/* Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. Database Glue between Samba and the KDC Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2005-2009 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce 2010 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program. If not, see . */ #include "includes.h" #include "libcli/security/security.h" #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_security.h" #include "auth/auth.h" #include "auth/auth_sam.h" #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h" #include "dsdb/common/util.h" #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h" #include "param/param.h" #include "param/secrets.h" #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h" #include "system/kerberos.h" #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h" #include "kdc/sdb.h" #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h" #include "kdc/db-glue.h" #include "kdc/pac-glue.h" #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_irpc_c.h" #include "lib/messaging/irpc.h" #undef strcasecmp #undef strncasecmp #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \ ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16)) #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(kvno) \ ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF)) #define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \ ((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \ ((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000))) enum trust_direction { UNKNOWN = 0, INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND, OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND }; static const char *trust_attrs[] = { "securityIdentifier", "flatName", "trustPartner", "trustAttributes", "trustDirection", "trustType", "msDS-TrustForestTrustInfo", "trustAuthIncoming", "trustAuthOutgoing", "whenCreated", "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes", NULL }; /* send a message to the drepl server telling it to initiate a REPL_SECRET getncchanges extended op to fetch the users secrets */ static void auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx, struct tevent_context *event_ctx, struct ldb_dn *user_dn) { struct dcerpc_binding_handle *irpc_handle; struct drepl_trigger_repl_secret r; struct tevent_req *req; TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { return; } irpc_handle = irpc_binding_handle_by_name(tmp_ctx, msg_ctx, "dreplsrv", &ndr_table_irpc); if (irpc_handle == NULL) { DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Unable to get binding handle for dreplsrv\n")); TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return; } r.in.user_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn); /* * This seem to rely on the current IRPC implementation, * which delivers the message in the _send function. * * TODO: we need a ONE_WAY IRPC handle and register * a callback and wait for it to be triggered! */ req = dcerpc_drepl_trigger_repl_secret_r_send(tmp_ctx, event_ctx, irpc_handle, &r); /* we aren't interested in a reply */ talloc_free(req); TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); } static time_t ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, time_t default_val) { const char *tmp; const char *gentime; struct tm tm; gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL); if (!gentime) return default_val; tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm); if (tmp == NULL) { return default_val; } return timegm(&tm); } static struct SDBFlags uf2SDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type) { struct SDBFlags flags = int2SDBFlags(0); /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */ flags.immutable = 1; /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */ flags.invalid = 1; flags.renewable = 1; /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */ flags.server = 1; /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */ if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) { if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) { flags.client = 1; } flags.invalid = 0; } if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) { if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) { flags.client = 1; } flags.invalid = 0; } if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) { if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) { flags.client = 1; } flags.invalid = 0; } if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) { if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) { flags.client = 1; } flags.invalid = 0; } /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */ if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) { flags.client = 0; } if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) { flags.locked_out = 1; } /* if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) { flags.invalid = 1; } */ /* UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent */ if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) { flags.invalid = 1; } /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */ /* if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) { flags.invalid = 1; } */ if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) { flags.require_hwauth = 1; } if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) { flags.ok_as_delegate = 1; } if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION) { /* * this is confusing... * * UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION * => ok_as_delegate * * and * * UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION * => trusted_for_delegation */ flags.trusted_for_delegation = 1; } if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) { flags.forwardable = 1; flags.proxiable = 1; } if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) { flags.require_preauth = 0; } else { flags.require_preauth = 1; } if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) { flags.no_auth_data_reqd = 1; } return flags; } static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p) { if (p->db_entry != NULL) { /* * A sdb_entry still has a reference */ return -1; } if (p->kdc_entry != NULL) { /* * hdb_entry or krb5_db_entry still * have a reference... */ return -1; } return 0; } /* * Sort keys in descending order of strength. * * Explanaton from Greg Hudson: * * To encrypt tickets only the first returned key is used by the MIT KDC. The * other keys just communicate support for session key enctypes, and aren't * really used. The encryption key for the ticket enc part doesn't have * to be of a type requested by the client. The session key enctype is chosen * based on the client preference order, limited by the set of enctypes present * in the server keys (unless the string attribute is set on the server * principal overriding that set). */ static int sdb_key_strength_priority(krb5_enctype etype) { static const krb5_enctype etype_list[] = { ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4, ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC, ENCTYPE_NULL }; int i; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(etype_list); i++) { if (etype == etype_list[i]) { break; } } return ARRAY_SIZE(etype_list) - i; } static int sdb_key_strength_cmp(const struct sdb_key *k1, const struct sdb_key *k2) { int p1 = sdb_key_strength_priority(KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&k1->key)); int p2 = sdb_key_strength_priority(KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&k2->key)); if (p1 == p2) { return 0; } if (p1 > p2) { /* * Higher priority comes first */ return -1; } else { return 1; } } static void samba_kdc_sort_keys(struct sdb_keys *keys) { if (keys == NULL) { return; } TYPESAFE_QSORT(keys->val, keys->len, sdb_key_strength_cmp); } int samba_kdc_set_fixed_keys(krb5_context context, const struct ldb_val *secretbuffer, uint32_t supported_enctypes, struct sdb_keys *keys) { uint16_t allocated_keys = 0; int ret; allocated_keys = 3; keys->len = 0; keys->val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key)); if (keys->val == NULL) { memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length); ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) { struct sdb_key key = {}; ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context, ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, secretbuffer->data, MIN(secretbuffer->length, 32), &key.key); if (ret) { memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length); goto out; } keys->val[keys->len] = key; keys->len++; } if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) { struct sdb_key key = {}; ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context, ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, secretbuffer->data, MIN(secretbuffer->length, 16), &key.key); if (ret) { memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length); goto out; } keys->val[keys->len] = key; keys->len++; } if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) { struct sdb_key key = {}; ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context, ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, secretbuffer->data, MIN(secretbuffer->length, 16), &key.key); if (ret) { memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length); goto out; } keys->val[keys->len] = key; keys->len++; } ret = 0; out: return ret; } static int samba_kdc_set_random_keys(krb5_context context, uint32_t supported_enctypes, struct sdb_keys *keys) { struct ldb_val secret_val; uint8_t secretbuffer[32]; /* * Fake keys until we have a better way to reject * non-pkinit requests. * * We just need to indicate which encryption types are * supported. */ generate_secret_buffer(secretbuffer, sizeof(secretbuffer)); secret_val = data_blob_const(secretbuffer, sizeof(secretbuffer)); return samba_kdc_set_fixed_keys(context, &secret_val, supported_enctypes, keys); } struct samba_kdc_user_keys { struct sdb_keys *skeys; uint32_t kvno; uint32_t *returned_kvno; uint32_t supported_enctypes; uint32_t *available_enctypes; const struct samr_Password *nthash; const char *salt_string; uint16_t num_pkeys; const struct package_PrimaryKerberosKey4 *pkeys; }; static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_user_keys *p) { /* * Make sure we'll never reveal DES keys */ uint32_t supported_enctypes = p->supported_enctypes & ENC_ALL_TYPES; uint32_t _available_enctypes = 0; uint32_t *available_enctypes = p->available_enctypes; uint32_t _returned_kvno = 0; uint32_t *returned_kvno = p->returned_kvno; uint32_t num_pkeys = p->num_pkeys; uint32_t allocated_keys = num_pkeys; uint32_t i; int ret; if (available_enctypes == NULL) { available_enctypes = &_available_enctypes; } *available_enctypes = 0; if (returned_kvno == NULL) { returned_kvno = &_returned_kvno; } *returned_kvno = p->kvno; if (p->nthash != NULL) { allocated_keys += 1; } allocated_keys = MAX(1, allocated_keys); /* allocate space to decode into */ p->skeys->len = 0; p->skeys->val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key)); if (p->skeys->val == NULL) { return ENOMEM; } for (i=0; i < num_pkeys; i++) { struct sdb_key key = {}; uint32_t enctype_bit; if (p->pkeys[i].value == NULL) { continue; } enctype_bit = kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(p->pkeys[i].keytype); if (!(enctype_bit & supported_enctypes)) { continue; } if (p->salt_string != NULL) { DATA_BLOB salt; salt = data_blob_string_const(p->salt_string); key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt)); if (key.salt == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto fail; } key.salt->type = KRB5_PW_SALT; ret = smb_krb5_copy_data_contents(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length); if (ret) { ZERO_STRUCTP(key.salt); sdb_key_free(&key); goto fail; } } ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context, p->pkeys[i].keytype, p->pkeys[i].value->data, p->pkeys[i].value->length, &key.key); if (ret == 0) { p->skeys->val[p->skeys->len++] = key; *available_enctypes |= enctype_bit; continue; } ZERO_STRUCT(key.key); sdb_key_free(&key); if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) { DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n", p->pkeys[i].keytype)); ret = 0; continue; } goto fail; } if (p->nthash != NULL && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) { struct sdb_key key = {}; ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context, ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, p->nthash->hash, sizeof(p->nthash->hash), &key.key); if (ret == 0) { p->skeys->val[p->skeys->len++] = key; *available_enctypes |= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5; } else if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) { DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n", ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC)); ret = 0; } if (ret != 0) { goto fail; } } samba_kdc_sort_keys(p->skeys); return 0; fail: sdb_keys_free(p->skeys); return ret; } krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const struct ldb_message *msg, bool is_krbtgt, bool is_rodc, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type, unsigned flags, krb5_kvno requested_kvno, struct sdb_entry *entry, const uint32_t supported_enctypes_in, uint32_t *supported_enctypes_out) { krb5_error_code ret = 0; enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; struct samr_Password *hash; unsigned int num_ntPwdHistory = 0; struct samr_Password *ntPwdHistory = NULL; struct samr_Password *old_hash = NULL; struct samr_Password *older_hash = NULL; const struct ldb_val *sc_val; struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb; struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL; struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb; struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL; int krbtgt_number = 0; uint32_t current_kvno; uint32_t old_kvno = 0; uint32_t older_kvno = 0; uint32_t returned_kvno = 0; uint16_t i; struct samba_kdc_user_keys keys = { .num_pkeys = 0, }; struct samba_kdc_user_keys old_keys = { .num_pkeys = 0, }; struct samba_kdc_user_keys older_keys = { .num_pkeys = 0, }; uint32_t available_enctypes = 0; uint32_t supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes_in; *supported_enctypes_out = 0; /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */ if (is_rodc) { krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1); if (krbtgt_number == -1) { return EINVAL; } if (krbtgt_number == 0) { return EINVAL; } } if ((ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) && (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED)) { ret = samba_kdc_set_random_keys(context, supported_enctypes, &entry->keys); *supported_enctypes_out = supported_enctypes; goto out; } current_kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0); if (current_kvno > 1) { old_kvno = current_kvno - 1; } if (current_kvno > 2) { older_kvno = current_kvno - 2; } if (is_krbtgt) { /* * Even for the main krbtgt account * we have to strictly split the kvno into * two 16-bit parts and the upper 16-bit * need to be all zero, even if * the msDS-KeyVersionNumber has a value * larger than 65535. * * See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14951 */ current_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(current_kvno); old_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(old_kvno); older_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(older_kvno); requested_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(requested_kvno); } /* Get keys from the db */ hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd"); num_ntPwdHistory = samdb_result_hashes(mem_ctx, msg, "ntPwdHistory", &ntPwdHistory); if (num_ntPwdHistory > 1) { old_hash = &ntPwdHistory[1]; } if (num_ntPwdHistory > 2) { older_hash = &ntPwdHistory[1]; } sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials"); /* supplementalCredentials if present */ if (sc_val) { ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length); ret = EINVAL; goto out; } if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) { if (scb.sub.num_packages != 0) { NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb); ret = EINVAL; goto out; } } for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) { if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) { scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i]; if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) { scpk = NULL; continue; } break; } } } /* * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys element * of supplementalCredentials * * The legacy Primary:Kerberos only contains * single DES keys, which are completely ignored * now. */ if (scpk) { DATA_BLOB blob; blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data); if (!blob.data) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */ ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { ret = EINVAL; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob"); krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob"); goto out; } if (_pkb.version != 4) { ret = EINVAL; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4"); krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4"); goto out; } pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4; } keys = (struct samba_kdc_user_keys) { .kvno = current_kvno, .supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes, .nthash = hash, .salt_string = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->salt.string : NULL, .num_pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->num_keys : 0, .pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->keys : NULL, }; old_keys = (struct samba_kdc_user_keys) { .kvno = old_kvno, .supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes, .nthash = old_hash, .salt_string = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->salt.string : NULL, .num_pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->num_old_keys : 0, .pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->old_keys : NULL, }; older_keys = (struct samba_kdc_user_keys) { .kvno = older_kvno, .supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes, .nthash = older_hash, .salt_string = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->salt.string : NULL, .num_pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->num_older_keys : 0, .pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->older_keys : NULL, }; if (flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) { if (requested_kvno == keys.kvno) { /* * The current kvno was requested, * so we return it. */ keys.skeys = &entry->keys; keys.available_enctypes = &available_enctypes; keys.returned_kvno = &returned_kvno; } else if (requested_kvno == 0) { /* * don't return any keys */ } else if (requested_kvno == old_keys.kvno) { /* * return the old keys as default keys * with the requested kvno. */ old_keys.skeys = &entry->keys; old_keys.available_enctypes = &available_enctypes; old_keys.returned_kvno = &returned_kvno; } else if (requested_kvno == older_keys.kvno) { /* * return the older keys as default keys * with the requested kvno. */ older_keys.skeys = &entry->keys; older_keys.available_enctypes = &available_enctypes; older_keys.returned_kvno = &returned_kvno; } else { /* * don't return any keys */ } } else { bool include_history = false; if ((flags & SDB_F_GET_CLIENT) && (flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)) { include_history = true; } else if (flags & SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) { include_history = true; } keys.skeys = &entry->keys; keys.available_enctypes = &available_enctypes; keys.returned_kvno = &returned_kvno; if (include_history && old_keys.kvno != 0) { old_keys.skeys = &entry->old_keys; } if (include_history && older_keys.kvno != 0) { older_keys.skeys = &entry->older_keys; } } if (keys.skeys != NULL) { ret = samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(context, &keys); if (ret != 0) { goto out; } } if (old_keys.skeys != NULL) { ret = samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(context, &old_keys); if (ret != 0) { goto out; } } if (older_keys.skeys != NULL) { ret = samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(context, &older_keys); if (ret != 0) { goto out; } } *supported_enctypes_out |= available_enctypes; /* Set FAST support bits */ *supported_enctypes_out |= supported_enctypes & (ENC_FAST_SUPPORTED | ENC_COMPOUND_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED | ENC_CLAIMS_SUPPORTED); if (is_krbtgt) { /* * Even for the main krbtgt account * we have to strictly split the kvno into * two 16-bit parts and the upper 16-bit * need to be all zero, even if * the msDS-KeyVersionNumber has a value * larger than 65535. * * See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14951 */ returned_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(returned_kvno, krbtgt_number); } entry->kvno = returned_kvno; out: return ret; } static int principal_comp_strcmp_int(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal principal, unsigned int component, const char *string, bool do_strcasecmp) { const char *p; #if defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_GET_COMP_STRING) p = krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, component); if (p == NULL) { return -1; } if (do_strcasecmp) { return strcasecmp(p, string); } else { return strcmp(p, string); } #else size_t len; krb5_data *d; if (component >= krb5_princ_size(context, principal)) { return -1; } d = krb5_princ_component(context, principal, component); if (d == NULL) { return -1; } p = d->data; len = strlen(string); /* * We explicitly return -1 or 1. Subtracting of the two lengths might * give the wrong result if the result overflows or loses data when * narrowed to int. */ if (d->length < len) { return -1; } else if (d->length > len) { return 1; } if (do_strcasecmp) { return strncasecmp(p, string, len); } else { return memcmp(p, string, len); } #endif } static int principal_comp_strcasecmp(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal principal, unsigned int component, const char *string) { return principal_comp_strcmp_int(context, principal, component, string, true); } static int principal_comp_strcmp(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal principal, unsigned int component, const char *string) { return principal_comp_strcmp_int(context, principal, component, string, false); } static bool is_kadmin_changepw(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal principal) { return krb5_princ_size(context, principal) == 2 && (principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, "kadmin") == 0) && (principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 1, "changepw") == 0); } static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_get_entry_principal( krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, const char *samAccountName, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type, unsigned flags, bool is_kadmin_changepw, krb5_const_principal in_princ, krb5_principal *out_princ) { struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx; krb5_error_code code = 0; bool canon = flags & (SDB_F_CANON|SDB_F_FORCE_CANON); /* * If we are set to canonicalize, we get back the fixed UPPER * case realm, and the real username (ie matching LDAP * samAccountName) * * Otherwise, if we are set to enterprise, we * get back the whole principal as-sent * * Finally, if we are not set to canonicalize, we get back the * fixed UPPER case realm, but the as-sent username */ /* * We need to ensure that the kadmin/changepw principal isn't able to * issue krbtgt tickets, even if canonicalization is turned on. */ if (!is_kadmin_changepw) { if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT && canon) { /* * When requested to do so, ensure that the * both realm values in the principal are set * to the upper case, canonical realm */ code = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, out_princ, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "krbtgt", lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), NULL); if (code != 0) { return code; } smb_krb5_principal_set_type(context, *out_princ, KRB5_NT_SRV_INST); return 0; } if ((canon && flags & (SDB_F_FORCE_CANON|SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)) || (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && in_princ == NULL)) { /* * SDB_F_CANON maps from the canonicalize flag in the * packet, and has a different meaning between AS-REQ * and TGS-REQ. We only change the principal in the * AS-REQ case. * * The SDB_F_FORCE_CANON if for new MIT KDC code that * wants the canonical name in all lookups, and takes * care to canonicalize only when appropriate. */ code = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, out_princ, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL); return code; } } /* * For a krbtgt entry, this appears to be required regardless of the * canonicalize flag from the client. */ code = krb5_copy_principal(context, in_princ, out_princ); if (code != 0) { return code; } /* * While we have copied the client principal, tests show that Win2k3 * returns the 'corrected' realm, not the client-specified realm. This * code attempts to replace the client principal's realm with the one * we determine from our records */ code = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context, *out_princ, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx)); return code; } /* * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry. */ static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type, unsigned flags, krb5_kvno kvno, struct ldb_dn *realm_dn, struct ldb_message *msg, struct sdb_entry *entry) { struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx; uint32_t userAccountControl; uint32_t msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed; krb5_error_code ret = 0; krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE; struct samba_kdc_entry *p; NTTIME acct_expiry; NTSTATUS status; bool protected_user = false; uint32_t rid; bool is_krbtgt = false; bool is_rodc = false; struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses; struct ldb_val computer_val = data_blob_string_const("computer"); uint32_t supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes", 0); const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL); ZERO_STRUCTP(entry); if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) { is_rodc = true; } if (!samAccountName) { ret = ENOENT; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present"); goto out; } objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass"); if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) { is_computer = TRUE; } p = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry); if (!p) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } p->is_rodc = is_rodc; p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx; p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn); if (!p->realm_dn) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor); entry->skdc_entry = p; userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0); msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed", UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE); /* * This brings in the lockout flag, block the account if not * found. We need the weird UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE check because * we do not want to fail open if the value is not returned, * but 0 is a valid value (all OK) */ if (msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed == UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) { ret = EINVAL; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: " "no msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed present"); goto out; } else { userAccountControl |= msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed; } if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) { p->is_krbtgt = true; } /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */ entry->flags = uf2SDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type); /* * Take control of the returned principal here, rather than * allowing the Heimdal code to do it as we have specific * behaviour around the forced realm to honour */ entry->flags.force_canonicalize = true; /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with * their probably patheticly insecure password) */ if (entry->flags.server && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) { if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) { entry->flags.server = 0; } } /* * We restrict a 3-part SPN ending in my domain/realm to full * domain controllers. * * This avoids any cases where (eg) a demoted DC still has * these more restricted SPNs. */ if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) > 2) { char *third_part = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context, principal, 2); bool is_our_realm = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, third_part); bool is_dc = userAccountControl & (UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT | UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT); if (is_our_realm && !is_dc) { entry->flags.server = 0; } } /* * To give the correct type of error to the client, we must * not just return the entry without .server set, we must * pretend the principal does not exist. Otherwise we may * return ERR_POLICY instead of * KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN */ if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER && entry->flags.server == 0) { ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no servicePrincipalName present for this server, refusing with no-such-entry"); goto out; } if (flags & SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) { /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure * we must return */ /* use 'whenCreated' */ entry->created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0); /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */ ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry->created_by.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL); if (ret) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); goto out; } entry->modified_by = (struct sdb_event *) malloc(sizeof(struct sdb_event)); if (entry->modified_by == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory"); goto out; } /* use 'whenChanged' */ entry->modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0); /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */ ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry->modified_by->principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL); if (ret) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); goto out; } } /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by * virtue of being that particular RID */ status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { ret = EINVAL; goto out; } if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) { char *realm = NULL; entry->valid_end = NULL; entry->pw_end = NULL; entry->flags.invalid = 0; entry->flags.server = 1; realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm( mem_ctx, context, principal); if (realm == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty. * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */ if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER && is_kadmin_changepw(context, principal) && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm)) { entry->flags.change_pw = 1; } TALLOC_FREE(realm); entry->flags.client = 0; entry->flags.forwardable = 1; entry->flags.ok_as_delegate = 1; } else if (is_rodc) { /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt, * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin * service */ entry->valid_end = NULL; entry->pw_end = NULL; /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */ entry->flags.client = 0; entry->flags.invalid = 0; entry->flags.server = 1; entry->flags.client = 0; entry->flags.forwardable = 1; entry->flags.ok_as_delegate = 0; } else if (entry->flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) { /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */ /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client, * it could bypass the password restrictions */ entry->flags.client = 0; entry->valid_end = NULL; entry->pw_end = NULL; } else { NTTIME must_change_time = samdb_result_nttime(msg, "msDS-UserPasswordExpiryTimeComputed", 0); if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) { entry->pw_end = NULL; } else { entry->pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry->pw_end)); if (entry->pw_end == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } *entry->pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time); } acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg); if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) { entry->valid_end = NULL; } else { entry->valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry->valid_end)); if (entry->valid_end == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } *entry->valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry); } } ret = samba_kdc_get_entry_principal(context, kdc_db_ctx, samAccountName, ent_type, flags, entry->flags.change_pw, principal, &entry->principal); if (ret != 0) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); goto out; } entry->valid_start = NULL; entry->max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry->max_life)); if (entry->max_life == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) { *entry->max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime; } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) { *entry->max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime; } else { *entry->max_life = MIN(kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime, kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime); } if (entry->flags.change_pw) { /* Limit lifetime of kpasswd tickets to two minutes or less. */ *entry->max_life = MIN(*entry->max_life, CHANGEPW_LIFETIME); } entry->max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry->max_renew)); if (entry->max_renew == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } *entry->max_renew = kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime; if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT && (flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)) { int result; struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc = NULL; /* * These protections only apply to clients, so servers in the * Protected Users group may still have service tickets to them * encrypted with RC4. For accounts looked up as servers, note * that 'msg' does not contain the 'memberOf' attribute for * determining whether the account is a member of Protected * Users. * * Additionally, Microsoft advises that accounts for services * and computers should never be members of Protected Users, or * they may fail to authenticate. */ status = samba_kdc_get_user_info_from_db(p, msg, &user_info_dc); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { ret = EINVAL; goto out; } result = dsdb_is_protected_user(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, user_info_dc->sids, user_info_dc->num_sids); if (result == -1) { ret = EINVAL; goto out; } protected_user = result; if (protected_user) { *entry->max_life = MIN(*entry->max_life, 4 * 60 * 60); *entry->max_renew = MIN(*entry->max_renew, 4 * 60 * 60); entry->flags.forwardable = 0; entry->flags.proxiable = 0; } } if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) { bool enable_fast; is_krbtgt = true; /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */ supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256; enable_fast = lpcfg_kdc_enable_fast(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx); if (enable_fast) { supported_enctypes |= ENC_FAST_SUPPORTED; } } else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) { /* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */ supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256; } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) { /* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it * supports, and this will vary between computers a * user logs in from. * * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported, * to export into a keytab */ supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES; } /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */ if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) { supported_enctypes = 0; } else { /* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */ supported_enctypes |= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5; } if (protected_user) { supported_enctypes &= ~ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5; } /* Get keys from the db */ ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, p, msg, is_krbtgt, is_rodc, userAccountControl, ent_type, flags, kvno, entry, supported_enctypes, &supported_enctypes); if (ret) { /* Could be bogus data in the entry, or out of memory */ goto out; } if (entry->keys.len == 0) { if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) { /* * We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this * account. Signal this to the caller */ auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(kdc_db_ctx, kdc_db_ctx->msg_ctx, kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx, msg->dn); return SDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE; } /* * oh, no password. Apparently (comment in * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */ } p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg); p->supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes; out: if (ret != 0) { /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */ sdb_entry_free(entry); } else { talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, p); } return ret; } /* * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry. * The kvno is what the remote client asked for */ static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, enum trust_direction direction, struct ldb_dn *realm_dn, unsigned flags, uint32_t kvno, struct ldb_message *msg, struct sdb_entry *entry) { struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx; const char *our_realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx); char *partner_realm = NULL; const char *realm = NULL; const char *krbtgt_realm = NULL; DATA_BLOB password_utf16 = data_blob_null; DATA_BLOB password_utf8 = data_blob_null; struct samr_Password _password_hash; const struct samr_Password *password_hash = NULL; const struct ldb_val *password_val; struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob; struct samba_kdc_entry *p; bool use_previous = false; uint32_t current_kvno; uint32_t previous_kvno; uint32_t num_keys = 0; enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; int ret; unsigned int i; struct AuthenticationInformationArray *auth_array; struct timeval tv; NTTIME an_hour_ago; uint32_t *auth_kvno; bool preferr_current = false; uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5; struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx *tdo = NULL; NTSTATUS status; ZERO_STRUCTP(entry); if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx->samdb) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008) { supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes", supported_enctypes); } status = dsdb_trust_parse_tdo_info(mem_ctx, msg, &tdo); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } if (!(tdo->trust_direction & direction)) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; goto out; } if (tdo->trust_type != LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL) { /* * Only UPLEVEL domains support kerberos here, * as we don't support LSA_TRUST_TYPE_MIT. */ krb5_clear_error_message(context); ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; goto out; } if (tdo->trust_attributes & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION) { /* * We don't support selective authentication yet. */ krb5_clear_error_message(context); ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; goto out; } if (tdo->domain_name.string == NULL) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; goto out; } partner_realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, tdo->domain_name.string); if (partner_realm == NULL) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } if (direction == INBOUND) { realm = our_realm; krbtgt_realm = partner_realm; password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming"); } else { /* OUTBOUND */ realm = partner_realm; krbtgt_realm = our_realm; password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing"); } if (password_val == NULL) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; goto out; } ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); ret = EINVAL; goto out; } p = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry); if (!p) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } p->is_trust = true; p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx; p->realm_dn = realm_dn; p->supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes; talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor); entry->skdc_entry = p; /* use 'whenCreated' */ entry->created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0); /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */ ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry->created_by.principal, realm, "kadmin", NULL); if (ret) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); goto out; } /* * We always need to generate the canonicalized principal * with the values of our database. */ ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry->principal, realm, "krbtgt", krbtgt_realm, NULL); if (ret) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); goto out; } smb_krb5_principal_set_type(context, entry->principal, KRB5_NT_SRV_INST); entry->valid_start = NULL; /* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or * the previous password hash. * We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno * passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then * we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1, * then we use the previous substrucure. */ /* * Windows preferrs the previous key for one hour. */ tv = timeval_current(); if (tv.tv_sec > 3600) { tv.tv_sec -= 3600; } an_hour_ago = timeval_to_nttime(&tv); /* first work out the current kvno */ current_kvno = 0; for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) { struct AuthenticationInformation *a = &password_blob.current.array[i]; if (a->LastUpdateTime <= an_hour_ago) { preferr_current = true; } if (a->AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) { current_kvno = a->AuthInfo.version.version; } } if (current_kvno == 0) { previous_kvno = 255; } else { previous_kvno = current_kvno - 1; } for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) { struct AuthenticationInformation *a = &password_blob.previous.array[i]; if (a->AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) { previous_kvno = a->AuthInfo.version.version; } } /* work out whether we will use the previous or current password */ if (password_blob.previous.count == 0) { /* there is no previous password */ use_previous = false; } else if (!(flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED)) { /* * If not specified we use the lowest kvno * for the first hour after an update. */ if (preferr_current) { use_previous = false; } else if (previous_kvno < current_kvno) { use_previous = true; } else { use_previous = false; } } else if (kvno == current_kvno) { /* * Exact match ... */ use_previous = false; } else if (kvno == previous_kvno) { /* * Exact match ... */ use_previous = true; } else { /* * Fallback to the current one for anything else */ use_previous = false; } if (use_previous) { auth_array = &password_blob.previous; auth_kvno = &previous_kvno; } else { auth_array = &password_blob.current; auth_kvno = ¤t_kvno; } /* use the kvno the client specified, if available */ if (flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) { entry->kvno = kvno; } else { entry->kvno = *auth_kvno; } for (i=0; i < auth_array->count; i++) { if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) { bool ok; password_utf16 = data_blob_const(auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password, auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size); if (password_utf16.length == 0) { break; } if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) { mdfour(_password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length); if (password_hash == NULL) { num_keys += 1; } password_hash = &_password_hash; } if (!(supported_enctypes & (ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128|ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256))) { break; } ok = convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx, CH_UTF16MUNGED, CH_UTF8, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length, (void *)&password_utf8.data, &password_utf8.length); if (!ok) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) { num_keys += 1; } if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) { num_keys += 1; } break; } else if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) { if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) { password_hash = &auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password; num_keys += 1; } } } /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */ if (num_keys == 0) { DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": no usable key found\n")); krb5_clear_error_message(context); ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; goto out; } entry->keys.val = calloc(num_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key)); if (entry->keys.val == NULL) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } if (password_utf8.length != 0) { struct sdb_key key = {}; krb5_const_principal salt_principal = entry->principal; krb5_data salt; krb5_data cleartext_data; cleartext_data.data = discard_const_p(char, password_utf8.data); cleartext_data.length = password_utf8.length; ret = smb_krb5_get_pw_salt(context, salt_principal, &salt); if (ret != 0) { goto out; } if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) { ret = smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(context, salt_principal, &salt, &cleartext_data, ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, &key.key); if (ret != 0) { smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt); goto out; } entry->keys.val[entry->keys.len] = key; entry->keys.len++; } if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) { ret = smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(context, salt_principal, &salt, &cleartext_data, ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, &key.key); if (ret != 0) { smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt); goto out; } entry->keys.val[entry->keys.len] = key; entry->keys.len++; } smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt); } if (password_hash != NULL) { struct sdb_key key = {}; ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context, ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, password_hash->hash, sizeof(password_hash->hash), &key.key); if (ret != 0) { goto out; } entry->keys.val[entry->keys.len] = key; entry->keys.len++; } entry->flags = int2SDBFlags(0); entry->flags.immutable = 1; entry->flags.invalid = 0; entry->flags.server = 1; entry->flags.require_preauth = 1; entry->pw_end = NULL; entry->max_life = NULL; entry->max_renew = NULL; /* Match Windows behavior and allow forwardable flag in cross-realm. */ entry->flags.forwardable = 1; samba_kdc_sort_keys(&entry->keys); p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg); out: TALLOC_FREE(partner_realm); if (ret != 0) { /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */ sdb_entry_free(entry); } else { talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, p); } return ret; } static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char *realm, struct ldb_dn *realm_dn, struct ldb_message **pmsg) { NTSTATUS status; const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs; status = dsdb_trust_search_tdo(ldb_ctx, realm, realm, attrs, mem_ctx, pmsg); if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return 0; } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND)) { return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) { int ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: out of memory"); return ret; } else { int ret = EINVAL; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: %s", nt_errstr(status)); return ret; } } static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, const char **attrs, struct ldb_dn **realm_dn, struct ldb_message **msg) { NTSTATUS nt_status; char *principal_string = NULL; if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) { principal_string = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context, principal, 0); if (principal_string == NULL) { return ENOMEM; } } else { char *principal_string_m = NULL; krb5_error_code ret; ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string_m); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } principal_string = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, principal_string_m); SAFE_FREE(principal_string_m); if (principal_string == NULL) { return ENOMEM; } } nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs, realm_dn, msg); if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) { krb5_principal fallback_principal = NULL; unsigned int num_comp; char *fallback_realm = NULL; char *fallback_account = NULL; krb5_error_code ret; ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal_string, &fallback_principal); TALLOC_FREE(principal_string); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } num_comp = krb5_princ_size(context, fallback_principal); fallback_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm( mem_ctx, context, fallback_principal); if (fallback_realm == NULL) { krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal); return ENOMEM; } if (num_comp == 1) { size_t len; fallback_account = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context, fallback_principal, 0); if (fallback_account == NULL) { krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal); TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm); return ENOMEM; } len = strlen(fallback_account); if (len >= 2 && fallback_account[len - 1] == '$') { TALLOC_FREE(fallback_account); } } krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal); fallback_principal = NULL; if (fallback_account != NULL) { char *with_dollar; with_dollar = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s$", fallback_account); if (with_dollar == NULL) { TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm); return ENOMEM; } TALLOC_FREE(fallback_account); ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &fallback_principal, fallback_realm, with_dollar, NULL); TALLOC_FREE(with_dollar); if (ret != 0) { TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm); return ret; } } TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm); if (fallback_principal != NULL) { char *fallback_string = NULL; ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, fallback_principal, &fallback_string); if (ret != 0) { krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal); return ret; } nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, fallback_string, attrs, realm_dn, msg); SAFE_FREE(fallback_string); } krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal); fallback_principal = NULL; } TALLOC_FREE(principal_string); if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) { return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) { return ENOMEM; } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { return EINVAL; } return 0; } static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, unsigned flags, krb5_kvno kvno, struct sdb_entry *entry) { struct ldb_dn *realm_dn; krb5_error_code ret; struct ldb_message *msg = NULL; ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, flags, kvno, realm_dn, msg, entry); return ret; } static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, unsigned flags, uint32_t kvno, struct sdb_entry *entry) { struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx; krb5_error_code ret; struct ldb_message *msg = NULL; struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb); char *realm_from_princ; char *realm_princ_comp = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context, principal, 1); realm_from_princ = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm( mem_ctx, context, principal); if (realm_from_princ == NULL) { /* can't happen */ return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) != 2 || (principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) { /* Not a krbtgt */ return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */ if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm_from_princ) && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm_princ_comp)) { /* us, or someone quite like us */ /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm, * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary * krbtgt */ int lret; unsigned int krbtgt_number; /* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do seem to need to treat it as unspecified */ if (flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) { krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno); if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) { if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) { return SDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE; } } } else { krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number; } if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) { lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE, krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG, "(objectClass=user)"); } else { /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another * RODC if we are a read-write DC */ lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG, "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number)); } if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) { krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number)); krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number)); return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) { krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number)); krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number)); return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, flags, kvno, realm_dn, msg, entry); if (ret != 0) { krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed"); } return ret; } else { enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN; const char *realm = NULL; /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */ if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), realm_from_princ) == 0) { /* look for inbound trust */ direction = INBOUND; realm = realm_princ_comp; } else if (principal_comp_strcasecmp(context, principal, 1, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx)) == 0) { /* look for outbound trust */ direction = OUTBOUND; realm = realm_from_princ; } else { krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')", realm_from_princ, realm_princ_comp); krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')", realm_from_princ, realm_princ_comp); return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */ ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, realm, realm_dn, &msg); if (ret != 0) { krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB"); krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB"); return ret; } ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, direction, realm_dn, flags, kvno, msg, entry); if (ret != 0) { krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed for %s", ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn)); krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: " "trust_message2entry failed for %s", ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn)); } return ret; } } static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, unsigned flags, const char **attrs, struct ldb_dn **realm_dn, struct ldb_message **msg) { krb5_error_code ret; if ((smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) && krb5_princ_size(context, principal) >= 2) { /* 'normal server' case */ int ldb_ret; NTSTATUS nt_status; struct ldb_dn *user_dn; char *principal_string; ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &principal_string); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } /* At this point we may find the host is known to be * in a different realm, so we should generate a * referral instead */ nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, principal_string, &user_dn, realm_dn); free(principal_string); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE, attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG, "(objectClass=*)"); if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } return 0; } else if (!(flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ) && smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) { /* * The behaviour of accepting an * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL server principal * containing a UPN only applies to TGS-REQ packets, * not AS-REQ packets. */ return samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, attrs, realm_dn, msg); } else { /* * This case is for: * - the AS-REQ, where we only accept * samAccountName based lookups for the server, no * matter if the name is an * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL or not * - for the TGS-REQ when we are not given an * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL, which also must * only lookup samAccountName based names. */ int lret; char *short_princ; krb5_principal enterprise_principal = NULL; krb5_const_principal used_principal = NULL; char *name1 = NULL; size_t len1 = 0; char *filter = NULL; if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) { char *str = NULL; /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */ if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) != 1) { ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: request for an " "enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components", krb5_princ_size(context, principal)); return ret; } str = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context, principal, 0); if (str == NULL) { return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; } ret = krb5_parse_name(context, str, &enterprise_principal); talloc_free(str); if (ret) { return ret; } used_principal = enterprise_principal; } else { used_principal = principal; } /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */ *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb); /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */ ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, used_principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM | KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY, &short_princ); used_principal = NULL; krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_principal); enterprise_principal = NULL; if (ret != 0) { krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal"); krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal"); return ret; } name1 = ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ); SAFE_FREE(short_princ); if (name1 == NULL) { return ENOMEM; } len1 = strlen(name1); if (len1 >= 1 && name1[len1 - 1] != '$') { filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=user)(|(samAccountName=%s)(samAccountName=%s$)))", name1, name1); if (filter == NULL) { return ENOMEM; } } else { filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))", name1); if (filter == NULL) { return ENOMEM; } } lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg, *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG, "%s", filter); if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) { DEBUG(10, ("Failed to find an entry for %s filter:%s\n", name1, filter)); return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } if (lret == LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION) { DEBUG(10, ("Failed to find unique entry for %s filter:%s\n", name1, filter)); return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) { DEBUG(0, ("Failed single search for %s - %s\n", name1, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb))); return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } return 0; } return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, unsigned flags, krb5_kvno kvno, struct sdb_entry *entry) { krb5_error_code ret; struct ldb_dn *realm_dn; struct ldb_message *msg; ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER, flags, kvno, realm_dn, msg, entry); if (ret != 0) { char *client_name = NULL; krb5_error_code code; code = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &client_name); if (code == 0) { krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed for " "%s", client_name); } else { krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry and " "krb5_unparse_name failed"); } SAFE_FREE(client_name); } return ret; } static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_realm(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, unsigned flags, struct sdb_entry *entry) { TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe(); NTSTATUS status; krb5_error_code ret; bool check_realm = false; const char *realm = NULL; struct dsdb_trust_routing_table *trt = NULL; const struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx *tdo = NULL; unsigned int num_comp; bool ok; char *upper = NULL; num_comp = krb5_princ_size(context, principal); if (flags & SDB_F_GET_CLIENT) { if (flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ) { check_realm = true; } } if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) { if (flags & SDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ) { check_realm = true; } } if (!check_realm) { TALLOC_FREE(frame); return 0; } realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(frame, context, principal); if (realm == NULL) { TALLOC_FREE(frame); return ENOMEM; } /* * The requested realm needs to be our own */ ok = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx, realm); if (!ok) { /* * The request is not for us... */ TALLOC_FREE(frame); return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) { char *principal_string = NULL; krb5_principal enterprise_principal = NULL; char *enterprise_realm = NULL; if (num_comp != 1) { TALLOC_FREE(frame); return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } principal_string = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(frame, context, principal, 0); if (principal_string == NULL) { TALLOC_FREE(frame); return ENOMEM; } ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal_string, &enterprise_principal); TALLOC_FREE(principal_string); if (ret) { TALLOC_FREE(frame); return ret; } enterprise_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm( frame, context, enterprise_principal); krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_principal); if (enterprise_realm != NULL) { realm = enterprise_realm; } } if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) { char *service_realm = NULL; ret = principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, KRB5_TGS_NAME); if (ret == 0) { /* * we need to search krbtgt/ locally */ TALLOC_FREE(frame); return 0; } /* * We need to check the last component against the routing table. * * Note this works only with 2 or 3 component principals, e.g: * * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/bla.base * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/ForestDnsZones.bla.base * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/DomainDnsZones.bla.base */ if (num_comp == 2 || num_comp == 3) { service_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(frame, context, principal, num_comp - 1); } if (service_realm != NULL) { realm = service_realm; } } ok = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx, realm); if (ok) { /* * skip the expensive routing lookup */ TALLOC_FREE(frame); return 0; } status = dsdb_trust_routing_table_load(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, frame, &trt); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { TALLOC_FREE(frame); return EINVAL; } tdo = dsdb_trust_routing_by_name(trt, realm); if (tdo == NULL) { /* * This principal has to be local */ TALLOC_FREE(frame); return 0; } if (tdo->trust_attributes & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST) { /* * TODO: handle the routing within the forest * * This should likely be handled in * samba_kdc_message2entry() in case we're * a global catalog. We'd need to check * if realm_dn is our own domain and derive * the dns domain name from realm_dn and check that * against the routing table or fallback to * the tdo we found here. * * But for now we don't support multiple domains * in our forest correctly anyway. * * Just search in our local database. */ TALLOC_FREE(frame); return 0; } ZERO_STRUCTP(entry); ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry->principal); if (ret) { TALLOC_FREE(frame); return ret; } upper = strupper_talloc(frame, tdo->domain_name.string); if (upper == NULL) { TALLOC_FREE(frame); return ENOMEM; } ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry->principal, upper); if (ret) { TALLOC_FREE(frame); return ret; } TALLOC_FREE(frame); return SDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM; } krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, unsigned flags, krb5_kvno kvno, struct sdb_entry *entry) { krb5_error_code ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx; mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context"); if (!mem_ctx) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!"); return ret; } ret = samba_kdc_lookup_realm(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry); if (ret != 0) { goto done; } ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; if (flags & SDB_F_GET_CLIENT) { ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry); if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done; } if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) { /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */ ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry); if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done; /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */ ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry); if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done; } if (flags & SDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) { ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry); if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done; } done: talloc_free(mem_ctx); return ret; } struct samba_kdc_seq { unsigned int index; unsigned int count; struct ldb_message **msgs; struct ldb_dn *realm_dn; }; static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, struct sdb_entry *entry) { krb5_error_code ret; struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx; const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx); struct ldb_message *msg = NULL; const char *sAMAccountName = NULL; krb5_principal principal = NULL; TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx; if (!priv) { return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context"); if (!mem_ctx) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!"); return ret; } while (priv->index < priv->count) { msg = priv->msgs[priv->index++]; sAMAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "sAMAccountName", NULL); if (sAMAccountName != NULL) { break; } } if (sAMAccountName == NULL) { ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; goto out; } ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &principal, realm, sAMAccountName, NULL); if (ret != 0) { goto out; } ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY, SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|SDB_F_GET_ANY, 0 /* kvno */, priv->realm_dn, msg, entry); out: if (principal != NULL) { krb5_free_principal(context, principal); } if (ret != 0) { TALLOC_FREE(priv); kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL; } else { talloc_free(mem_ctx); } return ret; } krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, struct sdb_entry *entry) { struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb; struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx; char *realm; struct ldb_result *res = NULL; krb5_error_code ret; TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx; int lret; if (priv) { TALLOC_FREE(priv); kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL; } priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq); if (!priv) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory"); return ret; } priv->index = 0; priv->msgs = NULL; priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx); priv->count = 0; mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context"); if (!mem_ctx) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!"); return ret; } ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm); if (ret != 0) { TALLOC_FREE(priv); return ret; } krb5_free_default_realm(context, realm); lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res, priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG, "(objectClass=user)"); if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) { TALLOC_FREE(priv); return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } priv->count = res->count; priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs); talloc_free(res); kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv; ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry); if (ret != 0) { TALLOC_FREE(priv); kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL; } else { talloc_free(mem_ctx); } return ret; } krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, struct sdb_entry *entry) { return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry); } /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal * * The safest way to determine 'self' is to check the DB record made at * the time the principal was presented to the KDC. */ krb5_error_code samba_kdc_check_client_matches_target_service(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry_client, struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry_server_target) { struct dom_sid *orig_sid; struct dom_sid *target_sid; TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe(); orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(frame, skdc_entry_client->msg, "objectSid"); target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(frame, skdc_entry_server_target->msg, "objectSid"); /* * Allow delegation to the same record (representing a * principal), even if by a different name. The easy and safe * way to prove this is by SID comparison */ if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) { talloc_free(frame); return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH; } talloc_free(frame); return 0; } /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same * SID */ krb5_error_code samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry, krb5_const_principal certificate_principal) { krb5_error_code ret; struct ldb_dn *realm_dn; struct ldb_message *msg; struct dom_sid *orig_sid; struct dom_sid *target_sid; const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = { "objectSid", NULL }; TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match"); if (!mem_ctx) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!"); return ret; } ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, certificate_principal, ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg); if (ret != 0) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); return ret; } orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, skdc_entry->msg, "objectSid"); target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"); /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID * comparison */ if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); #if defined(KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH) /* MIT */ return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH; #else /* Heimdal (where this is an enum) */ return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH; #endif } talloc_free(mem_ctx); return ret; } /* * Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal * with S4U2Proxy. */ krb5_error_code samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry, krb5_const_principal target_principal) { krb5_error_code ret; char *tmp = NULL; const char *client_dn = NULL; const char *target_principal_name = NULL; struct ldb_message_element *el; struct ldb_val val; unsigned int i; bool found = false; TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy"); if (!mem_ctx) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:" " talloc_named() failed!"); return ret; } client_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(skdc_entry->msg->dn); if (!client_dn) { if (errno == 0) { errno = ENOMEM; } ret = errno; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:" " ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!"); return ret; } el = ldb_msg_find_element(skdc_entry->msg, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"); if (el == NULL) { ret = ENOENT; goto bad_option; } SMB_ASSERT(el->num_values != 0); /* * This is the Microsoft forwardable flag behavior. * * If the proxy (target) principal is NULL, and we have any authorized * delegation target, allow to forward. */ if (target_principal == NULL) { return 0; } /* * The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal * belongs to the same realm as the client. * * So we just need the principal without the realm, * as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo" * attribute. */ ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, target_principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &tmp); if (ret) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:" " krb5_unparse_name() failed!"); return ret; } DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] for target[%s]\n", client_dn, tmp)); target_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, tmp); SAFE_FREE(tmp); if (target_principal_name == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:" " talloc_strdup() failed!"); return ret; } val = data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name); for (i=0; inum_values; i++) { struct ldb_val *val1 = &val; struct ldb_val *val2 = &el->values[i]; int cmp; if (val1->length != val2->length) { continue; } cmp = strncasecmp((const char *)val1->data, (const char *)val2->data, val1->length); if (cmp != 0) { continue; } found = true; break; } if (!found) { ret = ENOENT; goto bad_option; } DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n", client_dn, tmp)); talloc_free(mem_ctx); return 0; bad_option: krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] " "not allowed for delegation to target[%s]", client_dn, target_principal_name); talloc_free(mem_ctx); return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; } /* * This method is called for S4U2Proxy requests and implements the * resource-based constrained delegation variant, which can support * cross-realm delegation. */ krb5_error_code samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy_rbcd( krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, krb5_const_principal client_principal, krb5_const_principal server_principal, krb5_pac header_pac, struct samba_kdc_entry *proxy_skdc_entry) { krb5_error_code code; enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; char *client_name = NULL; char *server_name = NULL; const char *proxy_dn = NULL; const DATA_BLOB *data = NULL; struct security_descriptor *rbcd_security_descriptor = NULL; struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc = NULL; struct auth_session_info *session_info = NULL; uint32_t session_info_flags = AUTH_SESSION_INFO_SIMPLE_PRIVILEGES; /* * Testing shows that although Windows grants SEC_ADS_GENERIC_ALL access * in security descriptors it creates for RBCD, its KDC only requires * SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS for the access check to succeed. */ uint32_t access_desired = SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS; uint32_t access_granted = 0; NTSTATUS nt_status; TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = NULL; mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy_rbcd"); if (mem_ctx == NULL) { errno = ENOMEM; code = errno; return code; } proxy_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(proxy_skdc_entry->msg->dn); if (proxy_dn == NULL) { DBG_ERR("ldb_dn_get_linearized failed for proxy_dn!\n"); TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx); if (errno == 0) { errno = ENOMEM; } code = errno; goto out; } rbcd_security_descriptor = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct security_descriptor); if (rbcd_security_descriptor == NULL) { errno = ENOMEM; code = errno; goto out; } code = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, client_principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY, &client_name); if (code != 0) { DBG_ERR("Unable to parse client_principal!\n"); goto out; } code = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, server_principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY, &server_name); if (code != 0) { DBG_ERR("Unable to parse server_principal!\n"); SAFE_FREE(client_name); goto out; } DBG_INFO("Check delegation from client[%s] to server[%s] via " "proxy[%s]\n", client_name, server_name, proxy_dn); code = kerberos_pac_to_user_info_dc(mem_ctx, header_pac, context, &user_info_dc, NULL, NULL); if (code != 0) { goto out; } if (user_info_dc->info->authenticated) { session_info_flags |= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_AUTHENTICATED; } nt_status = auth_generate_session_info(mem_ctx, kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx, kdc_db_ctx->samdb, user_info_dc, session_info_flags, &session_info); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { code = map_errno_from_nt_status(nt_status); goto out; } data = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(proxy_skdc_entry->msg, "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity"); if (data == NULL) { DBG_ERR("Could not find security descriptor " "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity in " "proxy[%s]\n", proxy_dn); code = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; goto out; } ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob( data, mem_ctx, rbcd_security_descriptor, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_security_descriptor); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { errno = ndr_map_error2errno(ndr_err); DBG_ERR("Failed to unmarshall " "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity " "security descriptor of proxy[%s]\n", proxy_dn); code = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; goto out; } if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) { NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_token, session_info->security_token); NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, rbcd_security_descriptor); } nt_status = sec_access_check_ds(rbcd_security_descriptor, session_info->security_token, access_desired, &access_granted, NULL, NULL); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { DBG_WARNING("RBCD: sec_access_check_ds(access_desired=%#08x, " "access_granted:%#08x) failed with: %s\n", access_desired, access_granted, nt_errstr(nt_status)); code = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; goto out; } DBG_NOTICE("RBCD: Access granted for client[%s]\n", client_name); code = 0; out: SAFE_FREE(client_name); SAFE_FREE(server_name); TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx); return code; } NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out) { int ldb_ret; struct ldb_message *msg; struct auth_session_info *session_info; struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx; /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to * be circular. * * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME */ kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context); if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) { return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx; kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx; kdc_db_ctx->msg_ctx = base_ctx->msg_ctx; /* get default kdc policy */ lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(mem_ctx, base_ctx->lp_ctx, &kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime, &kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime, &kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime); session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx); if (session_info == NULL) { return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; } /* Setup the link to secrets.ldb */ kdc_db_ctx->secrets_db = secrets_db_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->lp_ctx); if (kdc_db_ctx->secrets_db == NULL) { DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: " "Cannot open secrets.ldb for KDC backend!")); talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx); return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO; } kdc_db_ctx->fx_cookie_dn = ldb_dn_new(kdc_db_ctx, kdc_db_ctx->secrets_db, "CN=FX Cookie"); /* Setup the link to LDB */ kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->ev_ctx, base_ctx->lp_ctx, session_info, NULL, 0); if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) { DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!")); talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx); return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO; } /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */ ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc); if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb))); talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx); return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO; } if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) { int my_krbtgt_number; const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL }; struct ldb_dn *account_dn; struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx); if (!server_dn) { DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb))); talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx); return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO; } ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn, "serverReference", &account_dn); if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb))); talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx); return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO; } ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn, "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn); talloc_free(account_dn); if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb))); talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx); return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO; } ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE, secondary_keytab, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG, "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))"); if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n", ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn), ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb), ldb_strerror(ldb_ret))); talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx); return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO; } my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1); if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) { DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n", ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn), my_krbtgt_number)); talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx); return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO; } kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number; } else { kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0; ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, &msg, ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb), LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG, "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))"); if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb))); talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx); return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO; } kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn); kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0; talloc_free(msg); } *kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx; return NT_STATUS_OK; } krb5_error_code dsdb_extract_aes_256_key(krb5_context context, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const struct ldb_message *msg, uint32_t user_account_control, const uint32_t *kvno, uint32_t *kvno_out, DATA_BLOB *aes_256_key, DATA_BLOB *salt) { krb5_error_code krb5_ret; uint32_t supported_enctypes; unsigned flags = SDB_F_GET_CLIENT; struct sdb_entry sentry = {}; if (kvno != NULL) { flags |= SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED; } krb5_ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, mem_ctx, msg, false, /* is_krbtgt */ false, /* is_rodc */ user_account_control, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, flags, (kvno != NULL) ? *kvno : 0, &sentry, ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256, &supported_enctypes); if (krb5_ret != 0) { DBG_ERR("Failed to parse supplementalCredentials " "of %s with %s kvno using " "ENCTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256 " "Kerberos Key: %s\n", ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn), (kvno != NULL) ? "previous" : "current", krb5_get_error_message(context, krb5_ret)); return krb5_ret; } if ((supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) == 0 || sentry.keys.len != 1) { DBG_INFO("Failed to find a ENCTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256 " "key in supplementalCredentials " "of %s at KVNO %u (got %u keys, expected 1)\n", ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn), sentry.kvno, sentry.keys.len); sdb_entry_free(&sentry); return ENOENT; } if (sentry.keys.val[0].salt == NULL) { DBG_INFO("Failed to find a salt in " "supplementalCredentials " "of %s at KVNO %u\n", ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn), sentry.kvno); sdb_entry_free(&sentry); return ENOENT; } if (aes_256_key != NULL) { *aes_256_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, KRB5_KEY_DATA(&sentry.keys.val[0].key), KRB5_KEY_LENGTH(&sentry.keys.val[0].key)); if (aes_256_key->data == NULL) { sdb_entry_free(&sentry); return ENOMEM; } talloc_keep_secret(aes_256_key->data); } if (salt != NULL) { *salt = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, sentry.keys.val[0].salt->salt.data, sentry.keys.val[0].salt->salt.length); if (salt->data == NULL) { sdb_entry_free(&sentry); return ENOMEM; } } if (kvno_out != NULL) { *kvno_out = sentry.kvno; } sdb_entry_free(&sentry); return 0; }