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authorGeoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>2001-07-20 15:16:10 +0000
committerGeoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>2001-07-20 15:16:10 +0000
commit81d1998e096684d8ca4318ffdfc07495a8c906de (patch)
treeab38030965caad2e0c0e3bce8ecb92deaf4e0dae /crypto/rsa
parent6b46ca135a70ad7f77bba771496751f555e4863c (diff)
downloadopenssl-new-81d1998e096684d8ca4318ffdfc07495a8c906de.tar.gz
Currently, RSA code, when using no padding scheme, simply checks that input
does not contain more bytes than the RSA modulus 'n' - it does not check that the input is strictly *less* than 'n'. Whether this should be the case or not is open to debate - however, due to security problems with returning miscalculated CRT results, the 'rsa_mod_exp' implementation in rsa_eay.c now performs a public-key exponentiation to verify the CRT result and in the event of an error will instead recalculate and return a non-CRT (more expensive) mod_exp calculation. As the mod_exp of 'I' is equivalent to the mod_exp of 'I mod n', and the verify result is automatically between 0 and n-1 inclusive, the verify only matches the input if 'I' was less than 'n', otherwise even a correct CRT calculation is only congruent to 'I' (ie. they differ by a multiple of 'n'). Rather than rejecting correct calculations and doing redundant and slower ones instead, this changes the equality check in the verification code to a congruence check.
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/rsa')
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c15
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index 06f73fc8ff..f325050c1c 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -545,10 +545,19 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
{
if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
- if (BN_cmp(I, &vrfy) != 0)
- {
+ /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
+ * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
+ * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
+ * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
+ if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (vrfy.neg)
+ if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy))
+ /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
+ * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
+ * mod_exp and return that instead. */
if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
- }
}
ret=1;
err: