summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorNikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>2002-02-23 09:00:20 +0000
committerNikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>2002-02-23 09:00:20 +0000
commitfc2a6f9e665a0276153c95930aa3f201da7cdea5 (patch)
tree7e1a71338c1f6e417de51f4a139bcd017d495ab3
parent3cabb6cb3bf309f269434b7aaff51baed6a99b92 (diff)
downloadgnutls-fc2a6f9e665a0276153c95930aa3f201da7cdea5.tar.gz
*** empty log message ***
-rw-r--r--lib/x509_verify.c55
1 files changed, 32 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/lib/x509_verify.c b/lib/x509_verify.c
index 110361481a..40f9db16f4 100644
--- a/lib/x509_verify.c
+++ b/lib/x509_verify.c
@@ -295,14 +295,16 @@ static gnutls_cert *find_issuer(gnutls_cert * cert, gnutls_cert * trusted_cas, i
return NULL;
}
-
+/* ret_trust is the value to return when the certificate chain is ok
+ * ret_else is the value to return otherwise.
+ */
int gnutls_verify_certificate2(gnutls_cert * cert, gnutls_cert * trusted_cas, int tcas_size,
- void *CRLs, int crls_size)
+ void *CRLs, int crls_size, int ret_trust, int ret_else)
{
/* CRL is ignored for now */
gnutls_cert *issuer;
- CertificateStatus ret = GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
+ CertificateStatus ret = ret_else;
if (tcas_size >= 1)
issuer = find_issuer(cert, trusted_cas, tcas_size);
@@ -316,31 +318,32 @@ int gnutls_verify_certificate2(gnutls_cert * cert, gnutls_cert * trusted_cas, in
*/
if (issuer == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
- return GNUTLS_CERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
+ return ret;
}
ret = check_if_ca( cert, issuer);
if (ret != GNUTLS_CERT_VALID) {
gnutls_assert();
- return ret;
+ return ret_else;
+ }
+
+ ret = check_if_expired( issuer);
+ if (ret != GNUTLS_CERT_VALID) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ return ret_else;
}
ret = gnutls_x509_verify_signature(cert, issuer);
if (ret != GNUTLS_CERT_VALID) {
gnutls_assert();
- return ret;
+ return ret_else;
}
/* FIXME: Check CRL --not done yet.
*/
- ret = check_if_expired( cert);
- if (ret != GNUTLS_CERT_VALID) {
- gnutls_assert();
- return ret;
- }
- return GNUTLS_CERT_VALID;
+ return ret_trust;
}
/* The algorithm used is:
@@ -367,41 +370,51 @@ int _gnutls_x509_verify_certificate( gnutls_cert * certificate_list,
return status;
}
+ ret = check_if_expired( &certificate_list[0]);
+ if (ret != GNUTLS_CERT_VALID) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ status |= GNUTLS_CERT_EXPIRED;
+ }
+
/* Verify the certificate path */
for (i = 0; i < clist_size; i++) {
if (i + 1 >= clist_size)
break;
- if ((ret = gnutls_verify_certificate2(&certificate_list[i], &certificate_list[i + 1], 1, NULL, 0)) != GNUTLS_CERT_VALID) {
+ if ((ret = gnutls_verify_certificate2(&certificate_list[i], &certificate_list[i + 1],
+ 1, NULL, 0, GNUTLS_CERT_VALID, GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID)) != GNUTLS_CERT_VALID) {
/*
* We only accept the first certificate to be
* expired, revoked etc. If any of the certificates in the
* certificate chain is expired then the certificate
* is not valid.
*/
- if (ret >= 0 && i==0) {
+ if (ret > 0) {
gnutls_assert();
status |= ret;
} else {
gnutls_assert();
- return GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
+ return ret;
}
}
}
+ if ( !(status & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID))
+ status |= GNUTLS_CERT_VALID;
+
/* Now verify the last certificate in the certificate path
* against the trusted CA certificate list.
*/
- ret = gnutls_verify_certificate2(&certificate_list[i], trusted_cas, tcas_size, CRLs, crls_size);
-
- if (ret >=0 && ret != GNUTLS_CERT_VALID) {
+ ret = gnutls_verify_certificate2(&certificate_list[i], trusted_cas, tcas_size,
+ CRLs, crls_size, GNUTLS_CERT_TRUSTED, GNUTLS_CERT_NOT_TRUSTED);
+
+ if (ret > 0) {
/* if the last certificate in the certificate
* list is expired, then the certificate is not
* trusted.
*/
gnutls_assert();
status |= ret;
- return (status | GNUTLS_CERT_NOT_TRUSTED);
}
if (ret < 0) {
@@ -409,11 +422,7 @@ int _gnutls_x509_verify_certificate( gnutls_cert * certificate_list,
return ret;
}
- status |= ret;
-
/* if we got here, then it's trusted.
*/
- status |= GNUTLS_CERT_TRUSTED;
-
return status;
}