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authorTodd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>2004-02-01 20:44:44 +0000
committerTodd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>2004-02-01 20:44:44 +0000
commit234a24f337f0c8de648bc5e42aa1ae7bbef7c84b (patch)
treed0c8e10e26de5869e9d125bc1b27c0089e0cbc41
parent46d5d9483fda6bfe546cc17f605100c4826fdece (diff)
downloadsudo-234a24f337f0c8de648bc5e42aa1ae7bbef7c84b.tar.gz
Add a note that noexec is not a cure-all.
-rw-r--r--sudoers.pod9
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/sudoers.pod b/sudoers.pod
index 9edd4f703..5801519f9 100644
--- a/sudoers.pod
+++ b/sudoers.pod
@@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@ the following as root:
If the resulting output contains a line that begins with:
- File containing dummy exec functions
+ File containing dummy exec functions:
then B<sudo> may be able to replace the exec family of functions
in the standard library with its own that simply return an error.
@@ -1185,6 +1185,13 @@ in the User Specification section above. If you are unsure whether
or not your system is capable of supporting I<noexec> you can always
just try it out and see if it works.
+Note that disabling shell escapes is not a panacea. Programs running
+as root are still capable of many potentially hazardous operations
+(such as chaning or overwriting files) that could lead to unintended
+privilege escalation. In the specific case of an editor, a safer
+approach is to give the user permission to run the B<sudoedit>
+program.
+
=head1 CAVEATS
The I<sudoers> file should B<always> be edited by the B<visudo>