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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-10-25 16:43:35 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-10-25 16:43:35 -0700 |
commit | 62606c224d72a98c35d21a849f95cccf95b0a252 (patch) | |
tree | 6f6f3466451edf9baa2ea8b5f9fc558aa555c69a /drivers/char | |
parent | 24ed334f33666f2ae929ccc08f72e7e72e353c64 (diff) | |
parent | a1c6fd4308d37f072e939a2782f24214115fc7e8 (diff) | |
download | linux-62606c224d72a98c35d21a849f95cccf95b0a252.tar.gz |
Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Remove VLA usage
- Add cryptostat user-space interface
- Add notifier for new crypto algorithms
Algorithms:
- Add OFB mode
- Remove speck
Drivers:
- Remove x86/sha*-mb as they are buggy
- Remove pcbc(aes) from x86/aesni
- Improve performance of arm/ghash-ce by up to 85%
- Implement CTS-CBC in arm64/aes-blk, faster by up to 50%
- Remove PMULL based arm64/crc32 driver
- Use PMULL in arm64/crct10dif
- Add aes-ctr support in s5p-sss
- Add caam/qi2 driver
Others:
- Pick better transform if one becomes available in crc-t10dif"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (124 commits)
crypto: chelsio - Update ntx queue received from cxgb4
crypto: ccree - avoid implicit enum conversion
crypto: caam - add SPDX license identifier to all files
crypto: caam/qi - simplify CGR allocation, freeing
crypto: mxs-dcp - make symbols 'sha1_null_hash' and 'sha256_null_hash' static
crypto: arm64/aes-blk - ensure XTS mask is always loaded
crypto: testmgr - fix sizeof() on COMP_BUF_SIZE
crypto: chtls - remove set but not used variable 'csk'
crypto: axis - fix platform_no_drv_owner.cocci warnings
crypto: x86/aes-ni - fix build error following fpu template removal
crypto: arm64/aes - fix handling sub-block CTS-CBC inputs
crypto: caam/qi2 - avoid double export
crypto: mxs-dcp - Fix AES issues
crypto: mxs-dcp - Fix SHA null hashes and output length
crypto: mxs-dcp - Implement sha import/export
crypto: aegis/generic - fix for big endian systems
crypto: morus/generic - fix for big endian systems
crypto: lrw - fix rebase error after out of bounds fix
crypto: cavium/nitrox - use pci_alloc_irq_vectors() while enabling MSI-X.
crypto: cavium/nitrox - NITROX command queue changes.
...
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 24 |
2 files changed, 14 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c index aaf9e5afaad4..95be7228f327 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c @@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ static unsigned short default_quality; /* = 0; default to "off" */ module_param(current_quality, ushort, 0644); MODULE_PARM_DESC(current_quality, - "current hwrng entropy estimation per mill"); + "current hwrng entropy estimation per 1024 bits of input"); module_param(default_quality, ushort, 0644); MODULE_PARM_DESC(default_quality, - "default entropy content of hwrng per mill"); + "default entropy content of hwrng per 1024 bits of input"); static void drop_current_rng(void); static int hwrng_init(struct hwrng *rng); diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index c75b6cdf0053..2eb70e76ed35 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -433,9 +433,9 @@ static int crng_init_cnt = 0; static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0; #define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, - __u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]); + __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]); static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, - __u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS], int used); + __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used); static void process_random_ready_list(void); static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); @@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) unsigned long flags; int i, num; union { - __u32 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]; + __u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; __u32 key[8]; } buf; @@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) } static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, - __u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]) + __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) { unsigned long v, flags; @@ -990,7 +990,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); } -static void extract_crng(__u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]) +static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) { struct crng_state *crng = NULL; @@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ static void extract_crng(__u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]) * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection. */ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, - __u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS], int used) + __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) { unsigned long flags; __u32 *s, *d; @@ -1020,14 +1020,14 @@ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, used = 0; } spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); - s = &tmp[used / sizeof(__u32)]; + s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used]; d = &crng->state[4]; for (i=0; i < 8; i++) *d++ ^= *s++; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); } -static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS], int used) +static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) { struct crng_state *crng = NULL; @@ -1043,7 +1043,7 @@ static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS], int used) static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) { ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; - __u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]; + __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4); int large_request = (nbytes > 256); while (nbytes) { @@ -1622,7 +1622,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, */ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) { - __u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]; + __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4); trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_); @@ -2248,7 +2248,7 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void) if (use_lock) read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) { - extract_crng((__u32 *)batch->entropy_u64); + extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64); batch->position = 0; } ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++]; @@ -2278,7 +2278,7 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void) if (use_lock) read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) { - extract_crng(batch->entropy_u32); + extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32); batch->position = 0; } ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++]; |