// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be // found in the LICENSE file. // Portions of this code based on Mozilla: // (netwerk/cookie/src/nsCookieService.cpp) /* ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK ***** * Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1 * * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version * 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at * http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/ * * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License * for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the * License. * * The Original Code is mozilla.org code. * * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is * Netscape Communications Corporation. * Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 2003 * the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved. * * Contributor(s): * Daniel Witte (dwitte@stanford.edu) * Michiel van Leeuwen (mvl@exedo.nl) * * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of * either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or * the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"), * in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead * of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only * under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to * use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your * decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice * and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete * the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under * the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL. * * ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */ #include "net/cookies/canonical_cookie.h" #include #include #include "base/feature_list.h" #include "base/format_macros.h" #include "base/logging.h" #include "base/metrics/histogram_functions.h" #include "base/metrics/histogram_macros.h" #include "base/strings/strcat.h" #include "base/strings/string_util.h" #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h" #include "net/base/features.h" #include "net/base/url_util.h" #include "net/cookies/cookie_util.h" #include "net/cookies/parsed_cookie.h" #include "url/gurl.h" #include "url/url_canon.h" #include "url/url_util.h" using base::Time; using base::TimeDelta; namespace net { namespace { // Determine the cookie domain to use for setting the specified cookie. bool GetCookieDomain(const GURL& url, const ParsedCookie& pc, std::string* result) { std::string domain_string; if (pc.HasDomain()) domain_string = pc.Domain(); return cookie_util::GetCookieDomainWithString(url, domain_string, result); } // Compares cookies using name, domain and path, so that "equivalent" cookies // (per RFC 2965) are equal to each other. int PartialCookieOrdering(const CanonicalCookie& a, const CanonicalCookie& b) { int diff = a.Name().compare(b.Name()); if (diff != 0) return diff; diff = a.Domain().compare(b.Domain()); if (diff != 0) return diff; return a.Path().compare(b.Path()); } void AppendCookieLineEntry(const CanonicalCookie& cookie, std::string* cookie_line) { if (!cookie_line->empty()) *cookie_line += "; "; // In Mozilla, if you set a cookie like "AAA", it will have an empty token // and a value of "AAA". When it sends the cookie back, it will send "AAA", // so we need to avoid sending "=AAA" for a blank token value. if (!cookie.Name().empty()) *cookie_line += cookie.Name() + "="; *cookie_line += cookie.Value(); } // Captures Strict -> Lax context downgrade with Strict cookie bool IsBreakingStrictToLaxDowngrade( CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType context, CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType schemeful_context, CookieEffectiveSameSite effective_same_site, bool is_cookie_being_set) { if (context == CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::SAME_SITE_STRICT && schemeful_context == CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::SAME_SITE_LAX && effective_same_site == CookieEffectiveSameSite::STRICT_MODE) { // This downgrade only applies when a SameSite=Strict cookie is being sent. // A Strict -> Lax downgrade will not affect a Strict cookie which is being // set because it will be set in either context. return !is_cookie_being_set; } return false; } // Captures Strict -> Cross-site context downgrade with {Strict, Lax} cookie // Captures Strict -> Lax Unsafe context downgrade with {Strict, Lax} cookie. // This is treated as a cross-site downgrade due to the Lax Unsafe context // behaving like cross-site. bool IsBreakingStrictToCrossDowngrade( CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType context, CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType schemeful_context, CookieEffectiveSameSite effective_same_site) { bool breaking_schemeful_context = schemeful_context == CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::CROSS_SITE || schemeful_context == CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType:: SAME_SITE_LAX_METHOD_UNSAFE; bool strict_lax_enforcement = effective_same_site == CookieEffectiveSameSite::STRICT_MODE || effective_same_site == CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE || // Treat LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE the same as LAX_MODE for the purposes of // our SameSite enforcement check. effective_same_site == CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE; if (context == CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::SAME_SITE_STRICT && breaking_schemeful_context && strict_lax_enforcement) { return true; } return false; } // Captures Lax -> Cross context downgrade with {Strict, Lax} cookies. // Ignores Lax Unsafe context. bool IsBreakingLaxToCrossDowngrade( CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType context, CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType schemeful_context, CookieEffectiveSameSite effective_same_site, bool is_cookie_being_set) { bool lax_enforcement = effective_same_site == CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE || // Treat LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE the same as LAX_MODE for the purposes of // our SameSite enforcement check. effective_same_site == CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE; if (context == CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::SAME_SITE_LAX && schemeful_context == CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::CROSS_SITE) { // For SameSite=Strict cookies this downgrade only applies when it is being // set. A Lax -> Cross downgrade will not affect a Strict cookie which is // being sent because it wouldn't be sent in either context. return effective_same_site == CookieEffectiveSameSite::STRICT_MODE ? is_cookie_being_set : lax_enforcement; } return false; } void ApplySameSiteCookieWarningToStatus( CookieSameSite samesite, CookieEffectiveSameSite effective_samesite, bool is_secure, CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext same_site_context, CookieInclusionStatus* status, bool is_cookie_being_set) { if (samesite == CookieSameSite::UNSPECIFIED && same_site_context.GetContextForCookieInclusion() < CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::SAME_SITE_LAX) { status->AddWarningReason( CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_SAMESITE_UNSPECIFIED_CROSS_SITE_CONTEXT); } if (effective_samesite == CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE && same_site_context.GetContextForCookieInclusion() == CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType:: SAME_SITE_LAX_METHOD_UNSAFE) { // This warning is more specific so remove the previous, more general, // warning. status->RemoveWarningReason( CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_SAMESITE_UNSPECIFIED_CROSS_SITE_CONTEXT); status->AddWarningReason( CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_SAMESITE_UNSPECIFIED_LAX_ALLOW_UNSAFE); } if (samesite == CookieSameSite::NO_RESTRICTION && !is_secure) { status->AddWarningReason( CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_SAMESITE_NONE_INSECURE); } // Add a warning if the cookie would be accessible in // |same_site_context|::context but not in // |same_site_context|::schemeful_context. if (IsBreakingStrictToLaxDowngrade(same_site_context.context(), same_site_context.schemeful_context(), effective_samesite, is_cookie_being_set)) { status->AddWarningReason( CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_STRICT_LAX_DOWNGRADE_STRICT_SAMESITE); } else if (IsBreakingStrictToCrossDowngrade( same_site_context.context(), same_site_context.schemeful_context(), effective_samesite)) { // Which warning to apply depends on the SameSite value. if (effective_samesite == CookieEffectiveSameSite::STRICT_MODE) { status->AddWarningReason( CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_STRICT_CROSS_DOWNGRADE_STRICT_SAMESITE); } else { // LAX_MODE or LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE. status->AddWarningReason( CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_STRICT_CROSS_DOWNGRADE_LAX_SAMESITE); } } else if (IsBreakingLaxToCrossDowngrade( same_site_context.context(), same_site_context.schemeful_context(), effective_samesite, is_cookie_being_set)) { // Which warning to apply depends on the SameSite value. if (effective_samesite == CookieEffectiveSameSite::STRICT_MODE) { status->AddWarningReason( CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_LAX_CROSS_DOWNGRADE_STRICT_SAMESITE); } else { // LAX_MODE or LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE. // This warning applies to both set/send. status->AddWarningReason( CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_LAX_CROSS_DOWNGRADE_LAX_SAMESITE); } } // If there are reasons to exclude the cookie other than the new SameSite // rules, don't warn about the cookie at all. status->MaybeClearSameSiteWarning(); } } // namespace CanonicalCookie::CanonicalCookie() = default; CanonicalCookie::CanonicalCookie(const CanonicalCookie& other) = default; CanonicalCookie::CanonicalCookie(const std::string& name, const std::string& value, const std::string& domain, const std::string& path, const base::Time& creation, const base::Time& expiration, const base::Time& last_access, bool secure, bool httponly, CookieSameSite same_site, CookiePriority priority, bool same_party, CookieSourceScheme scheme_secure, int source_port) : name_(name), value_(value), domain_(domain), path_(path), creation_date_(creation), expiry_date_(expiration), last_access_date_(last_access), secure_(secure), httponly_(httponly), same_site_(same_site), priority_(priority), same_party_(same_party), source_scheme_(scheme_secure) { SetSourcePort(source_port); } CanonicalCookie::~CanonicalCookie() = default; // static std::string CanonicalCookie::CanonPathWithString( const GURL& url, const std::string& path_string) { // The RFC says the path should be a prefix of the current URL path. // However, Mozilla allows you to set any path for compatibility with // broken websites. We unfortunately will mimic this behavior. We try // to be generous and accept cookies with an invalid path attribute, and // default the path to something reasonable. // The path was supplied in the cookie, we'll take it. if (!path_string.empty() && path_string[0] == '/') return path_string; // The path was not supplied in the cookie or invalid, we will default // to the current URL path. // """Defaults to the path of the request URL that generated the // Set-Cookie response, up to, but not including, the // right-most /.""" // How would this work for a cookie on /? We will include it then. const std::string& url_path = url.path(); size_t idx = url_path.find_last_of('/'); // The cookie path was invalid or a single '/'. if (idx == 0 || idx == std::string::npos) return std::string("/"); // Return up to the rightmost '/'. return url_path.substr(0, idx); } // static Time CanonicalCookie::CanonExpiration(const ParsedCookie& pc, const Time& current, const Time& server_time) { // First, try the Max-Age attribute. uint64_t max_age = 0; if (pc.HasMaxAge() && #ifdef COMPILER_MSVC sscanf_s( #else sscanf( #endif pc.MaxAge().c_str(), " %" PRIu64, &max_age) == 1) { return current + TimeDelta::FromSeconds(max_age); } // Try the Expires attribute. if (pc.HasExpires() && !pc.Expires().empty()) { // Adjust for clock skew between server and host. base::Time parsed_expiry = cookie_util::ParseCookieExpirationTime(pc.Expires()); if (!parsed_expiry.is_null()) return parsed_expiry + (current - server_time); } // Invalid or no expiration, session cookie. return Time(); } // static std::unique_ptr CanonicalCookie::Create( const GURL& url, const std::string& cookie_line, const base::Time& creation_time, base::Optional server_time, CookieInclusionStatus* status) { // Put a pointer on the stack so the rest of the function can assign to it if // the default nullptr is passed in. CookieInclusionStatus blank_status; if (status == nullptr) { status = &blank_status; } *status = CookieInclusionStatus(); ParsedCookie parsed_cookie(cookie_line); if (!parsed_cookie.IsValid()) { DVLOG(net::cookie_util::kVlogSetCookies) << "WARNING: Couldn't parse cookie"; status->AddExclusionReason(CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_FAILURE_TO_STORE); // Don't continue, because an invalid ParsedCookie doesn't have any // attributes. // TODO(chlily): Log metrics. return nullptr; } std::string cookie_domain; if (!GetCookieDomain(url, parsed_cookie, &cookie_domain)) { DVLOG(net::cookie_util::kVlogSetCookies) << "Create() failed to get a valid cookie domain"; status->AddExclusionReason(CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_INVALID_DOMAIN); } std::string cookie_path = CanonPathWithString( url, parsed_cookie.HasPath() ? parsed_cookie.Path() : std::string()); Time cookie_server_time(creation_time); if (server_time.has_value() && !server_time->is_null()) cookie_server_time = server_time.value(); DCHECK(!creation_time.is_null()); Time cookie_expires = CanonicalCookie::CanonExpiration( parsed_cookie, creation_time, cookie_server_time); CookiePrefix prefix = GetCookiePrefix(parsed_cookie.Name()); bool is_cookie_prefix_valid = IsCookiePrefixValid(prefix, url, parsed_cookie); RecordCookiePrefixMetrics(prefix, is_cookie_prefix_valid); if (!is_cookie_prefix_valid) { DVLOG(net::cookie_util::kVlogSetCookies) << "Create() failed because the cookie violated prefix rules."; status->AddExclusionReason(CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_INVALID_PREFIX); } bool is_same_party_valid = IsCookieSamePartyValid(parsed_cookie); if (!is_same_party_valid) { status->AddExclusionReason( CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_INVALID_SAMEPARTY); } // Collect metrics on whether usage of SameParty attribute is correct. if (parsed_cookie.IsSameParty()) base::UmaHistogramBoolean("Cookie.IsSamePartyValid", is_same_party_valid); // TODO(chlily): Log metrics. if (!status->IsInclude()) return nullptr; CookieSameSiteString samesite_string = CookieSameSiteString::kUnspecified; CookieSameSite samesite = parsed_cookie.SameSite(&samesite_string); RecordCookieSameSiteAttributeValueHistogram(samesite_string, parsed_cookie.IsSameParty()); CookieSourceScheme source_scheme = url.SchemeIsCryptographic() ? CookieSourceScheme::kSecure : CookieSourceScheme::kNonSecure; // Get the port, this will get a default value if a port isn't provided. int source_port = url.EffectiveIntPort(); std::unique_ptr cc(std::make_unique( parsed_cookie.Name(), parsed_cookie.Value(), cookie_domain, cookie_path, creation_time, cookie_expires, creation_time, parsed_cookie.IsSecure(), parsed_cookie.IsHttpOnly(), samesite, parsed_cookie.Priority(), parsed_cookie.IsSameParty(), source_scheme, source_port)); DCHECK(cc->IsCanonical()); // TODO(chlily): Log metrics. return cc; } // static // TODO(crbug.com/957184): This should ideally return a CookieInclusionStatus. std::unique_ptr CanonicalCookie::CreateSanitizedCookie( const GURL& url, const std::string& name, const std::string& value, const std::string& domain, const std::string& path, base::Time creation_time, base::Time expiration_time, base::Time last_access_time, bool secure, bool http_only, CookieSameSite same_site, CookiePriority priority, bool same_party) { // Validate consistency of passed arguments. if (ParsedCookie::ParseTokenString(name) != name || ParsedCookie::ParseValueString(value) != value || !ParsedCookie::IsValidCookieAttributeValue(name) || !ParsedCookie::IsValidCookieAttributeValue(value) || ParsedCookie::ParseValueString(domain) != domain || ParsedCookie::ParseValueString(path) != path) { return nullptr; } if (name.empty() && value.empty()) return nullptr; // This validation step must happen before GetCookieDomainWithString, so it // doesn't fail DCHECKs. if (!cookie_util::DomainIsHostOnly(url.host())) return nullptr; std::string cookie_domain; if (!cookie_util::GetCookieDomainWithString(url, domain, &cookie_domain)) return nullptr; CookieSourceScheme source_scheme = url.SchemeIsCryptographic() ? CookieSourceScheme::kSecure : CookieSourceScheme::kNonSecure; if (secure && source_scheme == CookieSourceScheme::kNonSecure) return nullptr; // Get the port, this will get a default value if a port isn't provided. int source_port = url.EffectiveIntPort(); std::string cookie_path = CanonicalCookie::CanonPathWithString(url, path); if (!path.empty() && cookie_path != path) return nullptr; if (!IsCookiePrefixValid(GetCookiePrefix(name), url, secure, domain, cookie_path)) { return nullptr; } if (!IsCookieSamePartyValid(same_party, secure, same_site)) return nullptr; if (!last_access_time.is_null() && creation_time.is_null()) return nullptr; // Canonicalize path again to make sure it escapes characters as needed. url::Component path_component(0, cookie_path.length()); url::RawCanonOutputT canon_path; url::Component canon_path_component; url::CanonicalizePath(cookie_path.data(), path_component, &canon_path, &canon_path_component); cookie_path = std::string(canon_path.data() + canon_path_component.begin, canon_path_component.len); std::unique_ptr cc(std::make_unique( name, value, cookie_domain, cookie_path, creation_time, expiration_time, last_access_time, secure, http_only, same_site, priority, same_party, source_scheme, source_port)); DCHECK(cc->IsCanonical()); return cc; } // static std::unique_ptr CanonicalCookie::FromStorage( const std::string& name, const std::string& value, const std::string& domain, const std::string& path, const base::Time& creation, const base::Time& expiration, const base::Time& last_access, bool secure, bool httponly, CookieSameSite same_site, CookiePriority priority, bool same_party, CookieSourceScheme source_scheme, int source_port) { std::unique_ptr cc(std::make_unique( name, value, domain, path, creation, expiration, last_access, secure, httponly, same_site, priority, same_party, source_scheme, source_port)); if (!cc->IsCanonical()) return nullptr; return cc; } std::string CanonicalCookie::DomainWithoutDot() const { return cookie_util::CookieDomainAsHost(domain_); } void CanonicalCookie::SetSourcePort(int port) { if ((port >= 0 && port <= 65535) || port == url::PORT_UNSPECIFIED) { // 0 would be really weird as it has a special meaning, but it's still // technically a valid tcp/ip port so we're going to accept it here. source_port_ = port; } else { source_port_ = url::PORT_INVALID; } } bool CanonicalCookie::IsEquivalentForSecureCookieMatching( const CanonicalCookie& secure_cookie) const { // Names must be the same bool same_name = name_ == secure_cookie.Name(); // They should domain-match in one direction or the other. (See RFC 6265bis // section 5.1.3.) // TODO(chlily): This does not check for the IP address case. This is bad due // to https://crbug.com/1069935. bool domain_match = IsSubdomainOf(DomainWithoutDot(), secure_cookie.DomainWithoutDot()) || IsSubdomainOf(secure_cookie.DomainWithoutDot(), DomainWithoutDot()); bool path_match = secure_cookie.IsOnPath(Path()); bool equivalent_for_secure_cookie_matching = same_name && domain_match && path_match; // IsEquivalent() is a stricter check than this. DCHECK(!IsEquivalent(secure_cookie) || equivalent_for_secure_cookie_matching); return equivalent_for_secure_cookie_matching; } bool CanonicalCookie::IsOnPath(const std::string& url_path) const { // A zero length would be unsafe for our trailing '/' checks, and // would also make no sense for our prefix match. The code that // creates a CanonicalCookie should make sure the path is never zero length, // but we double check anyway. if (path_.empty()) return false; // The Mozilla code broke this into three cases, based on if the cookie path // was longer, the same length, or shorter than the length of the url path. // I think the approach below is simpler. // Make sure the cookie path is a prefix of the url path. If the url path is // shorter than the cookie path, then the cookie path can't be a prefix. if (!base::StartsWith(url_path, path_, base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) return false; // |url_path| is >= |path_|, and |path_| is a prefix of |url_path|. If they // are the are the same length then they are identical, otherwise need an // additional check: // In order to avoid in correctly matching a cookie path of /blah // with a request path of '/blahblah/', we need to make sure that either // the cookie path ends in a trailing '/', or that we prefix up to a '/' // in the url path. Since we know that the url path length is greater // than the cookie path length, it's safe to index one byte past. if (path_.length() != url_path.length() && path_.back() != '/' && url_path[path_.length()] != '/') { return false; } return true; } bool CanonicalCookie::IsDomainMatch(const std::string& host) const { return cookie_util::IsDomainMatch(domain_, host); } CookieAccessResult CanonicalCookie::IncludeForRequestURL( const GURL& url, const CookieOptions& options, CookieAccessSemantics access_semantics) const { CookieInclusionStatus status; // Filter out HttpOnly cookies, per options. if (options.exclude_httponly() && IsHttpOnly()) status.AddExclusionReason(CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_HTTP_ONLY); // Secure cookies should not be included in requests for URLs with an // insecure scheme. if (IsSecure() && !url.SchemeIsCryptographic()) status.AddExclusionReason(CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SECURE_ONLY); // Don't include cookies for requests that don't apply to the cookie domain. if (!IsDomainMatch(url.host())) status.AddExclusionReason(CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_DOMAIN_MISMATCH); // Don't include cookies for requests with a url path that does not path // match the cookie-path. if (!IsOnPath(url.path())) status.AddExclusionReason(CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_NOT_ON_PATH); // For LEGACY cookies we should always return the schemeless context, // otherwise let GetContextForCookieInclusion() decide. CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType cookie_inclusion_context = access_semantics == CookieAccessSemantics::LEGACY ? options.same_site_cookie_context().context() : options.same_site_cookie_context().GetContextForCookieInclusion(); // Don't include same-site cookies for cross-site requests. CookieEffectiveSameSite effective_same_site = GetEffectiveSameSite(access_semantics); DCHECK(effective_same_site != CookieEffectiveSameSite::UNDEFINED); // Log the effective SameSite mode that is applied to the cookie on this // request, if its SameSite was not specified. if (SameSite() == CookieSameSite::UNSPECIFIED) { UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Cookie.SameSiteUnspecifiedEffective", effective_same_site, CookieEffectiveSameSite::COUNT); } UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION( "Cookie.RequestSameSiteContext", cookie_inclusion_context, CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::COUNT); switch (effective_same_site) { case CookieEffectiveSameSite::STRICT_MODE: if (cookie_inclusion_context < CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::SAME_SITE_STRICT) { status.AddExclusionReason( CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_STRICT); } break; case CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE: if (cookie_inclusion_context < CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::SAME_SITE_LAX) { status.AddExclusionReason( (SameSite() == CookieSameSite::UNSPECIFIED) ? CookieInclusionStatus:: EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_UNSPECIFIED_TREATED_AS_LAX : CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_LAX); } break; // TODO(crbug.com/990439): Add a browsertest for this behavior. case CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE: DCHECK(SameSite() == CookieSameSite::UNSPECIFIED); if (cookie_inclusion_context < CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType:: SAME_SITE_LAX_METHOD_UNSAFE) { // TODO(chlily): Do we need a separate CookieInclusionStatus for this? status.AddExclusionReason( CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_UNSPECIFIED_TREATED_AS_LAX); } break; default: break; } // If both SameSiteByDefaultCookies and CookiesWithoutSameSiteMustBeSecure // are enabled, non-SameSite cookies without the Secure attribute should be // ignored. This can apply to cookies which were created before the // experimental options were enabled (as non-SameSite, insecure cookies cannot // be set while the options are on). if (access_semantics != CookieAccessSemantics::LEGACY && cookie_util::IsCookiesWithoutSameSiteMustBeSecureEnabled() && SameSite() == CookieSameSite::NO_RESTRICTION && !IsSecure()) { status.AddExclusionReason( CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_NONE_INSECURE); } // TODO(chlily): Apply warning if SameSite-by-default is enabled but // access_semantics is LEGACY? ApplySameSiteCookieWarningToStatus(SameSite(), effective_same_site, IsSecure(), options.same_site_cookie_context(), &status, false /* is_cookie_being_set */); if (status.IsInclude()) { UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Cookie.IncludedRequestEffectiveSameSite", effective_same_site, CookieEffectiveSameSite::COUNT); } if (status.ShouldRecordDowngradeMetrics()) { UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Cookie.SameSiteContextDowngradeRequest", status.GetBreakingDowngradeMetricsEnumValue(url)); } // TODO(chlily): Log metrics. return CookieAccessResult(effective_same_site, status, access_semantics); } CookieAccessResult CanonicalCookie::IsSetPermittedInContext( const CookieOptions& options, CookieAccessSemantics access_semantics) const { CookieAccessResult access_result; IsSetPermittedInContext(options, access_semantics, &access_result); return access_result; } void CanonicalCookie::IsSetPermittedInContext( const CookieOptions& options, CookieAccessSemantics access_semantics, CookieAccessResult* access_result) const { access_result->access_semantics = access_semantics; if (options.exclude_httponly() && IsHttpOnly()) { DVLOG(net::cookie_util::kVlogSetCookies) << "HttpOnly cookie not permitted in script context."; access_result->status.AddExclusionReason( CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_HTTP_ONLY); } // If both SameSiteByDefaultCookies and CookiesWithoutSameSiteMustBeSecure // are enabled, non-SameSite cookies without the Secure attribute will be // rejected. if (access_semantics != CookieAccessSemantics::LEGACY && cookie_util::IsCookiesWithoutSameSiteMustBeSecureEnabled() && SameSite() == CookieSameSite::NO_RESTRICTION && !IsSecure()) { DVLOG(net::cookie_util::kVlogSetCookies) << "SetCookie() rejecting insecure cookie with SameSite=None."; access_result->status.AddExclusionReason( CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_NONE_INSECURE); } // Log whether a SameSite=None cookie is Secure or not. if (SameSite() == CookieSameSite::NO_RESTRICTION) { UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Cookie.SameSiteNoneIsSecure", IsSecure()); } // For LEGACY cookies we should always return the schemeless context, // otherwise let GetContextForCookieInclusion() decide. CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType cookie_inclusion_context = access_semantics == CookieAccessSemantics::LEGACY ? options.same_site_cookie_context().context() : options.same_site_cookie_context().GetContextForCookieInclusion(); access_result->effective_same_site = GetEffectiveSameSite(access_semantics); DCHECK(access_result->effective_same_site != CookieEffectiveSameSite::UNDEFINED); switch (access_result->effective_same_site) { case CookieEffectiveSameSite::STRICT_MODE: // This intentionally checks for `< SAME_SITE_LAX`, as we allow // `SameSite=Strict` cookies to be set for top-level navigations that // qualify for receipt of `SameSite=Lax` cookies. if (cookie_inclusion_context < CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::SAME_SITE_LAX) { DVLOG(net::cookie_util::kVlogSetCookies) << "Trying to set a `SameSite=Strict` cookie from a " "cross-site URL."; access_result->status.AddExclusionReason( CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_STRICT); } break; case CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE: case CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE: if (cookie_inclusion_context < CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::SAME_SITE_LAX) { if (SameSite() == CookieSameSite::UNSPECIFIED) { DVLOG(net::cookie_util::kVlogSetCookies) << "Cookies with no known SameSite attribute being treated as " "lax; attempt to set from a cross-site URL denied."; access_result->status.AddExclusionReason( CookieInclusionStatus:: EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_UNSPECIFIED_TREATED_AS_LAX); } else { DVLOG(net::cookie_util::kVlogSetCookies) << "Trying to set a `SameSite=Lax` cookie from a cross-site URL."; access_result->status.AddExclusionReason( CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_LAX); } } break; default: break; } ApplySameSiteCookieWarningToStatus( SameSite(), access_result->effective_same_site, IsSecure(), options.same_site_cookie_context(), &access_result->status, true /* is_cookie_being_set */); if (access_result->status.IsInclude()) { UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Cookie.IncludedResponseEffectiveSameSite", access_result->effective_same_site, CookieEffectiveSameSite::COUNT); } // TODO(chlily): Log metrics. } std::string CanonicalCookie::DebugString() const { return base::StringPrintf( "name: %s value: %s domain: %s path: %s creation: %" PRId64, name_.c_str(), value_.c_str(), domain_.c_str(), path_.c_str(), static_cast(creation_date_.ToTimeT())); } bool CanonicalCookie::PartialCompare(const CanonicalCookie& other) const { return PartialCookieOrdering(*this, other) < 0; } bool CanonicalCookie::IsCanonical() const { // Not checking domain or path against ParsedCookie as it may have // come purely from the URL. if (ParsedCookie::ParseTokenString(name_) != name_ || ParsedCookie::ParseValueString(value_) != value_ || !ParsedCookie::IsValidCookieAttributeValue(name_) || !ParsedCookie::IsValidCookieAttributeValue(value_)) { return false; } if (!last_access_date_.is_null() && creation_date_.is_null()) return false; url::CanonHostInfo canon_host_info; std::string canonical_domain(CanonicalizeHost(domain_, &canon_host_info)); // TODO(rdsmith): This specifically allows for empty domains. The spec // suggests this is invalid (if a domain attribute is empty, the cookie's // domain is set to the canonicalized request host; see // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6265#section-5.3). However, it is // needed for Chrome extension cookies. // See http://crbug.com/730633 for more information. if (canonical_domain != domain_) return false; if (path_.empty() || path_[0] != '/') return false; switch (GetCookiePrefix(name_)) { case COOKIE_PREFIX_HOST: if (!secure_ || path_ != "/" || domain_.empty() || domain_[0] == '.') return false; break; case COOKIE_PREFIX_SECURE: if (!secure_) return false; break; default: break; } return IsCookieSamePartyValid(same_party_, secure_, same_site_); } bool CanonicalCookie::IsEffectivelySameSiteNone( CookieAccessSemantics access_semantics) const { return GetEffectiveSameSite(access_semantics) == CookieEffectiveSameSite::NO_RESTRICTION; } CookieEffectiveSameSite CanonicalCookie::GetEffectiveSameSiteForTesting( CookieAccessSemantics access_semantics) const { return GetEffectiveSameSite(access_semantics); } // static std::string CanonicalCookie::BuildCookieLine(const CookieList& cookies) { std::string cookie_line; for (const auto& cookie : cookies) { AppendCookieLineEntry(cookie, &cookie_line); } return cookie_line; } // static std::string CanonicalCookie::BuildCookieLine( const CookieAccessResultList& cookie_access_result_list) { std::string cookie_line; for (const auto& cookie_with_access_result : cookie_access_result_list) { const CanonicalCookie& cookie = cookie_with_access_result.cookie; AppendCookieLineEntry(cookie, &cookie_line); } return cookie_line; } // static CanonicalCookie::CookiePrefix CanonicalCookie::GetCookiePrefix( const std::string& name) { const char kSecurePrefix[] = "__Secure-"; const char kHostPrefix[] = "__Host-"; if (base::StartsWith(name, kSecurePrefix, base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) return CanonicalCookie::COOKIE_PREFIX_SECURE; if (base::StartsWith(name, kHostPrefix, base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) return CanonicalCookie::COOKIE_PREFIX_HOST; return CanonicalCookie::COOKIE_PREFIX_NONE; } // static void CanonicalCookie::RecordCookiePrefixMetrics( CanonicalCookie::CookiePrefix prefix, bool is_cookie_valid) { const char kCookiePrefixHistogram[] = "Cookie.CookiePrefix"; const char kCookiePrefixBlockedHistogram[] = "Cookie.CookiePrefixBlocked"; UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(kCookiePrefixHistogram, prefix, CanonicalCookie::COOKIE_PREFIX_LAST); if (!is_cookie_valid) { UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(kCookiePrefixBlockedHistogram, prefix, CanonicalCookie::COOKIE_PREFIX_LAST); } } // Returns true if the cookie does not violate any constraints imposed // by the cookie name's prefix, as described in // https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-west-cookie-prefixes // // static bool CanonicalCookie::IsCookiePrefixValid(CanonicalCookie::CookiePrefix prefix, const GURL& url, const ParsedCookie& parsed_cookie) { return CanonicalCookie::IsCookiePrefixValid( prefix, url, parsed_cookie.IsSecure(), parsed_cookie.HasDomain() ? parsed_cookie.Domain() : "", parsed_cookie.HasPath() ? parsed_cookie.Path() : ""); } bool CanonicalCookie::IsCookiePrefixValid(CanonicalCookie::CookiePrefix prefix, const GURL& url, bool secure, const std::string& domain, const std::string& path) { if (prefix == CanonicalCookie::COOKIE_PREFIX_SECURE) return secure && url.SchemeIsCryptographic(); if (prefix == CanonicalCookie::COOKIE_PREFIX_HOST) { const bool domain_valid = domain.empty() || (url.HostIsIPAddress() && url.host() == domain); return secure && url.SchemeIsCryptographic() && domain_valid && path == "/"; } return true; } CookieEffectiveSameSite CanonicalCookie::GetEffectiveSameSite( CookieAccessSemantics access_semantics) const { base::TimeDelta lax_allow_unsafe_threshold_age = base::FeatureList::IsEnabled( features::kSameSiteDefaultChecksMethodRigorously) ? base::TimeDelta::Min() : (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled( features::kShortLaxAllowUnsafeThreshold) ? kShortLaxAllowUnsafeMaxAge : kLaxAllowUnsafeMaxAge); bool should_apply_same_site_lax_by_default = cookie_util::IsSameSiteByDefaultCookiesEnabled(); if (access_semantics == CookieAccessSemantics::LEGACY) { should_apply_same_site_lax_by_default = false; } else if (access_semantics == CookieAccessSemantics::NONLEGACY) { should_apply_same_site_lax_by_default = true; } switch (SameSite()) { // If a cookie does not have a SameSite attribute, the effective SameSite // mode depends on the SameSiteByDefaultCookies setting and whether the // cookie is recently-created. case CookieSameSite::UNSPECIFIED: return should_apply_same_site_lax_by_default ? (IsRecentlyCreated(lax_allow_unsafe_threshold_age) ? CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE : CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE) : CookieEffectiveSameSite::NO_RESTRICTION; case CookieSameSite::NO_RESTRICTION: return CookieEffectiveSameSite::NO_RESTRICTION; case CookieSameSite::LAX_MODE: return CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE; case CookieSameSite::STRICT_MODE: return CookieEffectiveSameSite::STRICT_MODE; } } bool CanonicalCookie::IsRecentlyCreated(base::TimeDelta age_threshold) const { return (base::Time::Now() - creation_date_) <= age_threshold; } // static bool CanonicalCookie::IsCookieSamePartyValid( const ParsedCookie& parsed_cookie) { return IsCookieSamePartyValid(parsed_cookie.IsSameParty(), parsed_cookie.IsSecure(), parsed_cookie.SameSite()); } // static bool CanonicalCookie::IsCookieSamePartyValid(bool is_same_party, bool is_secure, CookieSameSite same_site) { if (!is_same_party) return true; return is_secure && (same_site != CookieSameSite::STRICT_MODE); } CookieAndLineWithAccessResult::CookieAndLineWithAccessResult() = default; CookieAndLineWithAccessResult::CookieAndLineWithAccessResult( base::Optional cookie, std::string cookie_string, CookieAccessResult access_result) : cookie(std::move(cookie)), cookie_string(std::move(cookie_string)), access_result(access_result) {} CookieAndLineWithAccessResult::CookieAndLineWithAccessResult( const CookieAndLineWithAccessResult&) = default; CookieAndLineWithAccessResult& CookieAndLineWithAccessResult::operator=( const CookieAndLineWithAccessResult& cookie_and_line_with_access_result) = default; CookieAndLineWithAccessResult::CookieAndLineWithAccessResult( CookieAndLineWithAccessResult&&) = default; CookieAndLineWithAccessResult::~CookieAndLineWithAccessResult() = default; } // namespace net