| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Signed-off-by: Lamont Granquist <lamont@scriptkiddie.org>
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already working for kitchen-appbundle-updater in travis
Signed-off-by: Lamont Granquist <lamont@scriptkiddie.org>
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Signed-off-by: Lamont Granquist <lamont@scriptkiddie.org>
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Signed-off-by: Lamont Granquist <lamont@scriptkiddie.org>
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Signed-off-by: Thom May <thom@chef.io>
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Resolves CVE-2017-15412
Signed-off-by: Tim Smith <tsmith@chef.io>
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Signed-off-by: Thom May <thom@chef.io>
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This resolves this CVE https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2017/12/14/net-ftp-command-injection-cve-2017-17405/
It also backports a few bugfixes from 2.5.0:
https://github.com/ruby/ruby/compare/v2_4_2...v2_4_3
Signed-off-by: Tim Smith <tsmith@chef.io>
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Resolves:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-3738
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-3737
Signed-off-by: Tim Smith <tsmith@chef.io>
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openssl:
CVE-2017-3736 (OpenSSL advisory) [Moderate severity] 2nd November 2017:
There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. This only affects processors that support the BMI1, BMI2 and ADX extensions like Intel Broadwell (5th generation) and later or AMD Ryzen. Reported by Google OSS-Fuzz.
CVE-2017-3735 (OpenSSL advisory) [Low severity] 28th August 2017:
While parsing an IPAdressFamily extension in an X.509 certificate, it is possible to do a one-byte overread. This would result in an incorrect text display of the certificate. Reported by Google OSS-Fuzz.
rubygems:
Whitelist classes and symbols that are in loaded YAML. See CVE-2017-0903 for full details. Fix by Aaron Patterson.
Signed-off-by: Tim Smith <tsmith@chef.io>
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Minor bug fixes and updated vendored libs that we've already bumped to.
Signed-off-by: Tim Smith <tsmith@chef.io>
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It's 1.15 in Chef 12. I think when omnibus overrides were changed around
this slipped through the cracks.
Signed-off-by: Tim Smith <tsmith@chef.io>
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libxml2:
A GIANT list of bugfixes and these CVEs:
CVE-2017-9050
CVE-2017-9049
CVE-2017-9048
CVE-2017-9047
CVE-2017-8872
CVE-2016-9318
https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-1962/product_id-3311/Xmlsoft-Libxml2.html
libxslt:
- Fixes bad memory handling and null derefs plus a GIANT list of bug
libyaml:
* Fixed segfault in yaml_string_write_handler.
* Fixed invalid simple key assertion.
* Fixed error handling in some examples (thank to Mathias Svensson).
* Removed obsolete VS project files.
openssl:
CVE-2017-3731 (OpenSSL advisory) [Moderate severity] 26th January 2017:
If an SSL/TLS server or client is running on a 32-bit host, and a specific cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that server or client to perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash. For OpenSSL 1.1.0, the crash can be triggered when using CHACHA20/POLY1305; users should upgrade to 1.1.0d. For Openssl 1.0.2, the crash can be triggered when using RC4-MD5; users who have not disabled that algorithm should update to 1.0.2k Reported by Robert Święcki of Google.
CVE-2017-3732 (OpenSSL advisory) [Moderate severity] 26th January 2017:
There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. Note: This issue is very similar to CVE-2015-3193 but must be treated as a separate problem. Reported by OSS-Fuzz project.
CVE-2016-7055 (OpenSSL advisory) [Low severity] 10th November 2016:
There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery multiplication procedure that handles input lengths divisible by, but longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input. Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour. Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected.ctures using a callback which do not handle NULL value are affected. Reported by Publicly reported.
Signed-off-by: Tim Smith <tsmith@chef.io>
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Signed-off-by: Thom May <thom@chef.io>
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Signed-off-by: Lamont Granquist <lamont@scriptkiddie.org>
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Signed-off-by: jakauppila <Jared@Kauppi.la>
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this hand-builds it with the software dep, and its not a direct dep of
chef itself and shouldn't be in the Gemfile.lock anyway, plus we need
to pin via omnibus_overrides.rb and double-pinning in the Gemfile.lock
is just added fussiness
Signed-off-by: Lamont Granquist <lamont@scriptkiddie.org>
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Signed-off-by: Thom May <thom@chef.io>
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Signed-off-by: Lamont Granquist <lamont@scriptkiddie.org>
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See the PR comments for more philosophical background.
This simplifies the external tests. The major feature here is that
halite, poise, chefspec, etc are removed from the Gemfile.lock and
the transitive Gemfile splicing is gone from the external tests.
We're back to simply tracking master on external projects and bundle
installing without locks and going red if the break. Those external
projects should all similarly track master of chef/chef to reduce
the possibility that they break us here.
This also bumps bundler to 1.14.x and unblocks us there.
It continues to simplify our use of bundler to be more mainstream and
less impenetrable.
There was some crazy shit that I found where I had to remove env vars
like BUNDLE_ENABLE_TRAMPOLINE and the BUNDLE_IGNORE_CONFIG and
BUNDLE_FROZEN env vars in appveyor along with the .bundle/config frozen
setting were necessary to unbreak appveyor. We seem to have gotten
very far afield of standard bundler usage and it was breaking in strange
to debug ways.
Oddly enough this exposed weird errors in the
chef-config/spec/units/fips_spec.rb tests where we need to require the
"win32/registry" file there now even though I can't figure out why that
broke or how it was working previously.
Also, adding x64-mingw32 to x86-mingw32 was necessary to test in
appveyor on 64-bit windows (I tried universal-mingw32 and that failed)
which seems obvious and is another case that I don't understand how it
was working in bundler 1.12.x
Signed-off-by: Lamont Granquist <lamont@scriptkiddie.org>
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Signed-off-by: Thom May <thom@chef.io>
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Signed-off-by: Lamont Granquist <lamont@scriptkiddie.org>
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Signed-off-by: Lamont Granquist <lamont@scriptkiddie.org>
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can finally do this now that the branching nightmare is gone.
not bumping to 2.4.0 because of:
- perf regression in rspec and waiting for 2.4.1
- not wanting to buy that yak shave yet
- iterative development and moving the needle forwards in
small increments
Signed-off-by: Lamont Granquist <lamont@scriptkiddie.org>
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Signed-off-by: Tom Duffield <tom@chef.io>
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Signed-off-by: Lamont Granquist <lamont@scriptkiddie.org>
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Signed-off-by: Tom Duffield <tom@chef.io>
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Signed-off-by: Tim Smith <tsmith@chef.io>
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Signed-off-by: Thiago Oliveira <thiagoo@yahoo-inc.com>
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Signed-off-by: Thiago Oliveira <thiagoo@yahoo-inc.com>
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Signed-off-by: Matt Wrock <matt@mattwrock.com>
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