Fix typos.

Typos found with codespell

Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>

6 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/doc/cap_iab.3 b/doc/cap_iab.3
index 399e497..a453428 100644
--- a/doc/cap_iab.3
+++ b/doc/cap_iab.3
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Vector will survive
 and the Bound (or \fIblocked\fP) vector is the twos-complement of the
 process bounding set.
 .PP
-In some environments, it is considered desireable to naively inherit
+In some environments, it is considered desirable to naively inherit
 capabilities. That is pass capabilities, independent of the status of
 the executed binary, from parent to child through exec* system
 calls. The surviving capabilities become the Permitted flag for the
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ The text format accepted by
 is a comma separated list of capability values. Each capability is
 prefixed by nothing (or %) (Inh); ! (Bound); ^ (Amb). Or, some
 combination thereof. Since the Amb vector is constrained to be no
-greater than the Inh set, ^ is eqivalent to %^. Further, unless B is
+greater than the Inh set, ^ is equivalent to %^. Further, unless B is
 non-zero, % can be omitted. The following are legal text
 representations: "!%cap_chown" (Bound but Inh),
 "!cap_setuid,^cap_chown" (Bound, Inh+Amb). "cap_setuid,!cap_chown"
diff --git a/doc/capability.notes b/doc/capability.notes
index b1e5245..4087c80 100644
--- a/doc/capability.notes
+++ b/doc/capability.notes
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ the name 'system' who's account is locked with a '*' password. This
 user can be made the owner of all of the system directories on your
 system and critical system binaries too.
 
-Why is this a good idea? In a simple case, the CAP_FUSER capabilty is
+Why is this a good idea? In a simple case, the CAP_FUSER capability is
 required for the superuser to delete files owned by a non-root user in
 a 'sticky-bit' protected non-root owned directory. Thus, the sticky
 bit can help you protect the /lib/ directory from an compromized
diff --git a/doc/capsh.1 b/doc/capsh.1
index 3e26842..e309438 100644
--- a/doc/capsh.1
+++ b/doc/capsh.1
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ was found via the shell's PATH searching. If the
 occurs after a
 .BI \-\-chroot= /some/path
 argument the PATH located binary may not be resolve to the same binary
-as that running initially. This behavior is an intented feature as it
+as that running initially. This behavior is an intended feature as it
 can complete the chroot transition.
 .TP
 .BI \-\-caps= cap-set
diff --git a/doc/old/_setfilecap.2 b/doc/old/_setfilecap.2
index 6a0538c..3c9e374 100644
--- a/doc/old/_setfilecap.2
+++ b/doc/old/_setfilecap.2
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Search permission is denied on a component of the path prefix.
 .TP
 .SB ELOOP
 .I filename
-containes a circular reference (via symlinks).
+contains a circular reference (via symlinks).
 .TP
 .SB EBADF
 .I fd
diff --git a/doc/values/7.txt b/doc/values/7.txt
index 432a97e..fbc1240 100644
--- a/doc/values/7.txt
+++ b/doc/values/7.txt
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 Allows a process to freely manipulate its own UIDs:
-  - arbitraily set the UID, EUID, REUID and RESUID
+  - arbitrarily set the UID, EUID, REUID and RESUID
     values
   - allows the forging of UID credentials passed over a
     socket
diff --git a/doc/values/8.txt b/doc/values/8.txt
index d6d7c1f..d7654f0 100644
--- a/doc/values/8.txt
+++ b/doc/values/8.txt
@@ -14,6 +14,6 @@ capabilities (2008), this capability was suppressed by
 default, as its unsuppressed behavior was not
 auditable: it could asynchronously grant its own
 Permitted capabilities to and remove capabilities from
-other processes arbitraily. The former leads to
+other processes arbitrarily. The former leads to
 undefined behavior, and the latter is better served by
 the kill system call.]