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author | Oran Agra <oran@redislabs.com> | 2021-05-03 08:32:31 +0300 |
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committer | Oran Agra <oran@redislabs.com> | 2021-05-03 22:57:00 +0300 |
commit | 92e3b1802f72ca0c5b0bde97f01d9b57a758d85c (patch) | |
tree | 736b8ef647c4a0baa50312cf73b920b27aac8018 | |
parent | 046352069396fe3be0a50ca505cb65af15c0d995 (diff) | |
download | redis-92e3b1802f72ca0c5b0bde97f01d9b57a758d85c.tar.gz |
Fix integer overflow in STRALGO LCS (CVE-2021-29477)
An integer overflow bug in Redis version 6.0 or newer could be exploited using
the STRALGO LCS command to corrupt the heap and potentially result with remote
code execution.
(cherry picked from commit f0c5f920d0f88bd8aa376a2c05af4902789d1ef9)
-rw-r--r-- | src/t_string.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/t_string.c b/src/t_string.c index 0967e30e1..490d5983a 100644 --- a/src/t_string.c +++ b/src/t_string.c @@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ void stralgoLCS(client *c) { /* Setup an uint32_t array to store at LCS[i,j] the length of the * LCS A0..i-1, B0..j-1. Note that we have a linear array here, so * we index it as LCS[j+(blen+1)*j] */ - uint32_t *lcs = zmalloc((alen+1)*(blen+1)*sizeof(uint32_t)); + uint32_t *lcs = zmalloc((size_t)(alen+1)*(blen+1)*sizeof(uint32_t)); #define LCS(A,B) lcs[(B)+((A)*(blen+1))] /* Start building the LCS table. */ |