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author | Mike Guy <mjtg@cam.ac.uk> | 2001-06-06 20:58:15 +0000 |
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committer | Jarkko Hietaniemi <jhi@iki.fi> | 2001-06-06 20:58:15 +0000 |
commit | ee556d553a6eff7ecdc9231bcb7bcb56f26130e7 (patch) | |
tree | c4bcc6058935e43e5844b0761c74c1da48e801c9 /pod/perlsec.pod | |
parent | bef5f0791f598e360cf5fd6b8d073db19bd2955c (diff) | |
download | perl-ee556d553a6eff7ecdc9231bcb7bcb56f26130e7.tar.gz |
Re: [ID 20010604.015] taint + comma = false insecurity
Reply-To: mjtg@cam.ac.uk
Message-Id: <E157flx-0006Uz-00@draco.cus.cam.ac.uk>
p4raw-id: //depot/perl@10459
Diffstat (limited to 'pod/perlsec.pod')
-rw-r--r-- | pod/perlsec.pod | 14 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/pod/perlsec.pod b/pod/perlsec.pod index 622e25fb40..87d1f7b340 100644 --- a/pod/perlsec.pod +++ b/pod/perlsec.pod @@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ directories, or processes, B<with the following exceptions>: =item * -If you pass a list of arguments to either C<system> or C<exec>, -the elements of that list are B<not> checked for taintedness. +If you pass more than one argument to either C<system> or C<exec>, +the arguments are B<not> checked for taintedness. =item * @@ -53,9 +53,10 @@ Arguments to C<print> and C<syswrite> are B<not> checked for taintedness. =back -Any variable set to a value -derived from tainted data will itself be tainted, even if it is -logically impossible for the tainted data to alter the variable. +The value of an expression containing tainted data will itself be +tainted, even if it is logically impossible for the tainted data to +affect the value. + Because taintedness is associated with each scalar value, some elements of an array can be tainted and others not. @@ -107,6 +108,9 @@ For example: # either case the result is tainted since the list of filenames comes # from outside of the program. + $bad = ($arg, 23); # $bad will be tainted + $arg, `true`; # Insecure (although it isn't really) + If you try to do something insecure, you will get a fatal error saying something like "Insecure dependency" or "Insecure $ENV{PATH}". Note that you can still write an insecure B<system> or B<exec>, but only by explicitly |