pgcrypto had internal implementations of some encryption algorithms, as an alternative to calling out to OpenSSL. These were rarely used, since most production installations are built with OpenSSL. Moreover, maintaining parallel code paths makes the code more complex and difficult to maintain. This patch removes these internal implementations. Now, pgcrypto is only built if OpenSSL support is configured. Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/0b42f1df-8cba-6a30-77d7-acc241cc88c1%40enterprisedb.com
This is a replacement for the existing --with-openssl, extending the logic to make easier the addition of new SSL libraries. The grammar is chosen to be similar to --with-uuid, where multiple values can be chosen, with "openssl" as the only supported value for now. The original switch, --with-openssl, is kept for compatibility. Author: Daniel Gustafsson, Michael Paquier Reviewed-by: Jacob Champion Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/FAB21FC8-0F62-434F-AA78-6BD9336D630A@yesql.se
With this commit, SHA1 goes through the implementation provided by OpenSSL via EVP when building the backend with it, and uses as fallback implementation KAME which was located in pgcrypto and already shaped for an integration with a set of init, update and final routines. Structures and routines have been renamed to make things consistent with the fallback implementations of MD5 and SHA2. uuid-ossp has used for ages a shortcut with pgcrypto to fetch a copy of SHA1 if needed. This was built depending on the build options within ./configure, so this cleans up some code and removes the build dependency between pgcrypto and uuid-ossp. Note that this will help with the refactoring of HMAC, as pgcrypto offers the option to use MD5, SHA1 or SHA2, so only the second option was missing to make that possible. Author: Michael Paquier Reviewed-by: Heikki Linnakangas Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9HXKTgrvJvYO7Oh@paquier.xyz
This commit heavily reorganizes the MD5 implementations that exist in the tree in various aspects. First, MD5 is added to the list of options available in cryptohash.c and cryptohash_openssl.c. This means that if building with OpenSSL, EVP is used for MD5 instead of the fallback implementation that Postgres had for ages. With the recent refactoring work for cryptohash functions, this change is straight-forward. If not building with OpenSSL, a fallback implementation internal to src/common/ is used. Second, this reduces the number of MD5 implementations present in the tree from two to one, by moving the KAME implementation from pgcrypto to src/common/, and by removing the implementation that existed in src/common/. KAME was already structured with an init/update/final set of routines by pgcrypto (see original pgcrypto/md5.h) for compatibility with OpenSSL, so moving it to src/common/ has proved to be a straight-forward move, requiring no actual manipulation of the internals of each routine. Some benchmarking has not shown any performance gap between both implementations. Similarly to the fallback implementation used for SHA2, the fallback implementation of MD5 is moved to src/common/md5.c with an internal header called md5_int.h for the init, update and final routines. This gets then consumed by cryptohash.c. The original routines used for MD5-hashed passwords are moved to a separate file called md5_common.c, also in src/common/, aimed at being shared between all MD5 implementations as utility routines to keep compatibility with any code relying on them. Like the SHA2 changes, this commit had its round of tests on both Linux and Windows, across all versions of OpenSSL supported on HEAD, with and even without OpenSSL. Author: Michael Paquier Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20201106073434.GA4961@paquier.xyz
Andres Freund pointed out that allowing non-superusers to run "CREATE EXTENSION ... FROM unpackaged" has security risks, since the unpackaged-to-1.0 scripts don't try to verify that the existing objects they're modifying are what they expect. Just attaching such objects to an extension doesn't seem too dangerous, but some of them do more than that. We could have resolved this, perhaps, by still requiring superuser privilege to use the FROM option. However, it's fair to ask just what we're accomplishing by continuing to lug the unpackaged-to-1.0 scripts forward. None of them have received any real testing since 9.1 days, so they may not even work anymore (even assuming that one could still load the previous "loose" object definitions into a v13 database). And an installation that's trying to go from pre-9.1 to v13 or later in one jump is going to have worse compatibility problems than whether there's a trivial way to convert their contrib modules into extension style. Hence, let's just drop both those scripts and the core-code support for "CREATE EXTENSION ... FROM". Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20200213233015.r6rnubcvl4egdh5r@alap3.anarazel.de
When maintaining or merging patches, one of the most common sources for conflicts are the list of objects in makefiles. Especially when the split across lines has been changed on both sides, which is somewhat common due to attempting to stay below 80 columns, those conflicts are unnecessarily laborious to resolve. By splitting, and alphabetically sorting, OBJS style lines into one object per line, conflicts should be less frequent, and easier to resolve when they still occur. Author: Andres Freund Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20191029200901.vww4idgcxv74cwes@alap3.anarazel.de
Upstream fixed bugs over the years, but none are confirmed to have
affected pgcrypto. We're better off naively tracking upstream than
reactively maintaining a twelve-year-old snapshot of upstream. Add a
header comment describing the synchronization procedure. Discard use of
INVERT_COMPARE_RESULT(); the domain of the comparisons in question is
{-1,0,1}, controlled entirely by code in imath.c.
Andrew Gierth reviewed the Makefile change. Tom Lane reviewed the
synchronization procedure description.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20190203035704.GA6226@rfd.leadboat.com
This introduces a new generic SASL authentication method, similar to the GSS and SSPI methods. The server first tells the client which SASL authentication mechanism to use, and then the mechanism-specific SASL messages are exchanged in AuthenticationSASLcontinue and PasswordMessage messages. Only SCRAM-SHA-256 is supported at the moment, but this allows adding more SASL mechanisms in the future, without changing the overall protocol. Support for channel binding, aka SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS is left for later. The SASLPrep algorithm, for pre-processing the password, is not yet implemented. That could cause trouble, if you use a password with non-ASCII characters, and a client library that does implement SASLprep. That will hopefully be added later. Authorization identities, as specified in the SCRAM-SHA-256 specification, are ignored. SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION provides more or less the same functionality, anyway. If a user doesn't exist, perform a "mock" authentication, by constructing an authentic-looking challenge on the fly. The challenge is derived from a new system-wide random value, "mock authentication nonce", which is created at initdb, and stored in the control file. We go through these motions, in order to not give away the information on whether the user exists, to unauthenticated users. Bumps PG_CONTROL_VERSION, because of the new field in control file. Patch by Michael Paquier and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed at different stages by Robert Haas, Stephen Frost, David Steele, Aleksander Alekseev, and many others. Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRbR3GmFYdedCAhzukfKrgBLTLtMvENOmPrVWREsZkF8g%40mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSMXU35g%3DW9X74HVeQp0uvgJxvYOuA4A-A3M%2B0wfEBv-w%40mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/55192AFE.6080106@iki.fi
This way both frontend and backends can use them. The functions are taken from pgcrypto, which now fetches the source files it needs from src/common/. A new interface is designed for the SHA2 functions, which allow linking to either OpenSSL or the in-core stuff taken from KAME as needed. Michael Paquier, reviewed by Robert Haas. Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqTGKuTM5jiZriHrNaQeVqp5e_iT3X4BFLWY_HyHxLvySQ%40mail.gmail.com
This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes, for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong random numbers in libpq as well. pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources, depending on what's available: - OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL - On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used - /dev/urandom Unlike the current pgcrypto function, the source is chosen by configure. That makes it easier to test different implementations, and ensures that we don't accidentally fall back to a less secure implementation, if the primary source fails. All of those methods are quite reliable, it would be pretty surprising for them to fail, so we'd rather find out by failing hard. If no strong random source is available, we fall back to using erand48(), seeded from current timestamp, like PostmasterRandom() was. That isn't cryptographically secure, but allows us to still work on platforms that don't have any of the above stronger sources. Because it's not very secure, the built-in implementation is only used if explicitly requested with --disable-strong-random. This replaces the more complicated Fortuna algorithm we used to have in pgcrypto, which is unfortunate, but all modern platforms have /dev/urandom, so it doesn't seem worth the maintenance effort to keep that. pgcrypto functions that require strong random numbers will be disabled with --disable-strong-random. Original patch by Magnus Hagander, tons of further work by Michael Paquier and me. Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRWkNYRRPJA7-cF+LfroYV10pvjdz6GNvxk-Eee9FypKA@mail.gmail.com