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| author | Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> | 2016-06-05 23:34:57 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> | 2016-06-14 19:30:36 +0200 |
| commit | 947f3156ecedbc62e21da3569fc291166b3bc086 (patch) | |
| tree | 319270256fdc64b850c0f8ddaeeab0ea18f1ac67 | |
| parent | b2e8bd7bd555ad6826dd44f38c68425d92e86e95 (diff) | |
| download | openssl-new-947f3156ecedbc62e21da3569fc291166b3bc086.tar.gz | |
Initialize the session_id
ssl_session_hash() always looks at the first 4 bytes, regardless of the length.
A client can send a session id that's shorter, and the callback could also
generate one that's shorter. So we make sure that the rest of the buffer is
initliazed to 0 so that we always calculate the same hash.
Found by tis-interpreter, also previously reported as RT #2871
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
MR: #2911
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c index 6e53d9b27a..41abe44a82 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c @@ -359,6 +359,7 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->session_ctx->lock); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock); /* Choose a session ID */ + memset(ss->session_id, 0, ss->session_id_length); tmp = ss->session_id_length; if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) { /* The callback failed */ @@ -471,6 +472,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id) SSL_SESSION data; size_t local_len; data.ssl_version = s->version; + memset(data.session_id, 0, sizeof(data.session_id)); if (!PACKET_copy_all(session_id, data.session_id, sizeof(data.session_id), &local_len)) { |