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authorJarkko Hietaniemi <jhi@iki.fi>2003-09-08 21:09:34 +0000
committerJarkko Hietaniemi <jhi@iki.fi>2003-09-08 21:09:34 +0000
commit9a7034eb2c2d4f0ed795b3c479d700ded086d7e8 (patch)
treead5dacb3d6af123872a27a1b46cfd37069a0e138 /universal.c
parent504b85fcd4e66cce16619378c0455c069a17ed61 (diff)
downloadperl-9a7034eb2c2d4f0ed795b3c479d700ded086d7e8.tar.gz
Retract #21096, mostly: I had misexplained the situation
to Scott A. Crosby. Seeing the seed value while not good for the ultimate paranoia viewpoint is not that bad, as long as the users are fully aware of the dangers of disclosing the hash seed. So hash_seed() is okay. Being able to see the hash values (as in Java) would be another option, but dubious: it's not that per-key hash values themselves are bad to allow scripts to see, but rather that hash values are just as sensitive (from the DoSing viewpoint) as the hash seed itself (and there usually more hash values than the one hash seed....) p4raw-id: //depot/perl@21112
Diffstat (limited to 'universal.c')
-rw-r--r--universal.c8
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/universal.c b/universal.c
index dc9e253062..15c408d301 100644
--- a/universal.c
+++ b/universal.c
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ XS(XS_Internals_SvREFCNT);
XS(XS_Internals_hv_clear_placehold);
XS(XS_PerlIO_get_layers);
XS(XS_Regexp_DESTROY);
-XS(XS_Internals_hashes_random);
+XS(XS_Internals_hash_seed);
void
Perl_boot_core_UNIVERSAL(pTHX)
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ Perl_boot_core_UNIVERSAL(pTHX)
newXSproto("PerlIO::get_layers",
XS_PerlIO_get_layers, file, "*;@");
newXS("Regexp::DESTROY", XS_Regexp_DESTROY, file);
- newXSproto("Internals::hashes_random",XS_Internals_hashes_random, file, "");
+ newXSproto("Internals::hash_seed",XS_Internals_hash_seed, file, "");
}
@@ -908,9 +908,9 @@ XS(XS_PerlIO_get_layers)
XSRETURN(0);
}
-XS(XS_Internals_hashes_random)
+XS(XS_Internals_hash_seed)
{
dXSARGS;
- XSRETURN_IV(PL_hash_seed ? 1 : 0);
+ XSRETURN_UV(PL_hash_seed);
}