diff options
author | Bastien Nocera <hadess@hadess.net> | 2022-11-16 17:52:04 +0100 |
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committer | Bastien Nocera <hadess@hadess.net> | 2022-11-16 17:52:04 +0100 |
commit | 9cc1c511dfde62890a7fe5c58d1fe0b21326dd76 (patch) | |
tree | 60af40bae08d355fcec1a82239e6af46d1310763 | |
parent | a8120378c258ce3a90d89711a9beed3bd2fe1e6c (diff) | |
download | gnome-desktop-9cc1c511dfde62890a7fe5c58d1fe0b21326dd76.tar.gz |
thumbnail: s/blacklist/blocklist/
-rw-r--r-- | libgnome-desktop/gnome-desktop-thumbnail-script.c | 36 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/libgnome-desktop/gnome-desktop-thumbnail-script.c b/libgnome-desktop/gnome-desktop-thumbnail-script.c index a3c8e800..bbeddf03 100644 --- a/libgnome-desktop/gnome-desktop-thumbnail-script.c +++ b/libgnome-desktop/gnome-desktop-thumbnail-script.c @@ -301,8 +301,8 @@ setup_seccomp (GPtrArray *argv_array, * can do, and we should support code portability between different * container tools. * - * This syscall blacklist is copied from linux-user-chroot, which was in turn - * clearly influenced by the Sandstorm.io blacklist. + * This syscall blocklist is copied from linux-user-chroot, which was in turn + * clearly influenced by the Sandstorm.io blocklist. * * If you make any changes here, I suggest sending the changes along * to other sandbox maintainers. Using the libseccomp list is also @@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ setup_seccomp (GPtrArray *argv_array, * https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/libseccomp * * A non-exhaustive list of links to container tooling that might - * want to share this blacklist: + * want to share this blocklist: * * https://github.com/sandstorm-io/sandstorm * in src/sandstorm/supervisor.c++ @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ setup_seccomp (GPtrArray *argv_array, { int scall; struct scmp_arg_cmp *arg; - } syscall_blacklist[] = { + } syscall_blocklist[] = { /* Block dmesg */ {SCMP_SYS (syslog)}, /* Useless old syscall */ @@ -373,15 +373,15 @@ setup_seccomp (GPtrArray *argv_array, { int scall; struct scmp_arg_cmp *arg; - } syscall_nondevel_blacklist[] = { + } syscall_nondevel_blocklist[] = { /* Profiling operations; we expect these to be done by tools from outside * the sandbox. In particular perf has been the source of many CVEs. */ {SCMP_SYS (perf_event_open)}, {SCMP_SYS (ptrace)} }; - /* Blacklist all but unix, inet, inet6 and netlink */ - int socket_family_blacklist[] = { + /* blocklist all but unix, inet, inet6 and netlink */ + int socket_family_blocklist[] = { AF_AX25, AF_IPX, AF_APPLETALK, @@ -462,11 +462,11 @@ setup_seccomp (GPtrArray *argv_array, * leak system stuff or secrets from other apps. */ - for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (syscall_blacklist); i++) + for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (syscall_blocklist); i++) { - int scall = syscall_blacklist[i].scall; - if (syscall_blacklist[i].arg) - r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 1, *syscall_blacklist[i].arg); + int scall = syscall_blocklist[i].scall; + if (syscall_blocklist[i].arg) + r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 1, *syscall_blocklist[i].arg); else r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 0); if (r < 0 && r == -EFAULT /* unknown syscall */) @@ -475,11 +475,11 @@ setup_seccomp (GPtrArray *argv_array, if (!devel) { - for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (syscall_nondevel_blacklist); i++) + for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (syscall_nondevel_blocklist); i++) { - int scall = syscall_nondevel_blacklist[i].scall; - if (syscall_nondevel_blacklist[i].arg) - r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 1, *syscall_nondevel_blacklist[i].arg); + int scall = syscall_nondevel_blocklist[i].scall; + if (syscall_nondevel_blocklist[i].arg) + r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 1, *syscall_nondevel_blocklist[i].arg); else r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 0); @@ -491,10 +491,10 @@ setup_seccomp (GPtrArray *argv_array, /* Socket filtering doesn't work on e.g. i386, so ignore failures here * However, we need to user seccomp_rule_add_exact to avoid libseccomp doing * something else: https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/issues/8 */ - for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (socket_family_blacklist); i++) + for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (socket_family_blocklist); i++) { - int family = socket_family_blacklist[i]; - if (i == G_N_ELEMENTS (socket_family_blacklist) - 1) + int family = socket_family_blocklist[i]; + if (i == G_N_ELEMENTS (socket_family_blocklist) - 1) seccomp_rule_add_exact (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EAFNOSUPPORT), SCMP_SYS (socket), 1, SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_GE, family)); else seccomp_rule_add_exact (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EAFNOSUPPORT), SCMP_SYS (socket), 1, SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, family)); |