Ensure OAuth1 authorized roles are respected

Without this patch, when an OAuth1 request token is authorized with a
limited set of roles, the roles for the access token are ignored when
the user uses it to request a keystone token. This means that user of an
access token can use it to escallate their role assignments beyond what
was authorized by the creator. This patch fixes the issue by ensuring
the token model accounts for an OAuth1-scoped token and correctly
populating the roles for it.

Change-Id: I02f9836fbd4d7e629653977fc341476cfd89859e
Closes-bug: #1873290
(cherry picked from commit 6c73690f779a42a5c62914b6bc37f0ac2f41a3e3)
(cherry picked from commit ba89d27793c2d3a26ad95642660fa9bd820ed3be)

3 files changed, 50 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/keystone/models/token_model.py b/keystone/models/token_model.py
index 077f138b2..4b308d62a 100644
--- a/keystone/models/token_model.py
+++ b/keystone/models/token_model.py
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 """Unified in-memory token model."""
 
 from oslo_log import log
+from oslo_serialization import jsonutils
 from oslo_serialization import msgpackutils
 from oslo_utils import reflection
 import six
@@ -328,6 +329,21 @@ class TokenModel(object):
 
         return roles
 
+    def _get_oauth_roles(self):
+        roles = []
+        access_token_roles = self.access_token['role_ids']
+        access_token_roles = [
+            {'role_id': r} for r in jsonutils.loads(access_token_roles)]
+        effective_access_token_roles = (
+            PROVIDERS.assignment_api.add_implied_roles(access_token_roles)
+        )
+        user_roles = [r['id'] for r in self._get_project_roles()]
+        for role in effective_access_token_roles:
+            if role['role_id'] in user_roles:
+                role = PROVIDERS.role_api.get_role(role['role_id'])
+                roles.append({'id': role['id'], 'name': role['name']})
+        return roles
+
     def _get_federated_roles(self):
         roles = []
         group_ids = [group['id'] for group in self.federated_groups]
@@ -431,6 +447,8 @@ class TokenModel(object):
             roles = self._get_system_roles()
         elif self.trust_scoped:
             roles = self._get_trust_roles()
+        elif self.oauth_scoped:
+            roles = self._get_oauth_roles()
         elif self.is_federated and not self.unscoped:
             roles = self._get_federated_roles()
         elif self.domain_scoped:
diff --git a/keystone/tests/unit/test_v3_oauth1.py b/keystone/tests/unit/test_v3_oauth1.py
index 90378214e..4c648a23e 100644
--- a/keystone/tests/unit/test_v3_oauth1.py
+++ b/keystone/tests/unit/test_v3_oauth1.py
@@ -308,6 +308,19 @@ class OAuthFlowTests(OAuth1Tests):
         self.keystone_token = content.result['token']
         self.assertIsNotNone(self.keystone_token_id)
 
+        # add a new role assignment to ensure it is ignored in the access token
+        new_role = {'id': uuid.uuid4().hex, 'name': uuid.uuid4().hex}
+        PROVIDERS.role_api.create_role(new_role['id'], new_role)
+        PROVIDERS.assignment_api.add_role_to_user_and_project(
+            user_id=self.user_id,
+            project_id=self.project_id,
+            role_id=new_role['id'])
+        content = self.post(url, headers=headers, body=body)
+        token = content.result['token']
+        token_roles = [r['id'] for r in token['roles']]
+        self.assertIn(self.role_id, token_roles)
+        self.assertNotIn(new_role['id'], token_roles)
+
 
 class AccessTokenCRUDTests(OAuthFlowTests):
     def test_delete_access_token_dne(self):
diff --git a/releasenotes/notes/bug-1873290-ff7f8e4cee15b75a.yaml b/releasenotes/notes/bug-1873290-ff7f8e4cee15b75a.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ad35a3047
--- /dev/null
+++ b/releasenotes/notes/bug-1873290-ff7f8e4cee15b75a.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+---
+security:
+  - |
+    [`bug 1873290 <https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1873290>`_]
+    [`bug 1872735 <https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1872735>`_]
+    Fixed the token model to respect the roles authorized OAuth1 access tokens.
+    Previously, the list of roles authorized for an OAuth1 access token were
+    ignored, so when an access token was used to request a keystone token, the
+    keystone token would contain every role assignment the creator had for the
+    project. This also fixed EC2 credentials to respect those roles as well.
+fixes:
+  - |
+    [`bug 1873290 <https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1873290>`_]
+    [`bug 1872735 <https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1872735>`_]
+    Fixed the token model to respect the roles authorized OAuth1 access tokens.
+    Previously, the list of roles authorized for an OAuth1 access token were
+    ignored, so when an access token was used to request a keystone token, the
+    keystone token would contain every role assignment the creator had for the
+    project. This also fixed EC2 credentials to respect those roles as well.