libxslt offers the ability to read and write both files and URLs through
stylesheet commands, thus allowing unprivileged database users to both read
and write data with the privileges of the database server.  Disable that
through proper use of libxslt's security options.

Also, remove xslt_process()'s ability to fetch documents and stylesheets
from external files/URLs.  While this was a documented "feature", it was
long regarded as a terrible idea.  The fix for CVE-2012-3489 broke that
capability, and rather than expend effort on trying to fix it, we're just
going to summarily remove it.

While the ability to write as well as read makes this security hole
considerably worse than CVE-2012-3489, the problem is mitigated by the fact
that xslt_process() is not available unless contrib/xml2 is installed,
and the longstanding warnings about security risks from that should have
discouraged prudent DBAs from installing it in security-exposed databases.

Reported and fixed by Peter Eisentraut.

Security: CVE-2012-3488

xml_parse() would attempt to fetch external files or URLs as needed to
resolve DTD and entity references in an XML value, thus allowing
unprivileged database users to attempt to fetch data with the privileges
of the database server.  While the external data wouldn't get returned
directly to the user, portions of it could be exposed in error messages
if the data didn't parse as valid XML; and in any case the mere ability
to check existence of a file might be useful to an attacker.

The ideal solution to this would still allow fetching of references that
are listed in the host system's XML catalogs, so that documents can be
validated according to installed DTDs.  However, doing that with the
available libxml2 APIs appears complex and error-prone, so we're not going
to risk it in a security patch that necessarily hasn't gotten wide review.
So this patch merely shuts off all access, causing any external fetch to
silently expand to an empty string.  A future patch may improve this.

In HEAD and 9.2, also suppress warnings about undefined entities, which
would otherwise occur as a result of not loading referenced DTDs.  Previous
branches don't show such warnings anyway, due to different error handling
arrangements.

Credit to Noah Misch for first reporting the problem, and for much work
towards a solution, though this simplistic approach was not his preference.
Also thanks to Daniel Veillard for consultation.

Security: CVE-2012-3489

DST law changes in Morocco; Tokelau has relocated to the other side of
the International Date Line; and apparently Olson had Tokelau's GMT
offset wrong by an hour even before that.

There are also a large number of non-significant changes in this update.
Upstream took the opportunity to remove trailing whitespace, and the
SCCS-style version numbers on the individual files are gone too.

Should be limited to the maximum number of connections excluding
autovacuum workers, not including.

Add similar check for max_wal_senders, which should never be higher than
max_connections.

Dave Kerr, backpatched by Simon Riggs

This alternative expected output file is required when using SQL_ASCII
as the client and server encoding. The python encoding conversion used to
throw an error on that, but it is now accepted and you get the UTF-8
representation of the string. I thought that case was already covered by
the other expected output files, but the buildfarm says otherwise.

This is only required on REL9_2_STABLE. In 9.1, we explicitly set
client_encoding to UTF-8 to avoid this.

We used to convert the unicode object directly to a string in the server
encoding by calling Python's PyUnicode_AsEncodedString function. In other
words, we used Python's routines to do the encoding. However, that has a
few problems. First of all, it required keeping a mapping table of Python
encoding names and PostgreSQL encodings. But the real killer was that Python
doesn't support EUC_TW and MULE_INTERNAL encodings at all.

Instead, convert the Python unicode object to UTF-8, and use PostgreSQL's
encoding conversion functions to convert from UTF-8 to server encoding. We
were already doing the same in the other direction in PLyUnicode_FromString,
so this is more consistent, too.

Note: This makes SQL_ASCII to behave more leniently. We used to map
SQL_ASCII to Python's 'ascii', which on Python means strict 7-bit ASCII
only, so you got an error if the python string contained anything but pure
ASCII. You no longer get an error; you get the UTF-8 representation of the
string instead.

Backpatch to 9.0, where these conversions were introduced.

Jan Urbański