Merge branch 'upstream-curl' into update-curl

* upstream-curl:
  curl 2022-01-05 (801bd513)

1 files changed, 168 insertions, 122 deletions

diff --git a/Utilities/cmcurl/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/Utilities/cmcurl/lib/vtls/openssl.c
index 87f4b02b71..f836c63b07 100644
--- a/Utilities/cmcurl/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+++ b/Utilities/cmcurl/lib/vtls/openssl.c
@@ -171,6 +171,21 @@
 #define OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(x)
 #endif
 
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L)
+#define HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS 1
+#else
+#define SSL_get1_peer_certificate SSL_get_peer_certificate
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#define DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(name) BIGNUM *name = NULL
+#define FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(name) BN_clear_free(name)
+#else
+#define DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(name) const BIGNUM *name
+#define FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(name)
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Whether SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback is available.
  * OpenSSL: supported since 1.1.1 https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2287
@@ -227,6 +242,17 @@
 #endif
 #endif
 
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L)
+#define HAVE_RANDOM_INIT_BY_DEFAULT 1
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && \
+    !(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
+      LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070100fL) && \
+    !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
+#define HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
+#endif
+
 struct ssl_backend_data {
   struct Curl_easy *logger; /* transfer handle to pass trace logs to, only
                                using sockindex 0 */
@@ -435,18 +461,21 @@ static bool rand_enough(void)
 
 static CURLcode ossl_seed(struct Curl_easy *data)
 {
-  char fname[256];
-
   /* This might get called before it has been added to a multi handle */
   if(data->multi && data->multi->ssl_seeded)
     return CURLE_OK;
 
   if(rand_enough()) {
-    /* OpenSSL 1.1.0+ will return here */
+    /* OpenSSL 1.1.0+ should return here */
     if(data->multi)
       data->multi->ssl_seeded = TRUE;
     return CURLE_OK;
   }
+#ifdef HAVE_RANDOM_INIT_BY_DEFAULT
+  /* with OpenSSL 1.1.0+, a failed RAND_status is a showstopper */
+  failf(data, "Insufficient randomness");
+  return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+#else
 
 #ifndef RANDOM_FILE
   /* if RANDOM_FILE isn't defined, we only perform this if an option tells
@@ -507,19 +536,23 @@ static CURLcode ossl_seed(struct Curl_easy *data)
     RAND_add(randb, (int)len, (double)len/2);
   } while(!rand_enough());
 
-  /* generates a default path for the random seed file */
-  fname[0] = 0; /* blank it first */
-  RAND_file_name(fname, sizeof(fname));
-  if(fname[0]) {
-    /* we got a file name to try */
-    RAND_load_file(fname, RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
-    if(rand_enough())
-      return CURLE_OK;
+  {
+    /* generates a default path for the random seed file */
+    char fname[256];
+    fname[0] = 0; /* blank it first */
+    RAND_file_name(fname, sizeof(fname));
+    if(fname[0]) {
+      /* we got a file name to try */
+      RAND_load_file(fname, RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
+      if(rand_enough())
+        return CURLE_OK;
+    }
   }
 
   infof(data, "libcurl is now using a weak random seed!");
   return (rand_enough() ? CURLE_OK :
-    CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR /* confusing error code */);
+          CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR /* confusing error code */);
+#endif
 }
 
 #ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE
@@ -1088,7 +1121,8 @@ int cert_stuff(struct Curl_easy *data,
       EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
     }
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) && \
+    !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0)
     {
       /* If RSA is used, don't check the private key if its flags indicate
        * it doesn't support it. */
@@ -1401,6 +1435,12 @@ static void ossl_closeone(struct Curl_easy *data,
   if(backend->handle) {
     char buf[32];
     set_logger(conn, data);
+    /*
+     * The conn->sock[0] socket is passed to openssl with SSL_set_fd().  Make
+     * sure the socket is not closed before calling OpenSSL functions that
+     * will use it.
+     */
+    DEBUGASSERT(conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET] != CURL_SOCKET_BAD);
 
     /* Maybe the server has already sent a close notify alert.
        Read it to avoid an RST on the TCP connection. */
@@ -1639,9 +1679,10 @@ static bool subj_alt_hostcheck(struct Curl_easy *data,
    hostname. In this case, the iPAddress subjectAltName must be present
    in the certificate and must exactly match the IP in the URI.
 
+   This function is now used from ngtcp2 (QUIC) as well.
 */
-static CURLcode verifyhost(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
-                           X509 *server_cert)
+CURLcode Curl_ossl_verifyhost(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
+                              X509 *server_cert)
 {
   bool matched = FALSE;
   int target = GEN_DNS; /* target type, GEN_DNS or GEN_IPADD */
@@ -1926,7 +1967,7 @@ static CURLcode verifystatus(struct Curl_easy *data,
   }
 
   /* Compute the certificate's ID */
-  cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(backend->handle);
+  cert = SSL_get1_peer_certificate(backend->handle);
   if(!cert) {
     failf(data, "Error getting peer certificate");
     result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
@@ -2493,6 +2534,7 @@ static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid)
 
   if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) {
     bool incache;
+    bool added = FALSE;
     void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
 
     Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
@@ -2511,9 +2553,11 @@ static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid)
 
     if(!incache) {
       if(!Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn, isproxy, ssl_sessionid,
-                                0 /* unknown size */, sockindex)) {
-        /* the session has been put into the session cache */
-        res = 1;
+                                0 /* unknown size */, sockindex, &added)) {
+        if(added) {
+          /* the session has been put into the session cache */
+          res = 1;
+        }
       }
       else
         failf(data, "failed to store ssl session");
@@ -2936,7 +2980,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
                                NULL, cert_name, sizeof(cert_name))) {
           strcpy(cert_name, "Unknown");
         }
-        infof(data, "SSL: Checking cert %s\"\n", cert_name);
+        infof(data, "SSL: Checking cert \"%s\"", cert_name);
 #endif
 
         encoded_cert = (const unsigned char *)pContext->pbCertEncoded;
@@ -3052,60 +3096,36 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
     }
   }
 
+  if(verifypeer && !imported_native_ca && (ssl_cafile || ssl_capath)) {
 #if defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3)
   /* OpenSSL 3.0.0 has deprecated SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations */
-  {
-    if(ssl_cafile) {
-      if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_file(backend->ctx, ssl_cafile)) {
-        if(verifypeer && !imported_native_ca) {
-          /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
-          failf(data, "error setting certificate file: %s", ssl_cafile);
-          return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
-        }
-        /* Continue with warning if certificate verification isn't required. */
-        infof(data, "error setting certificate file, continuing anyway");
-      }
-      infof(data, " CAfile: %s", ssl_cafile);
+    if(ssl_cafile &&
+       !SSL_CTX_load_verify_file(backend->ctx, ssl_cafile)) {
+      /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
+      failf(data, "error setting certificate file: %s", ssl_cafile);
+      return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
     }
-    if(ssl_capath) {
-      if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_dir(backend->ctx, ssl_capath)) {
-        if(verifypeer && !imported_native_ca) {
-          /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
-          failf(data, "error setting certificate path: %s", ssl_capath);
-          return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
-        }
-        /* Continue with warning if certificate verification isn't required. */
-        infof(data, "error setting certificate path, continuing anyway");
-      }
-      infof(data, " CApath: %s", ssl_capath);
+    if(ssl_capath &&
+       !SSL_CTX_load_verify_dir(backend->ctx, ssl_capath)) {
+      /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
+      failf(data, "error setting certificate path: %s", ssl_capath);
+      return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
     }
-  }
 #else
-  if(ssl_cafile || ssl_capath) {
-    /* tell SSL where to find CA certificates that are used to verify
-       the server's certificate. */
+    /* tell OpenSSL where to find CA certificates that are used to verify the
+       server's certificate. */
     if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(backend->ctx, ssl_cafile, ssl_capath)) {
-      if(verifypeer && !imported_native_ca) {
-        /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
-        failf(data, "error setting certificate verify locations:"
-              "  CAfile: %s CApath: %s",
-              ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none",
-              ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none");
-        return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
-      }
-      /* Just continue with a warning if no strict certificate verification
-         is required. */
-      infof(data, "error setting certificate verify locations,"
-            " continuing anyway:");
-    }
-    else {
-      /* Everything is fine. */
-      infof(data, "successfully set certificate verify locations:");
+      /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
+      failf(data, "error setting certificate verify locations:"
+            "  CAfile: %s CApath: %s",
+            ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none",
+            ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none");
+      return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
     }
+#endif
     infof(data, " CAfile: %s", ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none");
     infof(data, " CApath: %s", ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none");
   }
-#endif
 
 #ifdef CURL_CA_FALLBACK
   if(verifypeer &&
@@ -3476,10 +3496,7 @@ static void pubkey_show(struct Curl_easy *data,
                         int num,
                         const char *type,
                         const char *name,
-#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
-                        const
-#endif
-                        BIGNUM *bn)
+                        const BIGNUM *bn)
 {
   char *ptr;
   char namebuf[32];
@@ -3544,12 +3561,6 @@ typedef size_t numcert_t;
 typedef int numcert_t;
 #endif
 
-#if defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3)
-#define OSSL3_CONST const
-#else
-#define OSSL3_CONST
-#endif
-
 static CURLcode get_cert_chain(struct Curl_easy *data,
                                struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
 {
@@ -3573,6 +3584,9 @@ static CURLcode get_cert_chain(struct Curl_easy *data,
   }
 
   mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+  if(!mem) {
+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+  }
 
   for(i = 0; i < (int)numcerts; i++) {
     ASN1_INTEGER *num;
@@ -3657,92 +3671,115 @@ static CURLcode get_cert_chain(struct Curl_easy *data,
       switch(pktype) {
       case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
       {
-        OSSL3_CONST RSA *rsa;
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
+        RSA *rsa;
 #ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
         rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pubkey);
 #else
         rsa = pubkey->pkey.rsa;
-#endif
+#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY */
+#endif /* !HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
 
-#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
         {
-          const BIGNUM *n;
-          const BIGNUM *e;
-
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+          DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(n);
+          DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(e);
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
+          EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, &n);
+          EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, &e);
+#else
           RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
           BIO_printf(mem, "%d", BN_num_bits(n));
+#else
+          BIO_printf(mem, "%d", BN_num_bits(rsa->n));
+#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH */
           push_certinfo("RSA Public Key", i);
           print_pubkey_BN(rsa, n, i);
           print_pubkey_BN(rsa, e, i);
+          FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(n);
+          FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(e);
         }
-#else
-        BIO_printf(mem, "%d", BN_num_bits(rsa->n));
-        push_certinfo("RSA Public Key", i);
-        print_pubkey_BN(rsa, n, i);
-        print_pubkey_BN(rsa, e, i);
-#endif
 
         break;
       }
       case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
       {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-        OSSL3_CONST DSA *dsa;
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
+        DSA *dsa;
 #ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
         dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pubkey);
 #else
         dsa = pubkey->pkey.dsa;
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY */
+#endif /* !HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
         {
-          const BIGNUM *p;
-          const BIGNUM *q;
-          const BIGNUM *g;
-          const BIGNUM *pub_key;
-
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+          DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(p);
+          DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(q);
+          DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(g);
+          DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(pub_key);
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
+          EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, &p);
+          EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, &q);
+          EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, &g);
+          EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &pub_key);
+#else
           DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g);
           DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, NULL);
-
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
+#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH */
           print_pubkey_BN(dsa, p, i);
           print_pubkey_BN(dsa, q, i);
           print_pubkey_BN(dsa, g, i);
           print_pubkey_BN(dsa, pub_key, i);
+          FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(p);
+          FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(q);
+          FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(g);
+          FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(pub_key);
         }
-#else
-        print_pubkey_BN(dsa, p, i);
-        print_pubkey_BN(dsa, q, i);
-        print_pubkey_BN(dsa, g, i);
-        print_pubkey_BN(dsa, pub_key, i);
-#endif
 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
         break;
       }
       case EVP_PKEY_DH:
       {
-        OSSL3_CONST DH *dh;
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
+        DH *dh;
 #ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
         dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pubkey);
 #else
         dh = pubkey->pkey.dh;
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY */
+#endif /* !HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
         {
-          const BIGNUM *p;
-          const BIGNUM *q;
-          const BIGNUM *g;
-          const BIGNUM *pub_key;
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+          DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(p);
+          DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(q);
+          DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(g);
+          DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(pub_key);
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
+          EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, &p);
+          EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, &q);
+          EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, &g);
+          EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &pub_key);
+#else
           DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, &q, &g);
           DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
           print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i);
           print_pubkey_BN(dh, q, i);
           print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i);
+#else
+          print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i);
+          print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i);
+#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH */
           print_pubkey_BN(dh, pub_key, i);
+          FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(p);
+          FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(q);
+          FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(g);
+          FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(pub_key);
        }
-#else
-        print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i);
-        print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i);
-        print_pubkey_BN(dh, pub_key, i);
-#endif
         break;
       }
       }
@@ -3846,11 +3883,20 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct Curl_easy *data,
   BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
   struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
 
+  if(!mem) {
+    failf(data,
+          "BIO_new return NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+          " error %s",
+          ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
+                        sizeof(error_buffer)) );
+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+  }
+
   if(data->set.ssl.certinfo)
     /* we've been asked to gather certificate info! */
     (void)get_cert_chain(data, connssl);
 
-  backend->server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(backend->handle);
+  backend->server_cert = SSL_get1_peer_certificate(backend->handle);
   if(!backend->server_cert) {
     BIO_free(mem);
     if(!strict)
@@ -3884,7 +3930,7 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct Curl_easy *data,
   BIO_free(mem);
 
   if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost)) {
-    result = verifyhost(data, conn, backend->server_cert);
+    result = Curl_ossl_verifyhost(data, conn, backend->server_cert);
     if(result) {
       X509_free(backend->server_cert);
       backend->server_cert = NULL;
@@ -4364,13 +4410,7 @@ static ssize_t ossl_recv(struct Curl_easy *data,   /* transfer */
 static size_t ossl_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
 {
 #ifdef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
-#if LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070100fL
-  return msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%lx.%lx.%lx",
-                   OSSL_PACKAGE,
-                   (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>28)&0xf,
-                   (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>20)&0xff,
-                   (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>12)&0xff);
-#else /* OpenSSL_version() first appeared in LibreSSL 2.7.1 */
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
   char *p;
   int count;
   const char *ver = OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION);
@@ -4384,6 +4424,12 @@ static size_t ossl_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
       *p = '_';
   }
   return count;
+#else
+  return msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%lx.%lx.%lx",
+                   OSSL_PACKAGE,
+                   (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>28)&0xf,
+                   (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>20)&0xff,
+                   (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>12)&0xff);
 #endif
 #elif defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
   return msnprintf(buffer, size, OSSL_PACKAGE);