Source-Git-URL: git://git.postgresql.org/git/pgtranslation/messages.git
Source-Git-Hash: 7a7a803d44fad7952cf6b1a1da29df2b06b1b380

In the documentation for nextval(), point out explicitly that INSERT ...
ON CONFLICT will call nextval() if needed for the insertion case, whether
or not it ends up following the ON CONFLICT path.  This seems to be a
matter of some confusion, cf bug #14126, so let's be clear about it.

Also mention the issue in the CREATE SEQUENCE reference page, since that
is another place where people might expect such things to be covered.

Minor wording improvements nearby, as well.

Back-patch to 9.5 where ON CONFLICT was introduced.

OpenSSL has an unfortunate tendency to mix per-session state error
handling with per-thread error handling.  This can cause problems when
programs that link to libpq with OpenSSL enabled have some other use of
OpenSSL; without care, one caller of OpenSSL may cause problems for the
other caller.  Backend code might similarly be affected, for example
when a third party extension independently uses OpenSSL without taking
the appropriate precautions.

To fix, don't trust other users of OpenSSL to clear the per-thread error
queue.  Instead, clear the entire per-thread queue ahead of certain I/O
operations when it appears that there might be trouble (these I/O
operations mostly need to call SSL_get_error() to check for success,
which relies on the queue being empty).  This is slightly aggressive,
but it's pretty clear that the other callers have a very dubious claim
to ownership of the per-thread queue.  Do this is both frontend and
backend code.

Finally, be more careful about clearing our own error queue, so as to
not cause these problems ourself.  It's possibly that control previously
did not always reach SSLerrmessage(), where ERR_get_error() was supposed
to be called to clear the queue's earliest code.  Make sure
ERR_get_error() is always called, so as to spare other users of OpenSSL
the possibility of similar problems caused by libpq (as opposed to
problems caused by a third party OpenSSL library like PHP's OpenSSL
extension).  Again, do this is both frontend and backend code.

See bug #12799 and https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=68276

Based on patches by Dave Vitek and Peter Eisentraut.

From: Peter Geoghegan <pg@bowt.ie>

These were accidentally broken by the great backpatching of
331828b754378733cb5c2e49227603e7354e4e39.

This patch essentially reverts commit 4c6780fd17aa43ed, in favor of a much
simpler solution for the case where the new cluster would choose to create
a TOAST table but the old cluster doesn't have one: just don't create a
TOAST table.

The existing code failed in at least two different ways if the situation
arose: (1) ALTER TABLE RESET didn't grab an exclusive lock, so that the
lock sanity check in create_toast_table failed; (2) pg_upgrade did not
provide a pg_type OID for the new toast table, so that the crosscheck in
TypeCreate failed.  While both these problems were introduced by later
patches, they show that the hack being used to cause TOAST table creation
is overwhelmingly fragile (and untested).  I also note that before the
TypeCreate crosscheck was added, the code would have resulted in assigning
an indeterminate pg_type OID to the toast table, possibly causing a later
OID conflict in that catalog; so that it didn't really work even when
committed.

If we simply don't create a TOAST table, there will only be a problem if
the code tries to store a tuple that's wider than a page, and field
compression isn't sufficient to get it under a page.  Given that the TOAST
creation threshold is intended to be about a quarter of a page, it's very
hard to believe that cross-version differences in the do-we-need-a-toast-
table heuristic could result in an observable problem.  So let's just
follow the old version's conclusion about whether a TOAST table is needed.

(If we ever do change needs_toast_table() so much that this conclusion
doesn't apply, we can devise a solution at that time, and hopefully do
it in a less klugy way than 4c6780fd17aa43ed did.)

Back-patch to 9.3, like the previous patch.

Discussion: <8110.1462291671@sss.pgh.pa.us>

to_timestamp() handles the TH/th format codes by advancing over two input
characters, whatever those are.  It failed to notice whether there were
two characters available to be skipped, making it possible to advance
the pointer past the end of the input string and keep on parsing.
A similar risk existed in the handling of "Y,YYY" format: it would advance
over three characters after the "," whether or not three characters were
available.

In principle this might be exploitable to disclose contents of server
memory.  But the security team concluded that it would be very hard to use
that way, because the parsing loop would stop upon hitting any zero byte,
and TH/th format codes can't be consecutive --- they have to follow some
other format code, which would have to match whatever data is there.
So it seems impractical to examine memory very much beyond the end of the
input string via this bug; and the input string will always be in local
memory not in disk buffers, making it unlikely that anything very
interesting is close to it in a predictable way.  So this doesn't quite
rise to the level of needing a CVE.

Thanks to Wolf Roediger for reporting this bug.

DST law changes in Russia (Magadan, Tomsk regions) and Venezuela.
Historical corrections for Russia.  There are new zone names Europe/Kirov
and Asia/Tomsk reflecting the fact that these regions now have different
time zone histories from adjacent regions.

Somebody added pg_replication_origin, pg_replication_origin_status and
pg_replication_slots to catalogs.sgml without a whole lot of concern for
either alphabetical order or the difference between a table and a view.
Clean up the mess.

Back-patch to 9.5, not so much because this is critical as because if
I don't it will result in a cross-branch divergence in release-9.5.sgml,
which would be a maintenance hazard.