From 0aaa71b90a9460e0e57c8e45163d1b2ba16e2d64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dimitris Apostolou Date: Mon, 3 Jan 2022 01:00:27 +0200 Subject: Fix typos Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17392) (cherry picked from commit e304aa87b35fac5ea97c405dd3c21549faa45e78) --- crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl | 6 +++--- crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-2k-avx512.pl | 2 +- crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-3k-avx512.pl | 2 +- crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-4k-avx512.pl | 2 +- crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c | 6 +++--- crypto/context.c | 2 +- crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c | 2 +- crypto/encode_decode/encoder_lib.c | 2 +- crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c | 2 +- crypto/evp/m_sigver.c | 2 +- crypto/ffc/ffc_params_generate.c | 2 +- crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c | 2 +- crypto/x509/v3_ist.c | 2 +- crypto/x509/v3_utf8.c | 2 +- crypto/x509/v3_utl.c | 2 +- crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c | 2 +- 16 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) (limited to 'crypto') diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl index ed5ae4207c..835bd49c11 100755 --- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl +++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl @@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ ___ # If lsize < 3*16 bytes, treat them as the tail, interleave the # two blocks AES instructions. # There is one special case, if the original input data size dsize -# = 16 bytes, we will treat it seperately to improve the +# = 16 bytes, we will treat it separately to improve the # performance: one independent code block without LR, FP load and # store, just looks like what the original ECB implementation does. @@ -2222,7 +2222,7 @@ ___ # will be processed specially, which be integrated into the 5*16 bytes # loop to improve the efficiency. # There is one special case, if the original input data size dsize -# = 16 bytes, we will treat it seperately to improve the +# = 16 bytes, we will treat it separately to improve the # performance: one independent code block without LR, FP load and # store. # Encryption will process the (length -tailcnt) bytes as mentioned @@ -3555,7 +3555,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/); cbnz x2,.Lxts_dec_1st_done vld1.32 {$dat0},[$inp],#16 - // Decrypt the last secod block to get the last plain text block + // Decrypt the last second block to get the last plain text block .Lxts_dec_1st_done: eor $tmpin,$dat0,$iv1 ldr $rounds,[$key1,#240] diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-2k-avx512.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-2k-avx512.pl index 80bc4a51b2..2ae7f70b72 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-2k-avx512.pl +++ b/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-2k-avx512.pl @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ ___ # specified in the original algorithm as according to the Lemma 1 from the paper # [2], the result will be always < 2*m and can be used as a direct input to # the next AMM iteration. This post-condition is true, provided the correct -# parameter |s| (notion of the Lemma 1 from [2]) is choosen, i.e. s >= n + 2 * k, +# parameter |s| (notion of the Lemma 1 from [2]) is chosen, i.e. s >= n + 2 * k, # which matches our case: 1040 > 1024 + 2 * 1. # # [1] Gueron, S. Efficient software implementations of modular exponentiation. diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-3k-avx512.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-3k-avx512.pl index e294afd294..5e8fa4b35b 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-3k-avx512.pl +++ b/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-3k-avx512.pl @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ if ($avx512ifma>0) {{{ # specified in the original algorithm as according to the Lemma 1 from the paper # [2], the result will be always < 2*m and can be used as a direct input to # the next AMM iteration. This post-condition is true, provided the correct -# parameter |s| (notion of the Lemma 1 from [2]) is choosen, i.e. s >= n + 2 * k, +# parameter |s| (notion of the Lemma 1 from [2]) is chosen, i.e. s >= n + 2 * k, # which matches our case: 1560 > 1536 + 2 * 1. # # [1] Gueron, S. Efficient software implementations of modular exponentiation. diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-4k-avx512.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-4k-avx512.pl index fb5bf10198..417e6dc809 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-4k-avx512.pl +++ b/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-4k-avx512.pl @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ if ($avx512ifma>0) {{{ # specified in the original algorithm as according to the Lemma 1 from the paper # [2], the result will be always < 2*m and can be used as a direct input to # the next AMM iteration. This post-condition is true, provided the correct -# parameter |s| (notion of the Lemma 1 from [2]) is choosen, i.e. s >= n + 2 * k, +# parameter |s| (notion of the Lemma 1 from [2]) is chosen, i.e. s >= n + 2 * k, # which matches our case: 2080 > 2048 + 2 * 1. # # [1] Gueron, S. Efficient software implementations of modular exponentiation. diff --git a/crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c b/crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c index b9d6fc2bdd..1696685ae9 100644 --- a/crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c @@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) break; } ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, - "sucessfully validated PBM-based CMP message protection"); + "successfully validated PBM-based CMP message protection"); return 1; } ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "verifying PBM-based CMP message protection failed"); @@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) /* use ctx->srvCert for signature check even if not acceptable */ if (verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt)) { ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, - "sucessfully validated signature-based CMP message protection"); + "successfully validated signature-based CMP message protection"); return 1; } @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) * Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted. * * Ensures that: - * its sender is of appropriate type (curently only X509_NAME) and + * its sender is of appropriate type (currently only X509_NAME) and * matches any expected sender or srvCert subject given in the ctx * it has a valid body type * its protection is valid (or invalid/absent, but only if a callback function diff --git a/crypto/context.c b/crypto/context.c index bdfc4d02a3..1647371bb7 100644 --- a/crypto/context.c +++ b/crypto/context.c @@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ void *ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, int index, * The alloc call ensures there's a value there. We release the ctx->lock * for this, because the allocation itself may recursively call * ossl_lib_ctx_get_data for other indexes (never this one). The allocation - * will itself aquire the ctx->lock when it actually comes to store the + * will itself acquire the ctx->lock when it actually comes to store the * allocated data (see ossl_lib_ctx_generic_new() above). We call * ossl_crypto_alloc_ex_data_intern() here instead of CRYPTO_alloc_ex_data(). * They do the same thing except that the latter calls CRYPTO_get_ex_data() diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c b/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c index 10a4932591..0b37c4f802 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ int ossl_ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, } /* - * The first octet is the point converison octet PC, see X9.62, page 4 + * The first octet is the point conversion octet PC, see X9.62, page 4 * and section 4.4.2. It must be: * 0x00 for the point at infinity * 0x02 or 0x03 for compressed form diff --git a/crypto/encode_decode/encoder_lib.c b/crypto/encode_decode/encoder_lib.c index 7a55c7ab9a..7868da79b7 100644 --- a/crypto/encode_decode/encoder_lib.c +++ b/crypto/encode_decode/encoder_lib.c @@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static int encoder_process(struct encoder_process_data_st *data) OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(ENCODER) { BIO_printf(trc_out, - "[%d] Skipping because recusion level %d failed\n", + "[%d] Skipping because recursion level %d failed\n", data->level, new_data.level); } OSSL_TRACE_END(ENCODER); } diff --git a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c index c767c31643..47a935ce9c 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c +++ b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c @@ -2192,7 +2192,7 @@ static const struct translation_st evp_pkey_ctx_translations[] = { OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST, OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING, fix_md }, /* * The "rsa_oaep_label" ctrl_str expects the value to always be hex. - * This is accomodated by default_fixup_args() above, which mimics that + * This is accommodated by default_fixup_args() above, which mimics that * expectation for any translation item where |ctrl_str| is NULL and * |ctrl_hexstr| is non-NULL. */ diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c index 76a6814b42..fc087d2cb6 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c +++ b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx, * This might be requested by a later call to EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(). * In that case the "explicit fetch" rules apply for that * function (as per man pages), i.e. the ref count is not updated - * so the EVP_MD should not be used beyound the lifetime of the + * so the EVP_MD should not be used beyond the lifetime of the * EVP_MD_CTX. */ ctx->fetched_digest = EVP_MD_fetch(locpctx->libctx, mdname, props); diff --git a/crypto/ffc/ffc_params_generate.c b/crypto/ffc/ffc_params_generate.c index f0601e1644..3431ac7ddd 100644 --- a/crypto/ffc/ffc_params_generate.c +++ b/crypto/ffc/ffc_params_generate.c @@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ static int generate_q_fips186_2(BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *q, const EVP_MD *evpmd, } if (r != 0) goto err; /* Exit if error */ - /* Try another iteration if it wasnt prime - was in old code.. */ + /* Try another iteration if it wasn't prime - was in old code.. */ generate_seed = 1; } err: diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c index 449097b8b2..9588a75964 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c @@ -1105,7 +1105,7 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *label, int llen) if (ret <= 0) return ret; - /* Ownership is supposed to be transfered to the callee. */ + /* Ownership is supposed to be transferred to the callee. */ OPENSSL_free(label); return 1; } diff --git a/crypto/x509/v3_ist.c b/crypto/x509/v3_ist.c index 0de281f668..069ae0def4 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/v3_ist.c +++ b/crypto/x509/v3_ist.c @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ /* * Issuer Sign Tool (1.2.643.100.112) The name of the tool used to signs the subject (ASN1_SEQUENCE) - * This extention is required to obtain the status of a qualified certificate at Russian Federation. + * This extension is required to obtain the status of a qualified certificate at Russian Federation. * RFC-style description is available here: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-deremin-rfc4491-bis-04#section-5 * Russian Federal Law 63 "Digital Sign" is available here: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_112701/ */ diff --git a/crypto/x509/v3_utf8.c b/crypto/x509/v3_utf8.c index 1c4f79c4cd..ab158c2fa0 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/v3_utf8.c +++ b/crypto/x509/v3_utf8.c @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ /* * Subject Sign Tool (1.2.643.100.111) The name of the tool used to signs the subject (UTF8String) - * This extention is required to obtain the status of a qualified certificate at Russian Federation. + * This extension is required to obtain the status of a qualified certificate at Russian Federation. * RFC-style description is available here: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-deremin-rfc4491-bis-04#section-5 * Russian Federal Law 63 "Digital Sign" is available here: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_112701/ */ diff --git a/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c b/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c index 6e4ef26ed6..ba76253029 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c +++ b/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static int x509v3_add_len_value(const char *name, const char *value, if (name != NULL && (tname = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL) goto err; if (value != NULL) { - /* We don't allow embeded NUL characters */ + /* We don't allow embedded NUL characters */ if (memchr(value, 0, vallen) != NULL) goto err; tvalue = OPENSSL_strndup(value, vallen); diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c b/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c index bc90ddd89b..a2855340b8 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ static int x509_pubkey_ex_d2i_ex(ASN1_VALUE **pval, /* * Try to decode with legacy method first. This ensures that engines - * aren't overriden by providers. + * aren't overridden by providers. */ if ((ret = x509_pubkey_decode(&pubkey->pkey, pubkey)) == -1) { /* -1 indicates a fatal error, like malloc failure */ -- cgit v1.2.1