summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/app/policies/project_policy.rb
blob: 47d8d0eef3e30713b022329abf8819fe65cee767 (plain)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
# frozen_string_literal: true

class ProjectPolicy < BasePolicy
  include CrudPolicyHelpers
  include ArchivedAbilities

  desc "Project has public builds enabled"
  condition(:public_builds, scope: :subject, score: 0) { project.public_builds? }

  # For guest access we use #team_member? so we can use
  # project.members, which gets cached in subject scope.
  # This is safe because team_access_level is guaranteed
  # by ProjectAuthorization's validation to be at minimum
  # GUEST
  desc "User has guest access"
  condition(:guest) { team_member? }

  desc "User has reporter access"
  condition(:reporter) { team_access_level >= Gitlab::Access::REPORTER }

  desc "User has developer access"
  condition(:developer) { team_access_level >= Gitlab::Access::DEVELOPER }

  desc "User has maintainer access"
  condition(:maintainer) { team_access_level >= Gitlab::Access::MAINTAINER }

  desc "User has owner access"
  condition :owner do
    owner_of_personal_namespace = project.owner.present? && project.owner == @user

    unless owner_of_personal_namespace
      group_or_project_owner = team_access_level >= Gitlab::Access::OWNER
    end

    owner_of_personal_namespace || group_or_project_owner
  end

  desc "User is a project bot"
  condition(:project_bot) { user.project_bot? && team_member? }

  desc "User is a security policy bot on the project"
  condition(:security_policy_bot) { user&.security_policy_bot? && team_member? }

  desc "Project is public"
  condition(:public_project, scope: :subject, score: 0) { project.public? }

  desc "Project is visible to internal users"
  condition(:internal_access) do
    project.internal? && !user.external?
  end

  desc "User is a member of the group"
  condition(:group_member, scope: :subject) { project_group_member? }

  desc "User is a requester of the group"
  condition(:group_requester, scope: :subject) { project_group_requester? }

  desc "Project is archived"
  condition(:archived, scope: :subject, score: 0) { project.archived? }

  desc "Project is in the process of being deleted"
  condition(:pending_delete) { project.pending_delete? }

  condition(:default_issues_tracker, scope: :subject) { project.default_issues_tracker? }

  desc "Container registry is disabled"
  condition(:container_registry_disabled, scope: :subject) do
    if user.is_a?(DeployToken)
      (!user.read_registry? && !user.write_registry?) ||
      user.revoked? ||
      !project.container_registry_enabled?
    else
      !access_allowed_to?(:container_registry)
    end
  end

  desc "Container registry is enabled for everyone with access to the project"
  condition(:container_registry_enabled_for_everyone_with_access, scope: :subject) do
    project.container_registry_access_level == ProjectFeature::ENABLED
  end

  desc "Project has an external wiki"
  condition(:has_external_wiki, scope: :subject, score: 0) { project.has_external_wiki? }

  desc "Project has request access enabled"
  condition(:request_access_enabled, scope: :subject, score: 0) { project.request_access_enabled }

  desc "Has merge requests allowing pushes to user"
  condition(:has_merge_requests_allowing_pushes) do
    project.merge_requests_allowing_push_to_user(user).any?
  end

  desc "Deploy key with read access"
  condition(:download_code_deploy_key) do
    user.is_a?(DeployKey) && user.has_access_to?(project)
  end

  desc "Deploy key with write access"
  condition(:push_code_deploy_key) do
    user.is_a?(DeployKey) && user.can_push_to?(project)
  end

  desc "Deploy token with read_container_image scope"
  condition(:read_container_image_deploy_token) do
    user.is_a?(DeployToken) && user.has_access_to?(project) && user.read_registry?
  end

  desc "Deploy token with create_container_image scope"
  condition(:create_container_image_deploy_token) do
    user.is_a?(DeployToken) && user.has_access_to?(project) && user.write_registry?
  end

  desc "Deploy token with read_package_registry scope"
  condition(:read_package_registry_deploy_token) do
    user.is_a?(DeployToken) && user.has_access_to?(project) && user.read_package_registry
  end

  desc "Deploy token with write_package_registry scope"
  condition(:write_package_registry_deploy_token) do
    user.is_a?(DeployToken) && user.has_access_to?(project) && user.write_package_registry
  end

  desc "Deploy token with read access"
  condition(:download_code_deploy_token) do
    user.is_a?(DeployToken) && user.has_access_to?(project)
  end

  desc "If user is authenticated via CI job token then the target project should be in scope"
  condition(:project_allowed_for_job_token) do
    !@user&.from_ci_job_token? || @user.ci_job_token_scope.accessible?(project)
  end

  with_scope :subject
  condition(:forking_allowed) do
    @subject.feature_available?(:forking, @user)
  end

  with_scope :subject
  condition(:metrics_dashboard_allowed) do
    access_allowed_to?(:metrics_dashboard)
  end

  with_scope :global
  condition(:mirror_available, score: 0) do
    ::Gitlab::CurrentSettings.current_application_settings.mirror_available
  end

  with_scope :subject
  condition(:classification_label_authorized, score: 32) do
    ::Gitlab::ExternalAuthorization.access_allowed?(
      @user,
      @subject.external_authorization_classification_label,
      @subject.full_path
    )
  end

  with_scope :subject
  condition(:design_management_disabled) do
    !@subject.design_management_enabled?
  end

  with_scope :subject
  condition(:service_desk_enabled) { @subject.service_desk_enabled? }

  with_scope :subject
  condition(:resource_access_token_feature_available) do
    resource_access_token_feature_available?
  end
  condition(:resource_access_token_creation_allowed) { resource_access_token_creation_allowed? }

  # We aren't checking `:read_issue` or `:read_merge_request` in this case
  # because it could be possible for a user to see an issuable-iid
  # (`:read_issue_iid` or `:read_merge_request_iid`) but then wouldn't be
  # allowed to read the actual issue after a more expensive `:read_issue`
  # check. These checks are intended to be used alongside
  # `:read_project_for_iids`.
  #
  # `:read_issue` & `:read_issue_iid` could diverge in gitlab-ee.
  condition(:issues_visible_to_user, score: 4) do
    @subject.feature_available?(:issues, @user)
  end

  condition(:merge_requests_visible_to_user, score: 4) do
    @subject.feature_available?(:merge_requests, @user)
  end

  condition(:internal_builds_disabled) do
    !@subject.builds_enabled?
  end

  condition(:user_confirmed?) do
    @user && @user.confirmed?
  end

  condition(:build_service_proxy_enabled) do
    ::Feature.enabled?(:build_service_proxy, @subject)
  end

  condition(:user_defined_variables_allowed) do
    !@subject.restrict_user_defined_variables?
  end

  with_scope :subject
  condition(:packages_disabled) { !@subject.packages_enabled }

  features = %w[
    merge_requests
    issues
    repository
    snippets
    wiki
    builds
    pages
    metrics_dashboard
    analytics
    operations
    monitor
    security_and_compliance
    environments
    feature_flags
    releases
    infrastructure
  ]

  features.each do |f|
    # these are scored high because they are unlikely
    desc "Project has #{f} disabled"
    condition(:"#{f}_disabled", score: 32) { !access_allowed_to?(f.to_sym) }
  end

  condition(:project_runner_registration_allowed, scope: :subject) do
    Gitlab::CurrentSettings.valid_runner_registrars.include?('project') && @subject.runner_registration_enabled
  end

  condition :registry_enabled do
    Gitlab.config.registry.enabled
  end

  condition :packages_enabled do
    Gitlab.config.packages.enabled
  end

  condition :terraform_state_disabled do
    !Gitlab.config.terraform_state.enabled
  end

  condition(:create_runner_workflow_enabled) do
    Feature.enabled?(:create_runner_workflow_for_namespace, project.namespace)
  end

  condition(:namespace_catalog_available) { namespace_catalog_available? }

  # `:read_project` may be prevented in EE, but `:read_project_for_iids` should
  # not.
  rule { guest | admin }.enable :read_project_for_iids

  rule { admin }.enable :update_max_artifacts_size
  rule { admin }.enable :read_storage_disk_path
  rule { can?(:read_all_resources) }.enable :read_confidential_issues

  rule { guest }.enable :guest_access
  rule { reporter }.enable :reporter_access
  rule { developer }.enable :developer_access
  rule { maintainer }.enable :maintainer_access
  rule { owner | admin }.enable :owner_access

  rule { can?(:owner_access) }.policy do
    enable :guest_access
    enable :reporter_access
    enable :developer_access
    enable :maintainer_access

    enable :change_namespace
    enable :change_visibility_level
    enable :remove_project
    enable :archive_project
    enable :remove_fork_project
    enable :destroy_merge_request
    enable :destroy_issue

    enable :set_issue_iid
    enable :set_issue_created_at
    enable :set_issue_updated_at
    enable :set_note_created_at
    enable :set_emails_disabled
    enable :set_show_default_award_emojis
    enable :set_show_diff_preview_in_email
    enable :set_warn_about_potentially_unwanted_characters
    enable :manage_owners
  end

  rule { can?(:guest_access) }.policy do
    enable :read_project
    enable :read_issue_board
    enable :read_issue_board_list
    enable :read_wiki
    enable :read_issue
    enable :read_label
    enable :read_planning_hierarchy
    enable :read_milestone
    enable :read_snippet
    enable :read_project_member
    enable :read_note
    enable :create_project
    enable :create_issue
    enable :create_note
    enable :upload_file
    enable :read_cycle_analytics
    enable :award_emoji
    enable :read_pages_content
    enable :read_release
    enable :read_analytics
    enable :read_insights
  end

  rule { can?(:reporter_access) & can?(:create_issue) }.enable :create_incident

  rule { can?(:reporter_access) & can?(:read_environment) }.enable :read_freeze_period

  rule { can?(:create_issue) }.enable :create_work_item

  rule { can?(:create_issue) }.enable :create_task

  # These abilities are not allowed to admins that are not members of the project,
  # that's why they are defined separately.
  rule { guest & can?(:download_code) }.enable :build_download_code
  rule { guest & can?(:read_container_image) }.enable :build_read_container_image

  rule { guest & ~public_project }.enable :read_grafana

  rule { can?(:reporter_access) }.policy do
    enable :admin_issue_board
    enable :download_code
    enable :read_statistics
    enable :daily_statistics
    enable :download_wiki_code
    enable :create_snippet
    enable :update_issue
    enable :reopen_issue
    enable :admin_issue
    enable :admin_label
    enable :admin_milestone
    enable :admin_issue_board_list
    enable :admin_issue_link
    enable :read_commit_status
    enable :read_build
    enable :read_container_image
    enable :read_harbor_registry
    enable :read_deploy_board
    enable :read_pipeline
    enable :read_pipeline_schedule
    enable :read_environment
    enable :read_deployment
    enable :read_merge_request
    enable :read_sentry_issue
    enable :read_prometheus
    enable :read_metrics_dashboard_annotation
    enable :metrics_dashboard
    enable :read_confidential_issues
    enable :read_package
    enable :read_ci_cd_analytics
    enable :read_external_emails
    enable :read_grafana
    enable :export_work_items
  end

  # We define `:public_user_access` separately because there are cases in gitlab-ee
  # where we enable or prevent it based on other coditions.
  rule { (~anonymous & public_project) | internal_access }.policy do
    enable :public_user_access
    enable :read_project_for_iids
  end

  rule { can?(:public_user_access) }.policy do
    enable :public_access
    enable :guest_access

    enable :build_download_code
    enable :request_access
  end

  rule { container_registry_enabled_for_everyone_with_access & can?(:public_user_access) }.policy do
    enable :build_read_container_image
  end

  rule { (can?(:public_user_access) | can?(:reporter_access)) & forking_allowed }.policy do
    enable :fork_project
  end

  rule { metrics_dashboard_disabled }.policy do
    prevent(:metrics_dashboard)
  end

  rule { environments_disabled }.policy do
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:environment))
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:deployment))
  end

  rule { feature_flags_disabled }.policy do
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:feature_flag))
    prevent(:admin_feature_flags_user_lists)
    prevent(:admin_feature_flags_client)
  end

  rule { releases_disabled }.policy do
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:release))
  end

  rule { monitor_disabled }.policy do
    prevent(:metrics_dashboard)
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:sentry_issue))
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:alert_management_alert))
  end

  rule { infrastructure_disabled }.policy do
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:cluster))
    prevent(:read_pod_logs)
    prevent(:read_prometheus)
    prevent(:admin_project_google_cloud)
    prevent(:admin_project_aws)
  end

  rule { infrastructure_disabled | terraform_state_disabled }.policy do
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:terraform_state))
  end

  rule { can?(:metrics_dashboard) }.policy do
    enable :read_deployment
  end

  rule { ~anonymous & can?(:metrics_dashboard) }.policy do
    enable :create_metrics_user_starred_dashboard
    enable :read_metrics_user_starred_dashboard
  end

  rule { packages_disabled }.policy do
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:package))
  end

  rule { owner | admin | guest | group_member | group_requester }.prevent :request_access
  rule { ~request_access_enabled }.prevent :request_access

  rule { can?(:developer_access) & can?(:create_issue) }.enable :import_issues
  rule { can?(:reporter_access) & can?(:create_work_item) }.enable :import_work_items

  rule { can?(:developer_access) }.policy do
    enable :create_package
    enable :admin_issue_board
    enable :admin_merge_request
    enable :update_merge_request
    enable :reopen_merge_request
    enable :create_commit_status
    enable :update_commit_status
    enable :create_build
    enable :update_build
    enable :read_resource_group
    enable :update_resource_group
    enable :create_merge_request_from
    enable :create_wiki
    enable :push_code
    enable :resolve_note
    enable :create_container_image
    enable :update_container_image
    enable :destroy_container_image
    enable :create_environment
    enable :update_environment
    enable :destroy_environment
    enable :create_deployment
    enable :update_deployment
    enable :read_cluster # Deprecated as certificate-based cluster integration (`Clusters::Cluster`).
    enable :read_cluster_agent
    enable :use_k8s_proxies
    enable :create_release
    enable :update_release
    enable :destroy_release
    enable :admin_metrics_dashboard_annotation
    enable :read_alert_management_alert
    enable :update_alert_management_alert
    enable :create_design
    enable :update_design
    enable :move_design
    enable :destroy_design
    enable :read_terraform_state
    enable :read_pod_logs
    enable :read_feature_flag
    enable :create_feature_flag
    enable :update_feature_flag
    enable :destroy_feature_flag
    enable :admin_feature_flag
    enable :admin_feature_flags_user_lists
    enable :update_escalation_status
    enable :read_secure_files
    enable :update_sentry_issue
  end

  rule { can?(:developer_access) & user_confirmed? }.policy do
    enable :create_pipeline
    enable :update_pipeline
    enable :create_pipeline_schedule
  end

  rule { can?(:maintainer_access) }.policy do
    enable :destroy_package
    enable :admin_package
    enable :admin_issue_board
    enable :push_to_delete_protected_branch
    enable :update_snippet
    enable :admin_snippet
    enable :rename_project
    enable :admin_project_member
    enable :admin_note
    enable :admin_wiki
    enable :admin_project
    enable :admin_commit_status
    enable :admin_build
    enable :admin_container_image
    enable :admin_pipeline
    enable :admin_environment
    enable :admin_deployment
    enable :destroy_deployment
    enable :admin_pages
    enable :read_pages
    enable :update_pages
    enable :remove_pages
    enable :add_cluster
    enable :create_cluster
    enable :update_cluster
    enable :admin_cluster
    enable :create_environment_terminal
    enable :destroy_release
    enable :destroy_artifacts
    enable :admin_operations
    enable :read_deploy_token
    enable :create_deploy_token
    enable :destroy_deploy_token
    enable :read_prometheus_alerts
    enable :admin_terraform_state
    enable :create_freeze_period
    enable :read_freeze_period
    enable :update_freeze_period
    enable :destroy_freeze_period
    enable :admin_feature_flags_client
    enable :register_project_runners
    enable :create_runner
    enable :admin_project_runners
    enable :read_project_runners
    enable :update_runners_registration_token
    enable :admin_project_google_cloud
    enable :admin_project_aws
    enable :admin_secure_files
    enable :read_upload
    enable :destroy_upload
    enable :admin_incident_management_timeline_event_tag
    enable :stop_environment
  end

  rule { public_project & metrics_dashboard_allowed }.policy do
    enable :metrics_dashboard
  end

  rule { internal_access & metrics_dashboard_allowed }.policy do
    enable :metrics_dashboard
  end

  rule { (mirror_available & can?(:admin_project)) | admin }.enable :admin_remote_mirror
  rule { can?(:push_code) }.enable :admin_tag

  rule { archived }.policy do
    prevent(*archived_abilities)

    archived_features.each do |feature|
      prevent(*create_update_admin(feature))
    end
  end

  rule { archived & ~pending_delete }.policy do
    archived_features.each do |feature|
      prevent(:"destroy_#{feature}")
    end
  end

  rule { issues_disabled }.policy do
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:issue))
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:issue_board))
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:issue_board_list))
  end

  rule { merge_requests_disabled | repository_disabled | ~can?(:download_code) }.policy do
    prevent :create_merge_request_in
    prevent :create_merge_request_from
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:merge_request))
  end

  rule { pages_disabled }.prevent :read_pages_content

  rule { issues_disabled & merge_requests_disabled }.policy do
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:label))
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:milestone))
    prevent(:read_cycle_analytics)
  end

  rule { snippets_disabled }.policy do
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:snippet))
  end

  rule { analytics_disabled }.policy do
    prevent(:read_analytics)
    prevent(:read_insights)
    prevent(:read_cycle_analytics)
    prevent(:read_repository_graphs)
    prevent(:read_ci_cd_analytics)
  end

  rule { wiki_disabled }.policy do
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:wiki))
    prevent(:download_wiki_code)
  end

  rule { download_code_deploy_token }.policy do
    enable :download_wiki_code
  end

  rule { builds_disabled | repository_disabled }.policy do
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:build))
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:pipeline_schedule))
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:environment))
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:cluster))
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:deployment))
  end

  # There's two separate cases when builds_disabled is true:
  # 1. When internal CI is disabled - builds_disabled && internal_builds_disabled
  #   - We do not prevent the user from accessing Pipelines to allow them to access external CI
  # 2. When the user is not allowed to access CI - builds_disabled && ~internal_builds_disabled
  #   - We prevent the user from accessing Pipelines
  rule { (builds_disabled & ~internal_builds_disabled) | repository_disabled }.policy do
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:pipeline))
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:commit_status))
  end

  rule { repository_disabled }.policy do
    prevent :push_code
    prevent :download_code
    prevent :build_download_code
    prevent :fork_project
    prevent :read_commit_status
    prevent :read_pipeline
    prevent :read_pipeline_schedule
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:feature_flag))
    prevent(:admin_feature_flags_user_lists)
  end

  rule { container_registry_disabled }.policy do
    prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:container_image))
  end

  rule { anonymous & ~public_project }.prevent_all

  rule { public_project }.policy do
    enable :public_access
    enable :read_project_for_iids
  end

  rule { ~public_project & ~internal_access & ~project_allowed_for_job_token }.prevent_all

  rule { can?(:public_access) }.policy do
    enable :read_package
    enable :read_project
    enable :read_issue_board
    enable :read_issue_board_list
    enable :read_wiki
    enable :read_label
    enable :read_planning_hierarchy
    enable :read_milestone
    enable :read_snippet
    enable :read_project_member
    enable :read_merge_request
    enable :read_note
    enable :read_pipeline
    enable :read_pipeline_schedule
    enable :read_environment
    enable :read_deployment
    enable :read_commit_status
    enable :read_container_image
    enable :download_code
    enable :read_release
    enable :download_wiki_code
    enable :read_cycle_analytics
    enable :read_pages_content
    enable :read_analytics
    enable :read_insights

    # NOTE: may be overridden by IssuePolicy
    enable :read_issue
  end

  rule { can?(:public_access) & public_builds }.enable :read_ci_cd_analytics

  rule { public_builds }.policy do
    enable :read_build
  end

  rule { public_builds & can?(:guest_access) }.policy do
    enable :read_pipeline
    enable :read_pipeline_schedule
  end

  # These rules are included to allow maintainers of projects to push to certain
  # to run pipelines for the branches they have access to.
  rule { can?(:public_access) & has_merge_requests_allowing_pushes & user_confirmed? }.policy do
    enable :create_build
    enable :create_pipeline
  end

  rule do
    (can?(:read_project_for_iids) & issues_visible_to_user) | can?(:read_issue)
  end.enable :read_issue_iid

  rule do
    (~guest & can?(:read_project_for_iids) & merge_requests_visible_to_user) | can?(:read_merge_request)
  end.enable :read_merge_request_iid

  rule { ~can?(:read_cross_project) & ~classification_label_authorized }.policy do
    # Preventing access here still allows the projects to be listed. Listing
    # projects doesn't check the `:read_project` ability. But instead counts
    # on the `project_authorizations` table.
    #
    # All other actions should explicitly check read project, which would
    # trigger the `classification_label_authorized` condition.
    #
    # `:read_project_for_iids` is not prevented by this condition, as it is
    # used for cross-project reference checks.
    prevent :guest_access
    prevent :public_access
    prevent :public_user_access
    prevent :reporter_access
    prevent :developer_access
    prevent :maintainer_access
    prevent :owner_access
  end

  rule { blocked }.policy do
    prevent :create_pipeline
  end

  rule { can?(:read_issue) }.policy do
    enable :read_design
    enable :read_design_activity
    enable :read_issue_link
    enable :read_work_item
  end

  rule { can?(:read_merge_request) }.policy do
    enable :read_vulnerability_merge_request_link
  end

  rule { can?(:developer_access) }.policy do
    enable :read_security_configuration
  end

  rule { can?(:guest_access) & can?(:download_code) }.policy do
    enable :create_merge_request_in
  end

  # Design abilities could also be prevented in the issue policy.
  rule { design_management_disabled }.policy do
    prevent :read_design
    prevent :read_design_activity
    prevent :create_design
    prevent :update_design
    prevent :destroy_design
    prevent :move_design
  end

  rule { download_code_deploy_key }.policy do
    enable :download_code
  end

  rule { push_code_deploy_key }.policy do
    enable :push_code
  end

  rule { read_container_image_deploy_token }.policy do
    enable :read_container_image
  end

  rule { create_container_image_deploy_token }.policy do
    enable :create_container_image
  end

  rule { read_package_registry_deploy_token }.policy do
    enable :read_package
    enable :read_project
  end

  rule { write_package_registry_deploy_token }.policy do
    enable :create_package
    enable :read_package
    enable :destroy_package
    enable :read_project
  end

  rule { can?(:create_pipeline) & can?(:maintainer_access) }.enable :create_web_ide_terminal

  rule { build_service_proxy_enabled }.enable :build_service_proxy_enabled

  rule { can?(:download_code) }.policy do
    enable :read_repository_graphs
  end

  rule { can?(:read_build) & can?(:read_pipeline) }.policy do
    enable :read_build_report_results
  end

  rule { support_bot }.enable :guest_access
  rule { support_bot & ~service_desk_enabled }.policy do
    prevent :create_note
    prevent :read_project
    prevent :guest_access
  end

  rule { project_bot }.enable :project_bot_access

  rule { can?(:read_all_resources) & resource_access_token_feature_available }.enable :read_resource_access_tokens

  rule { can?(:admin_project) & resource_access_token_feature_available }.policy do
    enable :read_resource_access_tokens
    enable :destroy_resource_access_tokens
  end

  rule { can?(:admin_project) & resource_access_token_feature_available & resource_access_token_creation_allowed }.policy do
    enable :create_resource_access_tokens
    enable :manage_resource_access_tokens
  end

  rule { can?(:admin_project) }.policy do
    enable :read_usage_quotas
  end

  rule { can?(:project_bot_access) }.policy do
    prevent :create_resource_access_tokens
    prevent :manage_resource_access_tokens
  end

  rule { user_defined_variables_allowed | can?(:maintainer_access) }.policy do
    enable :set_pipeline_variables
  end

  rule { ~security_and_compliance_disabled & can?(:developer_access) }.policy do
    enable :access_security_and_compliance
  end

  rule { ~admin & ~project_runner_registration_allowed }.policy do
    prevent :register_project_runners
    prevent :create_runner
  end

  rule { can?(:admin_project_member) }.policy do
    enable :import_project_members_from_another_project
    # ability to read, approve or reject member access requests of other users
    enable :admin_member_access_request
  end

  rule { registry_enabled & can?(:admin_container_image) }.policy do
    enable :view_package_registry_project_settings
  end

  rule { packages_enabled & can?(:admin_package) }.policy do
    enable :view_package_registry_project_settings
  end

  rule { can?(:read_project) }.policy do
    enable :read_incident_management_timeline_event_tag
  end

  rule { can?(:download_code) }.policy do
    enable :read_code
  end

  rule { ~create_runner_workflow_enabled }.policy do
    prevent :create_runner
  end

  # Should be matched with GroupPolicy#read_internal_note
  rule { admin | can?(:reporter_access) }.enable :read_internal_note

  rule { can?(:developer_access) & namespace_catalog_available }.policy do
    enable :read_namespace_catalog
  end

  rule { can?(:owner_access) & namespace_catalog_available }.policy do
    enable :add_catalog_resource
  end

  private

  def user_is_user?
    user.is_a?(User)
  end

  def team_member?
    return false if @user.nil?
    return false unless user_is_user?

    greedy_load_subject = false

    # when scoping by subject, we want to be greedy
    # and load *all* the members with one query.
    greedy_load_subject ||= DeclarativePolicy.preferred_scope == :subject

    # in this case we're likely to have loaded #members already
    # anyways, and #member? would fail with an error
    greedy_load_subject ||= !@user.persisted?

    if greedy_load_subject
      # We want to load all the members with one query. Calling #include? on
      # project.team.members will perform a separate query for each user, unless
      # project.team.members was loaded before somewhere else. Calling #to_a
      # ensures it's always loaded before checking for membership.
      project.team.members.to_a.include?(user)
    else
      # otherwise we just make a specific query for
      # this particular user.
      team_access_level >= Gitlab::Access::GUEST
    end
  end

  def project_group_member?
    return false if @user.nil?
    return false unless user_is_user?

    project.group && project.group.member?(@user)
  end

  # rubocop: disable CodeReuse/ActiveRecord
  def project_group_requester?
    return false if @user.nil?
    return false unless user_is_user?

    project.group && project.group.requesters.exists?(user_id: @user.id)
  end
  # rubocop: enable CodeReuse/ActiveRecord

  def team_access_level
    return -1 if @user.nil?
    return -1 unless user_is_user?

    lookup_access_level!
  end

  def lookup_access_level!
    return ::Gitlab::Access::REPORTER if alert_bot?
    return ::Gitlab::Access::REPORTER if support_bot? && service_desk_enabled?

    # NOTE: max_member_access has its own cache
    project.team.max_member_access(@user.id)
  end

  def access_allowed_to?(feature)
    return false unless project.project_feature

    case project.project_feature.access_level(feature)
    when ProjectFeature::DISABLED
      false
    when ProjectFeature::PRIVATE
      can?(:read_all_resources) || team_access_level >= ProjectFeature.required_minimum_access_level(feature)
    else
      true
    end
  end

  def resource_access_token_feature_available?
    true
  end

  def resource_access_token_create_feature_available?
    true
  end

  def resource_access_token_creation_allowed?
    group = project.group

    return true unless group # always enable for projects in personal namespaces

    resource_access_token_create_feature_available? && group.root_ancestor.namespace_settings.resource_access_token_creation_allowed?
  end

  def project
    @subject
  end

  def namespace_catalog_available?
    false
  end
end

ProjectPolicy.prepend_mod_with('ProjectPolicy')