// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be // found in the LICENSE file. #include "content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.h" #include "base/command_line.h" #include "base/files/file_path.h" #include "base/logging.h" #include "base/metrics/histogram.h" #include "base/platform_file.h" #include "base/stl_util.h" #include "base/strings/string_util.h" #include "content/browser/plugin_process_host.h" #include "content/browser/site_instance_impl.h" #include "content/public/browser/child_process_data.h" #include "content/public/browser/content_browser_client.h" #include "content/public/browser/render_process_host.h" #include "content/public/common/bindings_policy.h" #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h" #include "content/public/common/url_constants.h" #include "net/base/net_util.h" #include "net/url_request/url_request.h" #include "url/gurl.h" #include "webkit/browser/fileapi/file_permission_policy.h" #include "webkit/browser/fileapi/file_system_url.h" #include "webkit/browser/fileapi/isolated_context.h" #include "webkit/common/fileapi/file_system_util.h" namespace content { namespace { const int kReadFilePermissions = base::PLATFORM_FILE_OPEN | base::PLATFORM_FILE_READ | base::PLATFORM_FILE_EXCLUSIVE_READ | base::PLATFORM_FILE_ASYNC; const int kWriteFilePermissions = base::PLATFORM_FILE_OPEN | base::PLATFORM_FILE_WRITE | base::PLATFORM_FILE_APPEND | base::PLATFORM_FILE_EXCLUSIVE_WRITE | base::PLATFORM_FILE_ASYNC | base::PLATFORM_FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES; const int kCreateFilePermissions = base::PLATFORM_FILE_CREATE; const int kEnumerateDirectoryPermissions = kReadFilePermissions | base::PLATFORM_FILE_ENUMERATE; // TODO(tommycli): These flag sets need some work to make more obvious. // Why for instance, does Create|Write != CreateWrite? http://crbug.com/263150 const int kCreateReadWriteFilePermissions = kReadFilePermissions | kWriteFilePermissions | kCreateFilePermissions | base::PLATFORM_FILE_OPEN_ALWAYS | base::PLATFORM_FILE_CREATE_ALWAYS | base::PLATFORM_FILE_OPEN_TRUNCATED; const int kCreateWriteFilePermissions = kWriteFilePermissions | kCreateFilePermissions | base::PLATFORM_FILE_OPEN_ALWAYS | base::PLATFORM_FILE_CREATE_ALWAYS | base::PLATFORM_FILE_OPEN_TRUNCATED; } // namespace // The SecurityState class is used to maintain per-child process security state // information. class ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::SecurityState { public: SecurityState() : enabled_bindings_(0), can_read_raw_cookies_(false), can_send_midi_sysex_(false) { } ~SecurityState() { scheme_policy_.clear(); fileapi::IsolatedContext* isolated_context = fileapi::IsolatedContext::GetInstance(); for (FileSystemMap::iterator iter = filesystem_permissions_.begin(); iter != filesystem_permissions_.end(); ++iter) { isolated_context->RemoveReference(iter->first); } UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("ChildProcessSecurityPolicy.PerChildFilePermissions", file_permissions_.size()); } // Grant permission to request URLs with the specified scheme. void GrantScheme(const std::string& scheme) { scheme_policy_[scheme] = true; } // Revoke permission to request URLs with the specified scheme. void RevokeScheme(const std::string& scheme) { scheme_policy_[scheme] = false; } // Grant certain permissions to a file. void GrantPermissionsForFile(const base::FilePath& file, int permissions) { base::FilePath stripped = file.StripTrailingSeparators(); file_permissions_[stripped] |= permissions; UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("ChildProcessSecurityPolicy.FilePermissionPathLength", stripped.value().size()); } // Grant navigation to a file but not the file:// scheme in general. void GrantRequestOfSpecificFile(const base::FilePath &file) { request_file_set_.insert(file.StripTrailingSeparators()); } // Revokes all permissions granted to a file. void RevokeAllPermissionsForFile(const base::FilePath& file) { base::FilePath stripped = file.StripTrailingSeparators(); file_permissions_.erase(stripped); request_file_set_.erase(stripped); } // Grant certain permissions to a file. void GrantPermissionsForFileSystem(const std::string& filesystem_id, int permissions) { if (filesystem_permissions_.find(filesystem_id) == filesystem_permissions_.end()) fileapi::IsolatedContext::GetInstance()->AddReference(filesystem_id); filesystem_permissions_[filesystem_id] |= permissions; } bool HasPermissionsForFileSystem(const std::string& filesystem_id, int permissions) { if (filesystem_permissions_.find(filesystem_id) == filesystem_permissions_.end()) return false; return (filesystem_permissions_[filesystem_id] & permissions) == permissions; } void GrantBindings(int bindings) { enabled_bindings_ |= bindings; } void GrantReadRawCookies() { can_read_raw_cookies_ = true; } void RevokeReadRawCookies() { can_read_raw_cookies_ = false; } void GrantPermissionForMIDISysEx() { can_send_midi_sysex_ = true; } // Determine whether permission has been granted to request |url|. bool CanRequestURL(const GURL& url) { // Having permission to a scheme implies permssion to all of its URLs. SchemeMap::const_iterator judgment(scheme_policy_.find(url.scheme())); if (judgment != scheme_policy_.end()) return judgment->second; // file:// URLs are more granular. The child may have been given // permission to a specific file but not the file:// scheme in general. if (url.SchemeIs(chrome::kFileScheme)) { base::FilePath path; if (net::FileURLToFilePath(url, &path)) return request_file_set_.find(path) != request_file_set_.end(); } return false; // Unmentioned schemes are disallowed. } // Determine if the certain permissions have been granted to a file. bool HasPermissionsForFile(const base::FilePath& file, int permissions) { if (!permissions || file.empty() || !file.IsAbsolute()) return false; base::FilePath current_path = file.StripTrailingSeparators(); base::FilePath last_path; int skip = 0; while (current_path != last_path) { base::FilePath base_name = current_path.BaseName(); if (base_name.value() == base::FilePath::kParentDirectory) { ++skip; } else if (skip > 0) { if (base_name.value() != base::FilePath::kCurrentDirectory) --skip; } else { if (file_permissions_.find(current_path) != file_permissions_.end()) return (file_permissions_[current_path] & permissions) == permissions; } last_path = current_path; current_path = current_path.DirName(); } return false; } bool CanLoadPage(const GURL& gurl) { if (origin_lock_.is_empty()) return true; // TODO(creis): We must pass the valid browser_context to convert hosted // apps URLs. Currently, hosted apps cannot be loaded in this mode. // See http://crbug.com/160576. GURL site_gurl = SiteInstanceImpl::GetSiteForURL(NULL, gurl); return origin_lock_ == site_gurl; } bool CanAccessCookiesForOrigin(const GURL& gurl) { if (origin_lock_.is_empty()) return true; // TODO(creis): We must pass the valid browser_context to convert hosted // apps URLs. Currently, hosted apps cannot set cookies in this mode. // See http://crbug.com/160576. GURL site_gurl = SiteInstanceImpl::GetSiteForURL(NULL, gurl); return origin_lock_ == site_gurl; } bool CanSendCookiesForOrigin(const GURL& gurl) { // We only block cross-site cookies on network requests if the // --enable-strict-site-isolation flag is passed. This is expected to break // compatibility with many sites. The similar --site-per-process flag only // blocks JavaScript access to cross-site cookies (in // CanAccessCookiesForOrigin). const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(); if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableStrictSiteIsolation)) return true; if (origin_lock_.is_empty()) return true; // TODO(creis): We must pass the valid browser_context to convert hosted // apps URLs. Currently, hosted apps cannot set cookies in this mode. // See http://crbug.com/160576. GURL site_gurl = SiteInstanceImpl::GetSiteForURL(NULL, gurl); return origin_lock_ == site_gurl; } void LockToOrigin(const GURL& gurl) { origin_lock_ = gurl; } bool has_web_ui_bindings() const { return enabled_bindings_ & BINDINGS_POLICY_WEB_UI; } bool can_read_raw_cookies() const { return can_read_raw_cookies_; } bool can_send_midi_sysex() const { return can_send_midi_sysex_; } private: typedef std::map SchemeMap; typedef int FilePermissionFlags; // bit-set of PlatformFileFlags typedef std::map FileMap; typedef std::map FileSystemMap; typedef std::set FileSet; // Maps URL schemes to whether permission has been granted or revoked: // |true| means the scheme has been granted. // |false| means the scheme has been revoked. // If a scheme is not present in the map, then it has never been granted // or revoked. SchemeMap scheme_policy_; // The set of files the child process is permited to upload to the web. FileMap file_permissions_; // The set of files the child process is permitted to load. FileSet request_file_set_; int enabled_bindings_; bool can_read_raw_cookies_; bool can_send_midi_sysex_; GURL origin_lock_; // The set of isolated filesystems the child process is permitted to access. FileSystemMap filesystem_permissions_; DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(SecurityState); }; ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl() { // We know about these schemes and believe them to be safe. RegisterWebSafeScheme(kHttpScheme); RegisterWebSafeScheme(kHttpsScheme); RegisterWebSafeScheme(chrome::kFtpScheme); RegisterWebSafeScheme(chrome::kDataScheme); RegisterWebSafeScheme("feed"); RegisterWebSafeScheme(chrome::kBlobScheme); RegisterWebSafeScheme(chrome::kFileSystemScheme); // We know about the following pseudo schemes and treat them specially. RegisterPseudoScheme(chrome::kAboutScheme); RegisterPseudoScheme(kJavaScriptScheme); RegisterPseudoScheme(kViewSourceScheme); } ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::~ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl() { web_safe_schemes_.clear(); pseudo_schemes_.clear(); STLDeleteContainerPairSecondPointers(security_state_.begin(), security_state_.end()); security_state_.clear(); } // static ChildProcessSecurityPolicy* ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::GetInstance() { return ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance(); } ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance() { return Singleton::get(); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::Add(int child_id) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); AddChild(child_id); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::AddWorker(int child_id, int main_render_process_id) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); AddChild(child_id); worker_map_[child_id] = main_render_process_id; } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::Remove(int child_id) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); if (!security_state_.count(child_id)) return; // May be called multiple times. delete security_state_[child_id]; security_state_.erase(child_id); worker_map_.erase(child_id); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::RegisterWebSafeScheme( const std::string& scheme) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); DCHECK(web_safe_schemes_.count(scheme) == 0) << "Add schemes at most once."; DCHECK(pseudo_schemes_.count(scheme) == 0) << "Web-safe implies not pseudo."; web_safe_schemes_.insert(scheme); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::IsWebSafeScheme( const std::string& scheme) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); return (web_safe_schemes_.find(scheme) != web_safe_schemes_.end()); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::RegisterPseudoScheme( const std::string& scheme) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); DCHECK(pseudo_schemes_.count(scheme) == 0) << "Add schemes at most once."; DCHECK(web_safe_schemes_.count(scheme) == 0) << "Pseudo implies not web-safe."; pseudo_schemes_.insert(scheme); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::IsPseudoScheme( const std::string& scheme) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); return (pseudo_schemes_.find(scheme) != pseudo_schemes_.end()); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantRequestURL( int child_id, const GURL& url) { if (!url.is_valid()) return; // Can't grant the capability to request invalid URLs. if (IsWebSafeScheme(url.scheme())) return; // The scheme has already been whitelisted for every child process. if (IsPseudoScheme(url.scheme())) { // The view-source scheme is a special case of a pseudo-URL that eventually // results in requesting its embedded URL. if (url.SchemeIs(kViewSourceScheme)) { // URLs with the view-source scheme typically look like: // view-source:http://www.google.com/a // In order to request these URLs, the child_id needs to be able to // request the embedded URL. GrantRequestURL(child_id, GURL(url.path())); } return; // Can't grant the capability to request pseudo schemes. } { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return; // When the child process has been commanded to request this scheme, // we grant it the capability to request all URLs of that scheme. state->second->GrantScheme(url.scheme()); } } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantRequestSpecificFileURL( int child_id, const GURL& url) { if (!url.SchemeIs(chrome::kFileScheme)) return; { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return; // When the child process has been commanded to request a file:// URL, // then we grant it the capability for that URL only. base::FilePath path; if (net::FileURLToFilePath(url, &path)) state->second->GrantRequestOfSpecificFile(path); } } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantReadFile(int child_id, const base::FilePath& file) { GrantPermissionsForFile(child_id, file, kReadFilePermissions); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantCreateReadWriteFile( int child_id, const base::FilePath& file) { GrantPermissionsForFile(child_id, file, kCreateReadWriteFilePermissions); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantCreateWriteFile( int child_id, const base::FilePath& file) { GrantPermissionsForFile(child_id, file, kCreateWriteFilePermissions); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantReadDirectory( int child_id, const base::FilePath& directory) { GrantPermissionsForFile(child_id, directory, kEnumerateDirectoryPermissions); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantPermissionsForFile( int child_id, const base::FilePath& file, int permissions) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return; state->second->GrantPermissionsForFile(file, permissions); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::RevokeAllPermissionsForFile( int child_id, const base::FilePath& file) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return; state->second->RevokeAllPermissionsForFile(file); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantReadFileSystem( int child_id, const std::string& filesystem_id) { GrantPermissionsForFileSystem(child_id, filesystem_id, kReadFilePermissions); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantWriteFileSystem( int child_id, const std::string& filesystem_id) { GrantPermissionsForFileSystem(child_id, filesystem_id, kWriteFilePermissions); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantCreateFileForFileSystem( int child_id, const std::string& filesystem_id) { GrantPermissionsForFileSystem(child_id, filesystem_id, kCreateFilePermissions); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantCopyIntoFileSystem( int child_id, const std::string& filesystem_id) { // TODO(tommycli): These granted permissions a bit too broad, but not abused. // We are fixing in http://crbug.com/262142 and associated CL. GrantPermissionsForFileSystem(child_id, filesystem_id, kCreateFilePermissions); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantSendMIDISysExMessage(int child_id) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return; state->second->GrantPermissionForMIDISysEx(); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantScheme(int child_id, const std::string& scheme) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return; state->second->GrantScheme(scheme); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantWebUIBindings(int child_id) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return; state->second->GrantBindings(BINDINGS_POLICY_WEB_UI); // Web UI bindings need the ability to request chrome: URLs. state->second->GrantScheme(chrome::kChromeUIScheme); // Web UI pages can contain links to file:// URLs. state->second->GrantScheme(chrome::kFileScheme); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantReadRawCookies(int child_id) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return; state->second->GrantReadRawCookies(); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::RevokeReadRawCookies(int child_id) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return; state->second->RevokeReadRawCookies(); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanLoadPage( int child_id, const GURL& url, ResourceType::Type resource_type) { // If --site-per-process flag is passed, we should enforce // stronger security restrictions on page navigation. if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kSitePerProcess) && ResourceType::IsFrame(resource_type)) { // TODO(nasko): Do the proper check for site-per-process, once // out-of-process iframes is ready to go. return true; } return true; } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanRequestURL( int child_id, const GURL& url) { if (!url.is_valid()) return false; // Can't request invalid URLs. if (IsWebSafeScheme(url.scheme())) return true; // The scheme has been white-listed for every child process. if (IsPseudoScheme(url.scheme())) { // There are a number of special cases for pseudo schemes. if (url.SchemeIs(kViewSourceScheme)) { // A view-source URL is allowed if the child process is permitted to // request the embedded URL. Careful to avoid pointless recursion. GURL child_url(url.path()); if (child_url.SchemeIs(kViewSourceScheme) && url.SchemeIs(kViewSourceScheme)) return false; return CanRequestURL(child_id, child_url); } if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(url.spec(), kAboutBlankURL)) return true; // Every child process can request . // URLs like and shouldn't be requestable by // any child process. Also, this case covers , which should // be handled internally by the process and not kicked up to the browser. return false; } if (!GetContentClient()->browser()->IsHandledURL(url) && !net::URLRequest::IsHandledURL(url)) { return true; // This URL request is destined for ShellExecute. } { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return false; // Otherwise, we consult the child process's security state to see if it is // allowed to request the URL. return state->second->CanRequestURL(url); } } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanReadFile(int child_id, const base::FilePath& file) { return HasPermissionsForFile(child_id, file, kReadFilePermissions); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanWriteFile(int child_id, const base::FilePath& file) { return HasPermissionsForFile(child_id, file, kWriteFilePermissions); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanCreateFile(int child_id, const base::FilePath& file) { return HasPermissionsForFile(child_id, file, kCreateFilePermissions); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanCreateWriteFile( int child_id, const base::FilePath& file) { return HasPermissionsForFile(child_id, file, kCreateWriteFilePermissions); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanReadDirectory( int child_id, const base::FilePath& directory) { return HasPermissionsForFile(child_id, directory, kEnumerateDirectoryPermissions); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanReadFileSystem( int child_id, const std::string& filesystem_id) { return HasPermissionsForFileSystem(child_id, filesystem_id, kReadFilePermissions); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanReadWriteFileSystem( int child_id, const std::string& filesystem_id) { return HasPermissionsForFileSystem(child_id, filesystem_id, kReadFilePermissions | kWriteFilePermissions); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanCopyIntoFileSystem( int child_id, const std::string& filesystem_id) { // TODO(tommycli): These granted permissions a bit too broad, but not abused. // We are fixing in http://crbug.com/262142 and associated CL. return HasPermissionsForFileSystem(child_id, filesystem_id, kCreateFilePermissions); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::HasPermissionsForFile( int child_id, const base::FilePath& file, int permissions) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); bool result = ChildProcessHasPermissionsForFile(child_id, file, permissions); if (!result) { // If this is a worker thread that has no access to a given file, // let's check that its renderer process has access to that file instead. WorkerToMainProcessMap::iterator iter = worker_map_.find(child_id); if (iter != worker_map_.end() && iter->second != 0) { result = ChildProcessHasPermissionsForFile(iter->second, file, permissions); } } return result; } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::HasPermissionsForFileSystemFile( int child_id, const fileapi::FileSystemURL& url, int permissions) { if (!url.is_valid()) return false; if (url.path().ReferencesParent()) return false; // Any write access is disallowed on the root path. if (fileapi::VirtualPath::IsRootPath(url.path()) && (permissions & ~kReadFilePermissions)) { return false; } if (url.mount_type() == fileapi::kFileSystemTypeIsolated) { // When Isolated filesystems is overlayed on top of another filesystem, // its per-filesystem permission overrides the underlying filesystem // permissions). return HasPermissionsForFileSystem( child_id, url.mount_filesystem_id(), permissions); } FileSystemPermissionPolicyMap::iterator found = file_system_policy_map_.find(url.type()); if (found == file_system_policy_map_.end()) return false; if ((found->second & fileapi::FILE_PERMISSION_READ_ONLY) && permissions & ~kReadFilePermissions) { return false; } if (found->second & fileapi::FILE_PERMISSION_USE_FILE_PERMISSION) return HasPermissionsForFile(child_id, url.path(), permissions); if (found->second & fileapi::FILE_PERMISSION_SANDBOX) return true; return false; } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanReadFileSystemFile( int child_id, const fileapi::FileSystemURL& url) { return HasPermissionsForFileSystemFile(child_id, url, kReadFilePermissions); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanWriteFileSystemFile( int child_id, const fileapi::FileSystemURL& url) { return HasPermissionsForFileSystemFile(child_id, url, kWriteFilePermissions); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanCreateFileSystemFile( int child_id, const fileapi::FileSystemURL& url) { return HasPermissionsForFileSystemFile(child_id, url, kCreateFilePermissions); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanCreateWriteFileSystemFile( int child_id, const fileapi::FileSystemURL& url) { return HasPermissionsForFileSystemFile(child_id, url, kCreateWriteFilePermissions); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::HasWebUIBindings(int child_id) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return false; return state->second->has_web_ui_bindings(); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanReadRawCookies(int child_id) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return false; return state->second->can_read_raw_cookies(); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::AddChild(int child_id) { if (security_state_.count(child_id) != 0) { NOTREACHED() << "Add child process at most once."; return; } security_state_[child_id] = new SecurityState(); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::ChildProcessHasPermissionsForFile( int child_id, const base::FilePath& file, int permissions) { SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return false; return state->second->HasPermissionsForFile(file, permissions); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanAccessCookiesForOrigin( int child_id, const GURL& gurl) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return false; return state->second->CanAccessCookiesForOrigin(gurl); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanSendCookiesForOrigin(int child_id, const GURL& gurl) { for (PluginProcessHostIterator iter; !iter.Done(); ++iter) { if (iter.GetData().process_type == child_id) { if (iter.GetData().process_type == PROCESS_TYPE_PLUGIN) { // NPAPI plugin processes are unsandboxed and so are trusted. Plugins // can make request to any origin. return true; } break; } } base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return false; return state->second->CanSendCookiesForOrigin(gurl); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::LockToOrigin(int child_id, const GURL& gurl) { // "gurl" can be currently empty in some cases, such as file://blah. DCHECK(SiteInstanceImpl::GetSiteForURL(NULL, gurl) == gurl); base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); DCHECK(state != security_state_.end()); state->second->LockToOrigin(gurl); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantPermissionsForFileSystem( int child_id, const std::string& filesystem_id, int permission) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return; state->second->GrantPermissionsForFileSystem(filesystem_id, permission); } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::HasPermissionsForFileSystem( int child_id, const std::string& filesystem_id, int permission) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return false; return state->second->HasPermissionsForFileSystem(filesystem_id, permission); } void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::RegisterFileSystemPermissionPolicy( fileapi::FileSystemType type, int policy) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); file_system_policy_map_[type] = policy; } bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanSendMIDISysExMessage(int child_id) { base::AutoLock lock(lock_); SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id); if (state == security_state_.end()) return false; return state->second->can_send_midi_sysex(); } } // namespace content