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author | Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> | 2016-01-13 02:45:28 +0100 |
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committer | Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> | 2016-01-13 20:21:57 +0100 |
commit | e926785a1feff01901e6298261a9f635791d3b17 (patch) | |
tree | b038c3df03d5c6b6fae6db1201310f713a8cacc1 /src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c | |
parent | e8233bce196a14fa3ebde2969594fcdfa4404e19 (diff) | |
download | systemd-e926785a1feff01901e6298261a9f635791d3b17.tar.gz |
resolved: implement the full NSEC and NSEC3 postive wildcard proofs
Diffstat (limited to 'src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c | 144 |
1 files changed, 143 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c index 6f0f8f837e..afff979b5a 100644 --- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c +++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c @@ -1604,7 +1604,7 @@ int dnssec_nsec_test(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *r return 0; } -int dnssec_nsec_test_between(DnsAnswer *answer, const char *name, const char *zone, bool *authenticated) { +int dnssec_nsec_test_enclosed(DnsAnswer *answer, uint16_t type, const char *name, const char *zone, bool *authenticated) { DnsResourceRecord *rr; DnsAnswerFlags flags; int r; @@ -1618,6 +1618,9 @@ int dnssec_nsec_test_between(DnsAnswer *answer, const char *name, const char *zo DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { bool found = false; + if (rr->key->type != type && type != DNS_TYPE_ANY) + continue; + r = dns_name_endswith(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), zone); if (r < 0) return r; @@ -1685,6 +1688,145 @@ int dnssec_nsec_test_between(DnsAnswer *answer, const char *name, const char *zo return 0; } +static int dnssec_test_positive_wildcard_nsec3( + DnsAnswer *answer, + const char *name, + const char *source, + const char *zone, + bool *authenticated) { + + const char *next_closer = NULL; + int r; + + /* Run a positive NSEC3 wildcard proof. Specifically: + * + * A proof that the the "next closer" of the generating wildcard does not exist. + * + * Note a key difference between the NSEC3 and NSEC versions of the proof. NSEC RRs don't have to exist for + * empty non-transients. NSEC3 RRs however have to. This means it's sufficient to check if the next closer name + * exists for the NSEC3 RR and we are done. + * + * To prove that a.b.c.d.e.f is rightfully synthesized from a wildcard *.d.e.f all we have to check is that + * c.d.e.f does not exist. */ + + for (;;) { + next_closer = name; + r = dns_name_parent(&name); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + return 0; + + r = dns_name_equal(name, source); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) + break; + } + + return dnssec_nsec_test_enclosed(answer, DNS_TYPE_NSEC3, next_closer, zone, authenticated); +} + +static int dnssec_test_positive_wildcard_nsec( + DnsAnswer *answer, + const char *name, + const char *source, + const char *zone, + bool *_authenticated) { + + bool authenticated = true; + int r; + + /* Run a positive NSEC wildcard proof. Specifically: + * + * A proof that there's neither a wildcard name nor a non-wildcard name that is a suffix of the name "name" and + * a prefix of the synthesizing source "source" in the zone "zone". + * + * See RFC 5155, Section 8.8 and RFC 4035, Section 5.3.4 + * + * Note that if we want to prove that a.b.c.d.e.f is rightfully synthesized from a wildcard *.d.e.f, then we + * have to prove that none of the following exist: + * + * 1) a.b.c.d.e.f + * 2) *.b.c.d.e.f + * 3) b.c.d.e.f + * 4) *.c.d.e.f + * 5) c.d.e.f + * + */ + + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *wc = NULL; + bool a = false; + + /* Check if there's an NSEC or NSEC3 RR that proves that the mame we determined is really non-existing, + * i.e between the owner name and the next name of an NSEC RR. */ + r = dnssec_nsec_test_enclosed(answer, DNS_TYPE_NSEC, name, zone, &a); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + authenticated = authenticated && a; + + /* Strip one label off */ + r = dns_name_parent(&name); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + /* Did we reach the source of synthesis? */ + r = dns_name_equal(name, source); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) { + /* Successful exit */ + *_authenticated = authenticated; + return 1; + } + + /* Safety check, that the source of synthesis is still our suffix */ + r = dns_name_endswith(name, source); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + return -EBADMSG; + + /* Replace the label we stripped off with an asterisk */ + wc = strappend("*.", name); + if (!wc) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* And check if the proof holds for the asterisk name, too */ + r = dnssec_nsec_test_enclosed(answer, DNS_TYPE_NSEC, wc, zone, &a); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + authenticated = authenticated && a; + /* In the next iteration we'll check the non-asterisk-prefixed version */ + } +} + +int dnssec_test_positive_wildcard( + DnsAnswer *answer, + const char *name, + const char *source, + const char *zone, + bool *authenticated) { + + int r; + + assert(name); + assert(source); + assert(zone); + assert(authenticated); + + r = dns_answer_contains_zone_nsec3(answer, zone); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) + return dnssec_test_positive_wildcard_nsec3(answer, name, source, zone, authenticated); + else + return dnssec_test_positive_wildcard_nsec(answer, name, source, zone, authenticated); +} + static const char* const dnssec_result_table[_DNSSEC_RESULT_MAX] = { [DNSSEC_VALIDATED] = "validated", [DNSSEC_VALIDATED_WILDCARD] = "validated-wildcard", |