seccomp: real syscall numbers are >= 0

Real syscall numbers start at 0. The fake seccomp values seem to be
strictly less than 0.

Fixes: 4df8fe8415eaf4abd5b93c3447452547c6ea9e5f

2 files changed, 26 insertions, 26 deletions

diff --git a/src/basic/missing_syscall.h b/src/basic/missing_syscall.h
index cbda3f7c60..41164ea7d0 100644
--- a/src/basic/missing_syscall.h
+++ b/src/basic/missing_syscall.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline int missing_pivot_root(const char *new_root, const char *put_old)
 
 #if !HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
 /* may be (invalid) negative number due to libseccomp, see PR 13319 */
-#  if ! (defined __NR_memfd_create && __NR_memfd_create > 0)
+#  if ! (defined __NR_memfd_create && __NR_memfd_create >= 0)
 #    if defined __NR_memfd_create
 #      undef __NR_memfd_create
 #    endif
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static inline int missing_memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags) {
 
 #if !HAVE_GETRANDOM
 /* may be (invalid) negative number due to libseccomp, see PR 13319 */
-#  if ! (defined __NR_getrandom && __NR_getrandom > 0)
+#  if ! (defined __NR_getrandom && __NR_getrandom >= 0)
 #    if defined __NR_getrandom
 #      undef __NR_getrandom
 #    endif
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static inline pid_t missing_gettid(void) {
 
 #if !HAVE_NAME_TO_HANDLE_AT
 /* may be (invalid) negative number due to libseccomp, see PR 13319 */
-#  if ! (defined __NR_name_to_handle_at && __NR_name_to_handle_at > 0)
+#  if ! (defined __NR_name_to_handle_at && __NR_name_to_handle_at >= 0)
 #    if defined __NR_name_to_handle_at
 #      undef __NR_name_to_handle_at
 #    endif
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static inline int missing_name_to_handle_at(int fd, const char *name, struct fil
 
 #if !HAVE_SETNS
 /* may be (invalid) negative number due to libseccomp, see PR 13319 */
-#  if ! (defined __NR_setns && __NR_setns > 0)
+#  if ! (defined __NR_setns && __NR_setns >= 0)
 #    if defined __NR_setns
 #      undef __NR_setns
 #    endif
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ static inline pid_t raw_getpid(void) {
 
 #if !HAVE_RENAMEAT2
 /* may be (invalid) negative number due to libseccomp, see PR 13319 */
-#  if ! (defined __NR_renameat2 && __NR_renameat2 > 0)
+#  if ! (defined __NR_renameat2 && __NR_renameat2 >= 0)
 #    if defined __NR_renameat2
 #      undef __NR_renameat2
 #    endif
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static inline int missing_renameat2(int oldfd, const char *oldname, int newfd, c
 
 #if !HAVE_KCMP
 static inline int missing_kcmp(pid_t pid1, pid_t pid2, int type, unsigned long idx1, unsigned long idx2) {
-#  if defined __NR_kcmp && __NR_kcmp > 0
+#  if defined __NR_kcmp && __NR_kcmp >= 0
         return syscall(__NR_kcmp, pid1, pid2, type, idx1, idx2);
 #  else
         errno = ENOSYS;
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static inline int missing_kcmp(pid_t pid1, pid_t pid2, int type, unsigned long i
 
 #if !HAVE_KEYCTL
 static inline long missing_keyctl(int cmd, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) {
-#  if defined __NR_keyctl && __NR_keyctl > 0
+#  if defined __NR_keyctl && __NR_keyctl >= 0
         return syscall(__NR_keyctl, cmd, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
 #  else
         errno = ENOSYS;
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static inline long missing_keyctl(int cmd, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg
 }
 
 static inline key_serial_t missing_add_key(const char *type, const char *description, const void *payload, size_t plen, key_serial_t ringid) {
-#  if defined __NR_add_key && __NR_add_key > 0
+#  if defined __NR_add_key && __NR_add_key >= 0
         return syscall(__NR_add_key, type, description, payload, plen, ringid);
 #  else
         errno = ENOSYS;
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static inline key_serial_t missing_add_key(const char *type, const char *descrip
 }
 
 static inline key_serial_t missing_request_key(const char *type, const char *description, const char * callout_info, key_serial_t destringid) {
-#  if defined __NR_request_key && __NR_request_key > 0
+#  if defined __NR_request_key && __NR_request_key >= 0
         return syscall(__NR_request_key, type, description, callout_info, destringid);
 #  else
         errno = ENOSYS;
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ static inline key_serial_t missing_request_key(const char *type, const char *des
 
 #if !HAVE_COPY_FILE_RANGE
 /* may be (invalid) negative number due to libseccomp, see PR 13319 */
-#  if ! (defined __NR_copy_file_range && __NR_copy_file_range > 0)
+#  if ! (defined __NR_copy_file_range && __NR_copy_file_range >= 0)
 #    if defined __NR_copy_file_range
 #      undef __NR_copy_file_range
 #    endif
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ static inline ssize_t missing_copy_file_range(int fd_in, loff_t *off_in,
 
 #if !HAVE_BPF
 /* may be (invalid) negative number due to libseccomp, see PR 13319 */
-#  if ! (defined __NR_bpf && __NR_bpf > 0)
+#  if ! (defined __NR_bpf && __NR_bpf >= 0)
 #    if defined __NR_bpf
 #      undef __NR_bpf
 #    endif
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ static inline int missing_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, size_t size) {
 
 #ifndef __IGNORE_pkey_mprotect
 /* may be (invalid) negative number due to libseccomp, see PR 13319 */
-#  if ! (defined __NR_pkey_mprotect && __NR_pkey_mprotect > 0)
+#  if ! (defined __NR_pkey_mprotect && __NR_pkey_mprotect >= 0)
 #    if defined __NR_pkey_mprotect
 #      undef __NR_pkey_mprotect
 #    endif
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ static inline int missing_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, size_t size) {
 
 #if !HAVE_STATX
 /* may be (invalid) negative number due to libseccomp, see PR 13319 */
-#  if ! (defined __NR_statx && __NR_statx > 0)
+#  if ! (defined __NR_statx && __NR_statx >= 0)
 #    if defined __NR_statx
 #      undef __NR_statx
 #    endif
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ enum {
 static inline long missing_set_mempolicy(int mode, const unsigned long *nodemask,
                            unsigned long maxnode) {
         long i;
-#  if defined __NR_set_mempolicy && __NR_set_mempolicy > 0
+#  if defined __NR_set_mempolicy && __NR_set_mempolicy >= 0
         i = syscall(__NR_set_mempolicy, mode, nodemask, maxnode);
 #  else
         errno = ENOSYS;
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static inline long missing_get_mempolicy(int *mode, unsigned long *nodemask,
 
 #if !HAVE_PIDFD_OPEN
 /* may be (invalid) negative number due to libseccomp, see PR 13319 */
-#  if ! (defined __NR_pidfd_open && __NR_pidfd_open > 0)
+#  if ! (defined __NR_pidfd_open && __NR_pidfd_open >= 0)
 #    if defined __NR_pidfd_open
 #      undef __NR_pidfd_open
 #    endif
@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ static inline int pidfd_open(pid_t pid, unsigned flags) {
 
 #if !HAVE_PIDFD_SEND_SIGNAL
 /* may be (invalid) negative number due to libseccomp, see PR 13319 */
-#  if ! (defined __NR_pidfd_send_signal && __NR_pidfd_send_signal > 0)
+#  if ! (defined __NR_pidfd_send_signal && __NR_pidfd_send_signal >= 0)
 #    if defined __NR_pidfd_send_signal
 #      undef __NR_pidfd_send_signal
 #    endif
diff --git a/src/test/test-seccomp.c b/src/test/test-seccomp.c
index 69b1c788aa..75566199e3 100644
--- a/src/test/test-seccomp.c
+++ b/src/test/test-seccomp.c
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 #include "virt.h"
 
 /* __NR_socket may be invalid due to libseccomp */
-#if !defined(__NR_socket) || __NR_socket <= 0 || defined(__i386__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__s390__)
+#if !defined(__NR_socket) || __NR_socket < 0 || defined(__i386__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__s390__)
 /* On these archs, socket() is implemented via the socketcall() syscall multiplexer,
  * and we can't restrict it hence via seccomp. */
 #  define SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN 1
@@ -305,14 +305,14 @@ static void test_protect_sysctl(void) {
         assert_se(pid >= 0);
 
         if (pid == 0) {
-#if defined __NR__sysctl && __NR__sysctl > 0
+#if defined __NR__sysctl && __NR__sysctl >= 0
                 assert_se(syscall(__NR__sysctl, NULL) < 0);
                 assert_se(errno == EFAULT);
 #endif
 
                 assert_se(seccomp_protect_sysctl() >= 0);
 
-#if defined __NR__sysctl && __NR__sysctl > 0
+#if defined __NR__sysctl && __NR__sysctl >= 0
                 assert_se(syscall(__NR__sysctl, 0, 0, 0) < 0);
                 assert_se(errno == EPERM);
 #endif
@@ -347,14 +347,14 @@ static void test_protect_syslog(void) {
         assert_se(pid >= 0);
 
         if (pid == 0) {
-#if defined __NR_syslog && __NR_syslog > 0
+#if defined __NR_syslog && __NR_syslog >= 0
                 assert_se(syscall(__NR_syslog, -1, NULL, 0) < 0);
                 assert_se(errno == EINVAL);
 #endif
 
                 assert_se(seccomp_protect_syslog() >= 0);
 
-#if defined __NR_syslog && __NR_syslog > 0
+#if defined __NR_syslog && __NR_syslog >= 0
                 assert_se(syscall(__NR_syslog, 0, 0, 0) < 0);
                 assert_se(errno == EPERM);
 #endif
@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) {
                 assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) == 0);
 
                 assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL));
-#if defined __NR_access && __NR_access > 0
+#if defined __NR_access && __NR_access >= 0
                 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_access + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0);
 #else
                 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_faccessat + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0);
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) {
                 s = hashmap_free(s);
 
                 assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL));
-#if defined __NR_access && __NR_access > 0
+#if defined __NR_access && __NR_access >= 0
                 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_access + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0);
 #else
                 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_faccessat + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0);
@@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) {
                 s = hashmap_free(s);
 
                 assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL));
-#if defined __NR_poll && __NR_poll > 0
+#if defined __NR_poll && __NR_poll >= 0
                 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_poll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0);
 #else
                 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_ppoll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0);
@@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) {
                 s = hashmap_free(s);
 
                 assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL));
-#if defined __NR_poll && __NR_poll > 0
+#if defined __NR_poll && __NR_poll >= 0
                 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_poll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0);
 #else
                 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_ppoll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0);
@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ static int real_open(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode) {
          * testing purposes that calls the real syscall, on architectures where SYS_open is defined. On
          * other architectures, let's just fall back to the glibc call. */
 
-#if defined __NR_open && __NR_open > 0
+#if defined __NR_open && __NR_open >= 0
         return (int) syscall(__NR_open, path, flags, mode);
 #else
         return open(path, flags, mode);