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| author | Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> | 2020-06-23 08:31:16 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl> | 2020-06-25 09:00:19 +0200 |
| commit | 6b000af4f206a87f424f05c163ea818b142e372e (patch) | |
| tree | 941f6aee47abce048bd88a6218f8082b8b5c52fa /src | |
| parent | b18573e16fb0055029f6af9078c2e5f52626bc9b (diff) | |
| download | systemd-6b000af4f206a87f424f05c163ea818b142e372e.tar.gz | |
tree-wide: avoid some loaded terms
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-knodel-terminology-02
https://lwn.net/Articles/823224/
This gets rid of most but not occasions of these loaded terms:
1. scsi_id and friends are something that is supposed to be removed from
our tree (see #7594)
2. The test suite defines an API used by the ubuntu CI. We can remove
this too later, but this needs to be done in sync with the ubuntu CI.
3. In some cases the terms are part of APIs we call or where we expose
concepts the kernel names the way it names them. (In particular all
remaining uses of the word "slave" in our codebase are like this,
it's used by the POSIX PTY layer, by the network subsystem, the mount
API and the block device subsystem). Getting rid of the term in these
contexts would mean doing some major fixes of the kernel ABI first.
Regarding the replacements: when whitelist/blacklist is used as noun we
replace with with allow list/deny list, and when used as verb with
allow-list/deny-list.
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
42 files changed, 256 insertions, 254 deletions
diff --git a/src/analyze/analyze-security.c b/src/analyze/analyze-security.c index 0137883976..7b32fcb7b7 100644 --- a/src/analyze/analyze-security.c +++ b/src/analyze/analyze-security.c @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct security_info { char **system_call_architectures; - bool system_call_filter_whitelist; + bool system_call_filter_allow_list; Set *system_call_filter; uint32_t _umask; @@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ static int assess_system_call_architectures( #if HAVE_SECCOMP -static bool syscall_names_in_filter(Set *s, bool whitelist, const SyscallFilterSet *f) { +static bool syscall_names_in_filter(Set *s, bool allow_list, const SyscallFilterSet *f) { const char *syscall; NULSTR_FOREACH(syscall, f->value) { @@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ static bool syscall_names_in_filter(Set *s, bool whitelist, const SyscallFilterS const SyscallFilterSet *g; assert_se(g = syscall_filter_set_find(syscall)); - if (syscall_names_in_filter(s, whitelist, g)) + if (syscall_names_in_filter(s, allow_list, g)) return true; /* bad! */ continue; @@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ static bool syscall_names_in_filter(Set *s, bool whitelist, const SyscallFilterS if (id < 0) continue; - if (set_contains(s, syscall) == whitelist) { + if (set_contains(s, syscall) == allow_list) { log_debug("Offending syscall filter item: %s", syscall); return true; /* bad! */ } @@ -541,30 +541,30 @@ static int assess_system_call_filter( assert(a->parameter < _SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX); f = syscall_filter_sets + a->parameter; - if (!info->system_call_filter_whitelist && set_isempty(info->system_call_filter)) { + if (!info->system_call_filter_allow_list && set_isempty(info->system_call_filter)) { d = strdup("Service does not filter system calls"); b = 10; } else { bool bad; log_debug("Analyzing system call filter, checking against: %s", f->name); - bad = syscall_names_in_filter(info->system_call_filter, info->system_call_filter_whitelist, f); + bad = syscall_names_in_filter(info->system_call_filter, info->system_call_filter_allow_list, f); log_debug("Result: %s", bad ? "bad" : "good"); - if (info->system_call_filter_whitelist) { + if (info->system_call_filter_allow_list) { if (bad) { - (void) asprintf(&d, "System call whitelist defined for service, and %s is included", f->name); + (void) asprintf(&d, "System call allow list defined for service, and %s is included", f->name); b = 9; } else { - (void) asprintf(&d, "System call whitelist defined for service, and %s is not included", f->name); + (void) asprintf(&d, "System call allow list defined for service, and %s is not included", f->name); b = 0; } } else { if (bad) { - (void) asprintf(&d, "System call blacklist defined for service, and %s is not included", f->name); + (void) asprintf(&d, "System call deny list defined for service, and %s is not included", f->name); b = 10; } else { - (void) asprintf(&d, "System call blacklist defined for service, and %s is included", f->name); + (void) asprintf(&d, "System call deny list defined for service, and %s is included", f->name); b = 5; } } @@ -599,13 +599,13 @@ static int assess_ip_address_allow( d = strdup("Service defines custom ingress/egress IP filters with BPF programs"); b = 0; } else if (!info->ip_address_deny_all) { - d = strdup("Service does not define an IP address whitelist"); + d = strdup("Service does not define an IP address allow list"); b = 10; } else if (info->ip_address_allow_other) { - d = strdup("Service defines IP address whitelist with non-localhost entries"); + d = strdup("Service defines IP address allow list with non-localhost entries"); b = 5; } else if (info->ip_address_allow_localhost) { - d = strdup("Service defines IP address whitelist with only localhost entries"); + d = strdup("Service defines IP address allow list with only localhost entries"); b = 2; } else { d = strdup("Service blocks all IP address ranges"); @@ -1639,7 +1639,7 @@ static int property_read_restrict_address_families( void *userdata) { struct security_info *info = userdata; - int whitelist, r; + int allow_list, r; assert(bus); assert(member); @@ -1649,7 +1649,7 @@ static int property_read_restrict_address_families( if (r < 0) return r; - r = sd_bus_message_read(m, "b", &whitelist); + r = sd_bus_message_read(m, "b", &allow_list); if (r < 0) return r; @@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ static int property_read_restrict_address_families( info->restrict_address_family_unix = info->restrict_address_family_netlink = info->restrict_address_family_packet = - info->restrict_address_family_other = whitelist; + info->restrict_address_family_other = allow_list; r = sd_bus_message_enter_container(m, 'a', "s"); if (r < 0) @@ -1673,15 +1673,15 @@ static int property_read_restrict_address_families( break; if (STR_IN_SET(name, "AF_INET", "AF_INET6")) - info->restrict_address_family_inet = !whitelist; + info->restrict_address_family_inet = !allow_list; else if (streq(name, "AF_UNIX")) - info->restrict_address_family_unix = !whitelist; + info->restrict_address_family_unix = !allow_list; else if (streq(name, "AF_NETLINK")) - info->restrict_address_family_netlink = !whitelist; + info->restrict_address_family_netlink = !allow_list; else if (streq(name, "AF_PACKET")) - info->restrict_address_family_packet = !whitelist; + info->restrict_address_family_packet = !allow_list; else - info->restrict_address_family_other = !whitelist; + info->restrict_address_family_other = !allow_list; } r = sd_bus_message_exit_container(m); @@ -1699,7 +1699,7 @@ static int property_read_system_call_filter( void *userdata) { struct security_info *info = userdata; - int whitelist, r; + int allow_list, r; assert(bus); assert(member); @@ -1709,11 +1709,11 @@ static int property_read_system_call_filter( if (r < 0) return r; - r = sd_bus_message_read(m, "b", &whitelist); + r = sd_bus_message_read(m, "b", &allow_list); if (r < 0) return r; - info->system_call_filter_whitelist = whitelist; + info->system_call_filter_allow_list = allow_list; r = sd_bus_message_enter_container(m, 'a', "s"); if (r < 0) diff --git a/src/basic/device-nodes.c b/src/basic/device-nodes.c index 5ebe5b2483..888ef23664 100644 --- a/src/basic/device-nodes.c +++ b/src/basic/device-nodes.c @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ #include "device-nodes.h" #include "utf8.h" -int whitelisted_char_for_devnode(char c, const char *white) { +int allow_listed_char_for_devnode(char c, const char *white) { if ((c >= '0' && c <= '9') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ int encode_devnode_name(const char *str, char *str_enc, size_t len) { j += seqlen; i += (seqlen-1); - } else if (str[i] == '\\' || !whitelisted_char_for_devnode(str[i], NULL)) { + } else if (str[i] == '\\' || !allow_listed_char_for_devnode(str[i], NULL)) { if (len-j < 4) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/src/basic/device-nodes.h b/src/basic/device-nodes.h index 3840e6d307..0dad8c9c68 100644 --- a/src/basic/device-nodes.h +++ b/src/basic/device-nodes.h @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ #include "stdio-util.h" int encode_devnode_name(const char *str, char *str_enc, size_t len); -int whitelisted_char_for_devnode(char c, const char *additional); +int allow_listed_char_for_devnode(char c, const char *additional); #define DEV_NUM_PATH_MAX \ (STRLEN("/dev/block/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(dev_t) + 1 + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(dev_t)) diff --git a/src/basic/efivars.c b/src/basic/efivars.c index e7edd17d0b..007137cf01 100644 --- a/src/basic/efivars.c +++ b/src/basic/efivars.c @@ -210,9 +210,9 @@ int efi_set_variable( if (!p) return -ENOMEM; - /* Newer efivarfs protects variables that are not in a whitelist with FS_IMMUTABLE_FL by default, to protect - * them for accidental removal and modification. We are not changing these variables accidentally however, - * hence let's unset the bit first. */ + /* Newer efivarfs protects variables that are not in an allow list with FS_IMMUTABLE_FL by default, + * to protect them for accidental removal and modification. We are not changing these variables + * accidentally however, hence let's unset the bit first. */ r = chattr_path(p, 0, FS_IMMUTABLE_FL, &saved_flags); if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT) diff --git a/src/basic/fs-util.c b/src/basic/fs-util.c index 943bc56319..34a2260783 100644 --- a/src/basic/fs-util.c +++ b/src/basic/fs-util.c @@ -1576,7 +1576,7 @@ static int blockdev_is_encrypted(const char *sysfs_path, unsigned depth_left) { d = opendir(p); if (!d) { - if (errno == ENOENT) /* Doesn't have slaves */ + if (errno == ENOENT) /* Doesn't have underlying devices */ return false; return -errno; @@ -1592,7 +1592,7 @@ static int blockdev_is_encrypted(const char *sysfs_path, unsigned depth_left) { if (errno != 0) return -errno; - break; /* No more slaves */ + break; /* No more underlying devices */ } q = path_join(p, de->d_name); diff --git a/src/core/bpf-devices.c b/src/core/bpf-devices.c index 07ef9f6777..34320e88fb 100644 --- a/src/core/bpf-devices.c +++ b/src/core/bpf-devices.c @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static int bpf_access_type(const char *acc) { return r; } -static int bpf_prog_whitelist_device( +static int bpf_prog_allow_list_device( BPFProgram *prog, char type, int major, @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_whitelist_device( return r; } -static int bpf_prog_whitelist_major( +static int bpf_prog_allow_list_major( BPFProgram *prog, char type, int major, @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_whitelist_major( return r; } -static int bpf_prog_whitelist_class( +static int bpf_prog_allow_list_class( BPFProgram *prog, char type, const char *acc) { @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_whitelist_class( int bpf_devices_cgroup_init( BPFProgram **ret, CGroupDevicePolicy policy, - bool whitelist) { + bool allow_list) { const struct bpf_insn pre_insn[] = { /* load device type to r2 */ @@ -188,14 +188,14 @@ int bpf_devices_cgroup_init( assert(ret); - if (policy == CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_AUTO && !whitelist) + if (policy == CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_AUTO && !allow_list) return 0; r = bpf_program_new(BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE, &prog); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Loading device control BPF program failed: %m"); - if (policy == CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_CLOSED || whitelist) { + if (policy == CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_CLOSED || allow_list) { r = bpf_program_add_instructions(prog, pre_insn, ELEMENTSOF(pre_insn)); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Extending device control BPF program failed: %m"); @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ int bpf_devices_cgroup_init( int bpf_devices_apply_policy( BPFProgram *prog, CGroupDevicePolicy policy, - bool whitelist, + bool allow_list, const char *cgroup_path, BPFProgram **prog_installed) { @@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ int bpf_devices_apply_policy( if (!prog) goto finish; - const bool deny_everything = policy == CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_STRICT && !whitelist; + const bool deny_everything = policy == CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_STRICT && !allow_list; const struct bpf_insn post_insn[] = { /* return DENY */ @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ int bpf_devices_supported(void) { return supported = 1; } -static int whitelist_device_pattern( +static int allow_list_device_pattern( BPFProgram *prog, const char *path, char type, @@ -340,11 +340,11 @@ static int whitelist_device_pattern( return 0; if (maj && min) - return bpf_prog_whitelist_device(prog, type, *maj, *min, acc); + return bpf_prog_allow_list_device(prog, type, *maj, *min, acc); else if (maj) - return bpf_prog_whitelist_major(prog, type, *maj, acc); + return bpf_prog_allow_list_major(prog, type, *maj, acc); else - return bpf_prog_whitelist_class(prog, type, acc); + return bpf_prog_allow_list_class(prog, type, acc); } else { char buf[2+DECIMAL_STR_MAX(unsigned)*2+2+4]; @@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static int whitelist_device_pattern( } } -int bpf_devices_whitelist_device( +int bpf_devices_allow_list_device( BPFProgram *prog, const char *path, const char *node, @@ -405,10 +405,10 @@ int bpf_devices_whitelist_device( } unsigned maj = major(rdev), min = minor(rdev); - return whitelist_device_pattern(prog, path, S_ISCHR(mode) ? 'c' : 'b', &maj, &min, acc); + return allow_list_device_pattern(prog, path, S_ISCHR(mode) ? 'c' : 'b', &maj, &min, acc); } -int bpf_devices_whitelist_major( +int bpf_devices_allow_list_major( BPFProgram *prog, const char *path, const char *name, @@ -424,12 +424,12 @@ int bpf_devices_whitelist_major( if (streq(name, "*")) /* If the name is a wildcard, then apply this list to all devices of this type */ - return whitelist_device_pattern(prog, path, type, NULL, NULL, acc); + return allow_list_device_pattern(prog, path, type, NULL, NULL, acc); if (safe_atou(name, &maj) >= 0 && DEVICE_MAJOR_VALID(maj)) /* The name is numeric and suitable as major. In that case, let's take its major, and create * the entry directly. */ - return whitelist_device_pattern(prog, path, type, &maj, NULL, acc); + return allow_list_device_pattern(prog, path, type, &maj, NULL, acc); _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL; bool good = false, any = false; @@ -486,17 +486,17 @@ int bpf_devices_whitelist_major( continue; any = true; - (void) whitelist_device_pattern(prog, path, type, &maj, NULL, acc); + (void) allow_list_device_pattern(prog, path, type, &maj, NULL, acc); } if (!any) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOENT), - "Device whitelist pattern \"%s\" did not match anything.", name); + "Device allow list pattern \"%s\" did not match anything.", name); return 0; } -int bpf_devices_whitelist_static( +int bpf_devices_allow_list_static( BPFProgram *prog, const char *path) { @@ -515,13 +515,13 @@ int bpf_devices_whitelist_static( const char *node, *acc; NULSTR_FOREACH_PAIR(node, acc, auto_devices) { - k = bpf_devices_whitelist_device(prog, path, node, acc); + k = bpf_devices_allow_list_device(prog, path, node, acc); if (r >= 0 && k < 0) r = k; } /* PTS (/dev/pts) devices may not be duplicated, but accessed */ - k = bpf_devices_whitelist_major(prog, path, "pts", 'c', "rw"); + k = bpf_devices_allow_list_major(prog, path, "pts", 'c', "rw"); if (r >= 0 && k < 0) r = k; diff --git a/src/core/bpf-devices.h b/src/core/bpf-devices.h index 4a5f4b1fb1..e2a08016e3 100644 --- a/src/core/bpf-devices.h +++ b/src/core/bpf-devices.h @@ -7,15 +7,15 @@ typedef struct BPFProgram BPFProgram; -int bpf_devices_cgroup_init(BPFProgram **ret, CGroupDevicePolicy policy, bool whitelist); +int bpf_devices_cgroup_init(BPFProgram **ret, CGroupDevicePolicy policy, bool allow_list); int bpf_devices_apply_policy( BPFProgram *prog, CGroupDevicePolicy policy, - bool whitelist, + bool allow_list, const char *cgroup_path, BPFProgram **prog_installed); int bpf_devices_supported(void); -int bpf_devices_whitelist_device(BPFProgram *prog, const char *path, const char *node, const char *acc); -int bpf_devices_whitelist_major(BPFProgram *prog, const char *path, const char *name, char type, const char *acc); -int bpf_devices_whitelist_static(BPFProgram *prog, const char *path); +int bpf_devices_allow_list_device(BPFProgram *prog, const char *path, const char *node, const char *acc); +int bpf_devices_allow_list_major(BPFProgram *prog, const char *path, const char *name, char type, const char *acc); +int bpf_devices_allow_list_static(BPFProgram *prog, const char *path); diff --git a/src/core/cgroup.c b/src/core/cgroup.c index 7d45438e85..031b28a684 100644 --- a/src/core/cgroup.c +++ b/src/core/cgroup.c @@ -990,12 +990,12 @@ static int cgroup_apply_devices(Unit *u) { "Failed to reset devices.allow/devices.deny: %m"); } - bool whitelist_static = policy == CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_CLOSED || + bool allow_list_static = policy == CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_CLOSED || (policy == CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_AUTO && c->device_allow); - if (whitelist_static) - (void) bpf_devices_whitelist_static(prog, path); + if (allow_list_static) + (void) bpf_devices_allow_list_static(prog, path); - bool any = whitelist_static; + bool any = allow_list_static; LIST_FOREACH(device_allow, a, c->device_allow) { char acc[4], *val; unsigned k = 0; @@ -1011,11 +1011,11 @@ static int cgroup_apply_devices(Unit *u) { acc[k++] = 0; if (path_startswith(a->path, "/dev/")) - r = bpf_devices_whitelist_device(prog, path, a->path, acc); + r = bpf_devices_allow_list_device(prog, path, a->path, acc); else if ((val = startswith(a->path, "block-"))) - r = bpf_devices_whitelist_major(prog, path, val, 'b', acc); + r = bpf_devices_allow_list_major(prog, path, val, 'b', acc); else if ((val = startswith(a->path, "char-"))) - r = bpf_devices_whitelist_major(prog, path, val, 'c', acc); + r = bpf_devices_allow_list_major(prog, path, val, 'c', acc); else { log_unit_debug(u, "Ignoring device '%s' while writing cgroup attribute.", a->path); continue; @@ -1029,7 +1029,7 @@ static int cgroup_apply_devices(Unit *u) { log_unit_warning_errno(u, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENODEV), "No devices matched by device filter."); /* The kernel verifier would reject a program we would build with the normal intro and outro - but no whitelisting rules (outro would contain an unreachable instruction for successful + but no allow-listing rules (outro would contain an unreachable instruction for successful return). */ policy = CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_STRICT; } diff --git a/src/core/dbus-execute.c b/src/core/dbus-execute.c index 68ce395c56..45b5c0c13a 100644 --- a/src/core/dbus-execute.c +++ b/src/core/dbus-execute.c @@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ static int property_get_syscall_filter( if (r < 0) return r; - r = sd_bus_message_append(reply, "b", c->syscall_whitelist); + r = sd_bus_message_append(reply, "b", c->syscall_allow_list); if (r < 0) return r; @@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static int property_get_address_families( if (r < 0) return r; - r = sd_bus_message_append(reply, "b", c->address_families_whitelist); + r = sd_bus_message_append(reply, "b", c->address_families_allow_list); if (r < 0) return r; @@ -1672,14 +1672,14 @@ int bus_exec_context_set_transient_property( return bus_set_transient_errno(u, name, &c->syscall_errno, message, flags, error); if (streq(name, "SystemCallFilter")) { - int whitelist; + int allow_list; _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; r = sd_bus_message_enter_container(message, 'r', "bas"); if (r < 0) return r; - r = sd_bus_message_read(message, "b", &whitelist); + r = sd_bus_message_read(message, "b", &allow_list); if (r < 0) return r; @@ -1693,11 +1693,11 @@ int bus_exec_context_set_transient_property( if (!UNIT_WRITE_FLAGS_NOOP(flags)) { _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL; - SeccompParseFlags invert_flag = whitelist ? 0 : SECCOMP_PARSE_INVERT; + SeccompParseFlags invert_flag = allow_list ? 0 : SECCOMP_PARSE_INVERT; char **s; if (strv_isempty(l)) { - c->syscall_whitelist = false; + c->syscall_allow_list = false; c->syscall_filter = hashmap_free(c->syscall_filter); unit_write_settingf(u, flags, name, "SystemCallFilter="); @@ -1709,14 +1709,14 @@ int bus_exec_context_set_transient_property( if (!c->syscall_filter) return log_oom(); - c->syscall_whitelist = whitelist; + c->syscall_allow_list = allow_list; - if (c->syscall_whitelist) { + if (c->syscall_allow_list) { r = seccomp_parse_syscall_filter("@default", -1, c->syscall_filter, SECCOMP_PARSE_PERMISSIVE | - SECCOMP_PARSE_WHITELIST | invert_flag, + SECCOMP_PARSE_ALLOW_LIST | invert_flag, u->id, NULL, 0); if (r < 0) @@ -1737,7 +1737,7 @@ int bus_exec_context_set_transient_property( c->syscall_filter, SECCOMP_PARSE_LOG | SECCOMP_PARSE_PERMISSIVE | invert_flag | - (c->syscall_whitelist ? SECCOMP_PARSE_WHITELIST : 0), + (c->syscall_allow_list ? SECCOMP_PARSE_ALLOW_LIST : 0), u->id, NULL, 0); if (r < 0) @@ -1748,7 +1748,7 @@ int bus_exec_context_set_transient_property( if (!joined) return -ENOMEM; - unit_write_settingf(u, flags, name, "SystemCallFilter=%s%s", whitelist ? "" : "~", joined); + unit_write_settingf(u, flags, name, "SystemCallFilter=%s%s", allow_list ? "" : "~", joined); } return 1; @@ -1792,14 +1792,14 @@ int bus_exec_context_set_transient_property( return 1; } else if (streq(name, "RestrictAddressFamilies")) { - int whitelist; + int allow_list; _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; r = sd_bus_message_enter_container(message, 'r', "bas"); if (r < 0) return r; - r = sd_bus_message_read(message, "b", &whitelist); + r = sd_bus_message_read(message, "b", &allow_list); if (r < 0) return r; @@ -1816,7 +1816,7 @@ int bus_exec_context_set_transient_property( char **s; if (strv_isempty(l)) { - c->address_families_whitelist = false; + c->address_families_allow_list = false; c->address_families = set_free(c->address_families); unit_write_settingf(u, flags, name, "RestrictAddressFamilies="); @@ -1828,7 +1828,7 @@ int bus_exec_context_set_transient_property( if (!c->address_families) return log_oom(); - c->address_families_whitelist = whitelist; + c->address_families_allow_list = allow_list; } STRV_FOREACH(s, l) { @@ -1838,7 +1838,7 @@ int bus_exec_context_set_transient_property( if (af < 0) return af; - if (whitelist == c->address_families_whitelist) { + if (allow_list == c->address_families_allow_list) { r = set_put(c->address_families, INT_TO_PTR(af)); if (r < 0) return r; @@ -1850,7 +1850,7 @@ int bus_exec_context_set_transient_property( if (!joined) return -ENOMEM; - unit_write_settingf(u, flags, name, "RestrictAddressFamilies=%s%s", whitelist ? "" : "~", joined); + unit_write_settingf(u, flags, name, "RestrictAddressFamilies=%s%s", allow_list ? "" : "~", joined); } return 1; diff --git a/src/core/execute.c b/src/core/execute.c index e0835f9b92..0765f112fd 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.c +++ b/src/core/execute.c @@ -1380,14 +1380,14 @@ static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path) { static bool context_has_address_families(const ExecContext *c) { assert(c); - return c->address_families_whitelist || + return c->address_families_allow_list || !set_isempty(c->address_families); } static bool context_has_syscall_filters(const ExecContext *c) { assert(c); - return c->syscall_whitelist || + return c->syscall_allow_list || !hashmap_isempty(c->syscall_filter); } @@ -1443,7 +1443,7 @@ static int apply_syscall_filter(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c, bool needs_ negative_action = c->syscall_errno == 0 ? scmp_act_kill_process() : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c->syscall_errno); - if (c->syscall_whitelist) { + if (c->syscall_allow_list) { default_action = negative_action; action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; } else { @@ -1452,7 +1452,7 @@ static int apply_syscall_filter(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c, bool needs_ } if (needs_ambient_hack) { - r = seccomp_filter_set_add(c->syscall_filter, c->syscall_whitelist, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID); + r = seccomp_filter_set_add(c->syscall_filter, c->syscall_allow_list, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID); if (r < 0) return r; } @@ -1483,7 +1483,7 @@ static int apply_address_families(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictAddressFamilies=")) return 0; - return seccomp_restrict_address_families(c->address_families, c->address_families_whitelist); + return seccomp_restrict_address_families(c->address_families, c->address_families_allow_list); } static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { @@ -4918,7 +4918,7 @@ void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { "%sSystemCallFilter: ", prefix); - if (!c->syscall_whitelist) + if (!c->syscall_allow_list) fputc('~', f); #if HAVE_SECCOMP diff --git a/src/core/execute.h b/src/core/execute.h index 7c9d63c5e4..805709f2aa 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.h +++ b/src/core/execute.h @@ -287,9 +287,9 @@ struct ExecContext { Hashmap *syscall_filter; Set *syscall_archs; int syscall_errno; - bool syscall_whitelist:1; + bool syscall_allow_list:1; - bool address_families_whitelist:1; + bool address_families_allow_list:1; Set *address_families; char *network_namespace_path; diff --git a/src/core/load-fragment.c b/src/core/load-fragment.c index c3186f3824..4aaba1b31f 100644 --- a/src/core/load-fragment.c +++ b/src/core/load-fragment.c @@ -3017,7 +3017,7 @@ int config_parse_syscall_filter( if (isempty(rvalue)) { /* Empty assignment resets the list */ c->syscall_filter = hashmap_free(c->syscall_filter); - c->syscall_whitelist = false; + c->syscall_allow_list = false; return 0; } @@ -3033,15 +3033,15 @@ int config_parse_syscall_filter( if (invert) /* Allow everything but the ones listed */ - c->syscall_whitelist = false; + c->syscall_allow_list = false; else { /* Allow nothing but the ones listed */ - c->syscall_whitelist = true; + c->syscall_allow_list = true; - /* Accept default syscalls if we are on a whitelist */ + /* Accept default syscalls if we are on a allow_list */ r = seccomp_parse_syscall_filter( "@default", -1, c->syscall_filter, - SECCOMP_PARSE_PERMISSIVE|SECCOMP_PARSE_WHITELIST, + SECCOMP_PARSE_PERMISSIVE|SECCOMP_PARSE_ALLOW_LIST, unit, NULL, 0); if (r < 0) @@ -3074,7 +3074,7 @@ int config_parse_syscall_filter( name, num, c->syscall_filter, SECCOMP_PARSE_LOG|SECCOMP_PARSE_PERMISSIVE| (invert ? SECCOMP_PARSE_INVERT : 0)| - (c->syscall_whitelist ? SECCOMP_PARSE_WHITELIST : 0), + (c->syscall_allow_list ? SECCOMP_PARSE_ALLOW_LIST : 0), unit, filename, line); if (r < 0) return r; @@ -3189,7 +3189,7 @@ int config_parse_address_families( if (isempty(rvalue)) { /* Empty assignment resets the list */ c->address_families = set_free(c->address_families); - c->address_families_whitelist = false; + c->address_families_allow_list = false; return 0; } @@ -3203,7 +3203,7 @@ int config_parse_address_families( if (!c->address_families) return log_oom(); - c->address_families_whitelist = !invert; + c->address_families_allow_list = !invert; } for (p = rvalue;;) { @@ -3231,7 +3231,7 @@ int config_parse_address_families( /* If we previously wanted to forbid an address family and now * we want to allow it, then just remove it from the list. */ - if (!invert == c->address_families_whitelist) { + if (!invert == c->address_families_allow_list) { r = set_put(c->address_families, INT_TO_PTR(af)); if (r < 0) return log_oom(); diff --git a/src/core/namespace.c b/src/core/namespace.c index 423a47c7b8..7bb4440747 100644 --- a/src/core/namespace.c +++ b/src/core/namespace.c @@ -1067,7 +1067,7 @@ static int apply_mount( return 0; } -static int make_read_only(const MountEntry *m, char **blacklist, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) { +static int make_read_only(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) { unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0; bool submounts = false; int r = 0; @@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@ static int make_read_only(const MountEntry *m, char **blacklist, FILE *proc_self mount_entry_read_only(m) && !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS); if (submounts) - r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, blacklist, proc_self_mountinfo); + r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo); else r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo); @@ -1538,7 +1538,7 @@ int setup_namespace( if (n_mounts > 0) { _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL; - _cleanup_free_ char **blacklist = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char **deny_list = NULL; size_t j; /* Open /proc/self/mountinfo now as it may become unavailable if we mount anything on top of /proc. @@ -1591,19 +1591,19 @@ int setup_namespace( normalize_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts); } - /* Create a blacklist we can pass to bind_mount_recursive() */ - blacklist = new(char*, n_mounts+1); - if (!blacklist) { + /* Create a deny list we can pass to bind_mount_recursive() */ + deny_list = new(char*, n_mounts+1); + if (!deny_list) { r = -ENOMEM; goto finish; } for (j = 0; j < n_mounts; j++) - blacklist[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j); - blacklist[j] = NULL; + deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j); + deny_list[j] = NULL; /* Second round, flip the ro bits if necessary. */ for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; ++m) { - r = make_read_only(m, blacklist, proc_self_mountinfo); + r = make_read_only(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo); if (r < 0) { if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m)) *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m)); diff --git a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-generator.c b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-generator.c index 2c341702dd..b93fbb8660 100644 --- a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-generator.c +++ b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-generator.c @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static bool arg_enabled = true; static bool arg_read_crypttab = true; static const char *arg_crypttab = NULL; static const char *arg_runtime_directory = NULL; -static bool arg_whitelist = false; +static bool arg_allow_list = false; static Hashmap *arg_disks = NULL; static char *arg_default_options = NULL; static char *arg_default_keyfile = NULL; @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static int parse_proc_cmdline_item(const char *key, const char *value, void *dat if (!d) return log_oom(); - d->create = arg_whitelist = true; + d->create = arg_allow_list = true; } else if (streq(key, "luks.options")) { @@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static int parse_proc_cmdline_item(const char *key, const char *value, void *dat if (!d) return log_oom(); - d->create = arg_whitelist = true; + d->create = arg_allow_list = true; free_and_replace(d->name, uuid_value); } else @@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ static int add_crypttab_devices(void) { if (uuid) d = hashmap_get(arg_disks, uuid); - if (arg_whitelist && !d) { + if (arg_allow_list && !d) { log_info("Not creating device '%s' because it was not specified on the kernel command line.", name); continue; } diff --git a/src/libudev/libudev-util.c b/src/libudev/libudev-util.c index 37660d0313..4a471fb90d 100644 --- a/src/libudev/libudev-util.c +++ b/src/libudev/libudev-util.c @@ -154,8 +154,8 @@ size_t util_replace_whitespace(const char *str, char *to, size_t len) { return j; } -/* allow chars in whitelist, plain ascii, hex-escaping and valid utf8 */ -size_t util_replace_chars(char *str, const char *white) { +/* allow chars in allow list, plain ascii, hex-escaping and valid utf8 */ +size_t util_replace_chars(char *str, const char *allow) { size_t i = 0, replaced = 0; assert(str); @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ size_t util_replace_chars(char *str, const char *white) { while (str[i] != '\0') { int len; - if (whitelisted_char_for_devnode(str[i], white)) { + if (allow_listed_char_for_devnode(str[i], allow)) { i++; continue; } @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ size_t util_replace_chars(char *str, const char *white) { } /* if space is allowed, replace whitespace with ordinary space */ - if (isspace(str[i]) && white && strchr(white, ' ')) { + if (isspace(str[i]) && allow && strchr(allow, ' ')) { str[i] = ' '; i++; replaced++; diff --git a/src/login/logind-core.c b/src/login/logind-core.c index 4289461df6..475759c79b 100644 --- a/src/login/logind-core.c +++ b/src/login/logind-core.c @@ -601,10 +601,10 @@ static int manager_count_external_displays(Manager *m) { if (sd_device_get_sysname(d, &nn) < 0) continue; - /* Ignore internal displays: the type is encoded in the sysfs name, as the second dash separated item - * (the first is the card name, the last the connector number). We implement a blacklist of external - * displays here, rather than a whitelist of internal ones, to ensure we don't block suspends too - * eagerly. */ + /* Ignore internal displays: the type is encoded in the sysfs name, as the second dash + * separated item (the first is the card name, the last the connector number). We implement a + * deny list of external displays here, rather than an allow list of internal ones, to ensure + * we don't block suspends too eagerly. */ dash = strchr(nn, '-'); if (!dash) continue; diff --git a/src/network/networkd-dhcp4.c b/src/network/networkd-dhcp4.c index 6103792771..20dae6c19f 100644 --- a/src/network/networkd-dhcp4.c +++ b/src/network/networkd-dhcp4.c @@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ static int dhcp_lease_ip_change(sd_dhcp_client *client, Link *link) { return 0; } -static int dhcp_server_is_black_listed(Link *link, sd_dhcp_client *client) { +static int dhcp_server_is_deny_listed(Link *link, sd_dhcp_client *client) { sd_dhcp_lease *lease; struct in_addr addr; int r; @@ -1068,10 +1068,10 @@ static int dhcp_server_is_black_listed(Link *link, sd_dhcp_client *client) { if (r < 0) return log_link_debug_errno(link, r, "Failed to get DHCP server ip address: %m"); - if (set_contains(link->network->dhcp_black_listed_ip, UINT32_TO_PTR(addr.s_addr))) { + if (set_contains(link->network->dhcp_deny_listed_ip, UINT32_TO_PTR(addr.s_addr))) { log_struct(LOG_DEBUG, LOG_LINK_INTERFACE(link), - LOG_LINK_MESSAGE(link, "DHCPv4 ip '%u.%u.%u.%u' found in black listed ip addresses, ignoring offer", + LOG_LINK_MESSAGE(link, "DHCPv4 ip '%u.%u.%u.%u' found in deny-listed ip addresses, ignoring offer", ADDRESS_FMT_VAL(addr))); return true; } @@ -1163,7 +1163,7 @@ static int dhcp4_handler(sd_dhcp_client *client, int event, void *userdata) { } break; case SD_DHCP_CLIENT_EVENT_SELECTING: - r = dhcp_server_is_black_listed(link, client); + r = dhcp_server_is_deny_listed(link, client); if (r < 0) return r; if (r != 0) @@ -1551,7 +1551,7 @@ int config_parse_dhcp_max_attempts( return 0; } -int config_parse_dhcp_black_listed_ip_address( +int config_parse_dhcp_deny_listed_ip_address( const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, @@ -1572,7 +1572,7 @@ int config_parse_dhcp_black_listed_ip_address( assert(data); if (isempty(rvalue)) { - network->dhcp_black_listed_ip = set_free(network->dhcp_black_listed_ip); + network->dhcp_deny_listed_ip = set_free(network->dhcp_deny_listed_ip); return 0; } @@ -1583,7 +1583,7 @@ int config_parse_dhcp_black_listed_ip_address( r = extract_first_word(&p, &n, NULL, 0); if (r < 0) { log_syntax(unit, LOG_ERR, filename, line, r, - "Failed to parse DHCP black listed ip address, ignoring assignment: %s", + "Failed to parse DHCP deny-listed IP address, ignoring assignment: %s", rvalue); return 0; } @@ -1593,14 +1593,14 @@ int config_parse_dhcp_black_listed_ip_address( r = in_addr_from_string(AF_INET, n, &ip); if (r < 0) { log_syntax(unit, LOG_ERR, filename, line, r, - "DHCP black listed ip address is invalid, ignoring assignment: %s", n); + "DHCP deny-listed IP address is invalid, ignoring assignment: %s", n); continue; } - r = set_ensure_put(&network->dhcp_black_listed_ip, NULL, UINT32_TO_PTR(ip.in.s_addr)); + r = set_ensure_put(&network->dhcp_deny_listed_ip, NULL, UINT32_TO_PTR(ip.in.s_addr)); if (r < 0) log_syntax(unit, LOG_ERR, filename, line, r, - "Failed to store DHCP black listed ip address '%s', ignoring assignment: %m", n); + "Failed to store DHCP deny-listed IP address '%s', ignoring assignment: %m", n); } return 0; diff --git a/src/network/networkd-dhcp4.h b/src/network/networkd-dhcp4.h index a6e24be78d..567ee724da 100644 --- a/src/network/networkd-dhcp4.h +++ b/src/network/networkd-dhcp4.h @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ int dhcp4_set_client_identifier(Link *link); int dhcp4_set_promote_secondaries(Link *link); CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_dhcp_client_identifier); -CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_dhcp_black_listed_ip_address); +CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_dhcp_deny_listed_ip_address); CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_dhcp_max_attempts); CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_dhcp_ip_service_type); CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_dhcp_mud_url); diff --git a/src/network/networkd-ndisc.c b/src/network/networkd-ndisc.c index 7889bfb191..563901e33b 100644 --- a/src/network/networkd-ndisc.c +++ b/src/network/networkd-ndisc.c @@ -723,12 +723,12 @@ static int ndisc_router_process_options(Link *link, sd_ndisc_router *rt) { if (r < 0) return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Failed to get prefix address: %m"); - if (set_contains(link->network->ndisc_black_listed_prefix, &a.in6)) { + if (set_contains(link->network->ndisc_deny_listed_prefix, &a.in6)) { if (DEBUG_LOGGING) { _cleanup_free_ char *b = NULL; (void) in_addr_to_string(AF_INET6, &a, &b); - log_link_debug(link, "Prefix '%s' is black listed, ignoring", strna(b)); + log_link_debug(link, "Prefix '%s' is deny-listed, ignoring", strna(b)); } break; @@ -915,7 +915,7 @@ DEFINE_HASH_OPS_WITH_VALUE_DESTRUCTOR( IPv6Token, free); -int config_parse_ndisc_black_listed_prefix( +int config_parse_ndisc_deny_listed_prefix( const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, @@ -937,7 +937,7 @@ int config_parse_ndisc_black_listed_prefix( assert(data); if (isempty(rvalue)) { - network->ndisc_black_listed_prefix = set_free_free(network->ndisc_black_listed_prefix); + network->ndisc_deny_listed_prefix = set_free_free(network->ndisc_deny_listed_prefix); return 0; } @@ -949,7 +949,7 @@ int config_parse_ndisc_black_listed_prefix( r = extract_first_word(&p, &n, NULL, 0); if (r < 0) { log_syntax(unit, LOG_ERR, filename, line, r, - "Failed to parse NDISC black listed prefix, ignoring assignment: %s", + "Failed to parse NDISC deny-listed prefix, ignoring assignment: %s", rvalue); return 0; } @@ -959,18 +959,18 @@ int config_parse_ndisc_black_listed_prefix( r = in_addr_from_string(AF_INET6, n, &ip); if (r < 0) { log_syntax(unit, LOG_ERR, filename, line, r, - "NDISC black listed prefix is invalid, ignoring assignment: %s", n); + "NDISC deny-listed prefix is invalid, ignoring assignment: %s", n); continue; } - if (set_contains(network->ndisc_black_listed_prefix, &ip.in6)) + if (set_contains(network->ndisc_deny_listed_prefix, &ip.in6)) continue; a = newdup(struct in6_addr, &ip.in6, 1); if (!a) return log_oom(); - r = set_ensure_consume(&network->ndisc_black_listed_prefix, &in6_addr_hash_ops, TAKE_PTR(a)); + r = set_ensure_consume(&network->ndisc_deny_listed_prefix, &in6_addr_hash_ops, TAKE_PTR(a)); if (r < 0) return log_oom(); } diff --git a/src/network/networkd-ndisc.h b/src/network/networkd-ndisc.h index 68cd1c2bd7..0bc2882a6c 100644 --- a/src/network/networkd-ndisc.h +++ b/src/network/networkd-ndisc.h @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ int ndisc_configure(Link *link); void ndisc_vacuum(Link *link); void ndisc_flush(Link *link); -CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_ndisc_black_listed_prefix); +CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_ndisc_deny_listed_prefix); CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_address_generation_type); CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_ipv6_accept_ra_start_dhcp6_client); diff --git a/src/network/networkd-network-gperf.gperf b/src/network/networkd-network-gperf.gperf index 046eedc4bf..0326ae62de 100644 --- a/src/network/networkd-network-gperf.gperf +++ b/src/network/networkd-network-gperf.gperf @@ -187,7 +187,8 @@ DHCPv4.IAID, config_parse_iaid, DHCPv4.ListenPort, config_parse_uint16, 0, offsetof(Network, dhcp_client_port) DHCPv4.SendRelease, config_parse_bool, 0, offsetof(Network, dhcp_send_release) DHCPv4.SendDecline, config_parse_bool, 0, offsetof(Network, dhcp_send_decline) -DHCPv4.BlackList, config_parse_dhcp_black_listed_ip_address, 0, 0 +DHCPv4.DenyList, config_parse_dhcp_deny_listed_ip_address, 0, 0 +DHCPv4.BlackList, config_parse_dhcp_deny_listed_ip_address, 0, 0 DHCPv4.IPServiceType, config_parse_dhcp_ip_service_type, 0, offsetof(Network, ip_service_type) DHCPv4.SendOption, config_parse_dhcp_send_option, AF_INET, offsetof(Network, dhcp_client_send_options) DHCPv4.SendVendorOption, config_parse_dhcp_send_option, 0, offsetof(Network, dhcp_client_send_vendor_options) @@ -214,7 +215,8 @@ IPv6AcceptRA.UseDNS, config_parse_bool, IPv6AcceptRA.UseDomains, config_parse_dhcp_use_domains, 0, offsetof(Network, ipv6_accept_ra_use_domains) IPv6AcceptRA.DHCPv6Client, config_parse_ipv6_accept_ra_start_dhcp6_client, 0, offsetof(Network, ipv6_accept_ra_start_dhcp6_client) IPv6AcceptRA.RouteTable, config_parse_section_route_table, 0, 0 -IPv6AcceptRA.BlackList, config_parse_ndisc_black_listed_prefix, 0, 0 +IPv6AcceptRA.DenyList, config_parse_ndisc_deny_listed_prefix, 0, 0 +IPv6AcceptRA.BlackList, config_parse_ndisc_deny_listed_prefix, 0, 0 DHCPServer.MaxLeaseTimeSec, config_parse_sec, 0, offsetof(Network, dhcp_server_max_lease_time_usec) DHCPServer.DefaultLeaseTimeSec, config_parse_sec, 0, offsetof(Network, dhcp_server_default_lease_time_usec) DHCPServer.EmitDNS, config_parse_bool, 0, offsetof(Network, dhcp_server_emit[SD_DHCP_LEASE_DNS].emit) diff --git a/src/network/networkd-network.c b/src/network/networkd-network.c index 8478fe8c9e..0d54a7ef6b 100644 --- a/src/network/networkd-network.c +++ b/src/network/networkd-network.c @@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ static Network *network_free(Network *network) { free(network->dhcp_mudurl); strv_free(network->dhcp_user_class); free(network->dhcp_hostname); - set_free(network->dhcp_black_listed_ip); + set_free(network->dhcp_deny_listed_ip); set_free(network->dhcp_request_options); set_free(network->dhcp6_request_options); free(network->mac); @@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ static Network *network_free(Network *network) { ordered_set_free_free(network->router_search_domains); free(network->router_dns); - set_free_free(network->ndisc_black_listed_prefix); + set_free_free(network->ndisc_deny_listed_prefix); free(network->bridge_name); free(network->bond_name); diff --git a/src/network/networkd-network.h b/src/network/networkd-network.h index a2fcc5209b..67cf056b9d 100644 --- a/src/network/networkd-network.h +++ b/src/network/networkd-network.h @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ struct Network { bool dhcp_send_decline; DHCPUseDomains dhcp_use_domains; sd_ipv4acd *dhcp_acd; - Set *dhcp_black_listed_ip; + Set *dhcp_deny_listed_ip; Set *dhcp_request_options; OrderedHashmap *dhcp_client_send_options; OrderedHashmap *dhcp_client_send_vendor_options; @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ struct Network { DHCPUseDomains ipv6_accept_ra_use_domains; IPv6AcceptRAStartDHCP6Client ipv6_accept_ra_start_dhcp6_client; uint32_t ipv6_accept_ra_route_table; - Set *ndisc_black_listed_prefix; + Set *ndisc_deny_listed_prefix; OrderedHashmap *ipv6_tokens; IPv6PrivacyExtensions ipv6_privacy_extensions; diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-oci.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn-oci.c index 9a82443c66..e3ade92371 100644 --- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-oci.c +++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-oci.c @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ * spec should say what to do with unknown props * /bin/mount regarding NFS and FUSE required? * what does terminal=false mean? - * sysctl inside or outside? whitelisting? + * sysctl inside or outside? allow-listing? * swapiness typo -> swappiness * * Unsupported: @@ -1029,39 +1029,40 @@ static int oci_cgroup_devices(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlag return r; if (!data.allow) { - /* The fact that OCI allows 'deny' entries makes really no sense, as 'allow' vs. 'deny' for the - * devices cgroup controller is really not about whitelisting and blacklisting but about adding - * and removing entries from the whitelist. Since we always start out with an empty whitelist - * we hence ignore the whole thing, as removing entries which don't exist make no sense. We'll - * log about this, since this is really borked in the spec, with one exception: the entry - * that's supposed to drop the kernel's default we ignore silently */ + /* The fact that OCI allows 'deny' entries makes really no sense, as 'allow' + * vs. 'deny' for the devices cgroup controller is really not about allow-listing and + * deny-listing but about adding and removing entries from the allow list. Since we + * always start out with an empty allow list we hence ignore the whole thing, as + * removing entries which don't exist make no sense. We'll log about this, since this + * is really borked in the spec, with one exception: the entry that's supposed to + * drop the kernel's default we ignore silently */ if (!data.r || !data.w || !data.m || data.type != 0 || data.major != (unsigned) -1 || data.minor != (unsigned) -1) - json_log(v, flags|JSON_WARNING, 0, "Devices cgroup whitelist with arbitrary 'allow' entries not supported, ignoring."); + json_log(v, flags|JSON_WARNING, 0, "Devices cgroup allow list with arbitrary 'allow' entries not supported, ignoring."); /* We ignore the 'deny' entry as for us that's implied */ continue; } if (!data.r && !data.w && !data.m) { - json_log(v, flags|LOG_WARNING, 0, "Device cgroup whitelist entry with no effect found, ignoring."); + json_log(v, flags|LOG_WARNING, 0, "Device cgroup allow list entry with no effect found, ignoring."); continue; } if (data.minor != (unsigned) -1 && data.major == (unsigned) -1) return json_log(v, flags, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), - "Device cgroup whitelist entries with minors but no majors not supported."); + "Device cgroup allow list entries with minors but no majors not supported."); if (data.major != (unsigned) -1 && data.type == 0) return json_log(v, flags, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), - "Device cgroup whitelist entries with majors but no device node type not supported."); + "Device cgroup allow list entries with majors but no device node type not supported."); if (data.type == 0) { - if (data.r && data.w && data.m) /* a catchall whitelist entry means we are looking at a noop */ + if (data.r && data.w && data.m) /* a catchall allow list entry means we are looking at a noop */ noop = true; else return json_log(v, flags, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), - "Device cgroup whitelist entries with no type not supported."); + "Device cgroup allow list entries with no type not supported."); } a = reallocarray(list, n_list + 1, sizeof(struct device_data)); diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-seccomp.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn-seccomp.c index f94f131f22..79110d90d5 100644 --- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-seccomp.c +++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-seccomp.c @@ -25,13 +25,13 @@ static int seccomp_add_default_syscall_filter( scmp_filter_ctx ctx, uint32_t arch, uint64_t cap_list_retain, - char **syscall_whitelist, - char **syscall_blacklist) { + char **syscall_allow_list, + char **syscall_deny_list) { static const struct { uint64_t capability; const char* name; - } whitelist[] = { + } allow_list[] = { /* Let's use set names where we can */ { 0, "@aio" }, { 0, "@basic-io" }, @@ -142,17 +142,17 @@ static int seccomp_add_default_syscall_filter( char **p; int r; - for (size_t i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(whitelist); i++) { - if (whitelist[i].capability != 0 && (cap_list_retain & (1ULL << whitelist[i].capability)) == 0) + for (size_t i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(allow_list); i++) { + if (allow_list[i].capability != 0 && (cap_list_retain & (1ULL << allow_list[i].capability)) == 0) continue; - r = seccomp_add_syscall_filter_item(ctx, whitelist[i].name, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_blacklist, false); + r = seccomp_add_syscall_filter_item(ctx, allow_list[i].name, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_deny_list, false); if (r < 0) - return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add syscall filter item %s: %m", whitelist[i].name); + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add syscall filter item %s: %m", allow_list[i].name); } - STRV_FOREACH(p, syscall_whitelist) { - r = seccomp_add_syscall_filter_item(ctx, *p, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_blacklist, true); + STRV_FOREACH(p, syscall_allow_list) { + r = seccomp_add_syscall_filter_item(ctx, *p, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_deny_list, true); if (r < 0) log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to add rule for system call %s on %s, ignoring: %m", *p, seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int seccomp_add_default_syscall_filter( return 0; } -int setup_seccomp(uint64_t cap_list_retain, char **syscall_whitelist, char **syscall_blacklist) { +int setup_seccomp(uint64_t cap_list_retain, char **syscall_allow_list, char **syscall_deny_list) { uint32_t arch; int r; @@ -173,13 +173,13 @@ int setup_seccomp(uint64_t cap_list_retain, char **syscall_whitelist, char **sys SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; - log_debug("Applying whitelist on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); + log_debug("Applying allow list on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM)); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate seccomp object: %m"); - r = seccomp_add_default_syscall_filter(seccomp, arch, cap_list_retain, syscall_whitelist, syscall_blacklist); + r = seccomp_add_default_syscall_filter(seccomp, arch, cap_list_retain, syscall_allow_list, syscall_deny_list); if (r < 0) return r; @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ int setup_seccomp(uint64_t cap_list_retain, char **syscall_whitelist, char **sys #else -int setup_seccomp(uint64_t cap_list_retain, char **syscall_whitelist, char **syscall_blacklist) { +int setup_seccomp(uint64_t cap_list_retain, char **syscall_allow_list, char **syscall_deny_list) { return 0; } diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-seccomp.h b/src/nspawn/nspawn-seccomp.h index d852eef638..4174323520 100644 --- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-seccomp.h +++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-seccomp.h @@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ #include <sys/types.h> -int setup_seccomp(uint64_t cap_list_retain, char **syscall_whitelist, char **syscall_blacklist); +int setup_seccomp(uint64_t cap_list_retain, char **syscall_allow_ist, char **syscall_deny_list); diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.c index 996c0027c3..d341fa25aa 100644 --- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.c +++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.c @@ -129,8 +129,8 @@ Settings* settings_free(Settings *s) { free(s->pivot_root_new); free(s->pivot_root_old); free(s->working_directory); - strv_free(s->syscall_whitelist); - strv_free(s->syscall_blacklist); + strv_free(s->syscall_allow_list); + strv_free(s->syscall_deny_list); rlimit_free_all(s->rlimit); free(s->hostname); cpu_set_reset(&s->cpu_set); @@ -689,9 +689,9 @@ int config_parse_syscall_filter( } if (negative) - r = strv_extend(&settings->syscall_blacklist, word); + r = strv_extend(&settings->syscall_deny_list, word); else - r = strv_extend(&settings->syscall_whitelist, word); + r = strv_extend(&settings->syscall_allow_list, word); if (r < 0) return log_oom(); } diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.h b/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.h index 24f98fd7ef..ab31c05a9e 100644 --- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.h +++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.h @@ -165,8 +165,8 @@ typedef struct Settings { UserNamespaceMode userns_mode; uid_t uid_shift, uid_range; bool notify_ready; - char **syscall_whitelist; - char **syscall_blacklist; + char **syscall_allow_list; + char **syscall_deny_list; struct rlimit *rlimit[_RLIMIT_MAX]; char *hostname; int no_new_privileges; diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn.c index ae6828f2bf..2f86d4094d 100644 --- a/src/nspawn/nspawn.c +++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn.c @@ -201,8 +201,8 @@ static MountSettingsMask arg_mount_settings = MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO|MOUNT_APPLY_ static void *arg_root_hash = NULL; static char *arg_verity_data = NULL; static size_t arg_root_hash_size = 0; -static char **arg_syscall_whitelist = NULL; -static char **arg_syscall_blacklist = NULL; +static char **arg_syscall_allow_list = NULL; +static char **arg_syscall_deny_list = NULL; #if HAVE_SECCOMP static scmp_filter_ctx arg_seccomp = NULL; #endif @@ -244,8 +244,8 @@ STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_property_message, sd_bus_message_unrefp); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_parameters, strv_freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_root_hash, freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_verity_data, freep); -STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_syscall_whitelist, strv_freep); -STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_syscall_blacklist, strv_freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_syscall_allow_list, strv_freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_syscall_deny_list, strv_freep); #if HAVE_SECCOMP STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_seccomp, seccomp_releasep); #endif @@ -1346,9 +1346,9 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) { return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse system call filter: %m"); if (negative) - r = strv_extend(&arg_syscall_blacklist, word); + r = strv_extend(&arg_syscall_deny_list, word); else - r = strv_extend(&arg_syscall_whitelist, word); + r = strv_extend(&arg_syscall_allow_list, word); if (r < 0) return log_oom(); } @@ -2175,10 +2175,11 @@ static int setup_dev_console(const char *console) { static int setup_keyring(void) { key_serial_t keyring; - /* Allocate a new session keyring for the container. This makes sure the keyring of the session systemd-nspawn - * was invoked from doesn't leak into the container. Note that by default we block keyctl() and request_key() - * anyway via seccomp so doing this operation isn't strictly necessary, but in case people explicitly whitelist - * these system calls let's make sure we don't leak anything into the container. */ + /* Allocate a new session keyring for the container. This makes sure the keyring of the session + * systemd-nspawn was invoked from doesn't leak into the container. Note that by default we block + * keyctl() and request_key() anyway via seccomp so doing this operation isn't strictly necessary, + * but in case people explicitly allow-list these system calls let's make sure we don't leak anything + * into the container. */ keyring = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0, 0, 0); if (keyring == -1) { @@ -3089,7 +3090,7 @@ static int inner_child( } else #endif { - r = setup_seccomp(arg_caps_retain, arg_syscall_whitelist, arg_syscall_blacklist); + r = setup_seccomp(arg_caps_retain, arg_syscall_allow_list, arg_syscall_deny_list); if (r < 0) return r; } @@ -3954,11 +3955,11 @@ static int merge_settings(Settings *settings, const char *path) { if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_SYSCALL_FILTER) == 0) { - if (!arg_settings_trusted && !strv_isempty(settings->syscall_whitelist)) + if (!arg_settings_trusted && !strv_isempty(settings->syscall_allow_list)) log_warning("Ignoring SystemCallFilter= settings, file %s is not trusted.", path); else { - strv_free_and_replace(arg_syscall_whitelist, settings->syscall_whitelist); - strv_free_and_replace(arg_syscall_blacklist, settings->syscall_blacklist); + strv_free_and_replace(arg_syscall_allow_list, settings->syscall_allow_list); + strv_free_and_replace(arg_syscall_deny_list, settings->syscall_deny_list); } #if HAVE_SECCOMP diff --git a/src/partition/growfs.c b/src/partition/growfs.c index 7e2452a5d1..98a7e4d31d 100644 --- a/src/partition/growfs.c +++ b/src/partition/growfs.c @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int resize_crypt_luks_device(dev_t devno, const char *fstype, dev_t main_ } #endif -static int maybe_resize_slave_device(const char *mountpath, dev_t main_devno) { +static int maybe_resize_underlying_device(const char *mountpath, dev_t main_devno) { _cleanup_free_ char *fstype = NULL, *devpath = NULL; dev_t devno; int r; @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) { if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine block device of \"%s\": %m", arg_target); - r = maybe_resize_slave_device(arg_target, devno); + r = maybe_resize_underlying_device(arg_target, devno); if (r < 0) return r; diff --git a/src/resolve/test-resolved-etc-hosts.c b/src/resolve/test-resolved-etc-hosts.c index ca3590066c..721bf8732e 100644 --- a/src/resolve/test-resolved-etc-hosts.c +++ b/src/resolve/test-resolved-etc-hosts.c @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void test_parse_etc_hosts(void) { "1::2::3 multi.colon\n" "::0 some.where some.other\n" - "0.0.0.0 black.listed\n" + "0.0.0.0 deny.listed\n" "::5\t\t\t \tsome.where\tsome.other foobar.foo.foo\t\t\t\n" " \n", f); assert_se(fflush_and_check(f) >= 0); @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static void test_parse_etc_hosts(void) { assert_se( set_contains(hosts.no_address, "some.where")); assert_se( set_contains(hosts.no_address, "some.other")); - assert_se( set_contains(hosts.no_address, "black.listed")); + assert_se( set_contains(hosts.no_address, "deny.listed")); assert_se(!set_contains(hosts.no_address, "foobar.foo.foo")); } diff --git a/src/shared/bus-unit-util.c b/src/shared/bus-unit-util.c index d93d5d6013..6cfac82146 100644 --- a/src/shared/bus-unit-util.c +++ b/src/shared/bus-unit-util.c @@ -1173,11 +1173,11 @@ static int bus_append_execute_property(sd_bus_message *m, const char *field, con if (STR_IN_SET(field, "RestrictAddressFamilies", "SystemCallFilter")) { - int whitelist = 1; + int allow_list = 1; const char *p = eq; if (*p == '~') { - whitelist = 0; + allow_list = 0; p++; } @@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ static int bus_append_execute_property(sd_bus_message *m, const char *field, con if (r < 0) return bus_log_create_error(r); - r = sd_bus_message_append_basic(m, 'b', &whitelist); + r = sd_bus_message_append_basic(m, 'b', &allow_list); if (r < 0) return bus_log_create_error(r); diff --git a/src/shared/module-util.c b/src/shared/module-util.c index 9173cf2ffd..3e64d423c8 100644 --- a/src/shared/module-util.c +++ b/src/shared/module-util.c @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ int module_load_and_warn(struct kmod_ctx *ctx, const char *module, bool verbose) "Inserted module '%s'", kmod_module_get_name(mod)); else if (err == KMOD_PROBE_APPLY_BLACKLIST) log_full(verbose ? LOG_INFO : LOG_DEBUG, - "Module '%s' is blacklisted", kmod_module_get_name(mod)); + "Module '%s' is deny-listed", kmod_module_get_name(mod)); else { assert(err < 0); diff --git a/src/shared/mount-util.c b/src/shared/mount-util.c index d188e6bd7f..45fdd3b2da 100644 --- a/src/shared/mount-util.c +++ b/src/shared/mount-util.c @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ int bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo( const char *prefix, unsigned long new_flags, unsigned long flags_mask, - char **blacklist, + char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) { _cleanup_set_free_free_ Set *done = NULL; @@ -154,8 +154,8 @@ int bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo( * do not have any effect on future submounts that might get propagated, they might be writable. This includes * future submounts that have been triggered via autofs. * - * If the "blacklist" parameter is specified it may contain a list of subtrees to exclude from the - * remount operation. Note that we'll ignore the blacklist for the top-level path. */ + * If the "deny_list" parameter is specified it may contain a list of subtrees to exclude from the + * remount operation. Note that we'll ignore the deny list for the top-level path. */ simplified = strdup(prefix); if (!simplified) @@ -203,13 +203,13 @@ int bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo( if (!path_startswith(path, simplified)) continue; - /* Ignore this mount if it is blacklisted, but only if it isn't the top-level mount + /* Ignore this mount if it is deny-listed, but only if it isn't the top-level mount * we shall operate on. */ if (!path_equal(path, simplified)) { - bool blacklisted = false; + bool deny_listed = false; char **i; - STRV_FOREACH(i, blacklist) { + STRV_FOREACH(i, deny_list) { if (path_equal(*i, simplified)) continue; @@ -217,13 +217,13 @@ int bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo( continue; if (path_startswith(path, *i)) { - blacklisted = true; - log_debug("Not remounting %s blacklisted by %s, called for %s", + deny_listed = true; + log_debug("Not remounting %s deny-listed by %s, called for %s", path, *i, simplified); break; } } - if (blacklisted) + if (deny_listed) continue; } @@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ int bind_remount_recursive( const char *prefix, unsigned long new_flags, unsigned long flags_mask, - char **blacklist) { + char **deny_list) { _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL; int r; @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ int bind_remount_recursive( if (r < 0) return r; - return bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(prefix, new_flags, flags_mask, blacklist, proc_self_mountinfo); + return bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(prefix, new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo); } int bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo( diff --git a/src/shared/mount-util.h b/src/shared/mount-util.h index c7c89b3345..bcbd32c840 100644 --- a/src/shared/mount-util.h +++ b/src/shared/mount-util.h @@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ int repeat_unmount(const char *path, int flags); int umount_recursive(const char *target, int flags); -int bind_remount_recursive(const char *prefix, unsigned long new_flags, unsigned long flags_mask, char **blacklist); -int bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(const char *prefix, unsigned long new_flags, unsigned long flags_mask, char **blacklist, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo); +int bind_remount_recursive(const char *prefix, unsigned long new_flags, unsigned long flags_mask, char **deny_list); +int bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(const char *prefix, unsigned long new_flags, unsigned long flags_mask, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo); int bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(const char *path, unsigned long new_flags, unsigned long flags_mask, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo); int mount_move_root(const char *path); diff --git a/src/shared/seccomp-util.c b/src/shared/seccomp-util.c index de05fb092c..a8dd069a75 100644 --- a/src/shared/seccomp-util.c +++ b/src/shared/seccomp-util.c @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ const uint32_t seccomp_local_archs[] = { - /* Note: always list the native arch we are compiled as last, so that users can blacklist seccomp(), but our own calls to it still succeed */ + /* Note: always list the native arch we are compiled as last, so that users can deny-list seccomp(), but our own calls to it still succeed */ #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) SCMP_ARCH_X86, @@ -1112,7 +1112,7 @@ int seccomp_parse_syscall_filter( /* If we previously wanted to forbid a syscall and now * we want to allow it, then remove it from the list. */ - if (!(flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_INVERT) == !!(flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_WHITELIST)) { + if (!(flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_INVERT) == !!(flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_ALLOW_LIST)) { r = hashmap_put(filter, INT_TO_PTR(id + 1), INT_TO_PTR(errno_num)); if (r < 0) switch (r) { @@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ int seccomp_protect_syslog(void) { return 0; } -int seccomp_restrict_address_families(Set *address_families, bool whitelist) { +int seccomp_restrict_address_families(Set *address_families, bool allow_list) { uint32_t arch; int r; @@ -1362,13 +1362,13 @@ int seccomp_restrict_address_families(Set *address_families, bool whitelist) { if (r < 0) return r; - if (whitelist) { + if (allow_list) { int af, first = 0, last = 0; void *afp; - /* If this is a whitelist, we first block the address families that are out of range and then - * everything that is not in the set. First, we find the lowest and highest address family in - * the set. */ + /* If this is an allow list, we first block the address families that are out of + * range and then everything that is not in the set. First, we find the lowest and + * highest address family in the set. */ SET_FOREACH(afp, address_families, i) { af = PTR_TO_INT(afp); @@ -1448,9 +1448,8 @@ int seccomp_restrict_address_families(Set *address_families, bool whitelist) { } else { void *af; - /* If this is a blacklist, then generate one rule for - * each address family that are then combined in OR - * checks. */ + /* If this is a deny list, then generate one rule for each address family that are + * then combined in OR checks. */ SET_FOREACH(af, address_families, i) { @@ -1506,11 +1505,11 @@ int seccomp_restrict_realtime(void) { return r; /* Go through all policies with lower values than that, and block them -- unless they appear in the - * whitelist. */ + * allow list. */ for (p = 0; p < max_policy; p++) { bool good = false; - /* Check if this is in the whitelist. */ + /* Check if this is in the allow list. */ for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(permitted_policies); i++) if (permitted_policies[i] == p) { good = true; @@ -1533,8 +1532,8 @@ int seccomp_restrict_realtime(void) { } } - /* Blacklist all other policies, i.e. the ones with higher values. Note that all comparisons are - * unsigned here, hence no need no check for < 0 values. */ + /* Deny-list all other policies, i.e. the ones with higher values. Note that all comparisons + * are unsigned here, hence no need no check for < 0 values. */ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), diff --git a/src/shared/seccomp-util.h b/src/shared/seccomp-util.h index 9580f9268d..ef970434c6 100644 --- a/src/shared/seccomp-util.h +++ b/src/shared/seccomp-util.h @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ int seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(uint32_t default_action, Hashmap* set, u typedef enum SeccompParseFlags { SECCOMP_PARSE_INVERT = 1 << 0, - SECCOMP_PARSE_WHITELIST = 1 << 1, + SECCOMP_PARSE_ALLOW_LIST = 1 << 1, SECCOMP_PARSE_LOG = 1 << 2, SECCOMP_PARSE_PERMISSIVE = 1 << 3, } SeccompParseFlags; @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ int seccomp_restrict_archs(Set *archs); int seccomp_restrict_namespaces(unsigned long retain); int seccomp_protect_sysctl(void); int seccomp_protect_syslog(void); -int seccomp_restrict_address_families(Set *address_families, bool whitelist); +int seccomp_restrict_address_families(Set *address_families, bool allow_list); int seccomp_restrict_realtime(void); int seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute(void); int seccomp_lock_personality(unsigned long personality); diff --git a/src/systemctl/systemctl.c b/src/systemctl/systemctl.c index 681992b7e5..4d793d75e2 100644 --- a/src/systemctl/systemctl.c +++ b/src/systemctl/systemctl.c @@ -4819,13 +4819,13 @@ static int print_property(const char *name, const char *expected_value, sd_bus_m } else if (STR_IN_SET(name, "SystemCallFilter", "RestrictAddressFamilies")) { _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; - int whitelist; + int allow_list; r = sd_bus_message_enter_container(m, 'r', "bas"); if (r < 0) return bus_log_parse_error(r); - r = sd_bus_message_read(m, "b", &whitelist); + r = sd_bus_message_read(m, "b", &allow_list); if (r < 0) return bus_log_parse_error(r); @@ -4837,7 +4837,7 @@ static int print_property(const char *name, const char *expected_value, sd_bus_m if (r < 0) return bus_log_parse_error(r); - if (all || whitelist || !strv_isempty(l)) { + if (all || allow_list || !strv_isempty(l)) { bool first = true; char **i; @@ -4846,7 +4846,7 @@ static int print_property(const char *name, const char *expected_value, sd_bus_m fputc('=', stdout); } - if (!whitelist) + if (!allow_list) fputc('~', stdout); STRV_FOREACH(i, l) { diff --git a/src/test/test-bpf-devices.c b/src/test/test-bpf-devices.c index 1322af4812..d2740bca73 100644 --- a/src/test/test-bpf-devices.c +++ b/src/test/test-bpf-devices.c @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ static void test_policy_closed(const char *cgroup_path, BPFProgram **installed_p r = bpf_devices_cgroup_init(&prog, CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_CLOSED, true); assert_se(r >= 0); - r = bpf_devices_whitelist_static(prog, cgroup_path); + r = bpf_devices_allow_list_static(prog, cgroup_path); assert_se(r >= 0); r = bpf_devices_apply_policy(prog, CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_CLOSED, true, cgroup_path, installed_prog); @@ -62,13 +62,13 @@ static void test_policy_strict(const char *cgroup_path, BPFProgram **installed_p r = bpf_devices_cgroup_init(&prog, CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_STRICT, true); assert_se(r >= 0); - r = bpf_devices_whitelist_device(prog, cgroup_path, "/dev/null", "rw"); + r = bpf_devices_allow_list_device(prog, cgroup_path, "/dev/null", "rw"); assert_se(r >= 0); - r = bpf_devices_whitelist_device(prog, cgroup_path, "/dev/random", "r"); + r = bpf_devices_allow_list_device(prog, cgroup_path, "/dev/random", "r"); assert_se(r >= 0); - r = bpf_devices_whitelist_device(prog, cgroup_path, "/dev/zero", "w"); + r = bpf_devices_allow_list_device(prog, cgroup_path, "/dev/zero", "w"); assert_se(r >= 0); r = bpf_devices_apply_policy(prog, CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_STRICT, true, cgroup_path, installed_prog); @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static void test_policy_strict(const char *cgroup_path, BPFProgram **installed_p assert_se(wrong == 0); } -static void test_policy_whitelist_major(const char *pattern, const char *cgroup_path, BPFProgram **installed_prog) { +static void test_policy_allow_list_major(const char *pattern, const char *cgroup_path, BPFProgram **installed_prog) { _cleanup_(bpf_program_unrefp) BPFProgram *prog = NULL; unsigned wrong = 0; int r; @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static void test_policy_whitelist_major(const char *pattern, const char *cgroup_ r = bpf_devices_cgroup_init(&prog, CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_STRICT, true); assert_se(r >= 0); - r = bpf_devices_whitelist_major(prog, cgroup_path, pattern, 'c', "rw"); + r = bpf_devices_allow_list_major(prog, cgroup_path, pattern, 'c', "rw"); assert_se(r >= 0); r = bpf_devices_apply_policy(prog, CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_STRICT, true, cgroup_path, installed_prog); @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static void test_policy_whitelist_major(const char *pattern, const char *cgroup_ assert_se(wrong == 0); } -static void test_policy_whitelist_major_star(char type, const char *cgroup_path, BPFProgram **installed_prog) { +static void test_policy_allow_list_major_star(char type, const char *cgroup_path, BPFProgram **installed_prog) { _cleanup_(bpf_program_unrefp) BPFProgram *prog = NULL; unsigned wrong = 0; int r; @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static void test_policy_whitelist_major_star(char type, const char *cgroup_path, r = bpf_devices_cgroup_init(&prog, CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_STRICT, true); assert_se(r >= 0); - r = bpf_devices_whitelist_major(prog, cgroup_path, "*", type, "rw"); + r = bpf_devices_allow_list_major(prog, cgroup_path, "*", type, "rw"); assert_se(r >= 0); r = bpf_devices_apply_policy(prog, CGROUP_DEVICE_POLICY_STRICT, true, cgroup_path, installed_prog); @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static void test_policy_empty(bool add_mismatched, const char *cgroup_path, BPFP assert_se(r >= 0); if (add_mismatched) { - r = bpf_devices_whitelist_major(prog, cgroup_path, "foobarxxx", 'c', "rw"); + r = bpf_devices_allow_list_major(prog, cgroup_path, "foobarxxx", 'c', "rw"); assert_se(r < 0); } @@ -287,11 +287,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { test_policy_closed(cgroup, &prog); test_policy_strict(cgroup, &prog); - test_policy_whitelist_major("mem", cgroup, &prog); - test_policy_whitelist_major("1", cgroup, &prog); + test_policy_allow_list_major("mem", cgroup, &prog); + test_policy_allow_list_major("1", cgroup, &prog); - test_policy_whitelist_major_star('c', cgroup, &prog); - test_policy_whitelist_major_star('b', cgroup, &prog); + test_policy_allow_list_major_star('c', cgroup, &prog); + test_policy_allow_list_major_star('b', cgroup, &prog); test_policy_empty(false, cgroup, &prog); test_policy_empty(true, cgroup, &prog); diff --git a/src/test/test-execute.c b/src/test/test-execute.c index 43f66efa6c..9ca0620216 100644 --- a/src/test/test-execute.c +++ b/src/test/test-execute.c @@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ static void test_exec_restrictnamespaces(Manager *m) { test(__func__, m, "exec-restrictnamespaces-no.service", can_unshare ? 0 : EXIT_FAILURE, CLD_EXITED); test(__func__, m, "exec-restrictnamespaces-yes.service", 1, CLD_EXITED); test(__func__, m, "exec-restrictnamespaces-mnt.service", can_unshare ? 0 : EXIT_FAILURE, CLD_EXITED); - test(__func__, m, "exec-restrictnamespaces-mnt-blacklist.service", 1, CLD_EXITED); + test(__func__, m, "exec-restrictnamespaces-mnt-deny-list.service", 1, CLD_EXITED); test(__func__, m, "exec-restrictnamespaces-merge-and.service", can_unshare ? 0 : EXIT_FAILURE, CLD_EXITED); test(__func__, m, "exec-restrictnamespaces-merge-or.service", can_unshare ? 0 : EXIT_FAILURE, CLD_EXITED); test(__func__, m, "exec-restrictnamespaces-merge-all.service", can_unshare ? 0 : EXIT_FAILURE, CLD_EXITED); diff --git a/src/test/test-seccomp.c b/src/test/test-seccomp.c index b09d031f5d..eec2779a9e 100644 --- a/src/test/test-seccomp.c +++ b/src/test/test-seccomp.c @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static void test_filter_sets(void) { if (pid == 0) { /* Child? */ int fd; - /* If we look at the default set (or one that includes it), whitelist instead of blacklist */ + /* If we look at the default set (or one that includes it), allow-list instead of deny-list */ if (IN_SET(i, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SYSTEM_SERVICE)) r = seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUCLEAN), syscall_filter_sets + i, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, true); else diff --git a/src/tmpfiles/tmpfiles.c b/src/tmpfiles/tmpfiles.c index 7ad6f13b66..2404e36bf2 100644 --- a/src/tmpfiles/tmpfiles.c +++ b/src/tmpfiles/tmpfiles.c @@ -2405,8 +2405,7 @@ static bool should_include_path(const char *path) { return true; } - /* no matches, so we should include this path only if we - * have no whitelist at all */ + /* no matches, so we should include this path only if we have no allow list at all */ if (strv_isempty(arg_include_prefixes)) return true; 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