1 files changed, 0 insertions, 65 deletions
diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/common/curve25519.c b/third_party/boringssl/common/curve25519.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 2a7fad6509..0000000000
--- a/third_party/boringssl/common/curve25519.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright 2015, Google Inc.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
- * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
- * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
- * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
-
-/* This code is mostly taken from the ref10 version of Ed25519 in SUPERCOP
- * 20141124 (http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html). That code is released as
- * public domain but this file has the ISC license just to keep licencing
- * simple.
- *
- * The field functions are shared by Ed25519 and X25519 where possible. */
-
-#include "common.h"
-#include "curve25519.h"
-#include "trng.h"
-#include "util.h"
-#define CRYPTO_memcmp safe_memcmp
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_RNG
-void X25519_keypair(uint8_t out_public_value[32], uint8_t out_private_key[32]) {
-  rand_bytes(out_private_key, 32);
-
-  /* All X25519 implementations should decode scalars correctly (see
-   * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748#section-5). However, if an
-   * implementation doesn't then it might interoperate with random keys a
-   * fraction of the time because they'll, randomly, happen to be correctly
-   * formed.
-   *
-   * Thus we do the opposite of the masking here to make sure that our private
-   * keys are never correctly masked and so, hopefully, any incorrect
-   * implementations are deterministically broken.
-   *
-   * This does not affect security because, although we're throwing away
-   * entropy, a valid implementation of scalarmult should throw away the exact
-   * same bits anyway. */
-  out_private_key[0] |= 7;
-  out_private_key[31] &= 63;
-  out_private_key[31] |= 128;
-
-  X25519_public_from_private(out_public_value, out_private_key);
-}
-#endif
-
-int X25519(uint8_t out_shared_key[32], const uint8_t private_key[32],
-           const uint8_t peer_public_value[32]) {
-  static const uint8_t kZeros[32] = {0};
-  x25519_scalar_mult(out_shared_key, private_key, peer_public_value);
-  /* The all-zero output results when the input is a point of small order. */
-  return CRYPTO_memcmp(kZeros, out_shared_key, 32) != 0;
-}
-
-void X25519_public_from_private(uint8_t out_public_value[32],
-                                const uint8_t private_key[32]) {
-  static const uint8_t kMongomeryBasePoint[32] = {9};
-  x25519_scalar_mult(out_public_value, private_key, kMongomeryBasePoint);
-}