Update NEWS file for 3.4.1.nettle_3.4.1rc1

Mention dependency on GMP-6, and RSA performance regression.

1 files changed, 41 insertions, 23 deletions

diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 12811d50..cadd0f04 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -2,45 +2,47 @@ NEWS for the Nettle 3.4.1 release
 
 	This release fixes a few bugs, and makes the RSA private key
 	operations side channel silent. The RSA improvements are
-	contributed by Simo Sorce and Red Hat, and includes one new
-	public function.
+	contributed by Simo Sorce and Red Hat, and include one new
+	public function, rsa_sec_decrypt, see below.
 
-	All functions handling RSA private keys are now side-channel
+	All functions using RSA private keys are now side-channel
 	silent, meaning that they try hard to avoid any branches or
 	memory accesses depending on secret data. This applies both to
 	the bignum calculations, which now use GMP's mpn_sec_* family
-	of functions, and the processing of pkcs#1 padding.
+	of functions, and the processing of PKCS#1 padding needed for
+	RSA decryption.
 
 	Nettle's ECC functions were already side-channel silent, while
 	the DSA functions still aren't. There's also one caveat
 	regarding the improved RSA functions: due to small table
 	lookups in relevant mpn_sec_* functions in GMP-6.1.2, the
 	lowest and highest few bits of the secret factors p and q may
-	leak. I'm not aware of any attacks on RSA where knowing a few
-	bits of the factors makes a significant difference. This leak
-	will likely be plugged in later GMP versions).
+	still leak. I'm not aware of any attacks on RSA where knowing
+	a few bits of the factors makes a significant difference. This
+	leak will likely be plugged in later GMP versions.
 
 	Changes in behavior:
 
-	* The old rsa_decrypt_tr may now clobber all of the provided
-	  message buffer, independent of the actual message length. It
-	  is side-channel silent, in that branches and memory accesses
-	  don't depend on the validity or length of the message.
-	  Side-channel leakage from the caller's use of length and
-	  return value may still provide an oracle useable for a
-	  Bleichenbacher-style chosen ciphertext attack. Which is why
-	  the new function rsa_sec_decrypt, see below, is recommended.
+	* The functions rsa_decrypt and rsa_decrypt_tr may now clobber
+	  all of the provided message buffer, independent of the
+	  actual message length. They are side-channel silent, in that
+	  branches and memory accesses don't depend on the validity or
+	  length of the message. Side-channel leakage from the
+	  caller's use of length and return value may still provide an
+	  oracle useable for a Bleichenbacher-style chosen ciphertext
+	  attack. Which is why the new function rsa_sec_decrypt is
+	  recommended.
 
 	New features:
 
-	* New function rsa_sec_decrypt. It differs from rsa_decrypt_tr
-	  in that the length of the decrypted message is given a
-	  priori, and pkcs#1 padding indicating a different length is
-	  treated as an error. For applications that may be subject to
-	  chosen ciphertext attacks, it is recommended to initialize
-	  the message area with random data, call this function, and
-	  ignore the return value. This applies in particular to
-	  RSA-based key exchange in the TLS protocol.
+	* A new function rsa_sec_decrypt. It differs from
+	  rsa_decrypt_tr in that the length of the decrypted message
+	  is given a priori, and PKCS#1 padding indicating a different
+	  length is treated as an error. For applications that may be
+	  subject to chosen ciphertext attacks, it is recommended to
+	  initialize the message area with random data, call this
+	  function, and ignore the return value. This applies in
+	  particular to RSA-based key exchange in the TLS protocol.
 
 	Bug fixes:
 
@@ -50,6 +52,22 @@ NEWS for the Nettle 3.4.1 release
 	* Fix link error on the pss-mgf1-test test, affecting builds
 	  without public key support.
 
+	Performance regression:
+
+	* All RSA private key operations employing RSA blinding, i.e.,
+	  rsa_decrypt_tr, rsa_*_sign_tr, the new rsa_sec_decrypt, and
+	  rsa_compute_root_tr, are significantly slower. This is
+	  because (i) RSA blinding now use side-channel silent
+	  operations, (ii) blinding includes a modular inversion, and
+	  (iii) side-channel silent modular inversion, implemented as
+	  mpn_sec_invert, is very expensive. A 60% slowdown for
+	  2048-bit RSA keys have been measured.
+
+	Miscellaneous:
+
+	* Building the public key support of nettle now requires GMP
+	  version 6.0 or later (unless --enable-mini-gmp is used).
+
 	The shared library names are libnettle.so.6.5 and
 	libhogweed.so.4.5, with sonames still libnettle.so.6 and
 	libhogweed.so.4. It is intended to be fully binary compatible