summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/dbus/dbus-keyring.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorSimon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>2017-02-15 16:32:04 +0000
committerSimon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>2017-02-16 13:28:15 +0000
commitbe51bfe915af717aa462fc7957e5a3c6dabc746b (patch)
treef5b592b308d6b9d5e8436dd34a40c6782ade05b1 /dbus/dbus-keyring.c
parentbca5a8465a653a3e623d5ed172a419808e88f9b3 (diff)
downloaddbus-be51bfe915af717aa462fc7957e5a3c6dabc746b.tar.gz
Change _dbus_create_directory to fail for existing directories
If we don't trap EEXIST and its Windows equivalent, we are unable to detect the situation where we create an ostensibly unique subdirectory in a shared /tmp, but an attacker has already created it. This affects dbus-nonce (the nonce-tcp transport) and the activation reload test. Add a new _dbus_ensure_directory() for the one case where we want it to succeed even on EEXIST: the DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 keyring, which we know we are creating in our own trusted "official" $HOME. In the new transient service support on Bug #99825, ensure_owned_directory() would need the same treatment. We are not treating this as a serious security problem, because the nonce-tcp transport is rarely enabled on Unix and there are multiple mitigations. The nonce-tcp transport creates a new unique file with O_EXCL and 0600 (private to user) permissions, then overwrites the requested filename via atomic-overwrite, so the worst that could happen there is that an attacker could place a symbolic link matching the name of a directory we are going to create, causing a dbus-daemon configured for nonce-tcp to traverse the symlink and atomically overwrite a file named "nonce" in a directory of the attacker's choice, with new random contents that are not known to the attacker. This seems unlikely to be exploitable for anything worse than denial of service in practice. In mainline Linux since 3.6, this attack is also defeated by the fs.protected_symlinks sysctl, which many distributions enable by default. The activation reload test suffers from a classic symlink attack due to time-of-check/time-of-use errors in its implementation, but as part of the developer-only "embedded tests" that are only intended to be run on a trusted machine, it is not treated as security-sensitive. That code path will be fixed in a subsequent commit. Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=99828 Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'dbus/dbus-keyring.c')
-rw-r--r--dbus/dbus-keyring.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/dbus/dbus-keyring.c b/dbus/dbus-keyring.c
index bb7e4f8d..68b05794 100644
--- a/dbus/dbus-keyring.c
+++ b/dbus/dbus-keyring.c
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ _dbus_keyring_new_for_credentials (DBusCredentials *credentials,
* unless someone else manages to create it
*/
dbus_error_init (&tmp_error);
- if (!_dbus_create_directory (&keyring->directory,
+ if (!_dbus_ensure_directory (&keyring->directory,
&tmp_error))
{
_dbus_verbose ("Creating keyring directory: %s\n",