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authorSebastian Rasmussen <sebras@gmail.com>2020-01-11 01:51:19 +0100
committerSebastian Rasmussen <sebras@gmail.com>2020-02-08 02:09:36 +0800
commitebe1bfef330f4568c6ef394571cf800604dff277 (patch)
tree171df09b399b22440dc6a30bc8efe8b4bed4897a /openjpeg
parentc6d8dcf8448235895759fb7e3268105c4092a194 (diff)
downloadghostpdl-ebe1bfef330f4568c6ef394571cf800604dff277.tar.gz
Bug 702097: Import security fixes for OpenJPEG.
Upstream has merged two security fixes. At the moment there is no new upstream release, so we merge the two fixes downstream: * Fix for upstream issue #1228, registered as CVE-2020-6851: https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/024b8407392cb0b82b04b58ed256094ed5799e04 "opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions(): reject images whose coordinates are beyond INT_MAX (fixes #1228)" * Fix for upstream issue #1231, registered as CVE-2020-8112: https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/05f9b91e60debda0e83977e5e63b2e66486f7074 "opj_tcd_init_tile(): avoid integer overflow That could lead to later assertion failures. Fixes #1231 / CVE-2020-8112"
Diffstat (limited to 'openjpeg')
-rw-r--r--openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c8
-rw-r--r--openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c20
2 files changed, 26 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c b/openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c
index 8aaa34e8f..4a4b3494d 100644
--- a/openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c
+++ b/openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c
@@ -9236,6 +9236,14 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions(opj_image_t* p_image,
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
for (it_comp = 0; it_comp < p_image->numcomps; ++it_comp) {
OPJ_INT32 l_h, l_w;
+ if (p_image->x0 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX ||
+ p_image->y0 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX ||
+ p_image->x1 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX ||
+ p_image->y1 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) {
+ opj_event_msg(p_manager, EVT_ERROR,
+ "Image coordinates above INT_MAX are not supported\n");
+ return OPJ_FALSE;
+ }
l_img_comp->x0 = (OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildiv((OPJ_INT32)p_image->x0,
(OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
diff --git a/openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c b/openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
index be3b84363..647991c76 100644
--- a/openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
+++ b/openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
@@ -905,8 +905,24 @@ static INLINE OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_init_tile(opj_tcd_t *p_tcd, OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no,
/* p. 64, B.6, ISO/IEC FDIS15444-1 : 2000 (18 august 2000) */
l_tl_prc_x_start = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_res->x0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
l_tl_prc_y_start = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_res->y0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
- l_br_prc_x_end = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->x1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
- l_br_prc_y_end = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->y1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
+ {
+ OPJ_UINT32 tmp = ((OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->x1,
+ (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx)) << l_pdx;
+ if (tmp > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) {
+ opj_event_msg(manager, EVT_ERROR, "Integer overflow\n");
+ return OPJ_FALSE;
+ }
+ l_br_prc_x_end = (OPJ_INT32)tmp;
+ }
+ {
+ OPJ_UINT32 tmp = ((OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->y1,
+ (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy)) << l_pdy;
+ if (tmp > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) {
+ opj_event_msg(manager, EVT_ERROR, "Integer overflow\n");
+ return OPJ_FALSE;
+ }
+ l_br_prc_y_end = (OPJ_INT32)tmp;
+ }
/*fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\tprc_x_start=%d, prc_y_start=%d, br_prc_x_end=%d, br_prc_y_end=%d \n", l_tl_prc_x_start, l_tl_prc_y_start, l_br_prc_x_end ,l_br_prc_y_end );*/
l_res->pw = (l_res->x0 == l_res->x1) ? 0U : (OPJ_UINT32)((