diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'CHANGES')
| -rw-r--r-- | CHANGES | 192 |
1 files changed, 190 insertions, 2 deletions
@@ -2,9 +2,60 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ + Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014] + + *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension + can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or + server. + + Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to + Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for + preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160) + [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] + + *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL + ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack" + by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from: + http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140 + + Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this + flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076) + [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger] + + *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03 + + Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the + TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and + less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it + is at least 512 bytes long. + + [Adam Langley, Steve Henson] + + Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014] + + *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid + handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception. + Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues. + (CVE-2013-4353) + + *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission + structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need + to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which + avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be + Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for + several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug + is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing + 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer. + [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley] + Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013] - *) + *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI + supporting platforms or when small records were transferred. + [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013] @@ -404,6 +455,63 @@ Add command line options to s_client/s_server. [Steve Henson] + Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013] + + *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time. + + This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by + Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found + at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/ + + Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information + Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London + (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and + Emilia Käsper for the initial patch. + (CVE-2013-0169) + [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] + + *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL. + This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so + the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() + so it returns the certificate actually sent. + See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836. + (This is a backport) + [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>] + + *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [10 May 2012] + + [NB: OpenSSL 1.0.0i and later 1.0.0 patch levels were released after + OpenSSL 1.0.1.] + + *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS + to fix DoS attack. + + Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic + fuzzing as a service testing platform. + (CVE-2012-2333) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages. + Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012] + + *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio + BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer + in CRYPTO_realloc_clean. + + Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this + issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it. + (CVE-2012-2110) + [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team] + Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012] *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness @@ -1394,6 +1502,86 @@ *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default. [NTT] + Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013] + + *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time. + + This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by + Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found + at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/ + + Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information + Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London + (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and + Emilia Käsper for the initial patch. + (CVE-2013-0169) + [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] + + *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL. + This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so + the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() + so it returns the certificate actually sent. + See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836. + (This is a backport) + [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>] + + *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012] + + *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS + to fix DoS attack. + + Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic + fuzzing as a service testing platform. + (CVE-2012-2333) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages. + Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012] + + *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the + 'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an + int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by + rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131) + [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>] + + Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012] + + *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio + BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer + in CRYPTO_realloc_clean. + + Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this + issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it. + (CVE-2012-2110) + [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team] + + Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012] + + *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness + in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for + content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack + needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The + old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the + CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where + an MMA defence is not necessary. + Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering + this issue. (CVE-2012-0884) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a + client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to + Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug. + [Steve Henson] + Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012] *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109. @@ -1401,7 +1589,7 @@ Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050) [Antonio Martin] - + Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012] *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension |