diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'dist')
| -rw-r--r-- | dist/Storable/ChangeLog | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | dist/Storable/Storable.pm | 34 |
2 files changed, 38 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/dist/Storable/ChangeLog b/dist/Storable/ChangeLog index 351159c87a..31e1b0ca25 100644 --- a/dist/Storable/ChangeLog +++ b/dist/Storable/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,8 @@ +? + Version 2.40 + + Security warnings section added + Tue 11 Sep 06:51:11 IST 2012 Abhijit Menon-Sen <ams@toroid.org> Version 2.39 diff --git a/dist/Storable/Storable.pm b/dist/Storable/Storable.pm index 668bf446c6..7d53454ba6 100644 --- a/dist/Storable/Storable.pm +++ b/dist/Storable/Storable.pm @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ package Storable; @ISA = qw(Exporter); use vars qw($canonical $forgive_me $VERSION); -$VERSION = '2.39'; +$VERSION = '2.40'; BEGIN { if (eval { local $SIG{__DIE__}; require Log::Agent; 1 }) { @@ -1019,6 +1019,38 @@ compartment: =for example_testing is( $code->(), 42 ); +=head1 SECURITY WARNING + +B<Do not accept Storable documents from untrusted sources!> + +Some features of Storable can lead to security vulnerabilities if you +accept Storable documents from untrusted sources. Most obviously, the +optional (off by default) CODE reference serialization feature allows +transfer of code to the deserializing process. Furthermore, any +serialized object will cause Storable to helpfully load the module +corresponding to the class of the object in the deserializing module. +For manipulated module names, this can load almost arbitrary code. +Finally, the deserialized object's destructors will be invoked when +the objects get destroyed in the deserializing process. Maliciously +crafted Storable documents may put such objects in the value of +a hash key that is overridden by another key/value pair in the +same hash, thus causing immediate destructor execution. + +In a future version of Storable, we intend to provide options to disable +loading modules for classes and to disable deserializing objects +altogether. I<Nonetheless, Storable deserializing documents from +untrusted sources is expected to have other, yet undiscovered, +security concerns such as allowing an attacker to cause the deserializer +to crash hard.> + +B<Therefore, let me repeat: Do not accept Storable documents from +untrusted sources!> + +If your application requires accepting data from untrusted sources, you +are best off with a less powerful and more-likely safe serialization format +and implementation. If your data is sufficently simple, JSON is a good +choice and offers maximum interoperability. + =head1 WARNING If you're using references as keys within your hash tables, you're bound |