1 files changed, 12 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/pod/perlsec.pod b/pod/perlsec.pod
index 713a89c02c..b271f7016c 100644
--- a/pod/perlsec.pod
+++ b/pod/perlsec.pod
@@ -32,18 +32,18 @@ program more secure than the corresponding C program.
 You may not use data derived from outside your program to affect
 something else outside your program--at least, not by accident.  All
 command line arguments, environment variables, locale information (see
-L<perllocale>), results of certain system calls (readdir, readlink,
-the password, gcos and shell fields of the getpw* calls), and all file
-input are marked as "tainted".  Tainted data may not be used directly
-or indirectly in any command that invokes a sub-shell, nor in any
-command that modifies files, directories, or processes. (B<Important
-exception>: If you pass a list of arguments to either C<system> or
-C<exec>, the elements of that list are B<NOT> checked for
-taintedness.) Any variable set to a value derived from tainted data
-will itself be tainted, even if it is logically impossible for the
-tainted data to alter the variable.  Because taintedness is associated
-with each scalar value, some elements of an array can be tainted and
-others not.
+L<perllocale>), results of certain system calls (readdir(),
+readlink(), the variable of() shmread, the password, gcos and shell
+fields of the getpwxxx() calls), and all file input are marked as
+"tainted".  Tainted data may not be used directly or indirectly in any
+command that invokes a sub-shell, nor in any command that modifies
+files, directories, or processes. (B<Important exception>: If you pass
+a list of arguments to either C<system> or C<exec>, the elements of
+that list are B<NOT> checked for taintedness.) Any variable set to a
+value derived from tainted data will itself be tainted, even if it is
+logically impossible for the tainted data to alter the variable.
+Because taintedness is associated with each scalar value, some
+elements of an array can be tainted and others not.
 
 For example: