}
+	else {
+	    &cmp	($acc,10);
+	    &jle	(&label("10rounds"));
+	    &cmp	($acc,12);
+	    &jle	(&label("12rounds"));
+
+	&set_label("14rounds");
+	    for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
+		if ($vertical_spin) {
+		    &encvert("ebp",$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		} else {
+		    &encstep(0,"ebp",$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		    &encstep(1,"ebp",$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+		    &encstep(2,"ebp",$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+		    &encstep(3,"ebp",$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+		}
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+	    }
+	    &add	($key,32);
+	    &mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$key);		# advance rd_key
+	&set_label("12rounds");
+	    for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
+		if ($vertical_spin) {
+		    &encvert("ebp",$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		} else {
+		    &encstep(0,"ebp",$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		    &encstep(1,"ebp",$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+		    &encstep(2,"ebp",$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+		    &encstep(3,"ebp",$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+		}
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+	    }
+	    &add	($key,32);
+	    &mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$key);		# advance rd_key
+	&set_label("10rounds");
+	    for ($i=1;$i<10;$i++) {
+		if ($vertical_spin) {
+		    &encvert("ebp",$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		} else {
+		    &encstep(0,"ebp",$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		    &encstep(1,"ebp",$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+		    &encstep(2,"ebp",$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+		    &encstep(3,"ebp",$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+		}
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if ($vertical_spin) {
+	    # "reincarnate" some registers for "horizontal" spin...
+	    &mov	($s1="ebx",$key="edi");
+	    &mov	($s2="ecx",$acc="esi");
+	}
+	&enclast(0,"ebp",$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+	&enclast(1,"ebp",$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+	&enclast(2,"ebp",$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+	&enclast(3,"ebp",$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(16,"esp"));		# restore %esp
+	&add	($key,$small_footprint?16:160);
+	&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+	&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+	&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+	&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+	&ret	();
+
+&set_label("AES_Te",64);	# Yes! I keep it in the code segment!
+	&data_word(0xa56363c6, 0x847c7cf8, 0x997777ee, 0x8d7b7bf6);
+	&data_word(0x0df2f2ff, 0xbd6b6bd6, 0xb16f6fde, 0x54c5c591);
+	&data_word(0x50303060, 0x03010102, 0xa96767ce, 0x7d2b2b56);
+	&data_word(0x19fefee7, 0x62d7d7b5, 0xe6abab4d, 0x9a7676ec);
+	&data_word(0x45caca8f, 0x9d82821f, 0x40c9c989, 0x877d7dfa);
+	&data_word(0x15fafaef, 0xeb5959b2, 0xc947478e, 0x0bf0f0fb);
+	&data_word(0xecadad41, 0x67d4d4b3, 0xfda2a25f, 0xeaafaf45);
+	&data_word(0xbf9c9c23, 0xf7a4a453, 0x967272e4, 0x5bc0c09b);
+	&data_word(0xc2b7b775, 0x1cfdfde1, 0xae93933d, 0x6a26264c);
+	&data_word(0x5a36366c, 0x413f3f7e, 0x02f7f7f5, 0x4fcccc83);
+	&data_word(0x5c343468, 0xf4a5a551, 0x34e5e5d1, 0x08f1f1f9);
+	&data_word(0x937171e2, 0x73d8d8ab, 0x53313162, 0x3f15152a);
+	&data_word(0x0c040408, 0x52c7c795, 0x65232346, 0x5ec3c39d);
+	&data_word(0x28181830, 0xa1969637, 0x0f05050a, 0xb59a9a2f);
+	&data_word(0x0907070e, 0x36121224, 0x9b80801b, 0x3de2e2df);
+	&data_word(0x26ebebcd, 0x6927274e, 0xcdb2b27f, 0x9f7575ea);
+	&data_word(0x1b090912, 0x9e83831d, 0x742c2c58, 0x2e1a1a34);
+	&data_word(0x2d1b1b36, 0xb26e6edc, 0xee5a5ab4, 0xfba0a05b);
+	&data_word(0xf65252a4, 0x4d3b3b76, 0x61d6d6b7, 0xceb3b37d);
+	&data_word(0x7b292952, 0x3ee3e3dd, 0x712f2f5e, 0x97848413);
+	&data_word(0xf55353a6, 0x68d1d1b9, 0x00000000, 0x2cededc1);
+	&data_word(0x60202040, 0x1ffcfce3, 0xc8b1b179, 0xed5b5bb6);
+	&data_word(0xbe6a6ad4, 0x46cbcb8d, 0xd9bebe67, 0x4b393972);
+	&data_word(0xde4a4a94, 0xd44c4c98, 0xe85858b0, 0x4acfcf85);
+	&data_word(0x6bd0d0bb, 0x2aefefc5, 0xe5aaaa4f, 0x16fbfbed);
+	&data_word(0xc5434386, 0xd74d4d9a, 0x55333366, 0x94858511);
+	&data_word(0xcf45458a, 0x10f9f9e9, 0x06020204, 0x817f7ffe);
+	&data_word(0xf05050a0, 0x443c3c78, 0xba9f9f25, 0xe3a8a84b);
+	&data_word(0xf35151a2, 0xfea3a35d, 0xc0404080, 0x8a8f8f05);
+	&data_word(0xad92923f, 0xbc9d9d21, 0x48383870, 0x04f5f5f1);
+	&data_word(0xdfbcbc63, 0xc1b6b677, 0x75dadaaf, 0x63212142);
+	&data_word(0x30101020, 0x1affffe5, 0x0ef3f3fd, 0x6dd2d2bf);
+	&data_word(0x4ccdcd81, 0x140c0c18, 0x35131326, 0x2fececc3);
+	&data_word(0xe15f5fbe, 0xa2979735, 0xcc444488, 0x3917172e);
+	&data_word(0x57c4c493, 0xf2a7a755, 0x827e7efc, 0x473d3d7a);
+	&data_word(0xac6464c8, 0xe75d5dba, 0x2b191932, 0x957373e6);
+	&data_word(0xa06060c0, 0x98818119, 0xd14f4f9e, 0x7fdcdca3);
+	&data_word(0x66222244, 0x7e2a2a54, 0xab90903b, 0x8388880b);
+	&data_word(0xca46468c, 0x29eeeec7, 0xd3b8b86b, 0x3c141428);
+	&data_word(0x79dedea7, 0xe25e5ebc, 0x1d0b0b16, 0x76dbdbad);
+	&data_word(0x3be0e0db, 0x56323264, 0x4e3a3a74, 0x1e0a0a14);
+	&data_word(0xdb494992, 0x0a06060c, 0x6c242448, 0xe45c5cb8);
+	&data_word(0x5dc2c29f, 0x6ed3d3bd, 0xefacac43, 0xa66262c4);
+	&data_word(0xa8919139, 0xa4959531, 0x37e4e4d3, 0x8b7979f2);
+	&data_word(0x32e7e7d5, 0x43c8c88b, 0x5937376e, 0xb76d6dda);
+	&data_word(0x8c8d8d01, 0x64d5d5b1, 0xd24e4e9c, 0xe0a9a949);
+	&data_word(0xb46c6cd8, 0xfa5656ac, 0x07f4f4f3, 0x25eaeacf);
+	&data_word(0xaf6565ca, 0x8e7a7af4, 0xe9aeae47, 0x18080810);
+	&data_word(0xd5baba6f, 0x887878f0, 0x6f25254a, 0x722e2e5c);
+	&data_word(0x241c1c38, 0xf1a6a657, 0xc7b4b473, 0x51c6c697);
+	&data_word(0x23e8e8cb, 0x7cdddda1, 0x9c7474e8, 0x211f1f3e);
+	&data_word(0xdd4b4b96, 0xdcbdbd61, 0x868b8b0d, 0x858a8a0f);
+	&data_word(0x907070e0, 0x423e3e7c, 0xc4b5b571, 0xaa6666cc);
+	&data_word(0xd8484890, 0x05030306, 0x01f6f6f7, 0x120e0e1c);
+	&data_word(0xa36161c2, 0x5f35356a, 0xf95757ae, 0xd0b9b969);
+	&data_word(0x91868617, 0x58c1c199, 0x271d1d3a, 0xb99e9e27);
+	&data_word(0x38e1e1d9, 0x13f8f8eb, 0xb398982b, 0x33111122);
+	&data_word(0xbb6969d2, 0x70d9d9a9, 0x898e8e07, 0xa7949433);
+	&data_word(0xb69b9b2d, 0x221e1e3c, 0x92878715, 0x20e9e9c9);
+	&data_word(0x49cece87, 0xff5555aa, 0x78282850, 0x7adfdfa5);
+	&data_word(0x8f8c8c03, 0xf8a1a159, 0x80898909, 0x170d0d1a);
+	&data_word(0xdabfbf65, 0x31e6e6d7, 0xc6424284, 0xb86868d0);
+	&data_word(0xc3414182, 0xb0999929, 0x772d2d5a, 0x110f0f1e);
+	&data_word(0xcbb0b07b, 0xfc5454a8, 0xd6bbbb6d, 0x3a16162c);
+#Te1:
+	&data_word(0x6363c6a5, 0x7c7cf884, 0x7777ee99, 0x7b7bf68d);
+	&data_word(0xf2f2ff0d, 0x6b6bd6bd, 0x6f6fdeb1, 0xc5c59154);
+	&data_word(0x30306050, 0x01010203, 0x6767cea9, 0x2b2b567d);
+	&data_word(0xfefee719, 0xd7d7b562, 0xabab4de6, 0x7676ec9a);
+	&data_word(0xcaca8f45, 0x82821f9d, 0xc9c98940, 0x7d7dfa87);
+	&data_word(0xfafaef15, 0x5959b2eb, 0x47478ec9, 0xf0f0fb0b);
+	&data_word(0xadad41ec, 0xd4d4b367, 0xa2a25ffd, 0xafaf45ea);
+	&data_word(0x9c9c23bf, 0xa4a453f7, 0x7272e496, 0xc0c09b5b);
+	&data_word(0xb7b775c2, 0xfdfde11c, 0x93933dae, 0x26264c6a);
+	&data_word(0x36366c5a, 0x3f3f7e41, 0xf7f7f502, 0xcccc834f);
+	&data_word(0x3434685c, 0xa5a551f4, 0xe5e5d134, 0xf1f1f908);
+	&data_word(0x7171e293, 0xd8d8ab73, 0x31316253, 0x15152a3f);
+	&data_word(0x0404080c, 0xc7c79552, 0x23234665, 0xc3c39d5e);
+	&data_word(0x18183028, 0x969637a1, 0x05050a0f, 0x9a9a2fb5);
+	&data_word(0x07070e09, 0x12122436, 0x80801b9b, 0xe2e2df3d);
+	&data_word(0xebebcd26, 0x27274e69, 0xb2b27fcd, 0x7575ea9f);
+	&data_word(0x0909121b, 0x83831d9e, 0x2c2c5874, 0x1a1a342e);
+	&data_word(0x1b1b362d, 0x6e6edcb2, 0x5a5ab4ee, 0xa0a05bfb);
+	&data_word(0x5252a4f6, 0x3b3b764d, 0xd6d6b761, 0xb3b37dce);
+	&data_word(0x2929527b, 0xe3e3dd3e, 0x2f2f5e71, 0x84841397);
+	&data_word(0x5353a6f5, 0xd1d1b968, 0x00000000, 0xededc12c);
+	&data_word(0x20204060, 0xfcfce31f, 0xb1b179c8, 0x5b5bb6ed);
+	&data_word(0x6a6ad4be, 0xcbcb8d46, 0xbebe67d9, 0x3939724b);
+	&data_word(0x4a4a94de, 0x4c4c98d4, 0x5858b0e8, 0xcfcf854a);
+	&data_word(0xd0d0bb6b, 0xefefc52a, 0xaaaa4fe5, 0xfbfbed16);
+	&data_word(0x434386c5, 0x4d4d9ad7, 0x33336655, 0x85851194);
+	&data_word(0x45458acf, 0xf9f9e910, 0x02020406, 0x7f7ffe81);
+	&data_word(0x5050a0f0, 0x3c3c7844, 0x9f9f25ba, 0xa8a84be3);
+	&data_word(0x5151a2f3, 0xa3a35dfe, 0x404080c0, 0x8f8f058a);
+	&data_word(0x92923fad, 0x9d9d21bc, 0x38387048, 0xf5f5f104);
+	&data_word(0xbcbc63df, 0xb6b677c1, 0xdadaaf75, 0x21214263);
+	&data_word(0x10102030, 0xffffe51a, 0xf3f3fd0e, 0xd2d2bf6d);
+	&data_word(0xcdcd814c, 0x0c0c1814, 0x13132635, 0xececc32f);
+	&data_word(0x5f5fbee1, 0x979735a2, 0x444488cc, 0x17172e39);
+	&data_word(0xc4c49357, 0xa7a755f2, 0x7e7efc82, 0x3d3d7a47);
+	&data_word(0x6464c8ac, 0x5d5dbae7, 0x1919322b, 0x7373e695);
+	&data_word(0x6060c0a0, 0x81811998, 0x4f4f9ed1, 0xdcdca37f);
+	&data_word(0x22224466, 0x2a2a547e, 0x90903bab, 0x88880b83);
+	&data_word(0x46468cca, 0xeeeec729, 0xb8b86bd3, 0x1414283c);
+	&data_word(0xdedea779, 0x5e5ebce2, 0x0b0b161d, 0xdbdbad76);
+	&data_word(0xe0e0db3b, 0x32326456, 0x3a3a744e, 0x0a0a141e);
+	&data_word(0x494992db, 0x06060c0a, 0x2424486c, 0x5c5cb8e4);
+	&data_word(0xc2c29f5d, 0xd3d3bd6e, 0xacac43ef, 0x6262c4a6);
+	&data_word(0x919139a8, 0x959531a4, 0xe4e4d337, 0x7979f28b);
+	&data_word(0xe7e7d532, 0xc8c88b43, 0x37376e59, 0x6d6ddab7);
+	&data_word(0x8d8d018c, 0xd5d5b164, 0x4e4e9cd2, 0xa9a949e0);
+	&data_word(0x6c6cd8b4, 0x5656acfa, 0xf4f4f307, 0xeaeacf25);
+	&data_word(0x6565caaf, 0x7a7af48e, 0xaeae47e9, 0x08081018);
+	&data_word(0xbaba6fd5, 0x7878f088, 0x25254a6f, 0x2e2e5c72);
+	&data_word(0x1c1c3824, 0xa6a657f1, 0xb4b473c7, 0xc6c69751);
+	&data_word(0xe8e8cb23, 0xdddda17c, 0x7474e89c, 0x1f1f3e21);
+	&data_word(0x4b4b96dd, 0xbdbd61dc, 0x8b8b0d86, 0x8a8a0f85);
+	&data_word(0x7070e090, 0x3e3e7c42, 0xb5b571c4, 0x6666ccaa);
+	&data_word(0x484890d8, 0x03030605, 0xf6f6f701, 0x0e0e1c12);
+	&data_word(0x6161c2a3, 0x35356a5f, 0x5757aef9, 0xb9b969d0);
+	&data_word(0x86861791, 0xc1c19958, 0x1d1d3a27, 0x9e9e27b9);
+	&data_word(0xe1e1d938, 0xf8f8eb13, 0x98982bb3, 0x11112233);
+	&data_word(0x6969d2bb, 0xd9d9a970, 0x8e8e0789, 0x949433a7);
+	&data_word(0x9b9b2db6, 0x1e1e3c22, 0x87871592, 0xe9e9c920);
+	&data_word(0xcece8749, 0x5555aaff, 0x28285078, 0xdfdfa57a);
+	&data_word(0x8c8c038f, 0xa1a159f8, 0x89890980, 0x0d0d1a17);
+	&data_word(0xbfbf65da, 0xe6e6d731, 0x424284c6, 0x6868d0b8);
+	&data_word(0x414182c3, 0x999929b0, 0x2d2d5a77, 0x0f0f1e11);
+	&data_word(0xb0b07bcb, 0x5454a8fc, 0xbbbb6dd6, 0x16162c3a);
+#Te2:
+	&data_word(0x63c6a563, 0x7cf8847c, 0x77ee9977, 0x7bf68d7b);
+	&data_word(0xf2ff0df2, 0x6bd6bd6b, 0x6fdeb16f, 0xc59154c5);
+	&data_word(0x30605030, 0x01020301, 0x67cea967, 0x2b567d2b);
+	&data_word(0xfee719fe, 0xd7b562d7, 0xab4de6ab, 0x76ec9a76);
+	&data_word(0xca8f45ca, 0x821f9d82, 0xc98940c9, 0x7dfa877d);
+	&data_word(0xfaef15fa, 0x59b2eb59, 0x478ec947, 0xf0fb0bf0);
+	&data_word(0xad41ecad, 0xd4b367d4, 0xa25ffda2, 0xaf45eaaf);
+	&data_word(0x9c23bf9c, 0xa453f7a4, 0x72e49672, 0xc09b5bc0);
+	&data_word(0xb775c2b7, 0xfde11cfd, 0x933dae93, 0x264c6a26);
+	&data_word(0x366c5a36, 0x3f7e413f, 0xf7f502f7, 0xcc834fcc);
+	&data_word(0x34685c34, 0xa551f4a5, 0xe5d134e5, 0xf1f908f1);
+	&data_word(0x71e29371, 0xd8ab73d8, 0x31625331, 0x152a3f15);
+	&data_word(0x04080c04, 0xc79552c7, 0x23466523, 0xc39d5ec3);
+	&data_word(0x18302818, 0x9637a196, 0x050a0f05, 0x9a2fb59a);
+	&data_word(0x070e0907, 0x12243612, 0x801b9b80, 0xe2df3de2);
+	&data_word(0xebcd26eb, 0x274e6927, 0xb27fcdb2, 0x75ea9f75);
+	&data_word(0x09121b09, 0x831d9e83, 0x2c58742c, 0x1a342e1a);
+	&data_word(0x1b362d1b, 0x6edcb26e, 0x5ab4ee5a, 0xa05bfba0);
+	&data_word(0x52a4f652, 0x3b764d3b, 0xd6b761d6, 0xb37dceb3);
+	&data_word(0x29527b29, 0xe3dd3ee3, 0x2f5e712f, 0x84139784);
+	&data_word(0x53a6f553, 0xd1b968d1, 0x00000000, 0xedc12ced);
+	&data_word(0x20406020, 0xfce31ffc, 0xb179c8b1, 0x5bb6ed5b);
+	&data_word(0x6ad4be6a, 0xcb8d46cb, 0xbe67d9be, 0x39724b39);
+	&data_word(0x4a94de4a, 0x4c98d44c, 0x58b0e858, 0xcf854acf);
+	&data_word(0xd0bb6bd0, 0xefc52aef, 0xaa4fe5aa, 0xfbed16fb);
+	&data_word(0x4386c543, 0x4d9ad74d, 0x33665533, 0x85119485);
+	&data_word(0x458acf45, 0xf9e910f9, 0x02040602, 0x7ffe817f);
+	&data_word(0x50a0f050, 0x3c78443c, 0x9f25ba9f, 0xa84be3a8);
+	&data_word(0x51a2f351, 0xa35dfea3, 0x4080c040, 0x8f058a8f);
+	&data_word(0x923fad92, 0x9d21bc9d, 0x38704838, 0xf5f104f5);
+	&data_word(0xbc63dfbc, 0xb677c1b6, 0xdaaf75da, 0x21426321);
+	&data_word(0x10203010, 0xffe51aff, 0xf3fd0ef3, 0xd2bf6dd2);
+	&data_word(0xcd814ccd, 0x0c18140c, 0x13263513, 0xecc32fec);
+	&data_word(0x5fbee15f, 0x9735a297, 0x4488cc44, 0x172e3917);
+	&data_word(0xc49357c4, 0xa755f2a7, 0x7efc827e, 0x3d7a473d);
+	&data_word(0x64c8ac64, 0x5dbae75d, 0x19322b19, 0x73e69573);
+	&data_word(0x60c0a060, 0x81199881, 0x4f9ed14f, 0xdca37fdc);
+	&data_word(0x22446622, 0x2a547e2a, 0x903bab90, 0x880b8388);
+	&data_word(0x468cca46, 0xeec729ee, 0xb86bd3b8, 0x14283c14);
+	&data_word(0xdea779de, 0x5ebce25e, 0x0b161d0b, 0xdbad76db);
+	&data_word(0xe0db3be0, 0x32645632, 0x3a744e3a, 0x0a141e0a);
+	&data_word(0x4992db49, 0x060c0a06, 0x24486c24, 0x5cb8e45c);
+	&data_word(0xc29f5dc2, 0xd3bd6ed3, 0xac43efac, 0x62c4a662);
+	&data_word(0x9139a891, 0x9531a495, 0xe4d337e4, 0x79f28b79);
+	&data_word(0xe7d532e7, 0xc88b43c8, 0x376e5937, 0x6ddab76d);
+	&data_word(0x8d018c8d, 0xd5b164d5, 0x4e9cd24e, 0xa949e0a9);
+	&data_word(0x6cd8b46c, 0x56acfa56, 0xf4f307f4, 0xeacf25ea);
+	&data_word(0x65caaf65, 0x7af48e7a, 0xae47e9ae, 0x08101808);
+	&data_word(0xba6fd5ba, 0x78f08878, 0x254a6f25, 0x2e5c722e);
+	&data_word(0x1c38241c, 0xa657f1a6, 0xb473c7b4, 0xc69751c6);
+	&data_word(0xe8cb23e8, 0xdda17cdd, 0x74e89c74, 0x1f3e211f);
+	&data_word(0x4b96dd4b, 0xbd61dcbd, 0x8b0d868b, 0x8a0f858a);
+	&data_word(0x70e09070, 0x3e7c423e, 0xb571c4b5, 0x66ccaa66);
+	&data_word(0x4890d848, 0x03060503, 0xf6f701f6, 0x0e1c120e);
+	&data_word(0x61c2a361, 0x356a5f35, 0x57aef957, 0xb969d0b9);
+	&data_word(0x86179186, 0xc19958c1, 0x1d3a271d, 0x9e27b99e);
+	&data_word(0xe1d938e1, 0xf8eb13f8, 0x982bb398, 0x11223311);
+	&data_word(0x69d2bb69, 0xd9a970d9, 0x8e07898e, 0x9433a794);
+	&data_word(0x9b2db69b, 0x1e3c221e, 0x87159287, 0xe9c920e9);
+	&data_word(0xce8749ce, 0x55aaff55, 0x28507828, 0xdfa57adf);
+	&data_word(0x8c038f8c, 0xa159f8a1, 0x89098089, 0x0d1a170d);
+	&data_word(0xbf65dabf, 0xe6d731e6, 0x4284c642, 0x68d0b868);
+	&data_word(0x4182c341, 0x9929b099, 0x2d5a772d, 0x0f1e110f);
+	&data_word(0xb07bcbb0, 0x54a8fc54, 0xbb6dd6bb, 0x162c3a16);
+#Te3:
+	&data_word(0xc6a56363, 0xf8847c7c, 0xee997777, 0xf68d7b7b);
+	&data_word(0xff0df2f2, 0xd6bd6b6b, 0xdeb16f6f, 0x9154c5c5);
+	&data_word(0x60503030, 0x02030101, 0xcea96767, 0x567d2b2b);
+	&data_word(0xe719fefe, 0xb562d7d7, 0x4de6abab, 0xec9a7676);
+	&data_word(0x8f45caca, 0x1f9d8282, 0x8940c9c9, 0xfa877d7d);
+	&data_word(0xef15fafa, 0xb2eb5959, 0x8ec94747, 0xfb0bf0f0);
+	&data_word(0x41ecadad, 0xb367d4d4, 0x5ffda2a2, 0x45eaafaf);
+	&data_word(0x23bf9c9c, 0x53f7a4a4, 0xe4967272, 0x9b5bc0c0);
+	&data_word(0x75c2b7b7, 0xe11cfdfd, 0x3dae9393, 0x4c6a2626);
+	&data_word(0x6c5a3636, 0x7e413f3f, 0xf502f7f7, 0x834fcccc);
+	&data_word(0x685c3434, 0x51f4a5a5, 0xd134e5e5, 0xf908f1f1);
+	&data_word(0xe2937171, 0xab73d8d8, 0x62533131, 0x2a3f1515);
+	&data_word(0x080c0404, 0x9552c7c7, 0x46652323, 0x9d5ec3c3);
+	&data_word(0x30281818, 0x37a19696, 0x0a0f0505, 0x2fb59a9a);
+	&data_word(0x0e090707, 0x24361212, 0x1b9b8080, 0xdf3de2e2);
+	&data_word(0xcd26ebeb, 0x4e692727, 0x7fcdb2b2, 0xea9f7575);
+	&data_word(0x121b0909, 0x1d9e8383, 0x58742c2c, 0x342e1a1a);
+	&data_word(0x362d1b1b, 0xdcb26e6e, 0xb4ee5a5a, 0x5bfba0a0);
+	&data_word(0xa4f65252, 0x764d3b3b, 0xb761d6d6, 0x7dceb3b3);
+	&data_word(0x527b2929, 0xdd3ee3e3, 0x5e712f2f, 0x13978484);
+	&data_word(0xa6f55353, 0xb968d1d1, 0x00000000, 0xc12ceded);
+	&data_word(0x40602020, 0xe31ffcfc, 0x79c8b1b1, 0xb6ed5b5b);
+	&data_word(0xd4be6a6a, 0x8d46cbcb, 0x67d9bebe, 0x724b3939);
+	&data_word(0x94de4a4a, 0x98d44c4c, 0xb0e85858, 0x854acfcf);
+	&data_word(0xbb6bd0d0, 0xc52aefef, 0x4fe5aaaa, 0xed16fbfb);
+	&data_word(0x86c54343, 0x9ad74d4d, 0x66553333, 0x11948585);
+	&data_word(0x8acf4545, 0xe910f9f9, 0x04060202, 0xfe817f7f);
+	&data_word(0xa0f05050, 0x78443c3c, 0x25ba9f9f, 0x4be3a8a8);
+	&data_word(0xa2f35151, 0x5dfea3a3, 0x80c04040, 0x058a8f8f);
+	&data_word(0x3fad9292, 0x21bc9d9d, 0x70483838, 0xf104f5f5);
+	&data_word(0x63dfbcbc, 0x77c1b6b6, 0xaf75dada, 0x42632121);
+	&data_word(0x20301010, 0xe51affff, 0xfd0ef3f3, 0xbf6dd2d2);
+	&data_word(0x814ccdcd, 0x18140c0c, 0x26351313, 0xc32fecec);
+	&data_word(0xbee15f5f, 0x35a29797, 0x88cc4444, 0x2e391717);
+	&data_word(0x9357c4c4, 0x55f2a7a7, 0xfc827e7e, 0x7a473d3d);
+	&data_word(0xc8ac6464, 0xbae75d5d, 0x322b1919, 0xe6957373);
+	&data_word(0xc0a06060, 0x19988181, 0x9ed14f4f, 0xa37fdcdc);
+	&data_word(0x44662222, 0x547e2a2a, 0x3bab9090, 0x0b838888);
+	&data_word(0x8cca4646, 0xc729eeee, 0x6bd3b8b8, 0x283c1414);
+	&data_word(0xa779dede, 0xbce25e5e, 0x161d0b0b, 0xad76dbdb);
+	&data_word(0xdb3be0e0, 0x64563232, 0x744e3a3a, 0x141e0a0a);
+	&data_word(0x92db4949, 0x0c0a0606, 0x486c2424, 0xb8e45c5c);
+	&data_word(0x9f5dc2c2, 0xbd6ed3d3, 0x43efacac, 0xc4a66262);
+	&data_word(0x39a89191, 0x31a49595, 0xd337e4e4, 0xf28b7979);
+	&data_word(0xd532e7e7, 0x8b43c8c8, 0x6e593737, 0xdab76d6d);
+	&data_word(0x018c8d8d, 0xb164d5d5, 0x9cd24e4e, 0x49e0a9a9);
+	&data_word(0xd8b46c6c, 0xacfa5656, 0xf307f4f4, 0xcf25eaea);
+	&data_word(0xcaaf6565, 0xf48e7a7a, 0x47e9aeae, 0x10180808);
+	&data_word(0x6fd5baba, 0xf0887878, 0x4a6f2525, 0x5c722e2e);
+	&data_word(0x38241c1c, 0x57f1a6a6, 0x73c7b4b4, 0x9751c6c6);
+	&data_word(0xcb23e8e8, 0xa17cdddd, 0xe89c7474, 0x3e211f1f);
+	&data_word(0x96dd4b4b, 0x61dcbdbd, 0x0d868b8b, 0x0f858a8a);
+	&data_word(0xe0907070, 0x7c423e3e, 0x71c4b5b5, 0xccaa6666);
+	&data_word(0x90d84848, 0x06050303, 0xf701f6f6, 0x1c120e0e);
+	&data_word(0xc2a36161, 0x6a5f3535, 0xaef95757, 0x69d0b9b9);
+	&data_word(0x17918686, 0x9958c1c1, 0x3a271d1d, 0x27b99e9e);
+	&data_word(0xd938e1e1, 0xeb13f8f8, 0x2bb39898, 0x22331111);
+	&data_word(0xd2bb6969, 0xa970d9d9, 0x07898e8e, 0x33a79494);
+	&data_word(0x2db69b9b, 0x3c221e1e, 0x15928787, 0xc920e9e9);
+	&data_word(0x8749cece, 0xaaff5555, 0x50782828, 0xa57adfdf);
+	&data_word(0x038f8c8c, 0x59f8a1a1, 0x09808989, 0x1a170d0d);
+	&data_word(0x65dabfbf, 0xd731e6e6, 0x84c64242, 0xd0b86868);
+	&data_word(0x82c34141, 0x29b09999, 0x5a772d2d, 0x1e110f0f);
+	&data_word(0x7bcbb0b0, 0xa8fc5454, 0x6dd6bbbb, 0x2c3a1616);
+#Te4:
+	&data_word(0x63636363, 0x7c7c7c7c, 0x77777777, 0x7b7b7b7b);
+	&data_word(0xf2f2f2f2, 0x6b6b6b6b, 0x6f6f6f6f, 0xc5c5c5c5);
+	&data_word(0x30303030, 0x01010101, 0x67676767, 0x2b2b2b2b);
+	&data_word(0xfefefefe, 0xd7d7d7d7, 0xabababab, 0x76767676);
+	&data_word(0xcacacaca, 0x82828282, 0xc9c9c9c9, 0x7d7d7d7d);
+	&data_word(0xfafafafa, 0x59595959, 0x47474747, 0xf0f0f0f0);
+	&data_word(0xadadadad, 0xd4d4d4d4, 0xa2a2a2a2, 0xafafafaf);
+	&data_word(0x9c9c9c9c, 0xa4a4a4a4, 0x72727272, 0xc0c0c0c0);
+	&data_word(0xb7b7b7b7, 0xfdfdfdfd, 0x93939393, 0x26262626);
+	&data_word(0x36363636, 0x3f3f3f3f, 0xf7f7f7f7, 0xcccccccc);
+	&data_word(0x34343434, 0xa5a5a5a5, 0xe5e5e5e5, 0xf1f1f1f1);
+	&data_word(0x71717171, 0xd8d8d8d8, 0x31313131, 0x15151515);
+	&data_word(0x04040404, 0xc7c7c7c7, 0x23232323, 0xc3c3c3c3);
+	&data_word(0x18181818, 0x96969696, 0x05050505, 0x9a9a9a9a);
+	&data_word(0x07070707, 0x12121212, 0x80808080, 0xe2e2e2e2);
+	&data_word(0xebebebeb, 0x27272727, 0xb2b2b2b2, 0x75757575);
+	&data_word(0x09090909, 0x83838383, 0x2c2c2c2c, 0x1a1a1a1a);
+	&data_word(0x1b1b1b1b, 0x6e6e6e6e, 0x5a5a5a5a, 0xa0a0a0a0);
+	&data_word(0x52525252, 0x3b3b3b3b, 0xd6d6d6d6, 0xb3b3b3b3);
+	&data_word(0x29292929, 0xe3e3e3e3, 0x2f2f2f2f, 0x84848484);
+	&data_word(0x53535353, 0xd1d1d1d1, 0x00000000, 0xedededed);
+	&data_word(0x20202020, 0xfcfcfcfc, 0xb1b1b1b1, 0x5b5b5b5b);
+	&data_word(0x6a6a6a6a, 0xcbcbcbcb, 0xbebebebe, 0x39393939);
+	&data_word(0x4a4a4a4a, 0x4c4c4c4c, 0x58585858, 0xcfcfcfcf);
+	&data_word(0xd0d0d0d0, 0xefefefef, 0xaaaaaaaa, 0xfbfbfbfb);
+	&data_word(0x43434343, 0x4d4d4d4d, 0x33333333, 0x85858585);
+	&data_word(0x45454545, 0xf9f9f9f9, 0x02020202, 0x7f7f7f7f);
+	&data_word(0x50505050, 0x3c3c3c3c, 0x9f9f9f9f, 0xa8a8a8a8);
+	&data_word(0x51515151, 0xa3a3a3a3, 0x40404040, 0x8f8f8f8f);
+	&data_word(0x92929292, 0x9d9d9d9d, 0x38383838, 0xf5f5f5f5);
+	&data_word(0xbcbcbcbc, 0xb6b6b6b6, 0xdadadada, 0x21212121);
+	&data_word(0x10101010, 0xffffffff, 0xf3f3f3f3, 0xd2d2d2d2);
+	&data_word(0xcdcdcdcd, 0x0c0c0c0c, 0x13131313, 0xecececec);
+	&data_word(0x5f5f5f5f, 0x97979797, 0x44444444, 0x17171717);
+	&data_word(0xc4c4c4c4, 0xa7a7a7a7, 0x7e7e7e7e, 0x3d3d3d3d);
+	&data_word(0x64646464, 0x5d5d5d5d, 0x19191919, 0x73737373);
+	&data_word(0x60606060, 0x81818181, 0x4f4f4f4f, 0xdcdcdcdc);
+	&data_word(0x22222222, 0x2a2a2a2a, 0x90909090, 0x88888888);
+	&data_word(0x46464646, 0xeeeeeeee, 0xb8b8b8b8, 0x14141414);
+	&data_word(0xdededede, 0x5e5e5e5e, 0x0b0b0b0b, 0xdbdbdbdb);
+	&data_word(0xe0e0e0e0, 0x32323232, 0x3a3a3a3a, 0x0a0a0a0a);
+	&data_word(0x49494949, 0x06060606, 0x24242424, 0x5c5c5c5c);
+	&data_word(0xc2c2c2c2, 0xd3d3d3d3, 0xacacacac, 0x62626262);
+	&data_word(0x91919191, 0x95959595, 0xe4e4e4e4, 0x79797979);
+	&data_word(0xe7e7e7e7, 0xc8c8c8c8, 0x37373737, 0x6d6d6d6d);
+	&data_word(0x8d8d8d8d, 0xd5d5d5d5, 0x4e4e4e4e, 0xa9a9a9a9);
+	&data_word(0x6c6c6c6c, 0x56565656, 0xf4f4f4f4, 0xeaeaeaea);
+	&data_word(0x65656565, 0x7a7a7a7a, 0xaeaeaeae, 0x08080808);
+	&data_word(0xbabababa, 0x78787878, 0x25252525, 0x2e2e2e2e);
+	&data_word(0x1c1c1c1c, 0xa6a6a6a6, 0xb4b4b4b4, 0xc6c6c6c6);
+	&data_word(0xe8e8e8e8, 0xdddddddd, 0x74747474, 0x1f1f1f1f);
+	&data_word(0x4b4b4b4b, 0xbdbdbdbd, 0x8b8b8b8b, 0x8a8a8a8a);
+	&data_word(0x70707070, 0x3e3e3e3e, 0xb5b5b5b5, 0x66666666);
+	&data_word(0x48484848, 0x03030303, 0xf6f6f6f6, 0x0e0e0e0e);
+	&data_word(0x61616161, 0x35353535, 0x57575757, 0xb9b9b9b9);
+	&data_word(0x86868686, 0xc1c1c1c1, 0x1d1d1d1d, 0x9e9e9e9e);
+	&data_word(0xe1e1e1e1, 0xf8f8f8f8, 0x98989898, 0x11111111);
+	&data_word(0x69696969, 0xd9d9d9d9, 0x8e8e8e8e, 0x94949494);
+	&data_word(0x9b9b9b9b, 0x1e1e1e1e, 0x87878787, 0xe9e9e9e9);
+	&data_word(0xcececece, 0x55555555, 0x28282828, 0xdfdfdfdf);
+	&data_word(0x8c8c8c8c, 0xa1a1a1a1, 0x89898989, 0x0d0d0d0d);
+	&data_word(0xbfbfbfbf, 0xe6e6e6e6, 0x42424242, 0x68686868);
+	&data_word(0x41414141, 0x99999999, 0x2d2d2d2d, 0x0f0f0f0f);
+	&data_word(0xb0b0b0b0, 0x54545454, 0xbbbbbbbb, 0x16161616);
+#rcon:
+	&data_word(0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x00000004, 0x00000008);
+        &data_word(0x00000010, 0x00000020, 0x00000040, 0x00000080);
+        &data_word(0x0000001b, 0x00000036);
+&function_end_B("_x86_AES_encrypt");
+
+# void AES_encrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+&public_label("AES_Te");
+&function_begin("AES_encrypt");
+	&mov	($acc,&wparam(0));		# load inp
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));		# load key
+
+	&call   (&label("pic_point"));          # make it PIC!
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop("ebp");
+	&lea    ("ebp",&DWP(&label("AES_Te")."-".&label("pic_point"),"ebp"));
+
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$acc));		# load input data
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+	&call	("_x86_AES_encrypt");
+
+	&mov	($acc,&wparam(1));		# load out
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$acc),$s0);		# write output data
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+&function_end("AES_encrypt");
+
+#------------------------------------------------------------------#
+
+sub decstep()
+{ my ($i,$td,@s) = @_;
+  my $tmp = $key;
+  my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
+
+	# no instructions are reordered, as performance appears
+	# optimal... or rather that all attempts to reorder didn't
+	# result in better performance [which by the way is not a
+	# bit lower than ecryption].
+	if($i==3)   {	&mov	($key,&DWP(12,"esp"));		}
+	else        {	&mov	($out,$s[0]);			}
+			&and	($out,0xFF);
+			&mov	($out,&DWP(1024*0,$td,$out,4));
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[1];				}
+			&movz	($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
+			&xor	($out,&DWP(1024*1,$td,$tmp,4));
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$acc);		}
+	else        {	&mov	($tmp,$s[2]);			}
+			&shr	($tmp,16);
+			&and	($tmp,0xFF);
+			&xor	($out,&DWP(1024*2,$td,$tmp,4));
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],&DWP(4,"esp"));	}
+	else        {	&mov	($tmp,$s[3]);			}
+			&shr	($tmp,24);
+			&xor	($out,&DWP(1024*3,$td,$tmp,4));
+	if ($i<2)   {	&mov	(&DWP(4*$i,"esp"),$out);	}
+	if ($i==3)  {	&mov	($s[3],&DWP(0,"esp"));		}
+			&comment();
+}
+
+sub declast()
+{ my ($i,$td,@s)=@_;
+  my $tmp = $key;
+  my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
+
+	if($i==3)   {	&mov	($key,&DWP(12,"esp"));		}
+	else        {	&mov	($out,$s[0]);			}
+			&and	($out,0xFF);
+			&mov	($out,&DWP(1024*4,$td,$out,4));
+			&and	($out,0x000000ff);
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[1];				}
+			&movz	($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
+			&mov	($tmp,&DWP(1024*4,$td,$tmp,4));
+			&and	($tmp,0x0000ff00);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$acc);		}
+	else        {	mov	($tmp,$s[2]);			}
+			&shr	($tmp,16);
+			&and	($tmp,0xFF);
+			&mov	($tmp,&DWP(1024*4,$td,$tmp,4));
+			&and	($tmp,0x00ff0000);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],&DWP(4,"esp"));	}
+	else        {	&mov	($tmp,$s[3]);			}
+			&shr	($tmp,24);
+			&mov	($tmp,&DWP(1024*4,$td,$tmp,4));
+			&and	($tmp,0xff000000);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+	if ($i<2)   {	&mov	(&DWP(4*$i,"esp"),$out);	}
+	if ($i==3)  {	&mov	($s[3],&DWP(0,"esp"));		}
+}
+
+&public_label("AES_Td");
+&function_begin_B("_x86_AES_decrypt");
+	# allocate aligned stack frame
+	&mov	($acc,"esp");
+	&sub	("esp",20);
+	&and	("esp",-16);
+
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$key);		# save key
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"esp"),$acc);		# save %esp
+
+	&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));		# xor with key
+	&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+	&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+	&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(240,$key));		# load key->rounds
+
+	if ($small_footprint) {
+	    &lea	($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
+	    &lea	($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
+	    &mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),$acc);	# end of key schedule
+	    &align	(4);
+	    &set_label("loop");
+		&decstep(0,"ebp",$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+		&decstep(1,"ebp",$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+		&decstep(2,"ebp",$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+		&decstep(3,"ebp",$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+		&add	($key,16);			# advance rd_key
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+	    &cmp	($key,&DWP(8,"esp"));
+	    &mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$key);
+	    &jb		(&label("loop"));
+	}
+	else {
+	    &cmp	($acc,10);
+	    &jle	(&label("10rounds"));
+	    &cmp	($acc,12);
+	    &jle	(&label("12rounds"));
+
+	&set_label("14rounds");
+	    for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
+		&decstep(0,"ebp",$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+		&decstep(1,"ebp",$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+		&decstep(2,"ebp",$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+		&decstep(3,"ebp",$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+	    }
+	    &add	($key,32);
+	    &mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$key);		# advance rd_key
+	&set_label("12rounds");
+	    for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
+		&decstep(0,"ebp",$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+		&decstep(1,"ebp",$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+		&decstep(2,"ebp",$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+		&decstep(3,"ebp",$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+	    }
+	    &add	($key,32);
+	    &mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$key);		# advance rd_key
+	&set_label("10rounds");
+	    for ($i=1;$i<10;$i++) {
+		&decstep(0,"ebp",$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+		&decstep(1,"ebp",$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+		&decstep(2,"ebp",$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+		&decstep(3,"ebp",$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+	    }
+	}
+
+	&declast(0,"ebp",$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+	&declast(1,"ebp",$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+	&declast(2,"ebp",$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+	&declast(3,"ebp",$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(16,"esp"));		# restore %esp
+	&add	($key,$small_footprint?16:160);
+	&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+	&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+	&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+	&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+	&ret	();
+
+&set_label("AES_Td",64);	# Yes! I keep it in the code segment!
+	&data_word(0x50a7f451, 0x5365417e, 0xc3a4171a, 0x965e273a);
+	&data_word(0xcb6bab3b, 0xf1459d1f, 0xab58faac, 0x9303e34b);
+	&data_word(0x55fa3020, 0xf66d76ad, 0x9176cc88, 0x254c02f5);
+	&data_word(0xfcd7e54f, 0xd7cb2ac5, 0x80443526, 0x8fa362b5);
+	&data_word(0x495ab1de, 0x671bba25, 0x980eea45, 0xe1c0fe5d);
+	&data_word(0x02752fc3, 0x12f04c81, 0xa397468d, 0xc6f9d36b);
+	&data_word(0xe75f8f03, 0x959c9215, 0xeb7a6dbf, 0xda595295);
+	&data_word(0x2d83bed4, 0xd3217458, 0x2969e049, 0x44c8c98e);
+	&data_word(0x6a89c275, 0x78798ef4, 0x6b3e5899, 0xdd71b927);
+	&data_word(0xb64fe1be, 0x17ad88f0, 0x66ac20c9, 0xb43ace7d);
+	&data_word(0x184adf63, 0x82311ae5, 0x60335197, 0x457f5362);
+	&data_word(0xe07764b1, 0x84ae6bbb, 0x1ca081fe, 0x942b08f9);
+	&data_word(0x58684870, 0x19fd458f, 0x876cde94, 0xb7f87b52);
+	&data_word(0x23d373ab, 0xe2024b72, 0x578f1fe3, 0x2aab5566);
+	&data_word(0x0728ebb2, 0x03c2b52f, 0x9a7bc586, 0xa50837d3);
+	&data_word(0xf2872830, 0xb2a5bf23, 0xba6a0302, 0x5c8216ed);
+	&data_word(0x2b1ccf8a, 0x92b479a7, 0xf0f207f3, 0xa1e2694e);
+	&data_word(0xcdf4da65, 0xd5be0506, 0x1f6234d1, 0x8afea6c4);
+	&data_word(0x9d532e34, 0xa055f3a2, 0x32e18a05, 0x75ebf6a4);
+	&data_word(0x39ec830b, 0xaaef6040, 0x069f715e, 0x51106ebd);
+	&data_word(0xf98a213e, 0x3d06dd96, 0xae053edd, 0x46bde64d);
+	&data_word(0xb58d5491, 0x055dc471, 0x6fd40604, 0xff155060);
+	&data_word(0x24fb9819, 0x97e9bdd6, 0xcc434089, 0x779ed967);
+	&data_word(0xbd42e8b0, 0x888b8907, 0x385b19e7, 0xdbeec879);
+	&data_word(0x470a7ca1, 0xe90f427c, 0xc91e84f8, 0x00000000);
+	&data_word(0x83868009, 0x48ed2b32, 0xac70111e, 0x4e725a6c);
+	&data_word(0xfbff0efd, 0x5638850f, 0x1ed5ae3d, 0x27392d36);
+	&data_word(0x64d90f0a, 0x21a65c68, 0xd1545b9b, 0x3a2e3624);
+	&data_word(0xb1670a0c, 0x0fe75793, 0xd296eeb4, 0x9e919b1b);
+	&data_word(0x4fc5c080, 0xa220dc61, 0x694b775a, 0x161a121c);
+	&data_word(0x0aba93e2, 0xe52aa0c0, 0x43e0223c, 0x1d171b12);
+	&data_word(0x0b0d090e, 0xadc78bf2, 0xb9a8b62d, 0xc8a91e14);
+	&data_word(0x8519f157, 0x4c0775af, 0xbbdd99ee, 0xfd607fa3);
+	&data_word(0x9f2601f7, 0xbcf5725c, 0xc53b6644, 0x347efb5b);
+	&data_word(0x7629438b, 0xdcc623cb, 0x68fcedb6, 0x63f1e4b8);
+	&data_word(0xcadc31d7, 0x10856342, 0x40229713, 0x2011c684);
+	&data_word(0x7d244a85, 0xf83dbbd2, 0x1132f9ae, 0x6da129c7);
+	&data_word(0x4b2f9e1d, 0xf330b2dc, 0xec52860d, 0xd0e3c177);
+	&data_word(0x6c16b32b, 0x99b970a9, 0xfa489411, 0x2264e947);
+	&data_word(0xc48cfca8, 0x1a3ff0a0, 0xd82c7d56, 0xef903322);
+	&data_word(0xc74e4987, 0xc1d138d9, 0xfea2ca8c, 0x360bd498);
+	&data_word(0xcf81f5a6, 0x28de7aa5, 0x268eb7da, 0xa4bfad3f);
+	&data_word(0xe49d3a2c, 0x0d927850, 0x9bcc5f6a, 0x62467e54);
+	&data_word(0xc2138df6, 0xe8b8d890, 0x5ef7392e, 0xf5afc382);
+	&data_word(0xbe805d9f, 0x7c93d069, 0xa92dd56f, 0xb31225cf);
+	&data_word(0x3b99acc8, 0xa77d1810, 0x6e639ce8, 0x7bbb3bdb);
+	&data_word(0x097826cd, 0xf418596e, 0x01b79aec, 0xa89a4f83);
+	&data_word(0x656e95e6, 0x7ee6ffaa, 0x08cfbc21, 0xe6e815ef);
+	&data_word(0xd99be7ba, 0xce366f4a, 0xd4099fea, 0xd67cb029);
+	&data_word(0xafb2a431, 0x31233f2a, 0x3094a5c6, 0xc066a235);
+	&data_word(0x37bc4e74, 0xa6ca82fc, 0xb0d090e0, 0x15d8a733);
+	&data_word(0x4a9804f1, 0xf7daec41, 0x0e50cd7f, 0x2ff69117);
+	&data_word(0x8dd64d76, 0x4db0ef43, 0x544daacc, 0xdf0496e4);
+	&data_word(0xe3b5d19e, 0x1b886a4c, 0xb81f2cc1, 0x7f516546);
+	&data_word(0x04ea5e9d, 0x5d358c01, 0x737487fa, 0x2e410bfb);
+	&data_word(0x5a1d67b3, 0x52d2db92, 0x335610e9, 0x1347d66d);
+	&data_word(0x8c61d79a, 0x7a0ca137, 0x8e14f859, 0x893c13eb);
+	&data_word(0xee27a9ce, 0x35c961b7, 0xede51ce1, 0x3cb1477a);
+	&data_word(0x59dfd29c, 0x3f73f255, 0x79ce1418, 0xbf37c773);
+	&data_word(0xeacdf753, 0x5baafd5f, 0x146f3ddf, 0x86db4478);
+	&data_word(0x81f3afca, 0x3ec468b9, 0x2c342438, 0x5f40a3c2);
+	&data_word(0x72c31d16, 0x0c25e2bc, 0x8b493c28, 0x41950dff);
+	&data_word(0x7101a839, 0xdeb30c08, 0x9ce4b4d8, 0x90c15664);
+	&data_word(0x6184cb7b, 0x70b632d5, 0x745c6c48, 0x4257b8d0);
+#Td1:
+	&data_word(0xa7f45150, 0x65417e53, 0xa4171ac3, 0x5e273a96);
+	&data_word(0x6bab3bcb, 0x459d1ff1, 0x58faacab, 0x03e34b93);
+	&data_word(0xfa302055, 0x6d76adf6, 0x76cc8891, 0x4c02f525);
+	&data_word(0xd7e54ffc, 0xcb2ac5d7, 0x44352680, 0xa362b58f);
+	&data_word(0x5ab1de49, 0x1bba2567, 0x0eea4598, 0xc0fe5de1);
+	&data_word(0x752fc302, 0xf04c8112, 0x97468da3, 0xf9d36bc6);
+	&data_word(0x5f8f03e7, 0x9c921595, 0x7a6dbfeb, 0x595295da);
+	&data_word(0x83bed42d, 0x217458d3, 0x69e04929, 0xc8c98e44);
+	&data_word(0x89c2756a, 0x798ef478, 0x3e58996b, 0x71b927dd);
+	&data_word(0x4fe1beb6, 0xad88f017, 0xac20c966, 0x3ace7db4);
+	&data_word(0x4adf6318, 0x311ae582, 0x33519760, 0x7f536245);
+	&data_word(0x7764b1e0, 0xae6bbb84, 0xa081fe1c, 0x2b08f994);
+	&data_word(0x68487058, 0xfd458f19, 0x6cde9487, 0xf87b52b7);
+	&data_word(0xd373ab23, 0x024b72e2, 0x8f1fe357, 0xab55662a);
+	&data_word(0x28ebb207, 0xc2b52f03, 0x7bc5869a, 0x0837d3a5);
+	&data_word(0x872830f2, 0xa5bf23b2, 0x6a0302ba, 0x8216ed5c);
+	&data_word(0x1ccf8a2b, 0xb479a792, 0xf207f3f0, 0xe2694ea1);
+	&data_word(0xf4da65cd, 0xbe0506d5, 0x6234d11f, 0xfea6c48a);
+	&data_word(0x532e349d, 0x55f3a2a0, 0xe18a0532, 0xebf6a475);
+	&data_word(0xec830b39, 0xef6040aa, 0x9f715e06, 0x106ebd51);
+	&data_word(0x8a213ef9, 0x06dd963d, 0x053eddae, 0xbde64d46);
+	&data_word(0x8d5491b5, 0x5dc47105, 0xd406046f, 0x155060ff);
+	&data_word(0xfb981924, 0xe9bdd697, 0x434089cc, 0x9ed96777);
+	&data_word(0x42e8b0bd, 0x8b890788, 0x5b19e738, 0xeec879db);
+	&data_word(0x0a7ca147, 0x0f427ce9, 0x1e84f8c9, 0x00000000);
+	&data_word(0x86800983, 0xed2b3248, 0x70111eac, 0x725a6c4e);
+	&data_word(0xff0efdfb, 0x38850f56, 0xd5ae3d1e, 0x392d3627);
+	&data_word(0xd90f0a64, 0xa65c6821, 0x545b9bd1, 0x2e36243a);
+	&data_word(0x670a0cb1, 0xe757930f, 0x96eeb4d2, 0x919b1b9e);
+	&data_word(0xc5c0804f, 0x20dc61a2, 0x4b775a69, 0x1a121c16);
+	&data_word(0xba93e20a, 0x2aa0c0e5, 0xe0223c43, 0x171b121d);
+	&data_word(0x0d090e0b, 0xc78bf2ad, 0xa8b62db9, 0xa91e14c8);
+	&data_word(0x19f15785, 0x0775af4c, 0xdd99eebb, 0x607fa3fd);
+	&data_word(0x2601f79f, 0xf5725cbc, 0x3b6644c5, 0x7efb5b34);
+	&data_word(0x29438b76, 0xc623cbdc, 0xfcedb668, 0xf1e4b863);
+	&data_word(0xdc31d7ca, 0x85634210, 0x22971340, 0x11c68420);
+	&data_word(0x244a857d, 0x3dbbd2f8, 0x32f9ae11, 0xa129c76d);
+	&data_word(0x2f9e1d4b, 0x30b2dcf3, 0x52860dec, 0xe3c177d0);
+	&data_word(0x16b32b6c, 0xb970a999, 0x489411fa, 0x64e94722);
+	&data_word(0x8cfca8c4, 0x3ff0a01a, 0x2c7d56d8, 0x903322ef);
+	&data_word(0x4e4987c7, 0xd138d9c1, 0xa2ca8cfe, 0x0bd49836);
+	&data_word(0x81f5a6cf, 0xde7aa528, 0x8eb7da26, 0xbfad3fa4);
+	&data_word(0x9d3a2ce4, 0x9278500d, 0xcc5f6a9b, 0x467e5462);
+	&data_word(0x138df6c2, 0xb8d890e8, 0xf7392e5e, 0xafc382f5);
+	&data_word(0x805d9fbe, 0x93d0697c, 0x2dd56fa9, 0x1225cfb3);
+	&data_word(0x99acc83b, 0x7d1810a7, 0x639ce86e, 0xbb3bdb7b);
+	&data_word(0x7826cd09, 0x18596ef4, 0xb79aec01, 0x9a4f83a8);
+	&data_word(0x6e95e665, 0xe6ffaa7e, 0xcfbc2108, 0xe815efe6);
+	&data_word(0x9be7bad9, 0x366f4ace, 0x099fead4, 0x7cb029d6);
+	&data_word(0xb2a431af, 0x233f2a31, 0x94a5c630, 0x66a235c0);
+	&data_word(0xbc4e7437, 0xca82fca6, 0xd090e0b0, 0xd8a73315);
+	&data_word(0x9804f14a, 0xdaec41f7, 0x50cd7f0e, 0xf691172f);
+	&data_word(0xd64d768d, 0xb0ef434d, 0x4daacc54, 0x0496e4df);
+	&data_word(0xb5d19ee3, 0x886a4c1b, 0x1f2cc1b8, 0x5165467f);
+	&data_word(0xea5e9d04, 0x358c015d, 0x7487fa73, 0x410bfb2e);
+	&data_word(0x1d67b35a, 0xd2db9252, 0x5610e933, 0x47d66d13);
+	&data_word(0x61d79a8c, 0x0ca1377a, 0x14f8598e, 0x3c13eb89);
+	&data_word(0x27a9ceee, 0xc961b735, 0xe51ce1ed, 0xb1477a3c);
+	&data_word(0xdfd29c59, 0x73f2553f, 0xce141879, 0x37c773bf);
+	&data_word(0xcdf753ea, 0xaafd5f5b, 0x6f3ddf14, 0xdb447886);
+	&data_word(0xf3afca81, 0xc468b93e, 0x3424382c, 0x40a3c25f);
+	&data_word(0xc31d1672, 0x25e2bc0c, 0x493c288b, 0x950dff41);
+	&data_word(0x01a83971, 0xb30c08de, 0xe4b4d89c, 0xc1566490);
+	&data_word(0x84cb7b61, 0xb632d570, 0x5c6c4874, 0x57b8d042);
+#Td2:
+	&data_word(0xf45150a7, 0x417e5365, 0x171ac3a4, 0x273a965e);
+	&data_word(0xab3bcb6b, 0x9d1ff145, 0xfaacab58, 0xe34b9303);
+	&data_word(0x302055fa, 0x76adf66d, 0xcc889176, 0x02f5254c);
+	&data_word(0xe54ffcd7, 0x2ac5d7cb, 0x35268044, 0x62b58fa3);
+	&data_word(0xb1de495a, 0xba25671b, 0xea45980e, 0xfe5de1c0);
+	&data_word(0x2fc30275, 0x4c8112f0, 0x468da397, 0xd36bc6f9);
+	&data_word(0x8f03e75f, 0x9215959c, 0x6dbfeb7a, 0x5295da59);
+	&data_word(0xbed42d83, 0x7458d321, 0xe0492969, 0xc98e44c8);
+	&data_word(0xc2756a89, 0x8ef47879, 0x58996b3e, 0xb927dd71);
+	&data_word(0xe1beb64f, 0x88f017ad, 0x20c966ac, 0xce7db43a);
+	&data_word(0xdf63184a, 0x1ae58231, 0x51976033, 0x5362457f);
+	&data_word(0x64b1e077, 0x6bbb84ae, 0x81fe1ca0, 0x08f9942b);
+	&data_word(0x48705868, 0x458f19fd, 0xde94876c, 0x7b52b7f8);
+	&data_word(0x73ab23d3, 0x4b72e202, 0x1fe3578f, 0x55662aab);
+	&data_word(0xebb20728, 0xb52f03c2, 0xc5869a7b, 0x37d3a508);
+	&data_word(0x2830f287, 0xbf23b2a5, 0x0302ba6a, 0x16ed5c82);
+	&data_word(0xcf8a2b1c, 0x79a792b4, 0x07f3f0f2, 0x694ea1e2);
+	&data_word(0xda65cdf4, 0x0506d5be, 0x34d11f62, 0xa6c48afe);
+	&data_word(0x2e349d53, 0xf3a2a055, 0x8a0532e1, 0xf6a475eb);
+	&data_word(0x830b39ec, 0x6040aaef, 0x715e069f, 0x6ebd5110);
+	&data_word(0x213ef98a, 0xdd963d06, 0x3eddae05, 0xe64d46bd);
+	&data_word(0x5491b58d, 0xc471055d, 0x06046fd4, 0x5060ff15);
+	&data_word(0x981924fb, 0xbdd697e9, 0x4089cc43, 0xd967779e);
+	&data_word(0xe8b0bd42, 0x8907888b, 0x19e7385b, 0xc879dbee);
+	&data_word(0x7ca1470a, 0x427ce90f, 0x84f8c91e, 0x00000000);
+	&data_word(0x80098386, 0x2b3248ed, 0x111eac70, 0x5a6c4e72);
+	&data_word(0x0efdfbff, 0x850f5638, 0xae3d1ed5, 0x2d362739);
+	&data_word(0x0f0a64d9, 0x5c6821a6, 0x5b9bd154, 0x36243a2e);
+	&data_word(0x0a0cb167, 0x57930fe7, 0xeeb4d296, 0x9b1b9e91);
+	&data_word(0xc0804fc5, 0xdc61a220, 0x775a694b, 0x121c161a);
+	&data_word(0x93e20aba, 0xa0c0e52a, 0x223c43e0, 0x1b121d17);
+	&data_word(0x090e0b0d, 0x8bf2adc7, 0xb62db9a8, 0x1e14c8a9);
+	&data_word(0xf1578519, 0x75af4c07, 0x99eebbdd, 0x7fa3fd60);
+	&data_word(0x01f79f26, 0x725cbcf5, 0x6644c53b, 0xfb5b347e);
+	&data_word(0x438b7629, 0x23cbdcc6, 0xedb668fc, 0xe4b863f1);
+	&data_word(0x31d7cadc, 0x63421085, 0x97134022, 0xc6842011);
+	&data_word(0x4a857d24, 0xbbd2f83d, 0xf9ae1132, 0x29c76da1);
+	&data_word(0x9e1d4b2f, 0xb2dcf330, 0x860dec52, 0xc177d0e3);
+	&data_word(0xb32b6c16, 0x70a999b9, 0x9411fa48, 0xe9472264);
+	&data_word(0xfca8c48c, 0xf0a01a3f, 0x7d56d82c, 0x3322ef90);
+	&data_word(0x4987c74e, 0x38d9c1d1, 0xca8cfea2, 0xd498360b);
+	&data_word(0xf5a6cf81, 0x7aa528de, 0xb7da268e, 0xad3fa4bf);
+	&data_word(0x3a2ce49d, 0x78500d92, 0x5f6a9bcc, 0x7e546246);
+	&data_word(0x8df6c213, 0xd890e8b8, 0x392e5ef7, 0xc382f5af);
+	&data_word(0x5d9fbe80, 0xd0697c93, 0xd56fa92d, 0x25cfb312);
+	&data_word(0xacc83b99, 0x1810a77d, 0x9ce86e63, 0x3bdb7bbb);
+	&data_word(0x26cd0978, 0x596ef418, 0x9aec01b7, 0x4f83a89a);
+	&data_word(0x95e6656e, 0xffaa7ee6, 0xbc2108cf, 0x15efe6e8);
+	&data_word(0xe7bad99b, 0x6f4ace36, 0x9fead409, 0xb029d67c);
+	&data_word(0xa431afb2, 0x3f2a3123, 0xa5c63094, 0xa235c066);
+	&data_word(0x4e7437bc, 0x82fca6ca, 0x90e0b0d0, 0xa73315d8);
+	&data_word(0x04f14a98, 0xec41f7da, 0xcd7f0e50, 0x91172ff6);
+	&data_word(0x4d768dd6, 0xef434db0, 0xaacc544d, 0x96e4df04);
+	&data_word(0xd19ee3b5, 0x6a4c1b88, 0x2cc1b81f, 0x65467f51);
+	&data_word(0x5e9d04ea, 0x8c015d35, 0x87fa7374, 0x0bfb2e41);
+	&data_word(0x67b35a1d, 0xdb9252d2, 0x10e93356, 0xd66d1347);
+	&data_word(0xd79a8c61, 0xa1377a0c, 0xf8598e14, 0x13eb893c);
+	&data_word(0xa9ceee27, 0x61b735c9, 0x1ce1ede5, 0x477a3cb1);
+	&data_word(0xd29c59df, 0xf2553f73, 0x141879ce, 0xc773bf37);
+	&data_word(0xf753eacd, 0xfd5f5baa, 0x3ddf146f, 0x447886db);
+	&data_word(0xafca81f3, 0x68b93ec4, 0x24382c34, 0xa3c25f40);
+	&data_word(0x1d1672c3, 0xe2bc0c25, 0x3c288b49, 0x0dff4195);
+	&data_word(0xa8397101, 0x0c08deb3, 0xb4d89ce4, 0x566490c1);
+	&data_word(0xcb7b6184, 0x32d570b6, 0x6c48745c, 0xb8d04257);
+#Td3:
+	&data_word(0x5150a7f4, 0x7e536541, 0x1ac3a417, 0x3a965e27);
+	&data_word(0x3bcb6bab, 0x1ff1459d, 0xacab58fa, 0x4b9303e3);
+	&data_word(0x2055fa30, 0xadf66d76, 0x889176cc, 0xf5254c02);
+	&data_word(0x4ffcd7e5, 0xc5d7cb2a, 0x26804435, 0xb58fa362);
+	&data_word(0xde495ab1, 0x25671bba, 0x45980eea, 0x5de1c0fe);
+	&data_word(0xc302752f, 0x8112f04c, 0x8da39746, 0x6bc6f9d3);
+	&data_word(0x03e75f8f, 0x15959c92, 0xbfeb7a6d, 0x95da5952);
+	&data_word(0xd42d83be, 0x58d32174, 0x492969e0, 0x8e44c8c9);
+	&data_word(0x756a89c2, 0xf478798e, 0x996b3e58, 0x27dd71b9);
+	&data_word(0xbeb64fe1, 0xf017ad88, 0xc966ac20, 0x7db43ace);
+	&data_word(0x63184adf, 0xe582311a, 0x97603351, 0x62457f53);
+	&data_word(0xb1e07764, 0xbb84ae6b, 0xfe1ca081, 0xf9942b08);
+	&data_word(0x70586848, 0x8f19fd45, 0x94876cde, 0x52b7f87b);
+	&data_word(0xab23d373, 0x72e2024b, 0xe3578f1f, 0x662aab55);
+	&data_word(0xb20728eb, 0x2f03c2b5, 0x869a7bc5, 0xd3a50837);
+	&data_word(0x30f28728, 0x23b2a5bf, 0x02ba6a03, 0xed5c8216);
+	&data_word(0x8a2b1ccf, 0xa792b479, 0xf3f0f207, 0x4ea1e269);
+	&data_word(0x65cdf4da, 0x06d5be05, 0xd11f6234, 0xc48afea6);
+	&data_word(0x349d532e, 0xa2a055f3, 0x0532e18a, 0xa475ebf6);
+	&data_word(0x0b39ec83, 0x40aaef60, 0x5e069f71, 0xbd51106e);
+	&data_word(0x3ef98a21, 0x963d06dd, 0xddae053e, 0x4d46bde6);
+	&data_word(0x91b58d54, 0x71055dc4, 0x046fd406, 0x60ff1550);
+	&data_word(0x1924fb98, 0xd697e9bd, 0x89cc4340, 0x67779ed9);
+	&data_word(0xb0bd42e8, 0x07888b89, 0xe7385b19, 0x79dbeec8);
+	&data_word(0xa1470a7c, 0x7ce90f42, 0xf8c91e84, 0x00000000);
+	&data_word(0x09838680, 0x3248ed2b, 0x1eac7011, 0x6c4e725a);
+	&data_word(0xfdfbff0e, 0x0f563885, 0x3d1ed5ae, 0x3627392d);
+	&data_word(0x0a64d90f, 0x6821a65c, 0x9bd1545b, 0x243a2e36);
+	&data_word(0x0cb1670a, 0x930fe757, 0xb4d296ee, 0x1b9e919b);
+	&data_word(0x804fc5c0, 0x61a220dc, 0x5a694b77, 0x1c161a12);
+	&data_word(0xe20aba93, 0xc0e52aa0, 0x3c43e022, 0x121d171b);
+	&data_word(0x0e0b0d09, 0xf2adc78b, 0x2db9a8b6, 0x14c8a91e);
+	&data_word(0x578519f1, 0xaf4c0775, 0xeebbdd99, 0xa3fd607f);
+	&data_word(0xf79f2601, 0x5cbcf572, 0x44c53b66, 0x5b347efb);
+	&data_word(0x8b762943, 0xcbdcc623, 0xb668fced, 0xb863f1e4);
+	&data_word(0xd7cadc31, 0x42108563, 0x13402297, 0x842011c6);
+	&data_word(0x857d244a, 0xd2f83dbb, 0xae1132f9, 0xc76da129);
+	&data_word(0x1d4b2f9e, 0xdcf330b2, 0x0dec5286, 0x77d0e3c1);
+	&data_word(0x2b6c16b3, 0xa999b970, 0x11fa4894, 0x472264e9);
+	&data_word(0xa8c48cfc, 0xa01a3ff0, 0x56d82c7d, 0x22ef9033);
+	&data_word(0x87c74e49, 0xd9c1d138, 0x8cfea2ca, 0x98360bd4);
+	&data_word(0xa6cf81f5, 0xa528de7a, 0xda268eb7, 0x3fa4bfad);
+	&data_word(0x2ce49d3a, 0x500d9278, 0x6a9bcc5f, 0x5462467e);
+	&data_word(0xf6c2138d, 0x90e8b8d8, 0x2e5ef739, 0x82f5afc3);
+	&data_word(0x9fbe805d, 0x697c93d0, 0x6fa92dd5, 0xcfb31225);
+	&data_word(0xc83b99ac, 0x10a77d18, 0xe86e639c, 0xdb7bbb3b);
+	&data_word(0xcd097826, 0x6ef41859, 0xec01b79a, 0x83a89a4f);
+	&data_word(0xe6656e95, 0xaa7ee6ff, 0x2108cfbc, 0xefe6e815);
+	&data_word(0xbad99be7, 0x4ace366f, 0xead4099f, 0x29d67cb0);
+	&data_word(0x31afb2a4, 0x2a31233f, 0xc63094a5, 0x35c066a2);
+	&data_word(0x7437bc4e, 0xfca6ca82, 0xe0b0d090, 0x3315d8a7);
+	&data_word(0xf14a9804, 0x41f7daec, 0x7f0e50cd, 0x172ff691);
+	&data_word(0x768dd64d, 0x434db0ef, 0xcc544daa, 0xe4df0496);
+	&data_word(0x9ee3b5d1, 0x4c1b886a, 0xc1b81f2c, 0x467f5165);
+	&data_word(0x9d04ea5e, 0x015d358c, 0xfa737487, 0xfb2e410b);
+	&data_word(0xb35a1d67, 0x9252d2db, 0xe9335610, 0x6d1347d6);
+	&data_word(0x9a8c61d7, 0x377a0ca1, 0x598e14f8, 0xeb893c13);
+	&data_word(0xceee27a9, 0xb735c961, 0xe1ede51c, 0x7a3cb147);
+	&data_word(0x9c59dfd2, 0x553f73f2, 0x1879ce14, 0x73bf37c7);
+	&data_word(0x53eacdf7, 0x5f5baafd, 0xdf146f3d, 0x7886db44);
+	&data_word(0xca81f3af, 0xb93ec468, 0x382c3424, 0xc25f40a3);
+	&data_word(0x1672c31d, 0xbc0c25e2, 0x288b493c, 0xff41950d);
+	&data_word(0x397101a8, 0x08deb30c, 0xd89ce4b4, 0x6490c156);
+	&data_word(0x7b6184cb, 0xd570b632, 0x48745c6c, 0xd04257b8);
+#Td4:
+	&data_word(0x52525252, 0x09090909, 0x6a6a6a6a, 0xd5d5d5d5);
+	&data_word(0x30303030, 0x36363636, 0xa5a5a5a5, 0x38383838);
+	&data_word(0xbfbfbfbf, 0x40404040, 0xa3a3a3a3, 0x9e9e9e9e);
+	&data_word(0x81818181, 0xf3f3f3f3, 0xd7d7d7d7, 0xfbfbfbfb);
+	&data_word(0x7c7c7c7c, 0xe3e3e3e3, 0x39393939, 0x82828282);
+	&data_word(0x9b9b9b9b, 0x2f2f2f2f, 0xffffffff, 0x87878787);
+	&data_word(0x34343434, 0x8e8e8e8e, 0x43434343, 0x44444444);
+	&data_word(0xc4c4c4c4, 0xdededede, 0xe9e9e9e9, 0xcbcbcbcb);
+	&data_word(0x54545454, 0x7b7b7b7b, 0x94949494, 0x32323232);
+	&data_word(0xa6a6a6a6, 0xc2c2c2c2, 0x23232323, 0x3d3d3d3d);
+	&data_word(0xeeeeeeee, 0x4c4c4c4c, 0x95959595, 0x0b0b0b0b);
+	&data_word(0x42424242, 0xfafafafa, 0xc3c3c3c3, 0x4e4e4e4e);
+	&data_word(0x08080808, 0x2e2e2e2e, 0xa1a1a1a1, 0x66666666);
+	&data_word(0x28282828, 0xd9d9d9d9, 0x24242424, 0xb2b2b2b2);
+	&data_word(0x76767676, 0x5b5b5b5b, 0xa2a2a2a2, 0x49494949);
+	&data_word(0x6d6d6d6d, 0x8b8b8b8b, 0xd1d1d1d1, 0x25252525);
+	&data_word(0x72727272, 0xf8f8f8f8, 0xf6f6f6f6, 0x64646464);
+	&data_word(0x86868686, 0x68686868, 0x98989898, 0x16161616);
+	&data_word(0xd4d4d4d4, 0xa4a4a4a4, 0x5c5c5c5c, 0xcccccccc);
+	&data_word(0x5d5d5d5d, 0x65656565, 0xb6b6b6b6, 0x92929292);
+	&data_word(0x6c6c6c6c, 0x70707070, 0x48484848, 0x50505050);
+	&data_word(0xfdfdfdfd, 0xedededed, 0xb9b9b9b9, 0xdadadada);
+	&data_word(0x5e5e5e5e, 0x15151515, 0x46464646, 0x57575757);
+	&data_word(0xa7a7a7a7, 0x8d8d8d8d, 0x9d9d9d9d, 0x84848484);
+	&data_word(0x90909090, 0xd8d8d8d8, 0xabababab, 0x00000000);
+	&data_word(0x8c8c8c8c, 0xbcbcbcbc, 0xd3d3d3d3, 0x0a0a0a0a);
+	&data_word(0xf7f7f7f7, 0xe4e4e4e4, 0x58585858, 0x05050505);
+	&data_word(0xb8b8b8b8, 0xb3b3b3b3, 0x45454545, 0x06060606);
+	&data_word(0xd0d0d0d0, 0x2c2c2c2c, 0x1e1e1e1e, 0x8f8f8f8f);
+	&data_word(0xcacacaca, 0x3f3f3f3f, 0x0f0f0f0f, 0x02020202);
+	&data_word(0xc1c1c1c1, 0xafafafaf, 0xbdbdbdbd, 0x03030303);
+	&data_word(0x01010101, 0x13131313, 0x8a8a8a8a, 0x6b6b6b6b);
+	&data_word(0x3a3a3a3a, 0x91919191, 0x11111111, 0x41414141);
+	&data_word(0x4f4f4f4f, 0x67676767, 0xdcdcdcdc, 0xeaeaeaea);
+	&data_word(0x97979797, 0xf2f2f2f2, 0xcfcfcfcf, 0xcececece);
+	&data_word(0xf0f0f0f0, 0xb4b4b4b4, 0xe6e6e6e6, 0x73737373);
+	&data_word(0x96969696, 0xacacacac, 0x74747474, 0x22222222);
+	&data_word(0xe7e7e7e7, 0xadadadad, 0x35353535, 0x85858585);
+	&data_word(0xe2e2e2e2, 0xf9f9f9f9, 0x37373737, 0xe8e8e8e8);
+	&data_word(0x1c1c1c1c, 0x75757575, 0xdfdfdfdf, 0x6e6e6e6e);
+	&data_word(0x47474747, 0xf1f1f1f1, 0x1a1a1a1a, 0x71717171);
+	&data_word(0x1d1d1d1d, 0x29292929, 0xc5c5c5c5, 0x89898989);
+	&data_word(0x6f6f6f6f, 0xb7b7b7b7, 0x62626262, 0x0e0e0e0e);
+	&data_word(0xaaaaaaaa, 0x18181818, 0xbebebebe, 0x1b1b1b1b);
+	&data_word(0xfcfcfcfc, 0x56565656, 0x3e3e3e3e, 0x4b4b4b4b);
+	&data_word(0xc6c6c6c6, 0xd2d2d2d2, 0x79797979, 0x20202020);
+	&data_word(0x9a9a9a9a, 0xdbdbdbdb, 0xc0c0c0c0, 0xfefefefe);
+	&data_word(0x78787878, 0xcdcdcdcd, 0x5a5a5a5a, 0xf4f4f4f4);
+	&data_word(0x1f1f1f1f, 0xdddddddd, 0xa8a8a8a8, 0x33333333);
+	&data_word(0x88888888, 0x07070707, 0xc7c7c7c7, 0x31313131);
+	&data_word(0xb1b1b1b1, 0x12121212, 0x10101010, 0x59595959);
+	&data_word(0x27272727, 0x80808080, 0xecececec, 0x5f5f5f5f);
+	&data_word(0x60606060, 0x51515151, 0x7f7f7f7f, 0xa9a9a9a9);
+	&data_word(0x19191919, 0xb5b5b5b5, 0x4a4a4a4a, 0x0d0d0d0d);
+	&data_word(0x2d2d2d2d, 0xe5e5e5e5, 0x7a7a7a7a, 0x9f9f9f9f);
+	&data_word(0x93939393, 0xc9c9c9c9, 0x9c9c9c9c, 0xefefefef);
+	&data_word(0xa0a0a0a0, 0xe0e0e0e0, 0x3b3b3b3b, 0x4d4d4d4d);
+	&data_word(0xaeaeaeae, 0x2a2a2a2a, 0xf5f5f5f5, 0xb0b0b0b0);
+	&data_word(0xc8c8c8c8, 0xebebebeb, 0xbbbbbbbb, 0x3c3c3c3c);
+	&data_word(0x83838383, 0x53535353, 0x99999999, 0x61616161);
+	&data_word(0x17171717, 0x2b2b2b2b, 0x04040404, 0x7e7e7e7e);
+	&data_word(0xbabababa, 0x77777777, 0xd6d6d6d6, 0x26262626);
+	&data_word(0xe1e1e1e1, 0x69696969, 0x14141414, 0x63636363);
+	&data_word(0x55555555, 0x21212121, 0x0c0c0c0c, 0x7d7d7d7d);
+&function_end_B("_x86_AES_decrypt");
+
+# void AES_decrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+&public_label("AES_Td");
+&function_begin("AES_decrypt");
+	&mov	($acc,&wparam(0));		# load inp
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));		# load key
+
+	&call   (&label("pic_point"));          # make it PIC!
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop("ebp");
+	&lea    ("ebp",&DWP(&label("AES_Td")."-".&label("pic_point"),"ebp"));
+
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$acc));		# load input data
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+	&call	("_x86_AES_decrypt");
+
+	&mov	($acc,&wparam(1));		# load out
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$acc),$s0);		# write output data
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+&function_end("AES_decrypt");
+
+# void AES_cbc_encrypt (const void char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+#			size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+#			unsigned char *ivp,const int enc); 
+&public_label("AES_Te");
+&public_label("AES_Td");
+&function_begin("AES_cbc_encrypt");
+	&mov	($s2 eq "ecx"? $s2 : "",&wparam(2));	# load len
+	&cmp	($s2,0);
+	&je	(&label("enc_out"));
+
+	&call   (&label("pic_point"));          # make it PIC!
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop("ebp");
+
+	&cmp	(&wparam(5),0);
+	&je	(&label("DECRYPT"));
+
+	&lea    ("ebp",&DWP(&label("AES_Te")."-".&label("pic_point"),"ebp"));
+
+	&mov	($acc,&wparam(0));		# load inp
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(4));		# load ivp
+
+	&test	($s2,~15);
+	&jz	(&label("enc_tail"));		# short input...
+
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));		# load iv
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+
+	&align	(4);
+	&set_label("enc_loop");
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$acc));		# xor input data
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+		&mov	($key,&wparam(3));		# load key
+		&call	("_x86_AES_encrypt");
+
+		&mov	($acc,&wparam(0));		# load inp
+		&mov	($key,&wparam(1));		# load out
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);		# save output data
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+		&mov	($s2,&wparam(2));		# load len
+
+		&lea	($acc,&DWP(16,$acc));
+		&mov	(&wparam(0),$acc);		# save inp
+
+		&lea	($s3,&DWP(16,$key));
+		&mov	(&wparam(1),$s3);		# save out
+
+		&sub	($s2,16);
+		&test	($s2,~15);
+		&mov	(&wparam(2),$s2);		# save len
+	&jnz	(&label("enc_loop"));
+	&test	($s2,15);
+	&jnz	(&label("enc_tail"));
+	&mov	($acc,&wparam(4));		# load ivp
+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));		# restore last dwords
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$acc),$s0);		# save iv
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+    &set_label("enc_out");
+	&function_end_A();
+
+    &align	(4);
+    &set_label("enc_tail");
+	&push	($key eq "edi" ? $key : "");	# push ivp
+	&pushf	();
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(1));		# load out
+	&mov	($s1,16);
+	&sub	($s1,$s2);
+	&cmp	($key,$acc);			# compare with inp
+	&je	(&label("enc_in_place"));
+	&data_word(0x90A4F3FC);	# cld; rep movsb; nop	# copy input
+	&jmp	(&label("enc_skip_in_place"));
+    &set_label("enc_in_place");
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(0,$key,$s2));
+    &set_label("enc_skip_in_place");
+	&mov	($s2,$s1);
+	&xor	($s0,$s0);
+	&data_word(0x90AAF3FC);	# cld; rep stosb; nop	# zero tail
+	&popf	();
+	&pop	($key);				# pop ivp
+
+	&mov	($acc,&wparam(1));		# output as input
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+	&mov	(&wparam(2),16);		# len=16
+	&jmp	(&label("enc_loop"));		# one more spin...
+
+#----------------------------- DECRYPT -----------------------------#
+&align	(4);
+&set_label("DECRYPT");
+    &stack_push(5);				# allocate temp + ivp
+
+	&lea    ("ebp",&DWP(&label("AES_Td")."-".&label("pic_point"),"ebp"));
+
+	&mov	($acc,&wparam(0));		# load inp
+	&cmp	($acc,&wparam(1));
+	&je	(&label("dec_in_place"));	# in-place processing...
+
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(4));		# load ivp
+	&mov	(&swtmp(4),$key);
+
+	&align	(4);
+	&set_label("dec_loop");
+		&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$acc));		# read input
+		&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+		&mov	($key,&wparam(3));		# load key
+		&call	("_x86_AES_decrypt");
+
+		&mov	($key,&swtmp(4));		# load ivp
+		&mov	($acc,&wparam(2));		# load len
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));		# xor iv
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+		&sub	($acc,16);
+		&jc	(&label("dec_partial"));
+		&mov	(&wparam(2),$acc);		# save len
+		&mov	($acc,&wparam(0));		# load inp
+		&mov	($key,&wparam(1));		# load out
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);		# write output
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+		&mov	(&swtmp(4),$acc);		# save ivp
+		&lea	($acc,&DWP(16,$acc));
+		&mov	(&wparam(0),$acc);		# save inp
+
+		&lea	($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+		&mov	(&wparam(1),$key);		# save out
+
+	&jnz	(&label("dec_loop"));
+	&mov	($key,&swtmp(4));	# load temp ivp
+    &set_label("dec_end");
+	&mov	($acc,&wparam(4));	# load user ivp
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));	# load iv
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$acc),$s0);	# copy back to user
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+	&jmp	(&label("dec_out"));
+
+    &align	(4);
+    &set_label("dec_partial");
+	&lea	($key,&swtmp(0));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);	# dump output to stack
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+	&lea	($s2 eq "ecx" ? $s2 : "",&DWP(16,$acc));
+	&mov	($acc eq "esi" ? $acc : "",$key);
+	&mov	($key eq "edi" ? $key : "",&wparam(1));
+	&pushf	();
+	&data_word(0x90A4F3FC);	# cld; rep movsb; nop	# copy output
+	&popf	();
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(0));	# load temp ivp
+	&jmp	(&label("dec_end"));
+
+    &align	(4);
+    &set_label("dec_in_place");
+	&set_label("dec_in_place_loop");
+		&lea	($key,&swtmp(0));
+		&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$acc));		# read input
+		&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);		# copy to temp
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+		&mov	($key,&wparam(3));		# load key
+		&call	("_x86_AES_decrypt");
+
+		&mov	($key,&wparam(4));		# load ivp
+		&mov	($acc,&wparam(1));		# load out
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));		# xor iv
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$acc),$s0);		# write output
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+
+		&lea	($acc,&DWP(16,$acc));
+		&mov	(&wparam(1),$acc);		# save out
+
+		&lea	($acc,&swtmp(0));
+		&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$acc));		# read temp
+		&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);		# copy iv
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+		&mov	($acc,&wparam(0));		# load inp
+
+		&lea	($acc,&DWP(16,$acc));
+		&mov	(&wparam(0),$acc);		# save inp
+
+		&mov	($s2,&wparam(2));		# load len
+		&sub	($s2,16);
+		&jc	(&label("dec_in_place_partial"));
+		&mov	(&wparam(2),$s2);		# save len
+	&jnz	(&label("dec_in_place_loop"));
+	&jmp	(&label("dec_out"));
+
+    &align	(4);
+    &set_label("dec_in_place_partial");
+	# one can argue if this is actually required...
+	&mov	($key eq "edi" ? $key : "",&wparam(1));
+	&lea	($acc eq "esi" ? $acc : "",&swtmp(0));
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(0,$key,$s2));
+	&lea	($acc,&DWP(16,$acc,$s2));
+	&neg	($s2 eq "ecx" ? $s2 : "");
+	&pushf	();
+	&data_word(0x90A4F3FC);	# cld; rep movsb; nop	# restore tail
+	&popf	();
+
+    &align	(4);
+    &set_label("dec_out");
+    &stack_pop(5);
+&function_end("AES_cbc_encrypt");
+
+#------------------------------------------------------------------#
+
+sub enckey()
+{
+	&movz	("esi",&LB("edx"));		# rk[i]>>0
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(0,"ebp","esi",4));
+	&movz	("esi",&HB("edx"));		# rk[i]>>8
+	&and	("ebx",0xFF000000);
+	&xor	("eax","ebx");
+
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(0,"ebp","esi",4));
+	&shr	("edx",16);
+	&and	("ebx",0x000000FF);
+	&movz	("esi",&LB("edx"));		# rk[i]>>16
+	&xor	("eax","ebx");
+
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(0,"ebp","esi",4));
+	&movz	("esi",&HB("edx"));		# rk[i]>>24
+	&and	("ebx",0x0000FF00);
+	&xor	("eax","ebx");
+
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(0,"ebp","esi",4));
+	&and	("ebx",0x00FF0000);
+	&xor	("eax","ebx");
+
+	&xor	("eax",&DWP(1024,"ebp","ecx",4));	# rcon
+}
+
+# int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+#                        AES_KEY *key)
+&public_label("AES_Te");
+&function_begin("AES_set_encrypt_key");
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(0));		# user supplied key
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(2));		# private key schedule
+
+	&test	("esi",-1);
+	&jz	(&label("badpointer"));
+	&test	("edi",-1);
+	&jz	(&label("badpointer"));
+
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop("ebp");
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(&label("AES_Te")."-".&label("pic_point"),"ebp"));
+	&add	("ebp",1024*4);			# skip to Te4
+
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(1));		# number of bits in key
+	&cmp	("ecx",128);
+	&je	(&label("10rounds"));
+	&cmp	("ecx",192);
+	&je	(&label("12rounds"));
+	&cmp	("ecx",256);
+	&je	(&label("14rounds"));
+	&mov	("eax",-2);			# invalid number of bits
+	&jmp	(&label("exit"));
+
+    &set_label("10rounds");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esi"));		# copy first 4 dwords
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx");
+
+	&xor	("ecx","ecx");
+	&jmp	(&label("10shortcut"));
+
+	&align	(4);
+	&set_label("10loop");
+		&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"edi"));		# rk[0]
+		&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"edi"));		# rk[3]
+	&set_label("10shortcut");
+		&enckey	();
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[4]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(20,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[5]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(24,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[6]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(28,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[7]
+		&inc	("ecx");
+		&add	("edi",16);
+		&cmp	("ecx",10);
+	&jl	(&label("10loop"));
+
+	&mov	(&DWP(80,"edi"),10);		# setup number of rounds
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&jmp	(&label("exit"));
+		
+    &set_label("12rounds");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esi"));		# copy first 6 dwords
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx");
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(16,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"edi"),"edx");
+
+	&xor	("ecx","ecx");
+	&jmp	(&label("12shortcut"));
+
+	&align	(4);
+	&set_label("12loop");
+		&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"edi"));		# rk[0]
+		&mov	("edx",&DWP(20,"edi"));		# rk[5]
+	&set_label("12shortcut");
+		&enckey	();
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(24,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[6]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(28,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[7]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(32,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[8]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(36,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[9]
+
+		&cmp	("ecx",7);
+		&je	(&label("12break"));
+		&inc	("ecx");
+
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(16,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(40,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[10]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(20,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(44,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[11]
+
+		&add	("edi",24);
+	&jmp	(&label("12loop"));
+
+	&set_label("12break");
+	&mov	(&DWP(72,"edi"),12);		# setup number of rounds
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&jmp	(&label("exit"));
+
+    &set_label("14rounds");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esi"));		# copy first 8 dwords
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(16,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"edi"),"edx");
+
+	&xor	("ecx","ecx");
+	&jmp	(&label("14shortcut"));
+
+	&align	(4);
+	&set_label("14loop");
+		&mov	("edx",&DWP(28,"edi"));		# rk[7]
+	&set_label("14shortcut");
+		&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"edi"));		# rk[0]
+
+		&enckey	();
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(32,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[8]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(36,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[9]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(40,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[10]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(44,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[11]
+
+		&cmp	("ecx",6);
+		&je	(&label("14break"));
+		&inc	("ecx");
+
+		&mov	("edx","eax");
+		&mov	("eax",&DWP(16,"edi"));		# rk[4]
+		&movz	("esi",&LB("edx"));		# rk[11]>>0
+		&mov	("ebx",&DWP(0,"ebp","esi",4));
+		&movz	("esi",&HB("edx"));		# rk[11]>>8
+		&and	("ebx",0x000000FF);
+		&xor	("eax","ebx");
+
+		&mov	("ebx",&DWP(0,"ebp","esi",4));
+		&shr	("edx",16);
+		&and	("ebx",0x0000FF00);
+		&movz	("esi",&LB("edx"));		# rk[11]>>16
+		&xor	("eax","ebx");
+
+		&mov	("ebx",&DWP(0,"ebp","esi",4));
+		&movz	("esi",&HB("edx"));		# rk[11]>>24
+		&and	("ebx",0x00FF0000);
+		&xor	("eax","ebx");
+
+		&mov	("ebx",&DWP(0,"ebp","esi",4));
+		&and	("ebx",0xFF000000);
+		&xor	("eax","ebx");
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(48,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[12]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(20,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(52,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[13]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(24,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(56,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[14]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(28,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(60,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[15]
+
+		&add	("edi",32);
+	&jmp	(&label("14loop"));
+
+	&set_label("14break");
+	&mov	(&DWP(48,"edi"),14);		# setup number of rounds
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&jmp	(&label("exit"));
+
+    &set_label("badpointer");
+	&mov	("eax",-1);
+    &set_label("exit");
+&function_end("AES_set_encrypt_key");
+
+sub deckey()
+{ my ($i,$ptr,$te4,$td) = @_;
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP($i,$ptr));
+	&mov	("edx","eax");
+	&movz	("ebx",&HB("eax"));
+	&shr	("edx",16);
+	&and	("eax",0xFF);
+	&movz	("eax",&BP(0,$te4,"eax",4));
+	&movz	("ebx",&BP(0,$te4,"ebx",4));
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(1024*0,$td,"eax",4));
+	&xor	("eax",&DWP(1024*1,$td,"ebx",4));
+	&movz	("ebx",&HB("edx"));
+	&and	("edx",0xFF);
+	&movz	("edx",&BP(0,$te4,"edx",4));
+	&movz	("ebx",&BP(0,$te4,"ebx",4));
+	&xor	("eax",&DWP(1024*2,$td,"edx",4));
+	&xor	("eax",&DWP(1024*3,$td,"ebx",4));
+	&mov	(&DWP($i,$ptr),"eax");
+}
+
+# int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+#                        AES_KEY *key)
+&public_label("AES_Td");
+&public_label("AES_Te");
+&function_begin_B("AES_set_decrypt_key");
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("edx",&wparam(2));
+	&sub	("esp",12);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),"edx");
+	&call	("AES_set_encrypt_key");
+	&add	("esp",12);
+	&cmp	("eax",0);
+	&je	(&label("proceed"));
+	&ret	();
+
+    &set_label("proceed");
+	&push	("ebp");
+	&push	("ebx");
+	&push	("esi");
+	&push	("edi");
+
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(2));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(240,"esi"));	# pull number of rounds
+	&lea	("ecx",&DWP(0,"","ecx",4));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP(0,"esi","ecx",4));	# pointer to last chunk
+
+	&align	(4);
+	&set_label("invert");			# invert order of chunks
+		&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esi"));
+		&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+		&mov	("ecx",&DWP(0,"edi"));
+		&mov	("edx",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,"esi"),"ecx");
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,"esi"),"edx");
+		&mov	("eax",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+		&mov	("ebx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+		&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+		&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,"edi"),"eax");
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,"edi"),"ebx");
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,"esi"),"ecx");
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,"esi"),"edx");
+		&add	("esi",16);
+		&sub	("edi",16);
+		&cmp	("esi","edi");
+	&jne	(&label("invert"));
+
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	blindpop("ebp");
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP(&label("AES_Td")."-".&label("pic_point"),"ebp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(&label("AES_Te")."-".&label("pic_point"),"ebp"));
+	&add	("ebp",1024*4);			# skip to Te4
+
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(2));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(240,"esi"));	# pull number of rounds
+	&dec	("ecx");
+	&align	(4);
+	&set_label("permute");			# permute the key schedule
+		&add	("esi",16);
+		&deckey	(0,"esi","ebp","edi");
+		&deckey	(4,"esi","ebp","edi");
+		&deckey	(8,"esi","ebp","edi");
+		&deckey	(12,"esi","ebp","edi");
+		&dec	("ecx");
+	&jnz	(&label("permute"));
+
+	&xor	("eax","eax");			# return success
+&function_end("AES_set_decrypt_key");
+
+&asm_finish();
diff --git a/crypto/amd64cpuid.pl b/crypto/amd64cpuid.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..097f6b8d5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/amd64cpuid.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+
+$output=shift;
+$win64a=1 if ($output =~ /win64a\.[s|asm]/);
+open STDOUT,">$output" || die "can't open $output: $!";
+
+print<<___ if(defined($win64a));
+_TEXT	SEGMENT
+PUBLIC	OPENSSL_rdtsc
+ALIGN	16
+OPENSSL_rdtsc	PROC
+	rdtsc
+	shl	rdx,32
+	or	rax,rdx
+	ret
+OPENSSL_rdtsc	ENDP
+
+PUBLIC	OPENSSL_atomic_add
+ALIGN	16
+OPENSSL_atomic_add	PROC
+	mov	eax,DWORD PTR[rcx]
+\$Lspin:	lea	r8,DWORD PTR[rdx+rax]
+lock	cmpxchg	DWORD PTR[rcx],r8d
+	jne	\$Lspin
+	mov	eax,r8d
+	cdqe    
+	ret
+OPENSSL_atomic_add	ENDP
+
+PUBLIC	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+ALIGN	16
+OPENSSL_wipe_cpu	PROC
+	pxor	xmm0,xmm0
+	pxor	xmm1,xmm1
+	pxor	xmm2,xmm2
+	pxor	xmm3,xmm3
+	pxor	xmm4,xmm4
+	pxor	xmm5,xmm5
+	xor	rcx,rcx
+	xor	rdx,rdx
+	xor	r8,r8
+	xor	r9,r9
+	xor	r10,r10
+	xor	r11,r11
+	lea	rax,QWORD PTR[rsp+8]
+	ret
+OPENSSL_wipe_cpu	ENDP
+
+OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid	PROC
+	mov	r8,rbx
+	mov	eax,1
+	cpuid
+	shl	rcx,32
+	mov	eax,edx
+	mov	rbx,r8
+	or	rax,rcx
+	ret
+OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid	ENDP
+_TEXT	ENDS
+
+CRT\$XIU	SEGMENT
+EXTRN	OPENSSL_cpuid_setup:PROC
+DQ	OPENSSL_cpuid_setup
+CRT\$XIU	ENDS
+END
+___
+print<<___ if(!defined($win64a));
+.text
+.globl	OPENSSL_rdtsc
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_rdtsc:
+	rdtsc
+	shl	\$32,%rdx
+	or	%rdx,%rax
+	ret
+.size	OPENSSL_rdtsc,.-OPENSSL_rdtsc
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_atomic_add
+.type	OPENSSL_atomic_add,\@function
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_atomic_add:
+	movl	(%rdi),%eax
+.Lspin:	lea	(%rsi,%rax),%r8
+lock;	cmpxchg	%r8d,(%rdi)
+	jne	.Lspin
+	mov	%r8d,%eax
+	cdqe
+	ret
+.size	OPENSSL_atomic_add,.-OPENSSL_atomic_add
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+.type	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,\@function
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_wipe_cpu:
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm2,%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm5,%xmm5
+	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm6
+	pxor	%xmm7,%xmm7
+	pxor	%xmm8,%xmm8
+	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm9
+	pxor	%xmm10,%xmm10
+	pxor	%xmm11,%xmm11
+	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm12
+	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm13
+	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm14
+	pxor	%xmm15,%xmm15
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx
+	xor	%rdx,%rdx
+	xor	%rsi,%rsi
+	xor	%rdi,%rdi
+	xor	%r8,%r8
+	xor	%r9,%r9
+	xor	%r10,%r10
+	xor	%r11,%r11
+	lea	8(%rsp),%rax
+	ret
+.size	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,.-OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid:
+	mov	%rbx,%r8
+	mov	\$1,%eax
+	cpuid
+	shl	\$32,%rcx
+	mov	%edx,%eax
+	mov	%r8,%rbx
+	or	%rcx,%rax
+	ret
+.size	OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid,.-OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid
+
+.section	.init
+	call	OPENSSL_cpuid_setup
+	.align	16
+___
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_padlock.c b/crypto/engine/eng_padlock.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4f64a06fb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_padlock.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1091 @@
+/* 
+ * Support for VIA PadLock Advanced Cryptography Engine (ACE)
+ * Written by Michal Ludvig <michal@logix.cz>
+ *            http://www.logix.cz/michal
+ *
+ * Big thanks to Andy Polyakov for a help with optimization, 
+ * assembler fixes, port to MS Windows and a lot of other 
+ * valuable work on this engine!
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK
+
+/* Attempt to have a single source for both 0.9.7 and 0.9.8 :-) */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00908000L)
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+#    define DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+#  endif
+#elif (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+#  ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
+#    define DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+#  endif
+#else
+#  error "Only OpenSSL >= 0.9.7 is supported"
+#endif
+
+/* VIA PadLock AES is available *ONLY* on some x86 CPUs.
+   Not only that it doesn't exist elsewhere, but it
+   even can't be compiled on other platforms!
+ 
+   In addition, because of the heavy use of inline assembler,
+   compiler choice is limited to GCC and Microsoft C. */
+#undef COMPILE_HW_PADLOCK
+#if !defined(I386_ONLY) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM)
+# if defined(__i386__) || defined(__i386) || defined(_M_IX86)
+#  define COMPILE_HW_PADLOCK
+static ENGINE *ENGINE_padlock (void);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+void ENGINE_load_padlock (void)
+{
+/* On non-x86 CPUs it just returns. */
+#ifdef COMPILE_HW_PADLOCK
+	ENGINE *toadd = ENGINE_padlock ();
+	if (!toadd) return;
+	ENGINE_add (toadd);
+	ENGINE_free (toadd);
+	ERR_clear_error ();
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifdef COMPILE_HW_PADLOCK
+/* We do these includes here to avoid header problems on platforms that
+   do not have the VIA padlock anyway... */
+#ifdef _MSC_VER
+# include <malloc.h>
+# define alloca _alloca
+#else
+# include <stdlib.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Function for ENGINE detection and control */
+static int padlock_available(void);
+static int padlock_init(ENGINE *e);
+
+/* RNG Stuff */
+static RAND_METHOD padlock_rand;
+
+/* Cipher Stuff */
+static int padlock_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, const int **nids, int nid);
+
+/* Engine names */
+static const char *padlock_id = "padlock";
+static char padlock_name[100];
+
+/* Available features */
+static int padlock_use_ace = 0;	/* Advanced Cryptography Engine */
+static int padlock_use_rng = 0;	/* Random Number Generator */
+static int padlock_aes_align_required = 1;
+
+/* ===== Engine "management" functions ===== */
+
+/* Prepare the ENGINE structure for registration */
+static int
+padlock_bind_helper(ENGINE *e)
+{
+	/* Check available features */
+	padlock_available();
+
+#if 1	/* disable RNG for now, see commentary in vicinity of RNG code */
+	padlock_use_rng=0;
+#endif
+
+	/* Generate a nice engine name with available features */
+	BIO_snprintf(padlock_name, sizeof(padlock_name),
+		"VIA PadLock (%s, %s)", 
+		 padlock_use_rng ? "RNG" : "no-RNG",
+		 padlock_use_ace ? "ACE" : "no-ACE");
+
+	/* Register everything or return with an error */ 
+	if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, padlock_id) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_name(e, padlock_name) ||
+
+	    !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, padlock_init) ||
+
+	    (padlock_use_ace && !ENGINE_set_ciphers (e, padlock_ciphers)) ||
+	    (padlock_use_rng && !ENGINE_set_RAND (e, &padlock_rand))) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Everything looks good */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Constructor */
+static ENGINE *
+ENGINE_padlock(void)
+{
+	ENGINE *eng = ENGINE_new();
+
+	if (!eng) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!padlock_bind_helper(eng)) {
+		ENGINE_free(eng);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return eng;
+}
+
+/* Check availability of the engine */
+static int
+padlock_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+	return (padlock_use_rng || padlock_use_ace);
+}
+
+/* This stuff is needed if this ENGINE is being compiled into a self-contained
+ * shared-library.
+ */
+#ifdef DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+static int
+padlock_bind_fn(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+{
+	if (id && (strcmp(id, padlock_id) != 0)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!padlock_bind_helper(e))  {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN ();
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN (padlock_bind_fn);
+#endif /* DYNAMIC_ENGINE */
+
+/* ===== Here comes the "real" engine ===== */
+
+/* Some AES-related constants */
+#define AES_BLOCK_SIZE		16
+#define AES_KEY_SIZE_128	16
+#define AES_KEY_SIZE_192	24
+#define AES_KEY_SIZE_256	32
+
+/* Here we store the status information relevant to the 
+   current context. */
+/* BIG FAT WARNING:
+ * 	Inline assembler in PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM()
+ * 	depends on the order of items in this structure.
+ * 	Don't blindly modify, reorder, etc!
+ */
+struct padlock_cipher_data
+{
+	unsigned char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];	/* Initialization vector */
+	union {	unsigned int pad[4];
+		struct {
+			int rounds:4;
+			int algo:3;
+			int keygen:1;
+			int interm:1;
+			int encdec:1;
+			int ksize:2;
+		} b;
+	} cword;		/* Control word */
+	AES_KEY ks;		/* Encryption key */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Essentially this variable belongs in thread local storage.
+ * Having this variable global on the other hand can only cause
+ * few bogus key reloads [if any at all on single-CPU system],
+ * so we accept the penatly...
+ */
+static volatile struct padlock_cipher_data *padlock_saved_context;
+
+/*
+ * =======================================================
+ * Inline assembler section(s).
+ * =======================================================
+ * Order of arguments is chosen to facilitate Windows port
+ * using __fastcall calling convention. If you wish to add
+ * more routines, keep in mind that first __fastcall
+ * argument is passed in %ecx and second - in %edx.
+ * =======================================================
+ */
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+/*
+ * As for excessive "push %ebx"/"pop %ebx" found all over.
+ * When generating position-independent code GCC won't let
+ * us use "b" in assembler templates nor even respect "ebx"
+ * in "clobber description." Therefore the trouble...
+ */
+
+/* Helper function - check if a CPUID instruction
+   is available on this CPU */
+static int
+padlock_insn_cpuid_available(void)
+{
+	int result = -1;
+
+	/* We're checking if the bit #21 of EFLAGS 
+	   can be toggled. If yes = CPUID is available. */
+	asm volatile (
+		"pushf\n"
+		"popl %%eax\n"
+		"xorl $0x200000, %%eax\n"
+		"movl %%eax, %%ecx\n"
+		"andl $0x200000, %%ecx\n"
+		"pushl %%eax\n"
+		"popf\n"
+		"pushf\n"
+		"popl %%eax\n"
+		"andl $0x200000, %%eax\n"
+		"xorl %%eax, %%ecx\n"
+		"movl %%ecx, %0\n"
+		: "=r" (result) : : "eax", "ecx");
+	
+	return (result == 0);
+}
+
+/* Load supported features of the CPU to see if
+   the PadLock is available. */
+static int
+padlock_available(void)
+{
+	char vendor_string[16];
+	unsigned int eax, edx;
+
+	/* First check if the CPUID instruction is available at all... */
+	if (! padlock_insn_cpuid_available())
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Are we running on the Centaur (VIA) CPU? */
+	eax = 0x00000000;
+	vendor_string[12] = 0;
+	asm volatile (
+		"pushl	%%ebx\n"
+		"cpuid\n"
+		"movl	%%ebx,(%%edi)\n"
+		"movl	%%edx,4(%%edi)\n"
+		"movl	%%ecx,8(%%edi)\n"
+		"popl	%%ebx"
+		: "+a"(eax) : "D"(vendor_string) : "ecx", "edx");
+	if (strcmp(vendor_string, "CentaurHauls") != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Check for Centaur Extended Feature Flags presence */
+	eax = 0xC0000000;
+	asm volatile ("pushl %%ebx; cpuid; popl	%%ebx"
+		: "+a"(eax) : : "ecx", "edx");
+	if (eax < 0xC0000001)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Read the Centaur Extended Feature Flags */
+	eax = 0xC0000001;
+	asm volatile ("pushl %%ebx; cpuid; popl %%ebx"
+		: "+a"(eax), "=d"(edx) : : "ecx");
+
+	/* Fill up some flags */
+	padlock_use_ace = ((edx & (0x3<<6)) == (0x3<<6));
+	padlock_use_rng = ((edx & (0x3<<2)) == (0x3<<2));
+
+	return padlock_use_ace + padlock_use_rng;
+}
+
+/* Our own htonl()/ntohl() */
+static inline void
+padlock_bswapl(AES_KEY *ks)
+{
+	size_t i = sizeof(ks->rd_key)/sizeof(ks->rd_key[0]);
+	unsigned int *key = ks->rd_key;
+
+	while (i--) {
+		asm volatile ("bswapl %0" : "+r"(*key));
+		key++;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Force key reload from memory to the CPU microcode.
+   Loading EFLAGS from the stack clears EFLAGS[30] 
+   which does the trick. */
+static inline void
+padlock_reload_key(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("pushfl; popfl");
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is heuristic key context tracing. At first one
+ * believes that one should use atomic swap instructions,
+ * but it's not actually necessary. Point is that if
+ * padlock_saved_context was changed by another thread
+ * after we've read it and before we compare it with cdata,
+ * our key *shall* be reloaded upon thread context switch
+ * and we are therefore set in either case...
+ */
+static inline void
+padlock_verify_context(struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata)
+{
+	asm volatile (
+	"pushfl\n"
+"	bt	$30,(%%esp)\n"
+"	jnc	1f\n"
+"	cmp	%2,%1\n"
+"	je	1f\n"
+"	mov	%2,%0\n"
+"	popfl\n"
+"	sub	$4,%%esp\n"
+"1:	add	$4,%%esp"
+	:"+m"(padlock_saved_context)
+	: "r"(padlock_saved_context), "r"(cdata) : "cc");
+}
+
+/* Template for padlock_xcrypt_* modes */
+/* BIG FAT WARNING: 
+ * 	The offsets used with 'leal' instructions
+ * 	describe items of the 'padlock_cipher_data'
+ * 	structure.
+ */
+#define PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(name,rep_xcrypt)	\
+static inline void *name(size_t cnt,		\
+	struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata,	\
+	void *out, const void *inp) 		\
+{	void *iv; 				\
+	asm volatile ( "pushl	%%ebx\n"	\
+		"	leal	16(%0),%%edx\n"	\
+		"	leal	32(%0),%%ebx\n"	\
+			rep_xcrypt "\n"		\
+		"	popl	%%ebx"		\
+		: "=a"(iv), "=c"(cnt), "=D"(out), "=S"(inp) \
+		: "0"(cdata), "1"(cnt), "2"(out), "3"(inp) \
+		: "edx", "cc");			\
+	return iv;				\
+}
+
+/* Generate all functions with appropriate opcodes */
+PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_ecb, ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xc8")	/* rep xcryptecb */
+PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_cbc, ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xd0")	/* rep xcryptcbc */
+PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_cfb, ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xe0")	/* rep xcryptcfb */
+PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_ofb, ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xe8")	/* rep xcryptofb */
+
+/* The RNG call itself */
+static inline unsigned int
+padlock_xstore(void *addr, unsigned int edx_in)
+{
+	unsigned int eax_out;
+
+	asm volatile (".byte 0x0f,0xa7,0xc0"	/* xstore */
+	    : "=a"(eax_out),"=m"(*(unsigned *)addr)
+	    : "D"(addr), "d" (edx_in)
+	    );
+
+	return eax_out;
+}
+
+/* Why not inline 'rep movsd'? I failed to find information on what
+ * value in Direction Flag one can expect and consequently have to
+ * apply "better-safe-than-sorry" approach and assume "undefined."
+ * I could explicitly clear it and restore the original value upon
+ * return from padlock_aes_cipher, but it's presumably too much
+ * trouble for too little gain...
+ *
+ * In case you wonder 'rep xcrypt*' instructions above are *not*
+ * affected by the Direction Flag and pointers advance toward
+ * larger addresses unconditionally.
+ */ 
+static inline unsigned char *
+padlock_memcpy(void *dst,const void *src,size_t n)
+{
+	long       *d=dst;
+	const long *s=src;
+
+	n /= sizeof(*d);
+	do { *d++ = *s++; } while (--n);
+
+	return dst;
+}
+
+#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+/*
+ * Unlike GCC these are real functions. In order to minimize impact
+ * on performance we adhere to __fastcall calling convention in
+ * order to get two first arguments passed through %ecx and %edx.
+ * Which kind of suits very well, as instructions in question use
+ * both %ecx and %edx as input:-)
+ */
+#define REP_XCRYPT(code)		\
+	_asm _emit 0xf3			\
+	_asm _emit 0x0f _asm _emit 0xa7	\
+	_asm _emit code
+
+/* BIG FAT WARNING: 
+ * 	The offsets used with 'lea' instructions
+ * 	describe items of the 'padlock_cipher_data'
+ * 	structure.
+ */
+#define PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(name,code)	\
+static void * __fastcall 		\
+	name (size_t cnt, void *cdata,	\
+	void *outp, const void *inp)	\
+{	_asm	mov	eax,edx		\
+	_asm	lea	edx,[eax+16]	\
+	_asm	lea	ebx,[eax+32]	\
+	_asm	mov	edi,outp	\
+	_asm	mov	esi,inp		\
+	REP_XCRYPT(code)		\
+}
+
+PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_ecb,0xc8)
+PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_cbc,0xd0)
+PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_cfb,0xe0)
+PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_ofb,0xe8)
+
+static int __fastcall
+padlock_xstore(void *outp,unsigned int code)
+{	_asm	mov	edi,ecx
+	_asm _emit 0x0f _asm _emit 0xa7 _asm _emit 0xc0
+}
+
+static void __fastcall
+padlock_reload_key(void)
+{	_asm pushfd _asm popfd		}
+
+static void __fastcall
+padlock_verify_context(void *cdata)
+{	_asm	{
+		pushfd
+		bt	DWORD PTR[esp],30
+		jnc	skip
+		cmp	ecx,padlock_saved_context
+		je	skip
+		mov	padlock_saved_context,ecx
+		popfd
+		sub	esp,4
+	skip:	add	esp,4
+		}
+}
+
+static int
+padlock_available(void)
+{	_asm	{
+		pushfd
+		pop	eax
+		mov	ecx,eax
+		xor	eax,1<<21
+		push	eax
+		popfd
+		pushfd
+		pop	eax
+		xor	eax,ecx
+		bt	eax,21
+		jnc	noluck
+		mov	eax,0
+		cpuid
+		xor	eax,eax
+		cmp	ebx,'tneC'
+		jne	noluck
+		cmp	edx,'Hrua'
+		jne	noluck
+		cmp	ecx,'slua'
+		jne	noluck
+		mov	eax,0xC0000000
+		cpuid
+		mov	edx,eax
+		xor	eax,eax
+		cmp	edx,0xC0000001
+		jb	noluck
+		mov	eax,0xC0000001
+		cpuid
+		xor	eax,eax
+		bt	edx,6
+		jnc	skip_a
+		bt	edx,7
+		jnc	skip_a
+		mov	padlock_use_ace,1
+		inc	eax
+	skip_a:	bt	edx,2
+		jnc	skip_r
+		bt	edx,3
+		jnc	skip_r
+		mov	padlock_use_rng,1
+		inc	eax
+	skip_r:
+	noluck:
+		}
+}
+
+static void __fastcall
+padlock_bswapl(void *key)
+{	_asm	{
+		pushfd
+		cld
+		mov	esi,ecx
+		mov	edi,ecx
+		mov	ecx,60
+	up:	lodsd
+		bswap	eax
+		stosd
+		loop	up
+		popfd
+		}
+}
+
+/* MS actually specifies status of Direction Flag and compiler even
+ * manages to compile following as 'rep movsd' all by itself...
+ */
+#define padlock_memcpy(o,i,n) ((unsigned char *)memcpy((o),(i),(n)&~3U))
+#endif
+
+/* ===== AES encryption/decryption ===== */
+
+#if defined(NID_aes_128_cfb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_128_cfb)
+#define NID_aes_128_cfb	NID_aes_128_cfb128
+#endif
+
+#if defined(NID_aes_128_ofb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_128_ofb)
+#define NID_aes_128_ofb	NID_aes_128_ofb128
+#endif
+
+#if defined(NID_aes_192_cfb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_192_cfb)
+#define NID_aes_192_cfb	NID_aes_192_cfb128
+#endif
+
+#if defined(NID_aes_192_ofb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_192_ofb)
+#define NID_aes_192_ofb	NID_aes_192_ofb128
+#endif
+
+#if defined(NID_aes_256_cfb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_256_cfb)
+#define NID_aes_256_cfb	NID_aes_256_cfb128
+#endif
+
+#if defined(NID_aes_256_ofb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_256_ofb)
+#define NID_aes_256_ofb	NID_aes_256_ofb128
+#endif
+
+/* List of supported ciphers. */
+static int padlock_cipher_nids[] = {
+	NID_aes_128_ecb,
+	NID_aes_128_cbc,
+	NID_aes_128_cfb,
+	NID_aes_128_ofb,
+
+	NID_aes_192_ecb,
+	NID_aes_192_cbc,
+#if 0
+	NID_aes_192_cfb,	/* FIXME: AES192/256 CFB/OFB don't work. */
+	NID_aes_192_ofb,
+#endif
+
+	NID_aes_256_ecb,
+	NID_aes_256_cbc,
+#if 0
+	NID_aes_256_cfb,
+	NID_aes_256_ofb,
+#endif
+};
+static int padlock_cipher_nids_num = (sizeof(padlock_cipher_nids)/
+				      sizeof(padlock_cipher_nids[0]));
+
+/* Function prototypes ... */
+static int padlock_aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+				const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int padlock_aes_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+			      const unsigned char *in, size_t nbytes);
+
+#define NEAREST_ALIGNED(ptr) ( (unsigned char *)(ptr) +		\
+	( (0x10 - ((size_t)(ptr) & 0x0F)) & 0x0F )	)
+#define ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx) ((struct padlock_cipher_data *)\
+	NEAREST_ALIGNED(ctx->cipher_data))
+
+/* Declaring so many ciphers by hand would be a pain.
+   Instead introduce a bit of preprocessor magic :-) */
+#define	DECLARE_AES_EVP(ksize,lmode,umode)	\
+static const EVP_CIPHER padlock_aes_##ksize##_##lmode = {	\
+	NID_aes_##ksize##_##lmode,		\
+	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,			\
+	AES_KEY_SIZE_##ksize,		\
+	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,			\
+	0 | EVP_CIPH_##umode##_MODE,	\
+	padlock_aes_init_key,		\
+	padlock_aes_cipher,		\
+	NULL,				\
+	sizeof(struct padlock_cipher_data) + 16,	\
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,		\
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,		\
+	NULL,				\
+	NULL				\
+}
+
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(128,ecb,ECB);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(128,cbc,CBC);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(128,cfb,CFB);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(128,ofb,OFB);
+
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(192,ecb,ECB);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(192,cbc,CBC);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(192,cfb,CFB);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(192,ofb,OFB);
+
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(256,ecb,ECB);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(256,cbc,CBC);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(256,cfb,CFB);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(256,ofb,OFB);
+
+static int
+padlock_ciphers (ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, const int **nids, int nid)
+{
+	/* No specific cipher => return a list of supported nids ... */
+	if (!cipher) {
+		*nids = padlock_cipher_nids;
+		return padlock_cipher_nids_num;
+	}
+
+	/* ... or the requested "cipher" otherwise */
+	switch (nid) {
+	  case NID_aes_128_ecb:
+	    *cipher = &padlock_aes_128_ecb;
+	    break;
+	  case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+	    *cipher = &padlock_aes_128_cbc;
+	    break;
+	  case NID_aes_128_cfb:
+	    *cipher = &padlock_aes_128_cfb;
+	    break;
+	  case NID_aes_128_ofb:
+	    *cipher = &padlock_aes_128_ofb;
+	    break;
+
+	  case NID_aes_192_ecb:
+	    *cipher = &padlock_aes_192_ecb;
+	    break;
+	  case NID_aes_192_cbc:
+	    *cipher = &padlock_aes_192_cbc;
+	    break;
+	  case NID_aes_192_cfb:
+	    *cipher = &padlock_aes_192_cfb;
+	    break;
+	  case NID_aes_192_ofb:
+	    *cipher = &padlock_aes_192_ofb;
+	    break;
+
+	  case NID_aes_256_ecb:
+	    *cipher = &padlock_aes_256_ecb;
+	    break;
+	  case NID_aes_256_cbc:
+	    *cipher = &padlock_aes_256_cbc;
+	    break;
+	  case NID_aes_256_cfb:
+	    *cipher = &padlock_aes_256_cfb;
+	    break;
+	  case NID_aes_256_ofb:
+	    *cipher = &padlock_aes_256_ofb;
+	    break;
+
+	  default:
+	    /* Sorry, we don't support this NID */
+	    *cipher = NULL;
+	    return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Prepare the encryption key for PadLock usage */
+static int
+padlock_aes_init_key (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+		      const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+	struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata;
+	int key_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8;
+
+	if (key==NULL) return 0;	/* ERROR */
+
+	cdata = ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx);
+	memset(cdata, 0, sizeof(struct padlock_cipher_data));
+
+	/* Prepare Control word. */
+	cdata->cword.b.encdec = (ctx->encrypt == 0);
+	cdata->cword.b.rounds = 10 + (key_len - 128) / 32;
+	cdata->cword.b.ksize = (key_len - 128) / 64;
+
+	switch(key_len) {
+		case 128:
+			/* PadLock can generate an extended key for
+			   AES128 in hardware */
+			memcpy(cdata->ks.rd_key, key, AES_KEY_SIZE_128);
+			cdata->cword.b.keygen = 0;
+			break;
+
+		case 192:
+		case 256:
+			/* Generate an extended AES key in software.
+			   Needed for AES192/AES256 */
+			/* Well, the above applies to Stepping 8 CPUs
+			   and is listed as hardware errata. They most
+			   likely will fix it at some point and then
+			   a check for stepping would be due here. */
+			if (enc)
+				AES_set_encrypt_key(key, key_len, &cdata->ks);
+			else
+				AES_set_decrypt_key(key, key_len, &cdata->ks);
+#ifndef AES_ASM
+			/* OpenSSL C functions use byte-swapped extended key. */
+			padlock_bswapl(&cdata->ks);
+#endif
+			cdata->cword.b.keygen = 1;
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			/* ERROR */
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This is done to cover for cases when user reuses the
+	 * context for new key. The catch is that if we don't do
+	 * this, padlock_eas_cipher might proceed with old key...
+	 */
+	padlock_reload_key ();
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Simplified version of padlock_aes_cipher() used when
+ * 1) both input and output buffers are at aligned addresses.
+ * or when
+ * 2) running on a newer CPU that doesn't require aligned buffers.
+ */
+static int
+padlock_aes_cipher_omnivorous(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out_arg,
+		const unsigned char *in_arg, size_t nbytes)
+{
+	struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata;
+	void  *iv;
+
+	cdata = ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx);
+	padlock_verify_context(cdata);
+
+	switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx)) {
+	case EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE:
+		padlock_xcrypt_ecb(nbytes/AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out_arg, in_arg);
+		break;
+
+	case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE:
+		memcpy(cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		iv = padlock_xcrypt_cbc(nbytes/AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out_arg, in_arg);
+		memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		break;
+
+	case EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE:
+		memcpy(cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		iv = padlock_xcrypt_cfb(nbytes/AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out_arg, in_arg);
+		memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		break;
+
+	case EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE:
+		memcpy(cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		padlock_xcrypt_ofb(nbytes/AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out_arg, in_arg);
+		memcpy(ctx->iv, cdata->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	memset(cdata->iv, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef  PADLOCK_CHUNK
+# define PADLOCK_CHUNK	4096	/* Must be a power of 2 larger than 16 */
+#endif
+#if PADLOCK_CHUNK<16 || PADLOCK_CHUNK&(PADLOCK_CHUNK-1)
+# error "insane PADLOCK_CHUNK..."
+#endif
+
+/* Re-align the arguments to 16-Bytes boundaries and run the 
+   encryption function itself. This function is not AES-specific. */
+static int
+padlock_aes_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out_arg,
+		   const unsigned char *in_arg, size_t nbytes)
+{
+	struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata;
+	const  void *inp;
+	unsigned char  *out;
+	void  *iv;
+	int    inp_misaligned, out_misaligned, realign_in_loop;
+	size_t chunk, allocated=0;
+
+	if (nbytes == 0)
+		return 1;
+	if (nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+		return 0; /* are we expected to do tail processing? */
+
+	/* VIA promises CPUs that won't require alignment in the future.
+	   For now padlock_aes_align_required is initialized to 1 and
+	   the condition is never met... */
+	if (!padlock_aes_align_required)
+		return padlock_aes_cipher_omnivorous(ctx, out_arg, in_arg, nbytes);
+
+	inp_misaligned = (((size_t)in_arg) & 0x0F);
+	out_misaligned = (((size_t)out_arg) & 0x0F);
+
+	/* Note that even if output is aligned and input not,
+	 * I still prefer to loop instead of copy the whole
+	 * input and then encrypt in one stroke. This is done
+	 * in order to improve L1 cache utilization... */
+	realign_in_loop = out_misaligned|inp_misaligned;
+
+	if (!realign_in_loop)
+		return padlock_aes_cipher_omnivorous(ctx, out_arg, in_arg, nbytes);
+
+	/* this takes one "if" out of the loops */
+	chunk  = nbytes;
+	chunk %= PADLOCK_CHUNK;
+	if (chunk==0) chunk = PADLOCK_CHUNK;
+
+	if (out_misaligned) {
+		/* optmize for small input */
+		allocated = (chunk<nbytes?PADLOCK_CHUNK:nbytes);
+		out = alloca(0x10 + allocated);
+		out = NEAREST_ALIGNED(out);
+	}
+	else
+		out = out_arg;
+
+	cdata = ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx);
+	padlock_verify_context(cdata);
+
+	switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx)) {
+	case EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE:
+		do	{
+			if (inp_misaligned)
+				inp = padlock_memcpy(out, in_arg, chunk);
+			else
+				inp = in_arg;
+			in_arg += chunk;
+
+			padlock_xcrypt_ecb(chunk/AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out, inp);
+
+			if (out_misaligned)
+				out_arg = padlock_memcpy(out_arg, out, chunk) + chunk;
+			else
+				out     = out_arg+=chunk;
+
+			nbytes -= chunk;
+			chunk   = PADLOCK_CHUNK;
+		} while (nbytes);
+		break;
+
+	case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE:
+		memcpy(cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		goto cbc_shortcut;
+		do	{
+			if (iv != cdata->iv)
+				memcpy(cdata->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+			chunk = PADLOCK_CHUNK;
+		cbc_shortcut: /* optimize for small input */
+			if (inp_misaligned)
+				inp = padlock_memcpy(out, in_arg, chunk);
+			else
+				inp = in_arg;
+			in_arg += chunk;
+
+			iv = padlock_xcrypt_cbc(chunk/AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out, inp);
+
+			if (out_misaligned)
+				out_arg = padlock_memcpy(out_arg, out, chunk) + chunk;
+			else
+				out     = out_arg+=chunk;
+
+		} while (nbytes -= chunk);
+		memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		break;
+
+	case EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE:
+		memcpy (cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		goto cfb_shortcut;
+		do	{
+			if (iv != cdata->iv)
+				memcpy(cdata->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+			chunk = PADLOCK_CHUNK;
+		cfb_shortcut: /* optimize for small input */
+			if (inp_misaligned)
+				inp = padlock_memcpy(out, in_arg, chunk);
+			else
+				inp = in_arg;
+			in_arg += chunk;
+
+			iv = padlock_xcrypt_cfb(chunk/AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out, inp);
+
+			if (out_misaligned)
+				out_arg = padlock_memcpy(out_arg, out, chunk) + chunk;
+			else
+				out     = out_arg+=chunk;
+
+		} while (nbytes -= chunk);
+		memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		break;
+
+	case EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE:
+		memcpy(cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		do	{
+			if (inp_misaligned)
+				inp = padlock_memcpy(out, in_arg, chunk);
+			else
+				inp = in_arg;
+			in_arg += chunk;
+
+			padlock_xcrypt_ofb(chunk/AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out, inp);
+
+			if (out_misaligned)
+				out_arg = padlock_memcpy(out_arg, out, chunk) + chunk;
+			else
+				out     = out_arg+=chunk;
+
+			nbytes -= chunk;
+			chunk   = PADLOCK_CHUNK;
+		} while (nbytes);
+		memcpy(ctx->iv, cdata->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Clean the realign buffer if it was used */
+	if (out_misaligned) {
+		volatile unsigned long *p=(void *)out;
+		size_t   n = allocated/sizeof(*p);
+		while (n--) *p++=0;
+	}
+
+	memset(cdata->iv, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* ===== Random Number Generator ===== */
+/*
+ * This code is not engaged. The reason is that it does not comply
+ * with recommendations for VIA RNG usage for secure applications
+ * (posted at http://www.via.com.tw/en/viac3/c3.jsp) nor does it
+ * provide meaningful error control...
+ */
+/* Wrapper that provides an interface between the API and 
+   the raw PadLock RNG */
+static int
+padlock_rand_bytes(unsigned char *output, int count)
+{
+	unsigned int eax, buf;
+
+	while (count >= 8) {
+		eax = padlock_xstore(output, 0);
+		if (!(eax&(1<<6)))	return 0; /* RNG disabled */
+		/* this ---vv--- covers DC bias, Raw Bits and String Filter */
+		if (eax&(0x1F<<10))	return 0;
+		if ((eax&0x1F)==0)	continue; /* no data, retry... */
+		if ((eax&0x1F)!=8)	return 0; /* fatal failure...  */
+		output += 8;
+		count  -= 8;
+	}
+	while (count > 0) {
+		eax = padlock_xstore(&buf, 3);
+		if (!(eax&(1<<6)))	return 0; /* RNG disabled */
+		/* this ---vv--- covers DC bias, Raw Bits and String Filter */
+		if (eax&(0x1F<<10))	return 0;
+		if ((eax&0x1F)==0)	continue; /* no data, retry... */
+		if ((eax&0x1F)!=1)	return 0; /* fatal failure...  */
+		*output++ = (unsigned char)buf;
+		count--;
+	}
+	*(volatile unsigned int *)&buf=0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Dummy but necessary function */
+static int
+padlock_rand_status(void)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Prepare structure for registration */
+static RAND_METHOD padlock_rand = {
+	NULL,			/* seed */
+	padlock_rand_bytes,	/* bytes */
+	NULL,			/* cleanup */
+	NULL,			/* add */
+	padlock_rand_bytes,	/* pseudorand */
+	padlock_rand_status,	/* rand status */
+};
+
+#endif /* COMPILE_HW_PADLOCK */
+
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW */
diff --git a/crypto/ia64cpuid.S b/crypto/ia64cpuid.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a800527a58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/ia64cpuid.S
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+// Works on all IA-64 platforms: Linux, HP-UX, Win64i...
+// On Win64i compile with ias.exe.
+.text
+.global	OPENSSL_rdtsc#
+.proc	OPENSSL_rdtsc#
+OPENSSL_rdtsc:
+	mov	r8=ar.itc
+	br.ret	b0
+.endp   OPENSSL_rdtsc#
diff --git a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-ia64.S b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-ia64.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b517d2e88f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-ia64.S
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+// ====================================================================
+// Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+// project.
+//
+// Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are
+// granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is
+// disclaimed.
+// ====================================================================
+
+.ident  "rc4-ia64.S, Version 1.1"
+.ident  "IA-64 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>"
+
+// What's wrong with compiler generated code? Because of the nature of
+// C language, compiler doesn't [dare to] reorder load and stores. But
+// being memory-bound, RC4 should benefit from reorder [on in-order-
+// execution core such as IA-64]. But what can we reorder? At the very
+// least we can safely reorder references to key schedule in respect
+// to input and output streams. Secondly, from the first [close] glance
+// it appeared that it's possible to pull up some references to
+// elements of the key schedule itself. Original rationale ["prior
+// loads are not safe only for "degenerated" key schedule, when some
+// elements equal to the same value"] was kind of sloppy. I should have
+// formulated as it really was: if we assume that pulling up reference
+// to key[x+1] is not safe, then it would mean that key schedule would
+// "degenerate," which is never the case. The problem is that this
+// holds true in respect to references to key[x], but not to key[y].
+// Legitimate "collisions" do occur within every 256^2 bytes window.
+// Fortunately there're enough free instruction slots to keep prior
+// reference to key[x+1], detect "collision" and compensate for it.
+// All this without sacrificing a single clock cycle:-)
+// Furthermore. In order to compress loop body to the minimum, I chose
+// to deploy deposit instruction, which substitutes for the whole
+// key->data+((x&255)<<log2(sizeof(key->data[0]))). This unfortunately
+// requires key->data to be aligned at sizeof(key->data) boundary.
+// This is why you'll find "RC4_INT pad[512-256-2];" addenum to RC4_KEY
+// and "d=(RC4_INT *)(((size_t)(d+255))&~(sizeof(key->data)-1));" in
+// rc4_skey.c [and rc4_enc.c, where it's retained for debugging
+// purposes]. Throughput is ~210MBps on 900MHz CPU, which is is >3x
+// faster than gcc generated code and +30% - if compared to HP-UX C.
+// Unrolling loop below should give >30% on top of that...
+
+.text
+.explicit
+
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
+# define ADDP	addp4
+#else
+# define ADDP	add
+#endif
+
+#define SZ	4	// this is set to sizeof(RC4_INT)
+// SZ==4 seems to be optimal. At least SZ==8 is not any faster, not for
+// assembler implementation, while SZ==1 code is ~30% slower.
+#if SZ==1	// RC4_INT is unsigned char
+# define	LDKEY	ld1
+# define	STKEY	st1
+# define	OFF	0
+#elif SZ==4	// RC4_INT is unsigned int
+# define	LDKEY	ld4
+# define	STKEY	st4
+# define	OFF	2
+#elif SZ==8	// RC4_INT is unsigned long
+# define	LDKEY	ld8
+# define	STKEY	st8
+# define	OFF	3
+#endif
+
+out=r8;		// [expanded] output pointer
+inp=r9;		// [expanded] output pointer
+prsave=r10;
+key=r28;	// [expanded] pointer to RC4_KEY
+ksch=r29;	// (key->data+255)[&~(sizeof(key->data)-1)]
+xx=r30;
+yy=r31;
+
+// void RC4(RC4_KEY *key,size_t len,const void *inp,void *out);
+.global	RC4#
+.proc	RC4#
+.align	32
+.skip	16
+RC4:
+	.prologue
+	.fframe 0
+	.save   ar.pfs,r2
+	.save	ar.lc,r3
+	.save	pr,prsave
+{ .mii;	alloc	r2=ar.pfs,4,12,0,16
+	mov	prsave=pr
+	ADDP	key=0,in0		};;
+{ .mib;	cmp.eq	p6,p0=0,in1			// len==0?
+	mov	r3=ar.lc
+(p6)	br.ret.spnt.many	b0	};;	// emergency exit
+
+	.body
+	.rotr	dat[4],key_x[4],tx[2],rnd[2],key_y[2],ty[1];
+
+{ .mib;	LDKEY	xx=[key],SZ			// load key->x
+	add	in1=-1,in1			// adjust len for loop counter
+	nop.b	0			}
+{ .mib;	ADDP	inp=0,in2
+	ADDP	out=0,in3
+	brp.loop.imp	.Ltop,.Lexit-16	};;
+{ .mmi;	LDKEY	yy=[key]			// load key->y
+	add	ksch=(255+1)*SZ,key		// as ksch will be used with
+						// deposit instruction only,
+						// I don't have to &~255...
+	mov	ar.lc=in1		}
+{ .mmi;	mov	key_y[1]=r0			// guarantee inequality
+						// in first iteration
+	add	xx=1,xx
+	mov	pr.rot=1<<16		};;
+{ .mii;	nop.m	0
+	dep	key_x[1]=xx,ksch,OFF,8
+	mov	ar.ec=3			};;	// note that epilogue counter
+						// is off by 1. I compensate
+						// for this at exit...
+.Ltop:
+// The loop is scheduled for 3*(n+2) spin-rate on Itanium 2, which
+// theoretically gives asymptotic performance of clock frequency
+// divided by 3 bytes per seconds, or 500MBps on 1.5GHz CPU. Measured
+// performance however is distinctly lower than 1/4:-( The culplrit
+// seems to be *(out++)=dat, which inadvertently splits the bundle,
+// even though there is M-port available... Unrolling is due...
+// Unrolled loop should collect output with variable shift instruction
+// in order to avoid starvation for integer shifter... It should be
+// possible to get pretty close to theoretical peak...
+{ .mmi;	(p16)	LDKEY	tx[0]=[key_x[1]]		// tx=key[xx]
+	(p17)	LDKEY	ty[0]=[key_y[1]]		// ty=key[yy]	
+	(p18)	dep	rnd[1]=rnd[1],ksch,OFF,8}	// &key[(tx+ty)&255]
+{ .mmi;	(p19)	st1	[out]=dat[3],1			// *(out++)=dat
+	(p16)	add	xx=1,xx				// x++
+	(p16)	cmp.ne.unc p20,p21=key_x[1],key_y[1]	};;
+{ .mmi;	(p18)	LDKEY	rnd[1]=[rnd[1]]			// rnd=key[(tx+ty)&255]
+	(p16)	ld1	dat[0]=[inp],1			// dat=*(inp++)
+	(p16)	dep	key_x[0]=xx,ksch,OFF,8	}	// &key[xx&255]
+.pred.rel	"mutex",p20,p21
+{ .mmi;	(p21)	add	yy=yy,tx[1]			// (p16)
+	(p20)	add	yy=yy,tx[0]			// (p16) y+=tx
+	(p21)	mov	tx[0]=tx[1]		};;	// (p16)
+{ .mmi;	(p17)	STKEY	[key_y[1]]=tx[1]		// key[yy]=tx
+	(p17)	STKEY	[key_x[2]]=ty[0]		// key[xx]=ty
+	(p16)	dep	key_y[0]=yy,ksch,OFF,8	}	// &key[yy&255]
+{ .mmb;	(p17)	add	rnd[0]=tx[1],ty[0]		// tx+=ty
+	(p18)	xor	dat[2]=dat[2],rnd[1]		// dat^=rnd
+	br.ctop.sptk	.Ltop			};;
+.Lexit:
+{ .mib;	STKEY	[key]=yy,-SZ			// save key->y
+	mov	pr=prsave,0x1ffff
+	nop.b	0			}
+{ .mib;	st1	[out]=dat[3],1			// compensate for truncated
+						// epilogue counter
+	add	xx=-1,xx
+	nop.b	0			};;
+{ .mib;	STKEY	[key]=xx			// save key->x
+	mov	ar.lc=r3
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	RC4#
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ia64.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ia64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cb9dfad124
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ia64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,549 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary
+# forms are granted according to the OpenSSL license.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# Eternal question is what's wrong with compiler generated code? The
+# trick is that it's possible to reduce the number of shifts required
+# to perform rotations by maintaining copy of 32-bit value in upper
+# bits of 64-bit register. Just follow mux2 and shrp instructions...
+# Performance under big-endian OS such as HP-UX is 179MBps*1GHz, which
+# is >50% better than HP C and >2x better than gcc. As of this moment
+# performance under little-endian OS such as Linux and Windows will be
+# a bit lower, because data has to be picked in reverse byte-order.
+# It's possible to resolve this issue by implementing third function,
+# sha1_block_asm_data_order_aligned, which would temporarily flip
+# BE field in User Mask register...
+
+$code=<<___;
+.ident  \"sha1-ia64.s, version 1.0\"
+.ident  \"IA-64 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov <appro\@fy.chalmers.se>\"
+.explicit
+
+___
+
+
+if ($^O eq "hpux") {
+    $ADDP="addp4";
+    for (@ARGV) { $ADDP="add" if (/[\+DD|\-mlp]64/); }
+} else { $ADDP="add"; }
+for (@ARGV) {	$big_endian=1 if (/\-DB_ENDIAN/);
+		$big_endian=0 if (/\-DL_ENDIAN/);   }
+if (!defined($big_endian))
+	    {	$big_endian=(unpack('L',pack('N',1))==1);   }
+
+#$human=1;
+if ($human) {	# useful for visual code auditing...
+	($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T)   = ("A","B","C","D","E","T");
+	($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4) = ("h0","h1","h2","h3","h4");
+	($K_00_19, $K_20_39, $K_40_59, $K_60_79) =
+	    (	"K_00_19","K_20_39","K_40_59","K_60_79"	);
+	@X= (	"X0", "X1", "X2", "X3", "X4", "X5", "X6", "X7",
+		"X8", "X9","X10","X11","X12","X13","X14","X15"	);
+}
+else {
+	($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T)   = ("loc0","loc1","loc2","loc3","loc4","loc5");
+	($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4) = ("loc6","loc7","loc8","loc9","loc10");
+	($K_00_19, $K_20_39, $K_40_59, $K_60_79) =
+	    (	"r14", "r15", "loc11", "loc12"	);
+	@X= (	"r16", "r17", "r18", "r19", "r20", "r21", "r22", "r23",
+		"r24", "r25", "r26", "r27", "r28", "r29", "r30", "r31"	);
+}
+
+sub BODY_00_15 {
+local	*code=shift;
+local	($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$unaligned)=@_;
+
+if ($unaligned) {
+	$code.=<<___;
+{ .mmi;	ld1	tmp0=[inp],2		    // MSB
+	ld1	tmp1=[tmp3],2		};;
+{ .mmi;	ld1	tmp2=[inp],2
+	ld1	$X[$i&0xf]=[tmp3],2	    // LSB
+	dep	tmp1=tmp0,tmp1,8,8	};;
+{ .mii;	cmp.ne	p16,p0=r0,r0		    // no misaligned prefetch
+	dep	$X[$i&0xf]=tmp2,$X[$i&0xf],8,8;;
+	dep	$X[$i&0xf]=tmp1,$X[$i&0xf],16,16	};;
+{ .mmi;	nop.m	0
+___
+	}
+elsif ($i<15) {
+	$code.=<<___;
+{ .mmi;	ld4	$X[($i+1)&0xf]=[inp],4	// prefetch
+___
+	}
+else	{
+	$code.=<<___;
+{ .mmi;	nop.m	0
+___
+	}
+if ($i<15) {
+	$code.=<<___;
+	and	tmp0=$c,$b
+	dep.z	tmp5=$a,5,27		}   // a<<5
+{ .mmi;	andcm	tmp1=$d,$b
+	add	tmp4=$e,$K_00_19	};;
+{ .mmi;	or	tmp0=tmp0,tmp1		    // F_00_19(b,c,d)=(b&c)|(~b&d)
+	add	$f=tmp4,$X[$i&0xf]	    // f=xi+e+K_00_19
+	extr.u	tmp1=$a,27,5		};; // a>>27
+{ .mib;	add	$f=$f,tmp0		    // f+=F_00_19(b,c,d)
+	shrp	$b=tmp6,tmp6,2		}   // b=ROTATE(b,30)
+{ .mib;	or	tmp1=tmp1,tmp5		    // ROTATE(a,5)
+	mux2	tmp6=$a,0x44		};; // see b in next iteration
+{ .mii;	add	$f=$f,tmp1		    // f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+	mux2	$X[$i&0xf]=$X[$i&0xf],0x44
+	nop.i	0			};;
+
+___
+	}
+else	{
+	$code.=<<___;
+	and	tmp0=$c,$b
+	dep.z	tmp5=$a,5,27		}   // a<<5 ;;?
+{ .mmi;	andcm	tmp1=$d,$b
+	add	tmp4=$e,$K_00_19	};;
+{ .mmi;	or	tmp0=tmp0,tmp1		    // F_00_19(b,c,d)=(b&c)|(~b&d)
+	add	$f=tmp4,$X[$i&0xf]	    // f=xi+e+K_00_19
+	extr.u	tmp1=$a,27,5		}   // a>>27
+{ .mmi;	xor	tmp2=$X[($i+0+1)&0xf],$X[($i+2+1)&0xf]	// +1
+	xor	tmp3=$X[($i+8+1)&0xf],$X[($i+13+1)&0xf] // +1
+	nop.i	0			};;
+{ .mmi;	add	$f=$f,tmp0		    // f+=F_00_19(b,c,d)
+	xor	tmp2=tmp2,tmp3		    // +1
+	shrp	$b=tmp6,tmp6,2		}   // b=ROTATE(b,30)
+{ .mmi; or	tmp1=tmp1,tmp5		    // ROTATE(a,5)
+	mux2	tmp6=$a,0x44		};; // see b in next iteration
+{ .mii;	add	$f=$f,tmp1		    // f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+	shrp	$e=tmp2,tmp2,31		    // f+1=ROTATE(x[0]^x[2]^x[8]^x[13],1)
+	mux2	$X[$i&0xf]=$X[$i&0xf],0x44  };;
+
+___
+	}
+}
+
+sub BODY_16_19 {
+local	*code=shift;
+local	($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mmi;	mov	$X[$i&0xf]=$f		    // Xupdate
+	and	tmp0=$c,$b
+	dep.z	tmp5=$a,5,27		}   // a<<5
+{ .mmi;	andcm	tmp1=$d,$b
+	add	tmp4=$e,$K_00_19	};;
+{ .mmi;	or	tmp0=tmp0,tmp1		    // F_00_19(b,c,d)=(b&c)|(~b&d)
+	add	$f=$f,tmp4		    // f+=e+K_00_19
+	extr.u	tmp1=$a,27,5		}   // a>>27
+{ .mmi;	xor	tmp2=$X[($i+0+1)&0xf],$X[($i+2+1)&0xf]	// +1
+	xor	tmp3=$X[($i+8+1)&0xf],$X[($i+13+1)&0xf]	// +1
+	nop.i	0			};;
+{ .mmi;	add	$f=$f,tmp0		    // f+=F_00_19(b,c,d)
+	xor	tmp2=tmp2,tmp3		    // +1
+	shrp	$b=tmp6,tmp6,2		}   // b=ROTATE(b,30)
+{ .mmi;	or	tmp1=tmp1,tmp5		    // ROTATE(a,5)
+	mux2	tmp6=$a,0x44		};; // see b in next iteration
+{ .mii;	add	$f=$f,tmp1		    // f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+	shrp	$e=tmp2,tmp2,31		    // f+1=ROTATE(x[0]^x[2]^x[8]^x[13],1)
+	nop.i	0			};;
+
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_20_39 {
+local	*code=shift;
+local	($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$Konst)=@_;
+	$Konst = $K_20_39 if (!defined($Konst));
+
+if ($i<79) {
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mib;	mov	$X[$i&0xf]=$f		    // Xupdate
+	dep.z	tmp5=$a,5,27		}   // a<<5
+{ .mib;	xor	tmp0=$c,$b
+	add	tmp4=$e,$Konst		};;
+{ .mmi;	xor	tmp0=tmp0,$d		    // F_20_39(b,c,d)=b^c^d
+	add	$f=$f,tmp4		    // f+=e+K_20_39
+	extr.u	tmp1=$a,27,5		}   // a>>27
+{ .mmi;	xor	tmp2=$X[($i+0+1)&0xf],$X[($i+2+1)&0xf]	// +1
+	xor	tmp3=$X[($i+8+1)&0xf],$X[($i+13+1)&0xf]	// +1
+	nop.i	0			};;
+{ .mmi;	add	$f=$f,tmp0		    // f+=F_20_39(b,c,d)
+	xor	tmp2=tmp2,tmp3		    // +1
+	shrp	$b=tmp6,tmp6,2		}   // b=ROTATE(b,30)
+{ .mmi;	or	tmp1=tmp1,tmp5		    // ROTATE(a,5)
+	mux2	tmp6=$a,0x44		};; // see b in next iteration
+{ .mii;	add	$f=$f,tmp1		    // f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+	shrp	$e=tmp2,tmp2,31		    // f+1=ROTATE(x[0]^x[2]^x[8]^x[13],1)
+	nop.i	0			};;
+
+___
+}
+else {
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mib;	mov	$X[$i&0xf]=$f		    // Xupdate
+	dep.z	tmp5=$a,5,27		}   // a<<5
+{ .mib;	xor	tmp0=$c,$b
+	add	tmp4=$e,$Konst		};;
+{ .mib;	xor	tmp0=tmp0,$d		    // F_20_39(b,c,d)=b^c^d
+	extr.u	tmp1=$a,27,5		}   // a>>27
+{ .mib;	add	$f=$f,tmp4		    // f+=e+K_20_39
+	add	$h1=$h1,$a		};; // wrap up
+{ .mmi;
+(p16)	ld4.s	$X[0]=[inp],4		    // non-faulting prefetch
+	add	$f=$f,tmp0		    // f+=F_20_39(b,c,d)
+	shrp	$b=tmp6,tmp6,2		}   // b=ROTATE(b,30) ;;?
+{ .mmi;	or	tmp1=tmp1,tmp5		    // ROTATE(a,5)
+	add	$h3=$h3,$c		};; // wrap up
+{ .mib;	add	tmp3=1,inp		    // used in unaligned codepath
+	add	$f=$f,tmp1		}   // f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+{ .mib;	add	$h2=$h2,$b		    // wrap up
+	add	$h4=$h4,$d		};; // wrap up
+
+___
+}
+}
+
+sub BODY_40_59 {
+local	*code=shift;
+local	($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mmi;	mov	$X[$i&0xf]=$f		    // Xupdate
+	and	tmp0=$c,$b
+	dep.z	tmp5=$a,5,27		}   // a<<5
+{ .mmi;	and	tmp1=$d,$b
+	add	tmp4=$e,$K_40_59	};;
+{ .mmi;	or	tmp0=tmp0,tmp1		    // (b&c)|(b&d)
+	add	$f=$f,tmp4		    // f+=e+K_40_59
+	extr.u	tmp1=$a,27,5		}   // a>>27
+{ .mmi;	and	tmp4=$c,$d
+	xor	tmp2=$X[($i+0+1)&0xf],$X[($i+2+1)&0xf]	// +1
+	xor	tmp3=$X[($i+8+1)&0xf],$X[($i+13+1)&0xf]	// +1
+	};;
+{ .mmi;	or	tmp1=tmp1,tmp5		    // ROTATE(a,5)
+	xor	tmp2=tmp2,tmp3		    // +1
+	shrp	$b=tmp6,tmp6,2		}   // b=ROTATE(b,30)
+{ .mmi;	or	tmp0=tmp0,tmp4		    // F_40_59(b,c,d)=(b&c)|(b&d)|(c&d)
+	mux2	tmp6=$a,0x44		};; // see b in next iteration
+{ .mii;	add	$f=$f,tmp0		    // f+=F_40_59(b,c,d)
+	shrp	$e=tmp2,tmp2,31;;	    // f+1=ROTATE(x[0]^x[2]^x[8]^x[13],1)
+	add	$f=$f,tmp1		};; // f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+
+___
+}
+sub BODY_60_79	{ &BODY_20_39(@_,$K_60_79); }
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+tmp0=r8;
+tmp1=r9;
+tmp2=r10;
+tmp3=r11;
+ctx=r32;	// in0
+inp=r33;	// in1
+
+// void sha1_block_asm_host_order(SHA_CTX *c,const void *p,size_t num);
+.global	sha1_block_asm_host_order#
+.proc	sha1_block_asm_host_order#
+.align	32
+sha1_block_asm_host_order:
+	.prologue
+	.fframe	0
+	.save	ar.pfs,r0
+	.save	ar.lc,r3
+{ .mmi;	alloc	tmp1=ar.pfs,3,15,0,0
+	$ADDP	tmp0=4,ctx
+	mov	r3=ar.lc		}
+{ .mmi;	$ADDP	ctx=0,ctx
+	$ADDP	inp=0,inp
+	mov	r2=pr			};;
+tmp4=in2;
+tmp5=loc13;
+tmp6=loc14;
+	.body
+{ .mlx;	ld4	$h0=[ctx],8
+	movl	$K_00_19=0x5a827999	}
+{ .mlx;	ld4	$h1=[tmp0],8
+	movl	$K_20_39=0x6ed9eba1	};;
+{ .mlx;	ld4	$h2=[ctx],8
+	movl	$K_40_59=0x8f1bbcdc	}
+{ .mlx;	ld4	$h3=[tmp0]
+	movl	$K_60_79=0xca62c1d6	};;
+{ .mmi;	ld4	$h4=[ctx],-16
+	add	in2=-1,in2		    // adjust num for ar.lc
+	mov	ar.ec=1			};;
+{ .mmi;	ld4	$X[0]=[inp],4		    // prefetch
+	cmp.ne	p16,p0=r0,in2		    // prefecth at loop end
+	mov	ar.lc=in2		};; // brp.loop.imp: too far
+
+.Lhtop:
+{ .mmi;	mov	$A=$h0
+	mov	$B=$h1
+	mux2	tmp6=$h1,0x44		}
+{ .mmi;	mov	$C=$h2
+	mov	$D=$h3
+	mov	$E=$h4			};;
+
+___
+
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 1,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 2,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 3,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 4,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 5,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 6,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 7,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 8,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 9,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code,10,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code,11,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code,12,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code,13,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code,14,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code,15,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+
+	&BODY_16_19(\$code,16,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_16_19(\$code,17,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_16_19(\$code,18,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_16_19(\$code,19,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,20,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,21,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,22,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,23,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,24,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,25,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,26,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,27,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,28,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,29,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,30,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,31,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,32,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,33,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,34,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,35,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,36,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,37,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,38,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,39,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,40,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,41,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,42,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,43,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,44,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,45,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,46,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,47,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,48,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,49,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,50,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,51,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,52,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,53,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,54,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,55,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,56,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,57,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,58,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,59,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,60,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,61,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,62,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,63,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,64,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,65,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,66,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,67,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,68,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,69,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,70,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,71,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,72,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,73,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,74,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,75,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,76,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,77,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,78,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,79,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mmb;	add	$h0=$h0,$E
+	nop.m	0
+	br.ctop.dptk.many	.Lhtop	};;
+.Lhend:
+{ .mmi;	add	tmp0=4,ctx
+	mov	ar.lc=r3		};;
+{ .mmi;	st4	[ctx]=$h0,8
+	st4	[tmp0]=$h1,8		};;
+{ .mmi;	st4	[ctx]=$h2,8
+	st4	[tmp0]=$h3		};;
+{ .mib;	st4	[ctx]=$h4,-16
+	mov	pr=r2,0x1ffff
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	sha1_block_asm_host_order#
+___
+
+
+$code.=<<___;
+// void sha1_block_asm_data_order(SHA_CTX *c,const void *p,size_t num);
+.global	sha1_block_asm_data_order#
+.proc	sha1_block_asm_data_order#
+.align	32
+sha1_block_asm_data_order:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($big_endian);
+{ .mmi;	and	r2=3,inp				};;
+{ .mib;	cmp.eq	p6,p0=r0,r2
+(p6)	br.dptk.many	sha1_block_asm_host_order	};;
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.prologue
+	.fframe	0
+	.save	ar.pfs,r0
+	.save	ar.lc,r3
+{ .mmi;	alloc	tmp1=ar.pfs,3,15,0,0
+	$ADDP	tmp0=4,ctx
+	mov	r3=ar.lc		}
+{ .mmi;	$ADDP	ctx=0,ctx
+	$ADDP	inp=0,inp
+	mov	r2=pr			};;
+tmp4=in2;
+tmp5=loc13;
+tmp6=loc14;
+	.body
+{ .mlx;	ld4	$h0=[ctx],8
+	movl	$K_00_19=0x5a827999	}
+{ .mlx;	ld4	$h1=[tmp0],8
+	movl	$K_20_39=0x6ed9eba1	};;
+{ .mlx;	ld4	$h2=[ctx],8
+	movl	$K_40_59=0x8f1bbcdc	}
+{ .mlx;	ld4	$h3=[tmp0]
+	movl	$K_60_79=0xca62c1d6	};;
+{ .mmi;	ld4	$h4=[ctx],-16
+	add	in2=-1,in2		    // adjust num for ar.lc
+	mov	ar.ec=1			};;
+{ .mmi;	nop.m	0
+	add	tmp3=1,inp
+	mov	ar.lc=in2		};; // brp.loop.imp: too far
+
+.Ldtop:
+{ .mmi;	mov	$A=$h0
+	mov	$B=$h1
+	mux2	tmp6=$h1,0x44		}
+{ .mmi;	mov	$C=$h2
+	mov	$D=$h3
+	mov	$E=$h4			};;
+
+___
+
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,1);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 1,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,1);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 2,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,1);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 3,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,1);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 4,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,1);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 5,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,1);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 6,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,1);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 7,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,1);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 8,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,1);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code, 9,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,1);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code,10,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,1);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code,11,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,1);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code,12,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,1);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code,13,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,1);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code,14,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,1);
+	&BODY_00_15(\$code,15,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,1);
+
+	&BODY_16_19(\$code,16,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_16_19(\$code,17,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_16_19(\$code,18,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_16_19(\$code,19,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,20,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,21,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,22,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,23,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,24,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,25,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,26,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,27,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,28,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,29,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,30,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,31,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,32,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,33,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,34,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,35,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,36,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,37,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,38,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_20_39(\$code,39,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,40,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,41,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,42,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,43,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,44,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,45,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,46,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,47,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,48,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,49,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,50,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,51,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,52,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,53,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,54,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,55,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,56,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,57,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,58,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_40_59(\$code,59,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,60,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,61,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,62,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,63,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,64,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,65,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,66,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,67,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,68,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,69,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,70,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,71,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,72,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,73,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,74,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,75,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B,$C);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,76,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A,$B);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,77,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T,$A);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,78,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+	&BODY_60_79(\$code,79,$T,$A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mmb;	add	$h0=$h0,$E
+	nop.m	0
+	br.ctop.dptk.many	.Ldtop	};;
+.Ldend:
+{ .mmi;	add	tmp0=4,ctx
+	mov	ar.lc=r3		};;
+{ .mmi;	st4	[ctx]=$h0,8
+	st4	[tmp0]=$h1,8		};;
+{ .mmi;	st4	[ctx]=$h2,8
+	st4	[tmp0]=$h3		};;
+{ .mib;	st4	[ctx]=$h4,-16
+	mov	pr=r2,0x1ffff
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	sha1_block_asm_data_order#
+___
+
+print $code;
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..087e8783a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,400 @@
+/* x509_vpm.c */
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 2004.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+/* X509_VERIFY_PARAM functions */
+
+static void x509_verify_param_zero(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+	{
+	if (!param)
+		return;
+	param->name = NULL;
+	param->purpose = 0;
+	param->trust = 0;
+	param->inh_flags = X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT;
+	param->flags = 0;
+	param->depth = -1;
+	if (param->policies)
+		{
+		sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(param->policies, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+		param->policies = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(void)
+	{
+	X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+	param = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_VERIFY_PARAM));
+	memset(param, 0, sizeof(X509_VERIFY_PARAM));
+	x509_verify_param_zero(param);
+	return param;
+	}
+
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+	{
+	x509_verify_param_zero(param);
+	OPENSSL_free(param);
+	}
+
+/* This function determines how parameters are "inherited" from one structure
+ * to another. There are several different ways this can happen.
+ *
+ * 1. If a child structure needs to have its values initialized from a parent
+ *    they are simply copied across. For example SSL_CTX copied to SSL.
+ * 2. If the structure should take on values only if they are currently unset.
+ *    For example the values in an SSL structure will take appropriate value
+ *    for SSL servers or clients but only if the application has not set new
+ *    ones.
+ *
+ * The "inh_flags" field determines how this function behaves. 
+ *
+ * Normally any values which are set in the default are not copied from the
+ * destination and verify flags are ORed together.
+ *
+ * If X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT is set then anything set in the source is copied
+ * to the destination. Effectively the values in "to" become default values
+ * which will be used only if nothing new is set in "from".
+ *
+ * If X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE is set then all value are copied across whether
+ * they are set or not. Flags is still Ored though.
+ *
+ * If X509_VP_FLAG_RESET_FLAGS is set then the flags value is copied instead
+ * of ORed.
+ *
+ * If X509_VP_FLAG_LOCKED is set then no values are copied.
+ *
+ * If X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE is set then the current inh_flags setting is zeroed
+ * after the next call.
+ */
+
+/* Macro to test if a field should be copied from src to dest */
+
+#define test_x509_verify_param_copy(field, def) \
+	(to_overwrite || \
+		((src->field != def) && (to_default || (dest->field == def))))
+
+/* Macro to test and copy a field if necessary */
+
+#define x509_verify_param_copy(field, def) \
+	if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(field, def)) \
+		dest->field = src->field
+		
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *dest,
+						const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *src)
+	{
+	unsigned long inh_flags;
+	int to_default, to_overwrite;
+	if (!src)
+		return 1;
+	inh_flags = dest->inh_flags | src->inh_flags;
+
+	if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE)
+		dest->inh_flags = 0;
+
+	if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_LOCKED)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT)
+		to_default = 1;
+	else
+		to_default = 0;
+
+	if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE)
+		to_overwrite = 1;
+	else
+		to_overwrite = 0;
+
+	x509_verify_param_copy(purpose, 0);
+	x509_verify_param_copy(trust, 0);
+	x509_verify_param_copy(depth, -1);
+
+	if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_RESET_FLAGS)
+		dest->flags = 0;
+
+	dest->flags |= src->flags;
+
+	if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(policies, NULL))
+		{
+		if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(dest, src->policies))
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *to,
+						const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *from)
+	{
+	to->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT;
+	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(to, from);
+	}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_name(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *name)
+	{
+	if (param->name)
+		OPENSSL_free(param->name);
+	param->name = BUF_strdup(name);
+	if (param->name)
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned long flags)
+	{
+	param->flags |= flags;
+	if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_MASK)
+		param->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK;
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int purpose)
+	{
+	return X509_PURPOSE_set(&param->purpose, purpose);
+	}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int trust)
+	{
+	return X509_TRUST_set(&param->trust, trust);
+	}
+
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int depth)
+	{
+	param->depth = depth;
+	}
+
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, time_t t)
+	{
+	param->check_time = t;
+	param->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
+	}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, ASN1_OBJECT *policy)
+	{
+	if (!param->policies)
+		{
+		param->policies = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null();
+		if (!param->policies)
+			return 0;
+		}
+	if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(param->policies, policy))
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, 
+					STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies)
+	{
+	int i;
+	ASN1_OBJECT *oid, *doid;
+	if (!param)
+		return 0;
+	if (param->policies)
+		sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(param->policies, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+
+	if (!policies)
+		{
+		param->policies = NULL;
+		return 1;
+		}
+
+	param->policies = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null();
+	if (!param->policies)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policies); i++)
+		{
+		oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policies, i);
+		doid = OBJ_dup(oid);
+		if (!doid)
+			return 0;
+		if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(param->policies, doid))
+			{
+			ASN1_OBJECT_free(doid);
+			return 0;
+			}
+		}
+	param->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK;
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+	{
+	return param->depth;
+	}
+
+/* Default verify parameters: these are used for various
+ * applications and can be overridden by the user specified table.
+ * NB: the 'name' field *must* be in alphabetical order because it
+ * will be searched using OBJ_search.
+ */
+
+static const X509_VERIFY_PARAM default_table[] = {
+	{
+	"default",	/* X509 default parameters */
+	0,		/* Check time */
+	0,		/* internal flags */
+	0,		/* flags */
+	0,		/* purpose */
+	0,		/* trust */
+	9,		/* depth */
+	NULL		/* policies */
+	},
+	{
+	"pkcs7",			/* SSL/TLS client parameters */
+	0,				/* Check time */
+	0,				/* internal flags */
+	0,				/* flags */
+	X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN,	/* purpose */
+	X509_TRUST_EMAIL,		/* trust */
+	-1,				/* depth */
+	NULL				/* policies */
+	},
+	{
+	"ssl_client",			/* SSL/TLS client parameters */
+	0,				/* Check time */
+	0,				/* internal flags */
+	0,				/* flags */
+	X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT,	/* purpose */
+	X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT,		/* trust */
+	-1,				/* depth */
+	NULL				/* policies */
+	},
+	{
+	"ssl_server",			/* SSL/TLS server parameters */
+	0,				/* Check time */
+	0,				/* internal flags */
+	0,				/* flags */
+	X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER,	/* purpose */
+	X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER,		/* trust */
+	-1,				/* depth */
+	NULL				/* policies */
+	}};
+
+static STACK_OF(X509_VERIFY_PARAM) *param_table = NULL;
+
+static int table_cmp(const void *pa, const void *pb)
+	{
+	const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *a = pa, *b = pb;
+	return strcmp(a->name, b->name);
+	}
+
+static int param_cmp(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM * const *a,
+			const X509_VERIFY_PARAM * const *b)
+	{
+	return strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name);
+	}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_table(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+	{
+	int idx;
+	X509_VERIFY_PARAM *ptmp;
+	if (!param_table)
+		{
+		param_table = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(param_cmp);
+		if (!param_table)
+			return 0;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		idx = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_find(param_table, param);
+		if (idx != -1)
+			{
+			ptmp = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_value(param_table, idx);
+			X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ptmp);
+			sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_delete(param_table, idx);
+			}
+		}
+	if (!sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_push(param_table, param))
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(const char *name)
+	{
+	int idx;
+	X509_VERIFY_PARAM pm;
+	pm.name = (char *)name;
+	if (param_table)
+		{
+		idx = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_find(param_table, &pm);
+		if (idx != -1)
+			return sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_value(param_table, idx);
+		}
+	return (const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *) OBJ_bsearch((char *)&pm,
+				(char *)&default_table,
+				sizeof(default_table)/sizeof(X509_VERIFY_PARAM),
+				sizeof(X509_VERIFY_PARAM),
+				table_cmp);
+	}
+
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_table_cleanup(void)
+	{
+	if (param_table)
+		sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_pop_free(param_table,
+						X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free);
+	param_table = NULL;
+	}
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b32d968619
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+/* v3_pci.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004
+ * by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org)
+ */
+/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+ * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+static int i2r_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *ext,
+	BIO *out, int indent);
+static PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *r2i_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+	X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *str);
+
+X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_pci =
+	{ NID_proxyCertInfo, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION),
+	  0,0,0,0,
+	  0,0,
+	  NULL, NULL,
+	  (X509V3_EXT_I2R)i2r_pci,
+	  (X509V3_EXT_R2I)r2i_pci,
+	  NULL,
+	};
+
+static int i2r_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci,
+	BIO *out, int indent)
+	{
+	BIO_printf(out, "%*sPath Length Constraint: ", indent, "");
+	if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint)
+	  i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
+	else
+	  BIO_printf(out, "infinite");
+	BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+	BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Language: ", indent, "");
+	i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage);
+	BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+	if (pci->proxyPolicy->policy && pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data)
+	  BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Text: %s\n", indent, "",
+		     pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data);
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+static int process_pci_value(CONF_VALUE *val,
+	ASN1_OBJECT **language, ASN1_INTEGER **pathlen,
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING **policy)
+	{
+	int free_policy = 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(val->name, "language") == 0)
+		{
+		if (*language)
+			{
+			X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,X509V3_R_POLICY_LANGUAGE_ALREADTY_DEFINED);
+			X509V3_conf_err(val);
+			return 0;
+			}
+		if (!(*language = OBJ_txt2obj(val->value, 0)))
+			{
+			X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
+			X509V3_conf_err(val);
+			return 0;
+			}
+		}
+	else if (strcmp(val->name, "pathlen") == 0)
+		{
+		if (*pathlen)
+			{
+			X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH_ALREADTY_DEFINED);
+			X509V3_conf_err(val);
+			return 0;
+			}
+		if (!X509V3_get_value_int(val, pathlen))
+			{
+			X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH);
+			X509V3_conf_err(val);
+			return 0;
+			}
+		}
+	else if (strcmp(val->name, "policy") == 0)
+		{
+		unsigned char *tmp_data = NULL;
+		long val_len;
+		if (!*policy)
+			{
+			*policy = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+			if (!*policy)
+				{
+				X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				X509V3_conf_err(val);
+				return 0;
+				}
+			free_policy = 1;
+			}
+		if (strncmp(val->value, "hex:", 4) == 0)
+			{
+			unsigned char *tmp_data2 =
+				string_to_hex(val->value + 4, &val_len);
+
+			if (!tmp_data2) goto err;
+
+			tmp_data = OPENSSL_realloc((*policy)->data,
+				(*policy)->length + val_len + 1);
+			if (tmp_data)
+				{
+				(*policy)->data = tmp_data;
+				memcpy(&(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length],
+					tmp_data2, val_len);
+				(*policy)->length += val_len;
+				(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length] = '\0';
+				}
+			}
+		else if (strncmp(val->value, "file:", 5) == 0)
+			{
+			unsigned char buf[2048];
+			int n;
+			BIO *b = BIO_new_file(val->value + 5, "r");
+			if (!b)
+				{
+				X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+				X509V3_conf_err(val);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			while((n = BIO_read(b, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0
+				|| (n == 0 && BIO_should_retry(b)))
+				{
+				if (!n) continue;
+
+				tmp_data = OPENSSL_realloc((*policy)->data,
+					(*policy)->length + n + 1);
+
+				if (!tmp_data)
+					break;
+
+				(*policy)->data = tmp_data;
+				memcpy(&(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length],
+					buf, n);
+				(*policy)->length += n;
+				(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length] = '\0';
+				}
+
+			if (n < 0)
+				{
+				X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+				X509V3_conf_err(val);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			}
+		else if (strncmp(val->value, "text:", 5) == 0)
+			{
+			val_len = strlen(val->value + 5);
+			tmp_data = OPENSSL_realloc((*policy)->data,
+				(*policy)->length + val_len + 1);
+			if (tmp_data)
+				{
+				(*policy)->data = tmp_data;
+				memcpy(&(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length],
+					val->value + 5, val_len);
+				(*policy)->length += val_len;
+				(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length] = '\0';
+				}
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,X509V3_R_INCORRECT_POLICY_SYNTAX_TAG);
+			X509V3_conf_err(val);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (!tmp_data)
+			{
+			X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			X509V3_conf_err(val);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	return 1;
+err:
+	if (free_policy)
+		{
+		ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(*policy);
+		*policy = NULL;
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+static PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *r2i_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+	X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *value)
+	{
+	PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci = NULL;
+	STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *vals;
+	ASN1_OBJECT *language = NULL;
+	ASN1_INTEGER *pathlen = NULL;
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *policy = NULL;
+	int i, j;
+
+	vals = X509V3_parse_list(value);
+	for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(vals); i++)
+		{
+		CONF_VALUE *cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(vals, i);
+		if (!cnf->name || (*cnf->name != '@' && !cnf->value))
+			{
+			X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,X509V3_R_INVALID_PROXY_POLICY_SETTING);
+			X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (*cnf->name == '@')
+			{
+			STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sect;
+			int success_p = 1;
+
+			sect = X509V3_get_section(ctx, cnf->name + 1);
+			if (!sect)
+				{
+				X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,X509V3_R_INVALID_SECTION);
+				X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			for (j = 0; success_p && j < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sect); j++)
+				{
+				success_p =
+					process_pci_value(sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, j),
+						&language, &pathlen, &policy);
+				}
+			X509V3_section_free(ctx, sect);
+			if (!success_p)
+				goto err;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			if (!process_pci_value(cnf,
+					&language, &pathlen, &policy))
+				{
+				X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* Language is mandatory */
+	if (!language)
+		{
+		X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,X509V3_R_NO_PROXY_CERT_POLICY_LANGUAGE_DEFINED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	i = OBJ_obj2nid(language);
+	if ((i == NID_Independent || i == NID_id_ppl_inheritAll) && policy)
+		{
+		X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,X509V3_R_POLICY_WHEN_PROXY_LANGUAGE_REQUIRES_NO_POLICY);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	pci = PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_new();
+	if (!pci)
+		{
+		X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	pci->proxyPolicy = PROXY_POLICY_new();
+	if (!pci->proxyPolicy)
+		{
+		X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage = language; language = NULL;
+	pci->proxyPolicy->policy = policy; policy = NULL;
+	pci->pcPathLengthConstraint = pathlen; pathlen = NULL;
+	goto end;
+err:
+	if (language) { ASN1_OBJECT_free(language); language = NULL; }
+	if (pathlen) { ASN1_INTEGER_free(pathlen); pathlen = NULL; }
+	if (policy) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(policy); policy = NULL; }
+	if (pci && pci->proxyPolicy)
+		{
+		PROXY_POLICY_free(pci->proxyPolicy);
+		pci->proxyPolicy = NULL;
+		}
+	if (pci) { PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); pci = NULL; }
+end:
+	sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free);
+	return pci;
+	}
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bb362e0e5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/* v3_pcia.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004
+ * by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org)
+ */
+/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+ * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(PROXY_POLICY) =
+	{
+	ASN1_SIMPLE(PROXY_POLICY,policyLanguage,ASN1_OBJECT),
+	ASN1_OPT(PROXY_POLICY,policy,ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PROXY_POLICY)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PROXY_POLICY)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION) =
+	{
+	ASN1_OPT(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION,pcPathLengthConstraint,ASN1_INTEGER),
+	ASN1_SIMPLE(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION,proxyPolicy,PROXY_POLICY)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION)
diff --git a/crypto/x86cpuid.pl b/crypto/x86cpuid.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..894c49c0a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/x86cpuid.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+
+push(@INC,"perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"x86cpuid");
+
+&function_begin("OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid");
+	&xor	("edx","edx");
+	&pushf	();
+	&pop	("eax");
+	&mov	("ecx","eax");
+	&xor	("eax",1<<21);
+	&push	("eax");
+	&popf	();
+	&pushf	();
+	&pop	("eax");
+	&xor	("ecx","eax");
+	&bt	("ecx",21);
+	&jnc	(&label("nocpuid"));
+	&mov	("eax",1);
+	&cpuid	();
+&set_label("nocpuid");
+	&mov	("eax","edx");
+	&mov	("edx","ecx");
+&function_end("OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid");
+
+&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+
+&function_begin_B("OPENSSL_rdtsc","EXTRN\t_OPENSSL_ia32cap_P:DWORD");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&xor	("edx","edx");
+	&picmeup("ecx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+	&bt	(&DWP(0,"ecx"),4);
+	&jnc	(&label("notsc"));
+	&rdtsc	();
+&set_label("notsc");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("OPENSSL_rdtsc");
+
+# This works in Ring 0 only [read DJGPP+MS-DOS+privileged DPMI host],
+# but it's safe to call it on any [supported] 32-bit platform...
+# Just check for [non-]zero return value...
+&function_begin_B("OPENSSL_instrument_halt","EXTRN\t_OPENSSL_ia32cap_P:DWORD");
+	&picmeup("ecx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+	&bt	(&DWP(0,"ecx"),4);
+	&jnc	(&label("nohalt"));	# no TSC
+
+	&data_word(0x9058900e);		# push %cs; pop %eax
+	&and	("eax",3);
+	&jnz	(&label("nohalt"));	# not enough privileges
+
+	&pushf	();
+	&pop	("eax")
+	&bt	("eax",9);
+	&jnc	(&label("nohalt"));	# interrupts are disabled
+
+	&rdtsc	();
+	&push	("edx");
+	&push	("eax");
+	&halt	();
+	&rdtsc	();
+
+	&sub	("eax",&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&sbb	("edx",&DWP(4,"esp"));
+	&add	("esp",8);
+	&ret	();
+
+&set_label("nohalt");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&xor	("edx","edx");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("OPENSSL_instrument_halt");
+
+&initseg("OPENSSL_cpuid_setup");
+
+&asm_finish();
diff --git a/doc/apps/errstr.pod b/doc/apps/errstr.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b3c6ccfc9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/apps/errstr.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+errstr - lookup error codes
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl errstr error_code>
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Sometimes an application will not load error message and only
+numerical forms will be available. The B<errstr> utility can be used to 
+display the meaning of the hex code. The hex code is the hex digits after the
+second colon.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+The error code:
+
+ 27594:error:2006D080:lib(32):func(109):reason(128):bss_file.c:107:
+
+can be displayed with:
+ 
+ openssl errstr 2006D080
+
+to produce the error message:
+
+ error:2006D080:BIO routines:BIO_new_file:no such file
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<err(3)|err(3)>,
+L<ERR_load_crypto_strings(3)|ERR_load_crypto_strings(3)>,
+L<SSL_load_error_strings(3)|SSL_load_error_strings(3)>
+
+
+=cut
diff --git a/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod b/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..09954693a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
+=pod
+
+=for comment openssl_manual_section:5
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+x509v3_config - X509 V3 certificate extension configuration format
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Several of the OpenSSL utilities can add extensions to a certificate or
+certificate request based on the contents of a configuration file.
+
+Typically the application will contain an option to point to an extension
+section. Each line of the extension section takes the form:
+
+ extension_name=[critical,] extension_options
+
+If B<critical> is present then the extension will be critical.
+
+The format of B<extension_options> depends on the value of B<extension_name>.
+
+There are four main types of extension: I<string> extensions, I<multi-valued>
+extensions, I<raw> and I<arbitrary> extensions.
+
+String extensions simply have a string which contains either the value itself
+or how it is obtained.
+
+For example:
+
+ nsComment="This is a Comment"
+
+Multi-valued extensions have a short form and a long form. The short form
+is a list of names and values:
+
+ basicConstraints=critical,CA:true,pathlen:1
+
+The long form allows the values to be placed in a separate section:
+
+ basicConstraints=critical,@bs_section
+
+ [bs_section]
+
+ CA=true
+ pathlen=1
+
+Both forms are equivalent.
+
+The syntax of raw extensions is governed by the extension code: it can
+for example contain data in multiple sections. The correct syntax to
+use is defined by the extension code itself: check out the certificate
+policies extension for an example.
+
+If an extension type is unsupported then the I<arbitrary> extension syntax
+must be used, see the L<ARBITRART EXTENSIONS|/"ARBITRARY EXTENSIONS"> section for more details.
+
+=head1 STANDARD EXTENSIONS
+
+The following sections describe each supported extension in detail.
+
+=head2 Basic Constraints.
+
+This is a multi valued extension which indicates whether a certificate is
+a CA certificate. The first (mandatory) name is B<CA> followed by B<TRUE> or
+B<FALSE>. If B<CA> is B<TRUE> then an optional B<pathlen> name followed by an
+non-negative value can be included.
+
+For example:
+
+ basicConstraints=CA:TRUE
+
+ basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
+
+ basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE, pathlen:0
+
+A CA certificate B<must> include the basicConstraints value with the CA field
+set to TRUE. An end user certificate must either set CA to FALSE or exclude the
+extension entirely. Some software may require the inclusion of basicConstraints
+with CA set to FALSE for end entity certificates.
+
+The pathlen parameter indicates the maximum number of CAs that can appear
+below this one in a chain. So if you have a CA with a pathlen of zero it can
+only be used to sign end user certificates and not further CAs.
+
+
+=head2 Key Usage.
+
+Key usage is a multi valued extension consisting of a list of names of the
+permitted key usages.
+
+The supporte names are: digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyEncipherment,
+dataEncipherment, keyAgreement, keyCertSign, cRLSign, encipherOnly
+and decipherOnly.
+
+Examples:
+
+ keyUsage=digitalSignature, nonRepudiation
+
+ keyUsage=critical, keyCertSign
+
+
+=head2 Extended Key Usage.
+
+This extensions consists of a list of usages indicating purposes for which
+the certificate public key can be used for,
+
+These can either be object short names of the dotted numerical form of OIDs.
+While any OID can be used only certain values make sense. In particular the
+following PKIX, NS and MS values are meaningful:
+
+ Value			Meaning
+ -----			-------
+ serverAuth		SSL/TLS Web Server Authentication.
+ clientAuth		SSL/TLS Web Client Authentication.
+ codeSigning		Code signing.
+ emailProtection	E-mail Protection (S/MIME).
+ timeStamping		Trusted Timestamping
+ msCodeInd		Microsoft Individual Code Signing (authenticode)
+ msCodeCom		Microsoft Commercial Code Signing (authenticode)
+ msCTLSign		Microsoft Trust List Signing
+ msSGC			Microsoft Server Gated Crypto
+ msEFS			Microsoft Encrypted File System
+ nsSGC			Netscape Server Gated Crypto
+
+Examples:
+
+ extendedKeyUsage=critical,codeSigning,1.2.3.4
+ extendedKeyUsage=nsSGC,msSGC
+
+
+=head2 Subject Key Identifier.
+
+This is really a string extension and can take two possible values. Either
+the word B<hash> which will automatically follow the guidelines in RFC3280
+or a hex string giving the extension value to include. The use of the hex
+string is strongly discouraged.
+
+Example:
+
+ subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+
+
+=head2 Authority Key Identifier.
+
+The authority key identifier extension permits two options. keyid and issuer:
+both can take the optional value "always".
+
+If the keyid option is present an attempt is made to copy the subject key
+identifier from the parent certificate. If the value "always" is present
+then an error is returned if the option fails.
+
+The issuer option copies the issuer and serial number from the issuer
+certificate. This will only be done if the keyid option fails or
+is not included unless the "always" flag will always include the value.
+
+Example:
+
+ authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer
+
+
+=head2 Subject Alternative Name.
+
+The subject alternative name extension allows various literal values to be
+included in the configuration file. These include B<email> (an email address)
+B<URI> a uniform resource indicator, B<DNS> (a DNS domain name), B<RID> (a
+registered ID: OBJECT IDENTIFIER), B<IP> (an IP address), B<dirName>
+(a distinguished name) and otherName.
+
+The email option include a special 'copy' value. This will automatically
+include and email addresses contained in the certificate subject name in
+the extension.
+
+The IP address used in the B<IP> options can be in either IPv4 or IPv6 format.
+
+The value of B<dirName> should point to a section containing the distinguished
+name to use as a set of name value pairs. Multi values AVAs can be formed by
+preceeding the name with a B<+> character.
+
+otherName can include arbitrary data associated with an OID: the value
+should be the OID followed by a semicolon and the content in standard
+ASN1_generate_nconf() format.
+
+Examples:
+
+ subjectAltName=email:copy,email:my@other.address,URI:http://my.url.here/
+ subjectAltName=IP:192.168.7.1
+ subjectAltName=IP:13::17
+ subjectAltName=email:my@other.address,RID:1.2.3.4
+ subjectAltName=otherName:1.2.3.4;UTF8:some other identifier
+
+ subjectAltName=dirName:dir_sect
+
+ [dir_sect]
+ C=UK
+ O=My Organization
+ OU=My Unit
+ CN=My Name
+
+
+=head2 Issuer Alternative Name.
+
+The issuer alternative name option supports all the literal options of
+subject alternative name. It does B<not> support the email:copy option because
+that would not make sense. It does support an additional issuer:copy option
+that will copy all the subject alternative name values from the issuer 
+certificate (if possible).
+
+Example:
+
+ issuserAltName = issuer:copy
+
+
+=head2 Authority Info Access.
+
+The authority information access extension gives details about how to access
+certain information relating to the CA. Its syntax is accessOID;location
+where I<location> has the same syntax as subject alternative name (except
+that email:copy is not supported). accessOID can be any valid OID but only
+certain values are meaningful, for example OCSP and caIssuers.
+
+Example:
+
+ authorityInfoAccess = OCSP;URI:http://ocsp.my.host/
+ authorityInfoAccess = caIssuers;URI:http://my.ca/ca.html
+
+
+=head2 CRL distribution points.
+
+This is a multi-valued extension that supports all the literal options of
+subject alternative name. Of the few software packages that currently interpret
+this extension most only interpret the URI option.
+
+Currently each option will set a new DistributionPoint with the fullName
+field set to the given value.
+
+Other fields like cRLissuer and reasons cannot currently be set or displayed:
+at this time no examples were available that used these fields.
+
+Examples:
+
+ crlDistributionPoints=URI:http://myhost.com/myca.crl
+ crlDistributionPoints=URI:http://my.com/my.crl,URI:http://oth.com/my.crl
+
+=head2 Certificate Policies.
+
+This is a I<raw> extension. All the fields of this extension can be set by
+using the appropriate syntax.
+
+If you follow the PKIX recommendations and just using one OID then you just
+include the value of that OID. Multiple OIDs can be set separated by commas,
+for example:
+
+ certificatePolicies= 1.2.4.5, 1.1.3.4
+
+If you wish to include qualifiers then the policy OID and qualifiers need to
+be specified in a separate section: this is done by using the @section syntax
+instead of a literal OID value.
+
+The section referred to must include the policy OID using the name
+policyIdentifier, cPSuri qualifiers can be included using the syntax:
+
+ CPS.nnn=value
+
+userNotice qualifiers can be set using the syntax:
+
+ userNotice.nnn=@notice
+
+The value of the userNotice qualifier is specified in the relevant section.
+This section can include explicitText, organization and noticeNumbers
+options. explicitText and organization are text strings, noticeNumbers is a
+comma separated list of numbers. The organization and noticeNumbers options
+(if included) must BOTH be present. If you use the userNotice option with IE5
+then you need the 'ia5org' option at the top level to modify the encoding:
+otherwise it will not be interpreted properly.
+
+Example:
+
+ certificatePolicies=ia5org,1.2.3.4,1.5.6.7.8,@polsect
+
+ [polsect]
+
+ policyIdentifier = 1.3.5.8
+ CPS.1="http://my.host.name/"
+ CPS.2="http://my.your.name/"
+ userNotice.1=@notice
+
+ [notice]
+
+ explicitText="Explicit Text Here"
+ organization="Organisation Name"
+ noticeNumbers=1,2,3,4
+
+The B<ia5org> option changes the type of the I<organization> field. In RFC2459
+it can only be of type DisplayText. In RFC3280 IA5Strring is also permissible.
+Some software (for example some versions of MSIE) may require ia5org.
+
+=head2 Policy Constraints
+
+This is a multi-valued extension which consisting of the names
+B<requireExplicitPolicy> or B<inhibitPolicyMapping> and a non negative intger
+value. At least one component must be present.
+
+Example:
+
+ policyConstraints = requireExplicitPolicy:3
+
+
+=head2 Inhibit Any Policy
+
+This is a string extension whose value must be a non negative integer.
+
+Example:
+
+ inhibitAnyPolicy = 2
+
+
+=head2 Name Constraints
+
+The name constraints extension is a multi-valued extension. The name should
+begin with the word B<permitted> or B<excluded> followed by a B<;>. The rest of
+the name and the value follows the syntax of subjectAltName except email:copy
+is not supported and the B<IP> form should consist of an IP addresses and 
+subnet mask separated by a B</>.
+
+Examples:
+
+ nameConstraints=permitted;IP:192.168.0.0/255.255.0.0
+
+ nameConstraints=permitted;email:.somedomain.com
+
+ nameConstraints=excluded;email:.com
+
+=head1 DEPRECATED EXTENSIONS
+
+The following extensions are non standard, Netscape specific and largely
+obsolete. Their use in new applications is discouraged.
+
+=head2 Netscape String extensions.
+
+Netscape Comment (B<nsComment>) is a string extension containing a comment
+which will be displayed when the certificate is viewed in some browsers.
+
+Example:
+
+ nsComment = "Some Random Comment"
+
+Other supported extensions in this category are: B<nsBaseUrl>,
+B<nsRevocationUrl>, B<nsCaRevocationUrl>, B<nsRenewalUrl>, B<nsCaPolicyUrl>
+and B<nsSslServerName>.
+
+
+=head2 Netscape Certificate Type
+
+This is a multi-valued extensions which consists of a list of flags to be
+included. It was used to indicate the purposes for which a certificate could
+be used. The basicConstraints, keyUsage and extended key usage extensions are
+now used instead.
+
+Acceptable values for nsCertType are: B<client>, B<server>, B<email>,
+B<objsign>, B<reserved>, B<sslCA>, B<emailCA>, B<objCA>.
+
+
+=head1 ARBITRARY EXTENSIONS
+
+If an extension is not supported by the OpenSSL code then it must be encoded
+using the arbitrary extension format. It is also possible to use the arbitrary
+format for supported extensions. Extreme care should be taken to ensure that
+the data is formatted correctly for the given extension type.
+
+There are two ways to encode arbitrary extensions.
+
+The first way is to use the word ASN1 followed by the extension content
+using the same syntax as ASN1_generate_nconf(). For example:
+
+ 1.2.3.4=critical,ASN1:UTF8String:Some random data
+
+ 1.2.3.4=ASN1:SEQUENCE:seq_sect
+
+ [seq_sect]
+
+ field1 = UTF8:field1
+ field2 = UTF8:field2
+
+It is also possible to use the word DER to include the raw encoded data in any
+extension.
+
+ 1.2.3.4=critical,DER:01:02:03:04
+ 1.2.3.4=DER:01020304
+
+The value following DER is a hex dump of the DER encoding of the extension
+Any extension can be placed in this form to override the default behaviour.
+For example:
+
+ basicConstraints=critical,DER:00:01:02:03
+
+=head1 WARNING
+
+There is no guarantee that a specific implementation will process a given
+extension. It may therefore be sometimes possible to use certificates for
+purposes prohibited by their extensions because a specific application does
+not recognize or honour the values of the relevant extensions.
+
+The DER and ASN1 options should be used with caution. It is possible to create
+totally invalid extensions if they are not used carefully.
+
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If an extension is multi-value and a field value must contain a comma the long
+form must be used otherwise the comma would be misinterpreted as a field
+separator. For example:
+
+ subjectAltName=URI:ldap://somehost.com/CN=foo,OU=bar
+
+will produce an error but the equivalent form:
+
+ subjectAltName=@subject_alt_section
+
+ [subject_alt_section]
+ subjectAltName=URI:ldap://somehost.com/CN=foo,OU=bar
+
+is valid. 
+
+Due to the behaviour of the OpenSSL B<conf> library the same field name
+can only occur once in a section. This means that:
+
+ subjectAltName=@alt_section
+
+ [alt_section]
+
+ email=steve@here
+ email=steve@there
+
+will only recognize the last value. This can be worked around by using the form:
+
+ [alt_section]
+
+ email.1=steve@here
+ email.2=steve@there
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The X509v3 extension code was first added to OpenSSL 0.9.2.
+
+Policy mappings, name constraints, inhibit any policy and name
+constraints support was added in OpenSSL 0.9.8
+
+The B<directoryName> and B<otherName> option as well as the B<ASN1> option
+for arbitrary extensions was added in OpenSSL 0.9.8
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<req(1)|req(1)>, L<ca(1)|ca(1)>, L<x509(1)|x509(1)>
+
+
+=cut
diff --git a/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ec6b655c17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OPENSSL_ia32cap
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ unsigned long *OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc(void);
+ #define OPENSSL_ia32cap (*(OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc()))
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Value returned by OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc() is address of a variable
+containing IA-32 processor capabilities bit vector as it appears in EDX
+register after executing CPUID instruction with EAX=1 input value (see
+Intel Application Note #241618). Naturally it's meaningful on IA-32[E]
+platforms only. The variable is normally set up automatically upon
+toolkit initialization, but can be manipulated afterwards to modify
+crypto library behaviour. For the moment of this writing three bits are
+significant, namely bit #28 denoting Hyperthreading, which is used to
+distinguish Intel P4 core, bit #26 denoting SSE2 support, and bit #4
+denoting presence of Time-Stamp Counter. Clearing bit #26 at run-time
+for example disables high-performance SSE2 code present in the crypto
+library. You might have to do this if target OpenSSL application is
+executed on SSE2 capable CPU, but under control of OS which does not
+support SSE2 extentions. Even though you can manipulate the value
+programmatically, you most likely will find it more appropriate to set
+up an environment variable with the same name prior starting target
+application, e.g. 'env OPENSSL_ia32cap=0x10 apps/openssl', to achieve
+same effect without modifying the application source code.
+Alternatively you can reconfigure the toolkit with no-sse2 option and
+recompile.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/test/P1ss.cnf b/test/P1ss.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..876a0d35f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/P1ss.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+#
+# SSLeay example configuration file.
+# This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests.
+#
+
+RANDFILE		= ./.rnd
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+default_bits		= 512
+default_keyfile 	= keySS.pem
+distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
+encrypt_rsa_key		= no
+default_md		= md2
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName			= Country Name (2 letter code)
+countryName_default		= AU
+countryName_value		= AU
+
+organizationName                = Organization Name (eg, company)
+organizationName_value          = Dodgy Brothers
+
+0.commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+0.commonName_value		= Brother 1
+
+1.commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+1.commonName_value		= Brother 2
+
+2.commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+2.commonName_value		= Proxy 1
+
+[ v3_proxy ]
+basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always
+proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:1,policy:text:AB
diff --git a/test/P2ss.cnf b/test/P2ss.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..373a87e7c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/P2ss.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+#
+# SSLeay example configuration file.
+# This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests.
+#
+
+RANDFILE		= ./.rnd
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+default_bits		= 512
+default_keyfile 	= keySS.pem
+distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
+encrypt_rsa_key		= no
+default_md		= md2
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName			= Country Name (2 letter code)
+countryName_default		= AU
+countryName_value		= AU
+
+organizationName                = Organization Name (eg, company)
+organizationName_value          = Dodgy Brothers
+
+0.commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+0.commonName_value		= Brother 1
+
+1.commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+1.commonName_value		= Brother 2
+
+2.commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+2.commonName_value		= Proxy 1
+
+3.commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+3.commonName_value		= Proxy 2
+
+[ v3_proxy ]
+basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always
+proxyCertInfo=critical,@proxy_ext
+
+[ proxy_ext ]
+language=id-ppl-anyLanguage
+pathlen=0
+policy=text:BC
diff --git a/test/testsslproxy b/test/testsslproxy
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..70cf12342d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/testsslproxy
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+
+echo 'Testing a lot of proxy conditions.'
+echo 'Some of them may turn out being invalid, which is fine.'
+for auth in A B C BC; do
+    for cond in A B C 'A|B&!C'; do
+	sh ./testssl $1 $2 $3 "-proxy_auth $auth -proxy_cond $cond"
+	if [ $? = 3 ]; then exit 1; fi
+    done
+done
diff --git a/util/extract-section.pl b/util/extract-section.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7a0ba4f69a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/util/extract-section.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl
+
+while(<STDIN>) {
+	if (/=for\s+comment\s+openssl_manual_section:(\S+)/)
+		{
+		print "$1\n";
+		exit 0;
+		}
+}
+
+print "$ARGV[0]\n";
+
diff --git a/util/opensslwrap.sh b/util/opensslwrap.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..91d29e2b87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/util/opensslwrap.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+HERE="`echo $0 | sed -e 's|[^/]*$||'`"
+OPENSSL="${HERE}../apps/openssl"
+
+if [ -x "${OPENSSL}.exe" ]; then
+	# The original reason for this script existence is to work around
+	# certain caveats in run-time linker behaviour. On Windows platforms
+	# adjusting $PATH used to be sufficient, but with introduction of
+	# SafeDllSearchMode in XP/2003 the only way to get it right in
+	# *all* possible situations is to copy newly built .DLLs to apps/
+	# and test/, which is now done elsewhere... The $PATH is adjusted
+	# for backward compatibility (and nostagical reasons:-).
+	if [ "$OSTYPE" != msdosdjgpp ]; then
+		PATH="${HERE}..:$PATH"; export PATH
+	fi
+	exec "${OPENSSL}.exe" "$@"
+elif [ -x "${OPENSSL}" -a -x "${HERE}shlib_wrap.sh" ]; then
+	exec "${HERE}shlib_wrap.sh" "${OPENSSL}" "$@"
+else
+	exec "${OPENSSL}" "$@"	# hope for the best...
+fi
diff --git a/util/shlib_wrap.sh b/util/shlib_wrap.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..dc5f5b1ce4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/util/shlib_wrap.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+[ $# -ne 0 ] || set -x		# debug mode without arguments:-)
+
+THERE="`echo $0 | sed -e 's|[^/]*$||' 2>/dev/null`.."
+[ -d "${THERE}" ] || exec "$@"	# should never happen...
+
+# Alternative to this is to parse ${THERE}/Makefile...
+LIBCRYPTOSO="${THERE}/libcrypto.so"
+if [ -f "$LIBCRYPTOSO" ]; then
+    while [ -h "$LIBCRYPTOSO" ]; do
+	LIBCRYPTOSO="${THERE}/`ls -l "$LIBCRYPTOSO" | sed -e 's|.*\-> ||'`"
+    done
+    SOSUFFIX=`echo ${LIBCRYPTOSO} | sed -e 's|.*\.so||' 2>/dev/null`
+    LIBSSLSO="${THERE}/libssl.so${SOSUFFIX}"
+fi
+
+SYSNAME=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null`;
+case "$SYSNAME" in
+SunOS|IRIX*)
+	# SunOS and IRIX run-time linkers evaluate alternative
+	# variables depending on target ABI...
+	rld_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH
+	case "`(/usr/bin/file "$LIBCRYPTOSO") 2>/dev/null`" in
+	*ELF\ 64*SPARC*)
+		[ -n "$LD_LIBRARY_PATH_64" ] && rld_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH_64
+		;;
+	*ELF\ N32*MIPS*)
+		[ -n "$LD_LIBRARYN32_PATH" ] && rld_var=LD_LIBRARYN32_PATH
+		_RLDN32_LIST="$LIBCRYPTOSO:$LIBSSLSO:DEFAULT"; export _RLDN32_LIST
+		;;
+	*ELF\ 64*MIPS*)
+		[ -n "$LD_LIBRARY64_PATH"  ] && rld_var=LD_LIBRARY64_PATH
+		_RLD64_LIST="$LIBCRYPTOSO:$LIBSSLSO:DEFAULT"; export _RLD64_LIST
+		;;
+	esac
+	eval $rld_var=\"${THERE}:'$'$rld_var\"; export $rld_var
+	unset rld_var
+	;;
+*)	LD_LIBRARY_PATH="${THERE}:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH"	# Linux, ELF HP-UX
+	DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH="${THERE}:$DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH"	# MacOS X
+	SHLIB_PATH="${THERE}:$SHLIB_PATH"		# legacy HP-UX
+	LIBPATH="${THERE}:$LIBPATH"			# AIX, OS/2
+	export LD_LIBRARY_PATH DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH SHLIB_PATH LIBPATH
+	# Even though $PATH is adjusted [for Windows sake], it doesn't
+	# necessarily does the trick. Trouble is that with introduction
+	# of SafeDllSearchMode in XP/2003 it's more appropriate to copy
+	# .DLLs in vicinity of executable, which is done elsewhere...
+	if [ "$OSTYPE" != msdosdjgpp ]; then
+		PATH="${THERE}:$PATH"; export PATH
+	fi
+	;;
+esac
+
+if [ -f "$LIBCRYPTOSO" ]; then
+	# Following three lines are major excuse for isolating them into
+	# this wrapper script. Original reason for setting LD_PRELOAD
+	# was to make it possible to pass 'make test' when user linked
+	# with -rpath pointing to previous version installation. Wrapping
+	# it into a script makes it possible to do so on multi-ABI
+	# platforms.
+	case "$SYSNAME" in
+	*BSD)	LD_PRELOAD="$LIBCRYPTOSO:$LIBSSLSO" ;;	# *BSD
+	*)	LD_PRELOAD="$LIBCRYPTOSO $LIBSSLSO" ;;	# SunOS, Linux, ELF HP-UX
+	esac
+	_RLD_LIST="$LIBCRYPTOSO:$LIBSSLSO:DEFAULT"	# Tru64, o32 IRIX
+	export LD_PRELOAD _RLD_LIST
+fi
+
+exec "$@"