diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c | 4854 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 4854 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c deleted file mode 100644 index 4d65b15a8..000000000 --- a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4854 +0,0 @@ -/* - * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public - * License Version 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file - * except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of - * the License at http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/ - * - * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS - * IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or - * implied. See the License for the specific language governing - * rights and limitations under the License. - * - * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries. - * - * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is Netscape - * Communications Corporation. Portions created by Netscape are - * Copyright (C) 1994-2000 Netscape Communications Corporation. All - * Rights Reserved. - * - * Contributor(s): - * - * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the - * terms of the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the - * "GPL"), in which case the provisions of the GPL are applicable - * instead of those above. If you wish to allow use of your - * version of this file only under the terms of the GPL and not to - * allow others to use your version of this file under the MPL, - * indicate your decision by deleting the provisions above and - * replace them with the notice and other provisions required by - * the GPL. If you do not delete the provisions above, a recipient - * may use your version of this file under either the MPL or the - * GPL. - */ -/* - * This file implements the Symkey wrapper and the PKCS context - * Interfaces. - */ - -#include "seccomon.h" -#include "secmod.h" -#include "prlock.h" -#include "secmodi.h" -#include "pkcs11.h" -#include "pk11func.h" -#include "secitem.h" -#include "key.h" -#include "secoid.h" -#include "secasn1.h" -#include "sechash.h" -#include "cert.h" -#include "secerr.h" - -#define PAIRWISE_SECITEM_TYPE siBuffer -#define PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA1_LENGTH /* 160-bits */ -#define PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH 20 /* 160-bits */ - -/* forward static declarations. */ -static PK11SymKey *pk11_DeriveWithTemplate(PK11SymKey *baseKey, - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, SECItem *param, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, - CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize, CK_ATTRIBUTE *userAttr, - unsigned int numAttrs); - - -/* - * strip leading zero's from key material - */ -void -pk11_SignedToUnsigned(CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrib) { - char *ptr = (char *)attrib->pValue; - unsigned long len = attrib->ulValueLen; - - while (len && (*ptr == 0)) { - len--; - ptr++; - } - attrib->pValue = ptr; - attrib->ulValueLen = len; -} - -/* - * get a new session on a slot. If we run out of session, use the slot's - * 'exclusive' session. In this case owner becomes false. - */ -static CK_SESSION_HANDLE -pk11_GetNewSession(PK11SlotInfo *slot,PRBool *owner) -{ - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; - *owner = PR_TRUE; - if (!slot->isThreadSafe) PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - if ( PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_OpenSession(slot->slotID,CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, - slot,pk11_notify,&session) != CKR_OK) { - *owner = PR_FALSE; - session = slot->session; - } - if (!slot->isThreadSafe) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - - return session; -} - -static void -pk11_CloseSession(PK11SlotInfo *slot,CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,PRBool owner) -{ - if (!owner) return; - if (!slot->isThreadSafe) PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - (void) PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_CloseSession(session); - if (!slot->isThreadSafe) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); -} - - -SECStatus -PK11_CreateNewObject(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, - CK_ATTRIBUTE *theTemplate, int count, - PRBool token, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *objectID) -{ - CK_SESSION_HANDLE rwsession; - CK_RV crv; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - - rwsession = session; - if (rwsession == CK_INVALID_SESSION) { - if (token) { - rwsession = PK11_GetRWSession(slot); - } else { - rwsession = slot->session; - PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - } - } - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_CreateObject(rwsession, theTemplate, - count,objectID); - if(crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - rv = SECFailure; - } - - if (session == CK_INVALID_SESSION) { - if (token) { - PK11_RestoreROSession(slot, rwsession); - } else { - PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - } - } - - return rv; -} - -static void -pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(PK11SymKey *symKey) { - if (!symKey->sessionOwner || !(symKey->slot->isThreadSafe)) - PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(symKey->slot); -} - -static void -pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(PK11SymKey *symKey) { - if (!symKey->sessionOwner || !(symKey->slot->isThreadSafe)) - PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(symKey->slot); -} - - -static PK11SymKey *pk11SymKeyHead = NULL; -static PK11SymKey * -pk11_getKeyFromList(PK11SlotInfo *slot) { - PK11SymKey *symKey; - - - PK11_USE_THREADS(PR_Lock(slot->freeListLock);) - if (slot->freeSymKeysHead) { - symKey = slot->freeSymKeysHead; - slot->freeSymKeysHead = symKey->next; - slot->keyCount--; - } - PK11_USE_THREADS(PR_Unlock(slot->freeListLock);) - if (symKey) { - symKey->next = NULL; - return symKey; - } - - symKey = (PK11SymKey *)PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(PK11SymKey)); - if (symKey == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - symKey->refLock = PR_NewLock(); - if (symKey->refLock == NULL) { - PORT_Free(symKey); - return NULL; - } - symKey->session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot,&symKey->sessionOwner); - symKey->next = NULL; - return symKey; -} - -void -PK11_CleanKeyList(PK11SlotInfo *slot) -{ - PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL; - - while (slot->freeSymKeysHead) { - symKey = slot->freeSymKeysHead; - slot->freeSymKeysHead = symKey->next; - pk11_CloseSession(symKey->slot, symKey->session,symKey->sessionOwner); - PK11_USE_THREADS(PR_DestroyLock(symKey->refLock);) - PORT_Free(symKey); - }; - return; -} - -/* - * create a symetric key: - * Slot is the slot to create the key in. - * type is the mechainism type - */ -PK11SymKey * -PK11_CreateSymKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, void *wincx) -{ - - PK11SymKey *symKey = pk11_getKeyFromList(slot); - - - if (symKey == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - symKey->type = type; - symKey->data.data = NULL; - symKey->data.len = 0; - symKey->owner = PR_TRUE; - symKey->objectID = CK_INVALID_KEY; - symKey->slot = slot; - symKey->series = slot->series; - symKey->cx = wincx; - symKey->size = 0; - symKey->refCount = 1; - symKey->origin = PK11_OriginNULL; - symKey->origin = PK11_OriginNULL; - PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot); - return symKey; -} - -/* - * destroy a symetric key - */ -void -PK11_FreeSymKey(PK11SymKey *symKey) -{ - PRBool destroy = PR_FALSE; - PK11SlotInfo *slot; - PRBool freeit = PR_TRUE; - - PK11_USE_THREADS(PR_Lock(symKey->refLock);) - if (symKey->refCount-- == 1) { - destroy= PR_TRUE; - } - PK11_USE_THREADS(PR_Unlock(symKey->refLock);) - if (destroy) { - if ((symKey->owner) && symKey->objectID != CK_INVALID_KEY) { - pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey); - (void) PK11_GETTAB(symKey->slot)-> - C_DestroyObject(symKey->session, symKey->objectID); - pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey); - } - if (symKey->data.data) { - PORT_Memset(symKey->data.data, 0, symKey->data.len); - PORT_Free(symKey->data.data); - } - slot = symKey->slot; - PK11_USE_THREADS(PR_Lock(slot->freeListLock);) - if (slot->keyCount < slot->maxKeyCount) { - symKey->next = slot->freeSymKeysHead; - slot->freeSymKeysHead = symKey; - slot->keyCount++; - symKey->slot = NULL; - freeit = PR_FALSE; - } - PK11_USE_THREADS(PR_Unlock(slot->freeListLock);) - if (freeit) { - pk11_CloseSession(symKey->slot, symKey->session, - symKey->sessionOwner); - PK11_USE_THREADS(PR_DestroyLock(symKey->refLock);) - PORT_Free(symKey); - } - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - } -} - -PK11SymKey * -PK11_ReferenceSymKey(PK11SymKey *symKey) -{ - PK11_USE_THREADS(PR_Lock(symKey->refLock);) - symKey->refCount++; - PK11_USE_THREADS(PR_Unlock(symKey->refLock);) - return symKey; -} - -/* - * turn key handle into an appropriate key object - */ -PK11SymKey * -PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PK11SymKey *parent, PK11Origin origin, - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE keyID, PRBool owner, void *wincx) -{ - PK11SymKey *symKey; - - if (keyID == CK_INVALID_KEY) { - return NULL; - } - - symKey = PK11_CreateSymKey(slot,type,wincx); - if (symKey == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - symKey->objectID = keyID; - symKey->origin = origin; - symKey->owner = owner; - - /* adopt the parent's session */ - /* This is only used by SSL. What we really want here is a session - * structure with a ref count so the session goes away only after all the - * keys do. */ - if (owner && parent) { - pk11_CloseSession(symKey->slot, symKey->session,symKey->sessionOwner); - symKey->sessionOwner = parent->sessionOwner; - symKey->session = parent->session; - parent->sessionOwner = PR_FALSE; - } - - return symKey; -} - -/* - * turn key handle into an appropriate key object - */ -PK11SymKey * -PK11_GetWrapKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, int wrap, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, - int series, void *wincx) -{ - PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL; - - if (slot->series != series) return NULL; - if (slot->refKeys[wrap] == CK_INVALID_KEY) return NULL; - if (type == CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) type = slot->wrapMechanism; - - symKey = PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, NULL, PK11_OriginDerive, - slot->wrapMechanism, slot->refKeys[wrap], PR_FALSE, wincx); - return symKey; -} - -void -PK11_SetWrapKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, int wrap, PK11SymKey *wrapKey) -{ - /* save the handle and mechanism for the wrapping key */ - /* mark the key and session as not owned by us to they don't get freed - * when the key goes way... that lets us reuse the key later */ - slot->refKeys[wrap] = wrapKey->objectID; - wrapKey->owner = PR_FALSE; - wrapKey->sessionOwner = PR_FALSE; - slot->wrapMechanism = wrapKey->type; -} - -CK_MECHANISM_TYPE -PK11_GetMechanism(PK11SymKey *symKey) -{ - return symKey->type; -} - -/* - * figure out if a key is still valid or if it is stale. - */ -PRBool -PK11_VerifyKeyOK(PK11SymKey *key) { - if (!PK11_IsPresent(key->slot)) { - return PR_FALSE; - } - return (PRBool)(key->series == key->slot->series); -} - -static PK11SymKey * -pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, - PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyTemplate, - unsigned int templateCount, SECItem *key, void *wincx) -{ - PK11SymKey * symKey; - CK_RV crv; - - symKey = PK11_CreateSymKey(slot,type,wincx); - if (symKey == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - symKey->size = key->len; - - if (SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL,&symKey->data,key) != SECSuccess) { - PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); - return NULL; - } - - symKey->origin = origin; - - /* import the keys */ - crv = PK11_CreateNewObject(slot, symKey->session, keyTemplate, - templateCount, PR_FALSE, &symKey->objectID); - if ( crv != CKR_OK) { - PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv)); - return NULL; - } - - return symKey; -} - -/* - * turn key bits into an appropriate key object - */ -PK11SymKey * -PK11_ImportSymKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, - PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key,void *wincx) -{ - PK11SymKey * symKey; - unsigned int templateCount = 0; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY; - CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; /* sigh */ - CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[5]; - CK_ATTRIBUTE * attrs = keyTemplate; - - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass) ); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType) ); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, key->data, key->len); attrs++; - templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate; - PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)); - - keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(type,key->len); - symKey = pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(slot, type, origin, keyTemplate, - templateCount, key, wincx); - return symKey; -} - -/* - * import a public key into the desired slot - */ -CK_OBJECT_HANDLE -PK11_ImportPublicKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, - PRBool isToken) -{ - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; - CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; - CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID; - CK_ATTRIBUTE theTemplate[10]; - CK_ATTRIBUTE *signedattr = NULL; - CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = theTemplate; - int signedcount = 0; - int templateCount = 0; - CK_RV crv; - - /* if we already have an object in the desired slot, use it */ - if (!isToken && pubKey->pkcs11Slot == slot) { - return pubKey->pkcs11ID; - } - - /* free the existing key */ - if (pubKey->pkcs11Slot != NULL) { - PK11SlotInfo *oSlot = pubKey->pkcs11Slot; - PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(oSlot); - (void) PK11_GETTAB(oSlot)->C_DestroyObject(oSlot->session, - pubKey->pkcs11ID); - PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(oSlot); - PK11_FreeSlot(oSlot); - pubKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL; - } - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass) ); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType) ); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, isToken ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++; - - /* now import the key */ - { - switch (pubKey->keyType) { - case rsaKey: - keyType = CKK_RSA; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_WRAP, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ENCRYPT, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++; - signedattr = attrs; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_MODULUS, pubKey->u.rsa.modulus.data, - pubKey->u.rsa.modulus.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, - pubKey->u.rsa.publicExponent.data, - pubKey->u.rsa.publicExponent.len); attrs++; - break; - case dsaKey: - keyType = CKK_DSA; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));attrs++; - signedattr = attrs; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, pubKey->u.dsa.params.prime.data, - pubKey->u.dsa.params.prime.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs,CKA_SUBPRIME,pubKey->u.dsa.params.subPrime.data, - pubKey->u.dsa.params.subPrime.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, pubKey->u.dsa.params.base.data, - pubKey->u.dsa.params.base.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, pubKey->u.dsa.publicValue.data, - pubKey->u.dsa.publicValue.len); attrs++; - break; - case fortezzaKey: - keyType = CKK_DSA; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));attrs++; - signedattr = attrs; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME,pubKey->u.fortezza.params.prime.data, - pubKey->u.fortezza.params.prime.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs,CKA_SUBPRIME, - pubKey->u.fortezza.params.subPrime.data, - pubKey->u.fortezza.params.subPrime.len);attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, pubKey->u.fortezza.params.base.data, - pubKey->u.fortezza.params.base.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, pubKey->u.fortezza.DSSKey.data, - pubKey->u.fortezza.DSSKey.len); attrs++; - break; - case dhKey: - keyType = CKK_DH; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));attrs++; - signedattr = attrs; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, pubKey->u.dh.prime.data, - pubKey->u.dh.prime.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, pubKey->u.dh.base.data, - pubKey->u.dh.base.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, - pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len); attrs++; - break; - /* what about fortezza??? */ - default: - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY ); - return CK_INVALID_KEY; - } - - templateCount = attrs - theTemplate; - signedcount = attrs - signedattr; - PORT_Assert(templateCount <= (sizeof(theTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))); - for (attrs=signedattr; signedcount; attrs++, signedcount--) { - pk11_SignedToUnsigned(attrs); - } - crv = PK11_CreateNewObject(slot, CK_INVALID_SESSION, theTemplate, - templateCount, isToken, &objectID); - if ( crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError (PK11_MapError(crv)); - return CK_INVALID_KEY; - } - } - - pubKey->pkcs11ID = objectID; - pubKey->pkcs11Slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot); - - return objectID; -} - - -/* - * return the slot associated with a symetric key - */ -PK11SlotInfo * -PK11_GetSlotFromKey(PK11SymKey *symKey) -{ - return PK11_ReferenceSlot(symKey->slot); -} - -PK11SymKey * -PK11_FindFixedKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECItem *keyID, - void *wincx) -{ - CK_ATTRIBUTE findTemp[4]; - CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs; - CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY; - int tsize = 0; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE key_id; - - attrs = findTemp; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyclass, sizeof(keyclass)); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue)); attrs++; - if (keyID) { - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, keyID->data, keyID->len); attrs++; - } - tsize = attrs - findTemp; - PORT_Assert(tsize <= sizeof(findTemp)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)); - - key_id = pk11_FindObjectByTemplate(slot,findTemp,tsize); - if (key_id == CK_INVALID_KEY) { - return NULL; - } - return PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, NULL, PK11_OriginDerive, type, key_id, - PR_FALSE, wincx); -} - -void * -PK11_GetWindow(PK11SymKey *key) -{ - return key->cx; -} - - -/* - * extract a symetric key value. NOTE: if the key is sensitive, we will - * not be able to do this operation. This function is used to move - * keys from one token to another */ -SECStatus -PK11_ExtractKeyValue(PK11SymKey *symKey) -{ - - if (symKey->data.data != NULL) return SECSuccess; - - if (symKey->slot == NULL) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY ); - return SECFailure; - } - - return PK11_ReadAttribute(symKey->slot,symKey->objectID,CKA_VALUE,NULL, - &symKey->data); -} - -SECItem * -PK11_GetKeyData(PK11SymKey *symKey) -{ - return &symKey->data; -} - -/* - * take an attribute and copy it into a secitem, converting unsigned to signed. - */ -static CK_RV -pk11_Attr2SecItem(PRArenaPool *arena, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr, SECItem *item) { - unsigned char *dataPtr; - - item->len = attr->ulValueLen; - dataPtr = (unsigned char*) PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, item->len+1); - if ( dataPtr == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - *dataPtr = 0; - item->data = dataPtr+1; - PORT_Memcpy(item->data,attr->pValue,item->len); - if (item->data[0] & 0x80) { - item->data = item->data-1; - item->len++; - } - return CKR_OK; -} -/* - * extract a public key from a slot and id - */ -SECKEYPublicKey * -PK11_ExtractPublicKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot,KeyType keyType,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id) -{ - CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; - PRArenaPool *arena; - PRArenaPool *tmp_arena; - SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; - int templateCount = 0; - CK_KEY_TYPE pk11KeyType; - CK_RV crv; - CK_ATTRIBUTE template[8]; - CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs= template; - CK_ATTRIBUTE *modulus,*exponent,*base,*prime,*subprime,*value; - - /* if we didn't know the key type, get it */ - if (keyType== nullKey) { - - pk11KeyType = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot,id,CKA_KEY_TYPE); - if (pk11KeyType == CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return NULL; - } - switch (pk11KeyType) { - case CKK_RSA: - keyType = rsaKey; - break; - case CKK_DSA: - keyType = dsaKey; - break; - case CKK_DH: - keyType = dhKey; - break; - default: - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY ); - return NULL; - } - } - - - /* now we need to create space for the public key */ - arena = PORT_NewArena( DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); - if (arena == NULL) return NULL; - tmp_arena = PORT_NewArena( DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); - if (tmp_arena == NULL) { - PORT_FreeArena (arena, PR_FALSE); - return NULL; - } - - - pubKey = (SECKEYPublicKey *) - PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(SECKEYPublicKey)); - if (pubKey == NULL) { - PORT_FreeArena (arena, PR_FALSE); - PORT_FreeArena (tmp_arena, PR_FALSE); - return NULL; - } - - pubKey->arena = arena; - pubKey->keyType = keyType; - pubKey->pkcs11Slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot); - pubKey->pkcs11ID = id; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, - sizeof(keyClass)); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &pk11KeyType, - sizeof(pk11KeyType) ); attrs++; - switch (pubKey->keyType) { - case rsaKey: - modulus = attrs; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0); attrs++; - exponent = attrs; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0); attrs++; - - templateCount = attrs - template; - PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(template)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)); - crv = PK11_GetAttributes(tmp_arena,slot,id,template,templateCount); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - - if ((keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) || (pk11KeyType != CKK_RSA)) { - crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,modulus,&pubKey->u.rsa.modulus); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,exponent,&pubKey->u.rsa.publicExponent); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - break; - case dsaKey: - prime = attrs; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0); attrs++; - subprime = attrs; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_SUBPRIME, NULL, 0); attrs++; - base = attrs; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, NULL, 0); attrs++; - value = attrs; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0); attrs++; - templateCount = attrs - template; - PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(template)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)); - crv = PK11_GetAttributes(tmp_arena,slot,id,template,templateCount); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - - if ((keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) || (pk11KeyType != CKK_DSA)) { - crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,prime,&pubKey->u.dsa.params.prime); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,subprime,&pubKey->u.dsa.params.subPrime); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,base,&pubKey->u.dsa.params.base); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,value,&pubKey->u.dsa.publicValue); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - break; - case dhKey: - prime = attrs; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0); attrs++; - base = attrs; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, NULL, 0); attrs++; - value =attrs; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0); attrs++; - templateCount = attrs - template; - PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(template)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)); - crv = PK11_GetAttributes(tmp_arena,slot,id,template,templateCount); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - - if ((keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) || (pk11KeyType != CKK_DSA)) { - crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,prime,&pubKey->u.dh.prime); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,base,&pubKey->u.dh.base); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,value,&pubKey->u.dh.publicValue); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - break; - case fortezzaKey: - case nullKey: - default: - crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - - PORT_FreeArena(tmp_arena,PR_FALSE); - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_FALSE); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return NULL; - } - - return pubKey; -} - -/* - * Build a Private Key structure from raw PKCS #11 information. - */ -SECKEYPrivateKey * -PK11_MakePrivKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, KeyType keyType, - PRBool isTemp, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE privID, void *wincx) -{ - PRArenaPool *arena; - SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey; - - /* don't know? look it up */ - if (keyType == nullKey) { - CK_KEY_TYPE pk11Type = CKK_RSA; - - pk11Type = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot,privID,CKA_KEY_TYPE); - isTemp = (PRBool)!PK11_HasAttributeSet(slot,privID,CKA_TOKEN); - switch (pk11Type) { - case CKK_RSA: keyType = rsaKey; break; - case CKK_DSA: keyType = dsaKey; break; - case CKK_DH: keyType = dhKey; break; - case CKK_KEA: keyType = fortezzaKey; break; - default: - break; - } - } - - /* now we need to create space for the private key */ - arena = PORT_NewArena( DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); - if (arena == NULL) return NULL; - - privKey = (SECKEYPrivateKey *) - PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(SECKEYPrivateKey)); - if (privKey == NULL) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); - return NULL; - } - - privKey->arena = arena; - privKey->keyType = keyType; - privKey->pkcs11Slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot); - privKey->pkcs11ID = privID; - privKey->pkcs11IsTemp = isTemp; - privKey->wincx = wincx; - - return privKey; -} - -/* return the keylength if possible. '0' if not */ -unsigned int -PK11_GetKeyLength(PK11SymKey *key) -{ - if (key->size != 0) return key->size ; - if (key->data.data == NULL) { - PK11_ExtractKeyValue(key); - } - /* key is probably secret. Look up it's type and length */ - /* this is new PKCS #11 version 2.0 functionality. */ - if (key->size == 0) { - CK_ULONG keyLength; - - keyLength = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(key->slot,key->objectID,CKA_VALUE_LEN); - /* doesn't have a length field, check the known PKCS #11 key types, - * which don't have this field */ - if (keyLength == CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION) { - CK_KEY_TYPE keyType; - keyType = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(key->slot,key->objectID,CKA_KEY_TYPE); - switch (keyType) { - case CKK_DES: key->size = 8; break; - case CKK_DES2: key->size = 16; break; - case CKK_DES3: key->size = 24; break; - case CKK_SKIPJACK: key->size = 10; break; - case CKK_BATON: key->size = 20; break; - case CKK_JUNIPER: key->size = 20; break; - case CKK_GENERIC_SECRET: - if (key->type == CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN) { - key->size=48; - } - break; - default: break; - } - } else { - key->size = (unsigned int)keyLength; - } - } - - return key->size; -} - -/* return the strength of a key. This is different from length in that - * 1) it returns the size in bits, and 2) it returns only the secret portions - * of the key minus any checksums or parity. - */ -unsigned int -PK11_GetKeyStrength(PK11SymKey *key, SECAlgorithmID *algid) -{ - int size=0; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism= CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; /* RC2 only */ - SECItem *param = NULL; /* RC2 only */ - CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *rc2_params = NULL; /* RC2 ONLY */ - unsigned int effectiveBits = 0; /* RC2 ONLY */ - - switch (PK11_GetKeyType(key->type,0)) { - case CKK_CDMF: - return 40; - case CKK_DES: - return 56; - case CKK_DES3: - case CKK_DES2: - size = PK11_GetKeyLength(key); - if (size == 16) { - /* double des */ - return 112; /* 16*7 */ - } - return 168; - /* - * RC2 has is different than other ciphers in that it allows the user - * to deprecating keysize while still requiring all the bits for the - * original key. The info - * on what the effective key strength is in the parameter for the key. - * In S/MIME this parameter is stored in the DER encoded algid. In Our - * other uses of RC2, effectiveBits == keyBits, so this code functions - * correctly without an algid. - */ - case CKK_RC2: - /* if no algid was provided, fall through to default */ - if (!algid) { - break; - } - /* verify that the algid is for RC2 */ - mechanism = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algid)); - if ((mechanism != CKM_RC2_CBC) && (mechanism != CKM_RC2_ECB)) { - break; - } - - /* now get effective bits from the algorithm ID. */ - param = PK11_ParamFromAlgid(algid); - /* if we couldn't get memory just use key length */ - if (param == NULL) { - break; - } - - rc2_params = (CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *) param->data; - /* paranoia... shouldn't happen */ - PORT_Assert(param->data != NULL); - if (param->data == NULL) { - SECITEM_FreeItem(param,PR_TRUE); - break; - } - effectiveBits = (unsigned int)rc2_params->ulEffectiveBits; - SECITEM_FreeItem(param,PR_TRUE); - param = NULL; rc2_params=NULL; /* paranoia */ - - /* we have effective bits, is and allocated memory is free, now - * we need to return the smaller of effective bits and keysize */ - size = PK11_GetKeyLength(key); - if ((unsigned int)size*8 > effectiveBits) { - return effectiveBits; - } - - return size*8; /* the actual key is smaller, the strength can't be - * greater than the actual key size */ - - default: - break; - } - return PK11_GetKeyLength(key) * 8; -} - -/* Make a Key type to an appropriate signing/verification mechanism */ -static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE -pk11_mapSignKeyType(KeyType keyType) -{ - switch (keyType) { - case rsaKey: - return CKM_RSA_PKCS; - case fortezzaKey: - case dsaKey: - return CKM_DSA; - case dhKey: - default: - break; - } - return CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; -} - -static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE -pk11_mapWrapKeyType(KeyType keyType) -{ - switch (keyType) { - case rsaKey: - return CKM_RSA_PKCS; - /* Add fortezza?? */ - default: - break; - } - return CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; -} - -/* - * Some non-compliant PKCS #11 vendors do not give us the modulus, so actually - * set up a signature to get the signaure length. - */ -static int -pk11_backupGetSignLength(SECKEYPrivateKey *key) -{ - PK11SlotInfo *slot = key->pkcs11Slot; - CK_MECHANISM mech = {0, NULL, 0 }; - PRBool owner = PR_TRUE; - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; - CK_ULONG len; - CK_RV crv; - unsigned char h_data[20] = { 0 }; - unsigned char buf[20]; /* obviously to small */ - CK_ULONG smallLen = sizeof(buf); - - mech.mechanism = pk11_mapSignKeyType(key->keyType); - - session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot,&owner); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_SignInit(session,&mech,key->pkcs11ID); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return -1; - } - len = 0; - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_Sign(session,h_data,sizeof(h_data), - NULL, &len); - /* now call C_Sign with too small a buffer to clear the session state */ - (void) PK11_GETTAB(slot)-> - C_Sign(session,h_data,sizeof(h_data),buf,&smallLen); - - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return -1; - } - return len; -} -/* - * get the length of a signature object based on the key - */ -int -PK11_SignatureLen(SECKEYPrivateKey *key) -{ - PK11SlotInfo *slot = key->pkcs11Slot; - int val; - - switch (key->keyType) { - case rsaKey: - val = PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(key); - if (val == -1) { - break; /* failed */ - } - return (unsigned long) val; - - case fortezzaKey: - case dsaKey: - return 40; - - default: - break; - } - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY ); - return 0; -} - -PK11SlotInfo * -PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *key) -{ - PK11SlotInfo *slot = key->pkcs11Slot; - slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot); - return slot; -} - -/* - * Get the modulus length for raw parsing - */ -int -PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(SECKEYPrivateKey *key) -{ - CK_ATTRIBUTE theTemplate = { CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 }; - PK11SlotInfo *slot = key->pkcs11Slot; - CK_RV crv; - int length; - - switch (key->keyType) { - case rsaKey: - crv = PK11_GetAttributes(NULL, slot, key->pkcs11ID, &theTemplate, 1); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return -1; - } - length = theTemplate.ulValueLen; - if ( *(unsigned char *)theTemplate.pValue == 0) { - length--; - } - if (theTemplate.pValue != NULL) - PORT_Free(theTemplate.pValue); - return (int) length; - - case fortezzaKey: - case dsaKey: - case dhKey: - default: - break; - } - if (theTemplate.pValue != NULL) - PORT_Free(theTemplate.pValue); - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY ); - return -1; -} - -/* - * copy a key (or any other object) on a token - */ -CK_OBJECT_HANDLE -PK11_CopyKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE srcObject) -{ - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE destObject; - CK_RV crv; - - PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_CopyObject(slot->session,srcObject,NULL,0, - &destObject); - PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - if (crv == CKR_OK) return destObject; - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return CK_INVALID_KEY; -} - - -PK11SymKey * -pk11_KeyExchange(PK11SlotInfo *slot,CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, - CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, PK11SymKey *symKey); - -/* - * The next two utilities are to deal with the fact that a given operation - * may be a multi-slot affair. This creates a new key object that is copied - * into the new slot. - */ -PK11SymKey * -pk11_CopyToSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot,CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, - CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, PK11SymKey *symKey) -{ - SECStatus rv; - PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL; - - /* Extract the raw key data if possible */ - if (symKey->data.data == NULL) { - rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey); - /* KEY is sensitive, we're try key exchanging it. */ - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return pk11_KeyExchange(slot, type, operation, symKey); - } - } - newKey = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, type, symKey->origin, operation, - &symKey->data, symKey->cx); - if (newKey == NULL) newKey = pk11_KeyExchange(slot,type,operation,symKey); - return newKey; -} - -/* - * Make sure the slot we are in the correct slot for the operation - */ -static PK11SymKey * -pk11_ForceSlot(PK11SymKey *symKey,CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, - CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation) -{ - PK11SlotInfo *slot = symKey->slot; - PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL; - - if ((slot== NULL) || !PK11_DoesMechanism(slot,type)) { - slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type,symKey->cx); - if (slot == NULL) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE ); - return NULL; - } - newKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(slot, type, operation, symKey); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - } - return newKey; -} - -/* - * Use the token to Generate a key. keySize must be 'zero' for fixed key - * length algorithms. NOTE: this means we can never generate a DES2 key - * from this interface! - */ -PK11SymKey * -PK11_TokenKeyGen(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECItem *param, - int keySize, SECItem *keyid, PRBool isToken, void *wincx) -{ - PK11SymKey *symKey; - CK_ATTRIBUTE genTemplate[4]; - CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = genTemplate; - int count = sizeof(genTemplate)/sizeof(genTemplate[0]); - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; - CK_MECHANISM mechanism; - CK_RV crv; - PRBool weird = PR_FALSE; /* hack for fortezza */ - CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE; - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; - - if ((keySize == -1) && (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64)) { - weird = PR_TRUE; - keySize = 0; - } - - /* TNH: Isn't this redundant, since "handleKey" will set defaults? */ - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, (!weird) - ? CKA_ENCRYPT : CKA_DECRYPT, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++; - - if (keySize != 0) { - CK_ULONG key_size = keySize; /* Convert to PK11 type */ - - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &key_size, sizeof(key_size)); - attrs++; - } - - /* Include key id value if provided */ - if (keyid) { - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, keyid->data, keyid->len); attrs++; - } - - if (isToken) { - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(cktrue)); attrs++; - } - - count = attrs - genTemplate; - PR_ASSERT(count <= sizeof(genTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)); - - /* find a slot to generate the key into */ - /* Only do slot management if this is not a token key */ - if (!isToken && (slot == NULL || !PK11_DoesMechanism(slot,type))) { - PK11SlotInfo *bestSlot; - - bestSlot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type,wincx); /* TNH: references the slot? */ - if (bestSlot == NULL) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE ); - return NULL; - } - - symKey = PK11_CreateSymKey(bestSlot,type,wincx); - - PK11_FreeSlot(bestSlot); - } else { - symKey = PK11_CreateSymKey(slot, type, wincx); - } - if (symKey == NULL) return NULL; - - symKey->size = keySize; - symKey->origin = (!weird) ? PK11_OriginGenerated : PK11_OriginFortezzaHack; - - /* Initialize the Key Gen Mechanism */ - mechanism.mechanism = PK11_GetKeyGen(type); - if (mechanism.mechanism == CKM_FAKE_RANDOM) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE ); - return NULL; - } - - /* Set the parameters for the key gen if provided */ - mechanism.pParameter = NULL; - mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0; - if (param) { - mechanism.pParameter = param->data; - mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len; - } - - /* Get session and perform locking */ - if (isToken) { - session = PK11_GetRWSession(symKey->slot); /* Should always be original slot */ - } else { - session = symKey->session; - pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey); - } - - crv = PK11_GETTAB(symKey->slot)->C_GenerateKey(session, - &mechanism, genTemplate, count, &symKey->objectID); - - /* Release lock and session */ - if (isToken) { - PK11_RestoreROSession(symKey->slot, session); - } else { - pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey); - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return NULL; - } - - return symKey; -} - -PK11SymKey * -PK11_KeyGen(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECItem *param, - int keySize, void *wincx) -{ - return PK11_TokenKeyGen(slot, type, param, keySize, 0, PR_FALSE, wincx); -} - -/* --- */ -PK11SymKey * -PK11_GenDES3TokenKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECItem *keyid, void *cx) -{ - return PK11_TokenKeyGen(slot, CKM_DES3_CBC, 0, 0, keyid, PR_TRUE, cx); -} - -/* - * PKCS #11 pairwise consistency check utilized to validate key pair. - */ -static SECStatus -pk11_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, - SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, CK_MECHANISM *mech, void* wincx ) -{ - /* Variables used for Encrypt/Decrypt functions. */ - unsigned char *known_message = (unsigned char *)"Known Crypto Message"; - CK_BBOOL isEncryptable = CK_FALSE; - CK_BBOOL canSignVerify = CK_FALSE; - CK_BBOOL isDerivable = CK_FALSE; - unsigned char plaintext[PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH]; - CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted; - PK11SlotInfo *slot; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id; - unsigned char *ciphertext; - unsigned char *text_compared; - CK_ULONG max_bytes_encrypted; - CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted; - CK_ULONG bytes_compared; - CK_RV crv; - - /* Variables used for Signature/Verification functions. */ - unsigned char *known_digest = (unsigned char *)"Mozilla Rules World!"; - SECItem signature; - SECItem digest; /* always uses SHA-1 digest */ - int signature_length; - SECStatus rv; - - /**************************************************/ - /* Pairwise Consistency Check of Encrypt/Decrypt. */ - /**************************************************/ - - isEncryptable = PK11_HasAttributeSet( privKey->pkcs11Slot, - privKey->pkcs11ID, CKA_DECRYPT ); - - /* If the encryption attribute is set; attempt to encrypt */ - /* with the public key and decrypt with the private key. */ - if( isEncryptable ) { - /* Find a module to encrypt against */ - slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(pk11_mapWrapKeyType(privKey->keyType),wincx); - if (slot == NULL) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE ); - return SECFailure; - } - - id = PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot,pubKey,PR_FALSE); - if (id == CK_INVALID_KEY) { - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - return SECFailure; - } - - /* Compute max bytes encrypted from modulus length of private key. */ - max_bytes_encrypted = PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen( privKey ); - - - /* Prepare for encryption using the public key. */ - PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - crv = PK11_GETTAB( slot )->C_EncryptInit( slot->session, - mech, id ); - if( crv != CKR_OK ) { - PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError( crv ) ); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - return SECFailure; - } - - /* Allocate space for ciphertext. */ - ciphertext = (unsigned char *) PORT_Alloc( max_bytes_encrypted ); - if( ciphertext == NULL ) { - PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY ); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - return SECFailure; - } - - /* Initialize bytes encrypted to max bytes encrypted. */ - bytes_encrypted = max_bytes_encrypted; - - /* Encrypt using the public key. */ - crv = PK11_GETTAB( slot )->C_Encrypt( slot->session, - known_message, - PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH, - ciphertext, - &bytes_encrypted ); - PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - if( crv != CKR_OK ) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError( crv ) ); - PORT_Free( ciphertext ); - return SECFailure; - } - - /* Always use the smaller of these two values . . . */ - bytes_compared = ( bytes_encrypted > PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH ) - ? PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH - : bytes_encrypted; - - /* If there was a failure, the plaintext */ - /* goes at the end, therefore . . . */ - text_compared = ( bytes_encrypted > PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH ) - ? (ciphertext + bytes_encrypted - - PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH ) - : ciphertext; - - /* Check to ensure that ciphertext does */ - /* NOT EQUAL known input message text */ - /* per FIPS PUB 140-1 directive. */ - if( ( bytes_encrypted != max_bytes_encrypted ) || - ( PORT_Memcmp( text_compared, known_message, - bytes_compared ) == 0 ) ) { - /* Set error to Invalid PRIVATE Key. */ - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY ); - PORT_Free( ciphertext ); - return SECFailure; - } - - slot = privKey->pkcs11Slot; - /* Prepare for decryption using the private key. */ - PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - crv = PK11_GETTAB( slot )->C_DecryptInit( slot->session, - mech, - privKey->pkcs11ID ); - if( crv != CKR_OK ) { - PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - PORT_Free( ciphertext ); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - return SECFailure; - } - - /* Initialize bytes decrypted to be the */ - /* expected PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH. */ - bytes_decrypted = PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH; - - /* Decrypt using the private key. */ - /* NOTE: No need to reset the */ - /* value of bytes_encrypted. */ - crv = PK11_GETTAB( slot )->C_Decrypt( slot->session, - ciphertext, - bytes_encrypted, - plaintext, - &bytes_decrypted ); - PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - - /* Finished with ciphertext; free it. */ - PORT_Free( ciphertext ); - - if( crv != CKR_OK ) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - return SECFailure; - } - - /* Check to ensure that the output plaintext */ - /* does EQUAL known input message text. */ - if( ( bytes_decrypted != PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH ) || - ( PORT_Memcmp( plaintext, known_message, - PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH ) != 0 ) ) { - /* Set error to Bad PUBLIC Key. */ - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY ); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - return SECFailure; - } - } - - /**********************************************/ - /* Pairwise Consistency Check of Sign/Verify. */ - /**********************************************/ - - canSignVerify = PK11_HasAttributeSet ( privKey->pkcs11Slot, - privKey->pkcs11ID, CKA_VERIFY); - - if (canSignVerify) - { - /* Initialize signature and digest data. */ - signature.data = NULL; - digest.data = NULL; - - /* Determine length of signature. */ - signature_length = PK11_SignatureLen( privKey ); - if( signature_length == 0 ) - goto failure; - - /* Allocate space for signature data. */ - signature.data = (unsigned char *) PORT_Alloc( signature_length ); - if( signature.data == NULL ) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY ); - goto failure; - } - - /* Allocate space for known digest data. */ - digest.data = (unsigned char *) PORT_Alloc( PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH ); - if( digest.data == NULL ) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY ); - goto failure; - } - - /* "Fill" signature type and length. */ - signature.type = PAIRWISE_SECITEM_TYPE; - signature.len = signature_length; - - /* "Fill" digest with known SHA-1 digest parameters. */ - digest.type = PAIRWISE_SECITEM_TYPE; - PORT_Memcpy( digest.data, known_digest, PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH ); - digest.len = PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH; - - /* Sign the known hash using the private key. */ - rv = PK11_Sign( privKey, &signature, &digest ); - if( rv != SECSuccess ) - goto failure; - - /* Verify the known hash using the public key. */ - rv = PK11_Verify( pubKey, &signature, &digest, wincx ); - if( rv != SECSuccess ) - goto failure; - - /* Free signature and digest data. */ - PORT_Free( signature.data ); - PORT_Free( digest.data ); - } - - - - /**********************************************/ - /* Pairwise Consistency Check for Derivation */ - /**********************************************/ - - isDerivable = PK11_HasAttributeSet ( privKey->pkcs11Slot, - privKey->pkcs11ID, CKA_DERIVE); - - if (isDerivable) - { - /* - * We are not doing consistency check for Diffie-Hellman Key - - * otherwise it would be here - */ - - } - - return SECSuccess; - -failure: - if( signature.data != NULL ) - PORT_Free( signature.data ); - if( digest.data != NULL ) - PORT_Free( digest.data ); - - return SECFailure; -} - - - -/* - * take a private key in one pkcs11 module and load it into another: - * NOTE: the source private key is a rare animal... it can't be sensitive. - * This is used to do a key gen using one pkcs11 module and storing the - * result into another. - */ -SECKEYPrivateKey * -pk11_loadPrivKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot,SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, - SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, PRBool token, PRBool sensitive) -{ - CK_ATTRIBUTE privTemplate[] = { - /* class must be first */ - { CKA_CLASS, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_KEY_TYPE, NULL, 0 }, - /* these three must be next */ - { CKA_TOKEN, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_PRIVATE, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_SENSITIVE, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 }, -#ifdef notdef - { CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_SUBJECT, NULL, 0 }, -#endif - /* RSA */ - { CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_PRIME_1, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_PRIME_2, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_EXPONENT_1, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_EXPONENT_2, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_COEFFICIENT, NULL, 0 }, - }; - CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = NULL, *ap; - int templateSize = sizeof(privTemplate)/sizeof(privTemplate[0]); - PRArenaPool *arena; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID; - int i, count = 0; - int extra_count = 0; - CK_RV crv; - SECStatus rv; - - for (i=0; i < templateSize; i++) { - if (privTemplate[i].type == CKA_MODULUS) { - attrs= &privTemplate[i]; - count = i; - break; - } - } - PORT_Assert(attrs != NULL); - if (attrs == NULL) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return NULL; - } - - ap = attrs; - - switch (privKey->keyType) { - case rsaKey: - count = templateSize; - extra_count = templateSize - (attrs - privTemplate); - break; - case dsaKey: - ap->type = CKA_PRIME; ap++; count++; extra_count++; - ap->type = CKA_SUBPRIME; ap++; count++; extra_count++; - ap->type = CKA_BASE; ap++; count++; extra_count++; - ap->type = CKA_VALUE; ap++; count++; extra_count++; - break; - case dhKey: - ap->type = CKA_PRIME; ap++; count++; extra_count++; - ap->type = CKA_BASE; ap++; count++; extra_count++; - ap->type = CKA_VALUE; ap++; count++; extra_count++; - break; - default: - count = 0; - extra_count = 0; - break; - } - - if (count == 0) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return NULL; - } - - arena = PORT_NewArena( DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); - if (arena == NULL) return NULL; - /* - * read out the old attributes. - */ - crv = PK11_GetAttributes(arena, privKey->pkcs11Slot, privKey->pkcs11ID, - privTemplate,count); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE); - return NULL; - } - - /* Reset sensitive, token, and private */ - *(CK_BBOOL *)(privTemplate[2].pValue) = token ? CK_TRUE : CK_FALSE; - *(CK_BBOOL *)(privTemplate[3].pValue) = token ? CK_TRUE : CK_FALSE; - *(CK_BBOOL *)(privTemplate[4].pValue) = sensitive ? CK_TRUE : CK_FALSE; - - /* Not everyone can handle zero padded key values, give - * them the raw data as unsigned */ - for (ap=attrs; extra_count; ap++, extra_count--) { - pk11_SignedToUnsigned(ap); - } - - /* now Store the puppies */ - rv = PK11_CreateNewObject(slot, CK_INVALID_SESSION, privTemplate, - count, token, &objectID); - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return NULL; - } - - /* try loading the public key as a token object */ - if (pubKey) { - PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot, pubKey, PR_TRUE); - if (pubKey->pkcs11Slot) { - PK11_FreeSlot(pubKey->pkcs11Slot); - pubKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL; - pubKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_KEY; - } - } - - /* build new key structure */ - return PK11_MakePrivKey(slot, privKey->keyType, (PRBool)!token, - objectID, privKey->wincx); -} - - -/* - * Use the token to Generate a key. keySize must be 'zero' for fixed key - * length algorithms. NOTE: this means we can never generate a DES2 key - * from this interface! - */ -SECKEYPrivateKey * -PK11_GenerateKeyPair(PK11SlotInfo *slot,CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, - void *param, SECKEYPublicKey **pubKey, PRBool token, - PRBool sensitive, void *wincx) -{ - /* we have to use these native types because when we call PKCS 11 modules - * we have to make sure that we are using the correct sizes for all the - * parameters. */ - CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE; - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; - CK_ULONG modulusBits; - CK_BYTE publicExponent[4]; - CK_ATTRIBUTE privTemplate[] = { - { CKA_SENSITIVE, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_TOKEN, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_PRIVATE, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_DERIVE, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_UNWRAP, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_SIGN, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_DECRYPT, NULL, 0}, - }; - CK_ATTRIBUTE rsaPubTemplate[] = { - { CKA_MODULUS_BITS, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_TOKEN, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_DERIVE, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_WRAP, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_VERIFY, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0}, - }; - CK_ATTRIBUTE dsaPubTemplate[] = { - { CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_SUBPRIME, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_BASE, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_TOKEN, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_DERIVE, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_WRAP, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_VERIFY, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0}, - }; - CK_ATTRIBUTE dhPubTemplate[] = { - { CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_BASE, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_TOKEN, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_DERIVE, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_WRAP, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_VERIFY, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, NULL, 0}, - { CKA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0}, - }; - - int dsaPubCount = sizeof(dsaPubTemplate)/sizeof(dsaPubTemplate[0]); - /*CK_ULONG key_size = 0;*/ - CK_ATTRIBUTE *pubTemplate; - int privCount = sizeof(privTemplate)/sizeof(privTemplate[0]); - int rsaPubCount = sizeof(rsaPubTemplate)/sizeof(rsaPubTemplate[0]); - int dhPubCount = sizeof(dhPubTemplate)/sizeof(dhPubTemplate[0]); - int pubCount = 0; - PK11RSAGenParams *rsaParams; - PQGParams *dsaParams; - DHParams * dhParams; - CK_MECHANISM mechanism; - CK_MECHANISM test_mech; - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session_handle; - CK_RV crv; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE privID,pubID; - SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey; - KeyType keyType; - PRBool restore; - int peCount,i; - CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs; - CK_ATTRIBUTE *privattrs; - SECItem *pubKeyIndex; - CK_ATTRIBUTE setTemplate; - SECStatus rv; - CK_MECHANISM_INFO mechanism_info; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass; - SECItem *cka_id; - PRBool haslock = PR_FALSE; - PRBool pubIsToken = PR_FALSE; - - PORT_Assert(slot != NULL); - if (slot == NULL) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE); - return NULL; - } - - /* if our slot really doesn't do this mechanism, Generate the key - * in our internal token and write it out */ - if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot,type)) { - PK11SlotInfo *int_slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot(); - - /* don't loop forever looking for a slot */ - if (slot == int_slot) { - PK11_FreeSlot(int_slot); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return NULL; - } - - /* if there isn't a suitable slot, then we can't do the keygen */ - if (int_slot == NULL) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE ); - return NULL; - } - - /* generate the temporary key to load */ - privKey = PK11_GenerateKeyPair(int_slot,type, param, pubKey, PR_FALSE, - PR_FALSE, wincx); - PK11_FreeSlot(int_slot); - - /* if successful, load the temp key into the new token */ - if (privKey != NULL) { - SECKEYPrivateKey *newPrivKey = pk11_loadPrivKey(slot,privKey, - *pubKey,token,sensitive); - SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); - if (newPrivKey == NULL) { - SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(*pubKey); - *pubKey = NULL; - } - return newPrivKey; - } - return NULL; - } - - - mechanism.mechanism = type; - mechanism.pParameter = NULL; - mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0; - test_mech.pParameter = NULL; - test_mech.ulParameterLen = 0; - - /* set up the private key template */ - privattrs = privTemplate; - PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_SENSITIVE, sensitive ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); privattrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_TOKEN, token ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); privattrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_PRIVATE, sensitive ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); privattrs++; - - /* set up the mechanism specific info */ - switch (type) { - case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN: - rsaParams = (PK11RSAGenParams *)param; - modulusBits = rsaParams->keySizeInBits; - peCount = 0; - - /* convert pe to a PKCS #11 string */ - for (i=0; i < 4; i++) { - if (peCount || (rsaParams->pe & - ((unsigned long)0xff000000L >> (i*8)))) { - publicExponent[peCount] = - (CK_BYTE)((rsaParams->pe >> (3-i)*8) & 0xff); - peCount++; - } - } - PORT_Assert(peCount != 0); - attrs = rsaPubTemplate; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_MODULUS_BITS, - &modulusBits, sizeof(modulusBits)); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, - publicExponent, peCount);attrs++; - pubTemplate = rsaPubTemplate; - pubCount = rsaPubCount; - keyType = rsaKey; - test_mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; - break; - case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN: - dsaParams = (PQGParams *)param; - attrs = dsaPubTemplate; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, dsaParams->prime.data, - dsaParams->prime.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_SUBPRIME, dsaParams->subPrime.data, - dsaParams->subPrime.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, dsaParams->base.data, - dsaParams->base.len); attrs++; - pubTemplate = dsaPubTemplate; - pubCount = dsaPubCount; - keyType = dsaKey; - test_mech.mechanism = CKM_DSA; - break; - case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN: - dhParams = (DHParams *)param; - attrs = dhPubTemplate; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, dhParams->prime.data, - dhParams->prime.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, dhParams->base.data, - dhParams->base.len); attrs++; - pubTemplate = dhPubTemplate; - pubCount = dhPubCount; - keyType = dhKey; - test_mech.mechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE; - break; - default: - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY ); - return NULL; - } - - /* now query the slot to find out how "good" a key we can generate */ - if (!slot->isThreadSafe) PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot->slotID, - test_mech.mechanism,&mechanism_info); - if (!slot->isThreadSafe) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - if ((crv != CKR_OK) || (mechanism_info.flags == 0)) { - /* must be old module... guess what it should be... */ - switch (test_mech.mechanism) { - case CKM_RSA_PKCS: - mechanism_info.flags = (CKF_SIGN | CKF_DECRYPT | - CKF_WRAP | CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER | CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_WRAP);; - break; - case CKM_DSA: - mechanism_info.flags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; - break; - case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE: - mechanism_info.flags = CKF_DERIVE; - break; - default: - break; - } - } - /* set the public key objects */ - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, token ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_DERIVE, - mechanism_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_WRAP, - mechanism_info.flags & CKF_WRAP ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, - mechanism_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, - mechanism_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ENCRYPT, - mechanism_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_DERIVE, - mechanism_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); privattrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_UNWRAP, - mechanism_info.flags & CKF_UNWRAP ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); privattrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_SIGN, - mechanism_info.flags & CKF_SIGN ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); privattrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_DECRYPT, - mechanism_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); privattrs++; - - if (token) { - session_handle = PK11_GetRWSession(slot); - haslock = PK11_RWSessionHasLock(slot,session_handle); - restore = PR_TRUE; - } else { - PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); /* gross!! */ - session_handle = slot->session; - restore = PR_FALSE; - haslock = PR_TRUE; - } - - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_GenerateKeyPair(session_handle, &mechanism, - pubTemplate,pubCount,privTemplate,privCount,&pubID,&privID); - - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - if (restore) { - PK11_RestoreROSession(slot,session_handle); - } else PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return NULL; - } - /* This locking code is dangerous and needs to be more thought - * out... the real problem is that we're holding the mutex open this long - */ - if (haslock) { PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); } - - /* swap around the ID's for older PKCS #11 modules */ - keyClass = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot,pubID,CKA_CLASS); - if (keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) { - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE tmp = pubID; - pubID = privID; - privID = tmp; - } - - *pubKey = PK11_ExtractPublicKey(slot, keyType, pubID); - if (*pubKey == NULL) { - if (restore) { - /* we may have to restore the mutex so it get's exited properly - * in RestoreROSession */ - if (haslock) PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - PK11_RestoreROSession(slot,session_handle); - } - PK11_DestroyObject(slot,pubID); - PK11_DestroyObject(slot,privID); - return NULL; - } - - /* set the ID to the public key so we can find it again */ - pubKeyIndex = NULL; - switch (type) { - case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN: - pubKeyIndex = &(*pubKey)->u.rsa.modulus; - break; - case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN: - pubKeyIndex = &(*pubKey)->u.dsa.publicValue; - break; - case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN: - pubKeyIndex = &(*pubKey)->u.dh.publicValue; - break; - } - PORT_Assert(pubKeyIndex != NULL); - - cka_id = PK11_MakeIDFromPubKey(pubKeyIndex); - pubIsToken = (PRBool)PK11_HasAttributeSet(slot,pubID, CKA_TOKEN); - - PK11_SETATTRS(&setTemplate, CKA_ID, cka_id->data, cka_id->len); - - if (haslock) { PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); } - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_SetAttributeValue(session_handle, privID, - &setTemplate, 1); - - if (crv == CKR_OK && pubIsToken) { - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_SetAttributeValue(session_handle, pubID, - &setTemplate, 1); - } - - - if (restore) { - PK11_RestoreROSession(slot,session_handle); - } else { - PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - } - SECITEM_FreeItem(cka_id,PR_TRUE); - - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PK11_DestroyObject(slot,pubID); - PK11_DestroyObject(slot,privID); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - *pubKey = NULL; - return NULL; - } - - privKey = PK11_MakePrivKey(slot,keyType,(PRBool)!token,privID,wincx); - if (privKey == NULL) { - SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(*pubKey); - PK11_DestroyObject(slot,privID); - *pubKey = NULL; - return NULL; /* due to pairwise consistency check */ - } - - /* Perform PKCS #11 pairwise consistency check. */ - rv = pk11_PairwiseConsistencyCheck( *pubKey, privKey, &test_mech, wincx ); - if( rv != SECSuccess ) { - SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey( *pubKey ); - SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey( privKey ); - *pubKey = NULL; - privKey = NULL; - return NULL; - } - - return privKey; -} - -/* - * This function does a straight public key wrap (which only RSA can do). - * Use PK11_PubGenKey and PK11_WrapSymKey to implement the FORTEZZA and - * Diffie-Hellman Ciphers. */ -SECStatus -PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, - PK11SymKey *symKey, SECItem *wrappedKey) -{ - PK11SlotInfo *slot; - CK_ULONG len = wrappedKey->len; - PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id; - CK_MECHANISM mechanism; - PRBool owner = PR_TRUE; - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; - CK_RV crv; - - /* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */ - newKey = pk11_ForceSlot(symKey,type,CKA_ENCRYPT); - if (newKey != NULL) { - symKey = newKey; - } - - if ((symKey == NULL) || (symKey->slot == NULL)) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE ); - return SECFailure; - } - - slot = symKey->slot; - mechanism.mechanism = pk11_mapWrapKeyType(pubKey->keyType); - mechanism.pParameter = NULL; - mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0; - - id = PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot,pubKey,PR_FALSE); - - session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot,&owner); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_WrapKey(session,&mechanism, - id,symKey->objectID,wrappedKey->data,&len); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - if (newKey) { - PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey); - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return SECFailure; - } - wrappedKey->len = len; - return SECSuccess; -} - -/* - * this little function uses the Encrypt function to wrap a key, just in - * case we have problems with the wrap implementation for a token. - */ -static SECStatus -pk11_HandWrap(PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, SECItem *param, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, - SECItem *inKey, SECItem *outKey) -{ - PK11SlotInfo *slot; - CK_ULONG len; - SECItem *data; - CK_MECHANISM mech; - PRBool owner = PR_TRUE; - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; - CK_RV crv; - - slot = wrappingKey->slot; - /* use NULL IV's for wrapping */ - mech.mechanism = type; - if (param) { - mech.pParameter = param->data; - mech.ulParameterLen = param->len; - } else { - mech.pParameter = NULL; - mech.ulParameterLen = 0; - } - session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot,&owner); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_EncryptInit(session,&mech, - wrappingKey->objectID); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return SECFailure; - } - - /* keys are almost always aligned, but if we get this far, - * we've gone above and beyond anyway... */ - data = PK11_BlockData(inKey,PK11_GetBlockSize(type,param)); - if (data == NULL) { - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); - return SECFailure; - } - len = outKey->len; - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_Encrypt(session,data->data,data->len, - outKey->data, &len); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - SECITEM_FreeItem(data,PR_TRUE); - outKey->len = len; - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return SECFailure; - } - return SECSuccess; -} - -/* - * This function does a symetric based wrap. - */ -SECStatus -PK11_WrapSymKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECItem *param, - PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, PK11SymKey *symKey, SECItem *wrappedKey) -{ - PK11SlotInfo *slot; - CK_ULONG len = wrappedKey->len; - PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL; - SECItem *param_save = NULL; - CK_MECHANISM mechanism; - PRBool owner = PR_TRUE; - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; - CK_RV crv; - SECStatus rv; - - /* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */ - /* Force symKey and wrappingKey into the same slot */ - if ((wrappingKey->slot == NULL) || (symKey->slot != wrappingKey->slot)) { - /* first try copying the wrapping Key to the symKey slot */ - if (symKey->slot && PK11_DoesMechanism(symKey->slot,type)) { - newKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(symKey->slot,type,CKA_WRAP,wrappingKey); - } - /* Nope, try it the other way */ - if (newKey == NULL) { - if (wrappingKey->slot) { - newKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(wrappingKey->slot, - symKey->type, CKA_ENCRYPT, symKey); - } - /* just not playing... one last thing, can we get symKey's data? - * If it's possible, we it should already be in the - * symKey->data.data pointer because pk11_CopyToSlot would have - * tried to put it there. */ - if (newKey == NULL) { - /* Can't get symKey's data: Game Over */ - if (symKey->data.data == NULL) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE ); - return SECFailure; - } - if (param == NULL) { - param_save = param = PK11_ParamFromIV(type,NULL); - } - rv = pk11_HandWrap(wrappingKey, param, type, - &symKey->data,wrappedKey); - if (param_save) SECITEM_FreeItem(param_save,PR_TRUE); - return rv; - } - /* we successfully moved the sym Key */ - symKey = newKey; - } else { - /* we successfully moved the wrapping Key */ - wrappingKey = newKey; - } - } - - /* at this point both keys are in the same token */ - slot = wrappingKey->slot; - mechanism.mechanism = type; - /* use NULL IV's for wrapping */ - if (param == NULL) { - param_save = param = PK11_ParamFromIV(type,NULL); - } - if (param) { - mechanism.pParameter = param->data; - mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len; - } else { - mechanism.pParameter = NULL; - mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0; - } - - len = wrappedKey->len; - - session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot,&owner); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_WrapKey(session, &mechanism, - wrappingKey->objectID, symKey->objectID, - wrappedKey->data, &len); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - rv = SECSuccess; - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - /* can't wrap it? try hand wrapping it... */ - do { - if (symKey->data.data == NULL) { - rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey); - if (rv != SECSuccess) break; - } - rv = pk11_HandWrap(wrappingKey, param, type, &symKey->data, - wrappedKey); - } while (PR_FALSE); - } else { - wrappedKey->len = len; - } - if (newKey) PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey); - if (param_save) SECITEM_FreeItem(param_save,PR_TRUE); - return rv; -} - -/* - * This Generates a new key based on a symetricKey - */ -PK11SymKey * -PK11_Derive( PK11SymKey *baseKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, SECItem *param, - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, - int keySize) -{ - return pk11_DeriveWithTemplate(baseKey, derive, param, target, operation, - keySize, NULL, 0); -} - -#define MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS 16 /* maximum attributes in template */ - -/* This mask includes all CK_FLAGs with an equivalent CKA_ attribute. */ -#define CKF_KEY_OPERATION_FLAGS 0x000e7b00UL - -static unsigned int -pk11_FlagsToAttributes(CK_FLAGS flags, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs, CK_BBOOL *ckTrue) -{ - - const static CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE attrTypes[12] = { - CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT, 0 /* DIGEST */, CKA_SIGN, - CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, CKA_VERIFY, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, 0 /* GEN */, - 0 /* GEN PAIR */, CKA_WRAP, CKA_UNWRAP, CKA_DERIVE - }; - - const CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE *pType = attrTypes; - CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr = attrs; - CK_FLAGS test = CKF_ENCRYPT; - - - PR_ASSERT(!(flags & ~CKF_KEY_OPERATION_FLAGS)); - flags &= CKF_KEY_OPERATION_FLAGS; - - for (; flags && test <= CKF_DERIVE; test <<= 1, ++pType) { - if (test & flags) { - flags ^= test; - PK11_SETATTRS(attr, *pType, ckTrue, sizeof *ckTrue); - ++attr; - } - } - return (attr - attrs); -} - -PK11SymKey * -PK11_DeriveWithFlags( PK11SymKey *baseKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, - SECItem *param, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, - int keySize, CK_FLAGS flags) -{ - CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE; - CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS]; - unsigned int templateCount; - - templateCount = pk11_FlagsToAttributes(flags, keyTemplate, &ckTrue); - return pk11_DeriveWithTemplate(baseKey, derive, param, target, operation, - keySize, keyTemplate, templateCount); -} - -static PRBool -pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(CK_ATTRIBUTE * attr, - unsigned int numAttrs, - CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE target) -{ - for (; numAttrs > 0; ++attr, --numAttrs) { - if (attr->type == target) - return PR_TRUE; - } - return PR_FALSE; -} - -static PK11SymKey * -pk11_DeriveWithTemplate( PK11SymKey *baseKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, - SECItem *param, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, - int keySize, CK_ATTRIBUTE *userAttr, unsigned int numAttrs) -{ - PK11SlotInfo * slot = baseKey->slot; - PK11SymKey * symKey; - PK11SymKey * newBaseKey = NULL; - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY; - CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; - CK_ULONG valueLen = 0; - CK_MECHANISM mechanism; - CK_RV crv; - CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS]; - CK_ATTRIBUTE * attrs = keyTemplate; - unsigned int templateCount; - - if (numAttrs > MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); - return NULL; - } - /* first copy caller attributes in. */ - for (templateCount = 0; templateCount < numAttrs; ++templateCount) { - *attrs++ = *userAttr++; - } - - /* We only add the following attributes to the template if the caller - ** didn't already supply them. - */ - if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_CLASS)) { - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof keyClass); - attrs++; - } - if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE)) { - keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize); - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof keyType ); - attrs++; - } - if (keySize > 0 && - !pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN)) { - valueLen = (CK_ULONG)keySize; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &valueLen, sizeof valueLen); - attrs++; - } - if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, operation)) { - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, sizeof cktrue); attrs++; - } - - templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate; - PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS); - - /* move the key to a slot that can do the function */ - if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot,derive)) { - /* get a new base key & slot */ - PK11SlotInfo *newSlot = PK11_GetBestSlot(derive, baseKey->cx); - - if (newSlot == NULL) return NULL; - - newBaseKey = pk11_CopyToSlot (newSlot, derive, CKA_DERIVE, - baseKey); - PK11_FreeSlot(newSlot); - if (newBaseKey == NULL) return NULL; - baseKey = newBaseKey; - slot = baseKey->slot; - } - - - /* get our key Structure */ - symKey = PK11_CreateSymKey(slot,target,baseKey->cx); - if (symKey == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - symKey->size = keySize; - - mechanism.mechanism = derive; - if (param) { - mechanism.pParameter = param->data; - mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len; - } else { - mechanism.pParameter = NULL; - mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0; - } - symKey->origin=PK11_OriginDerive; - - pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session, &mechanism, - baseKey->objectID, keyTemplate, templateCount, &symKey->objectID); - pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey); - - if (newBaseKey) PK11_FreeSymKey(newBaseKey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); - return NULL; - } - return symKey; -} - -/* build a public KEA key from the public value */ -SECKEYPublicKey * -PK11_MakeKEAPubKey(unsigned char *keyData,int length) -{ - SECKEYPublicKey *pubk; - SECItem pkData; - SECStatus rv; - PRArenaPool *arena; - - pkData.data = keyData; - pkData.len = length; - - arena = PORT_NewArena (DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); - if (arena == NULL) - return NULL; - - pubk = (SECKEYPublicKey *) PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(SECKEYPublicKey)); - if (pubk == NULL) { - PORT_FreeArena (arena, PR_FALSE); - return NULL; - } - - pubk->arena = arena; - pubk->pkcs11Slot = 0; - pubk->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_KEY; - pubk->keyType = fortezzaKey; - rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pubk->u.fortezza.KEAKey, &pkData); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PORT_FreeArena (arena, PR_FALSE); - return NULL; - } - return pubk; -} - - -/* - * This Generates a wrapping key based on a privateKey, publicKey, and two - * random numbers. For Mail usage RandomB should be NULL. In the Sender's - * case RandomA is generate, outherwize it is passed. - */ -static unsigned char *rb_email = NULL; - -PK11SymKey * -PK11_PubDerive(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, - PRBool isSender, SECItem *randomA, SECItem *randomB, - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, - CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize,void *wincx) -{ - PK11SlotInfo *slot = privKey->pkcs11Slot; - CK_MECHANISM mechanism; - PK11SymKey *symKey; - CK_RV crv; - - - if (rb_email == NULL) { - rb_email = PORT_ZAlloc(128); - if (rb_email == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - rb_email[127] = 1; - } - - /* get our key Structure */ - symKey = PK11_CreateSymKey(slot,target,wincx); - if (symKey == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - symKey->origin = PK11_OriginDerive; - - switch (privKey->keyType) { - case rsaKey: - case nullKey: - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); - break; - /* case keaKey: */ - case dsaKey: - case fortezzaKey: - { - CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS param; - param.isSender = (CK_BBOOL) isSender; - param.ulRandomLen = randomA->len; - param.pRandomA = randomA->data; - param.pRandomB = rb_email; - if (randomB) - param.pRandomB = randomB->data; - if (pubKey->keyType == fortezzaKey) { - param.ulPublicDataLen = pubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.len; - param.pPublicData = pubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.data; - } else { - /* assert type == keaKey */ - /* XXX change to match key key types */ - param.ulPublicDataLen = pubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.len; - param.pPublicData = pubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.data; - } - - mechanism.mechanism = derive; - mechanism.pParameter = ¶m; - mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(param); - - /* get a new symKey structure */ - pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey); - crv=PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session, &mechanism, - privKey->pkcs11ID, NULL, 0, &symKey->objectID); - pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey); - if (crv == CKR_OK) return symKey; - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - } - break; - case dhKey: - { - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY; - CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; - CK_ULONG key_size = 0; - CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[4]; - int templateCount; - CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate; - - if (pubKey->keyType != dhKey) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); - break; - } - - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass)); - attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)); - attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &key_size, sizeof(key_size)); - attrs++; - templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate; - PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)); - - keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target,keySize); - key_size = keySize; - symKey->size = keySize; - if (key_size == 0) templateCount--; - - mechanism.mechanism = derive; - - /* we can undefine these when we define diffie-helman keys */ - mechanism.pParameter = pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data; - mechanism.ulParameterLen = pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len; - - pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session, &mechanism, - privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate, templateCount, &symKey->objectID); - pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey); - if (crv == CKR_OK) return symKey; - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - } - break; - } - - PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); - return NULL; -} - -/* - * this little function uses the Decrypt function to unwrap a key, just in - * case we are having problem with unwrap. NOTE: The key size may - * not be preserved properly for some algorithms! - */ -static PK11SymKey * -pk11_HandUnwrap(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE wrappingKey, - CK_MECHANISM *mech, SECItem *inKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, - CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyTemplate, unsigned int templateCount, - int key_size, void * wincx) -{ - CK_ULONG len; - SECItem outKey; - PK11SymKey *symKey; - CK_RV crv; - PRBool owner = PR_TRUE; - PRBool bool = PR_TRUE; - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; - - /* keys are almost always aligned, but if we get this far, - * we've gone above and beyond anyway... */ - outKey.data = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(inKey->len); - if (outKey.data == NULL) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY ); - return NULL; - } - len = inKey->len; - - /* use NULL IV's for wrapping */ - session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot,&owner); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DecryptInit(session,mech,wrappingKey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - PORT_Free(outKey.data); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return NULL; - } - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_Decrypt(session,inKey->data,inKey->len, - outKey.data, &len); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(outKey.data); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return NULL; - } - - outKey.len = (key_size == 0) ? len : key_size; - - if (PK11_DoesMechanism(slot,target)) { - symKey = pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(slot, target, PK11_OriginUnwrap, - keyTemplate, templateCount, - &outKey, wincx); - } else { - slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(target,wincx); - if (slot == NULL) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE ); - PORT_Free(outKey.data); - return NULL; - } - symKey = pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(slot, target, PK11_OriginUnwrap, - keyTemplate, templateCount, - &outKey, wincx); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - } - PORT_Free(outKey.data); - return symKey; -} - -/* - * The wrap/unwrap function is pretty much the same for private and - * public keys. It's just getting the Object ID and slot right. This is - * the combined unwrap function. - */ -static PK11SymKey * -pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE wrappingKey, - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType, SECItem *param, SECItem *wrappedKey, - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize, - void *wincx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *userAttr, unsigned int numAttrs) -{ - PK11SymKey * symKey; - SECItem * param_free = NULL; - CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE; - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY; - CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; - CK_ULONG valueLen = 0; - CK_MECHANISM mechanism; - CK_RV crv; - CK_MECHANISM_INFO mechanism_info; - CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS]; - CK_ATTRIBUTE * attrs = keyTemplate; - unsigned int templateCount; - - if (numAttrs > MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); - return NULL; - } - /* first copy caller attributes in. */ - for (templateCount = 0; templateCount < numAttrs; ++templateCount) { - *attrs++ = *userAttr++; - } - - /* We only add the following attributes to the template if the caller - ** didn't already supply them. - */ - if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_CLASS)) { - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof keyClass); - attrs++; - } - if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE)) { - keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize); - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof keyType ); - attrs++; - } - if (keySize > 0 && - !pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN)) { - valueLen = (CK_ULONG)keySize; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &valueLen, sizeof valueLen); - attrs++; - } - if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, operation)) { - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1); attrs++; - } - - templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate; - PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)); - - - /* find out if we can do wrap directly. Because the RSA case if *very* - * common, cache the results for it. */ - if ((wrapType == CKM_RSA_PKCS) && (slot->hasRSAInfo)) { - mechanism_info.flags = slot->RSAInfoFlags; - } else { - if (!slot->isThreadSafe) PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot->slotID,wrapType, - &mechanism_info); - if (!slot->isThreadSafe) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - mechanism_info.flags = 0; - } - if (wrapType == CKM_RSA_PKCS) { - slot->RSAInfoFlags = mechanism_info.flags; - slot->hasRSAInfo = PR_TRUE; - } - } - - /* initialize the mechanism structure */ - mechanism.mechanism = wrapType; - /* use NULL IV's for wrapping */ - if (param == NULL) param = param_free = PK11_ParamFromIV(wrapType,NULL); - if (param) { - mechanism.pParameter = param->data; - mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len; - } else { - mechanism.pParameter = NULL; - mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0; - } - - if ((mechanism_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT) - && !PK11_DoesMechanism(slot,target)) { - symKey = pk11_HandUnwrap(slot, wrappingKey, &mechanism, wrappedKey, - target, keyTemplate, templateCount, keySize, - wincx); - if (symKey) { - if (param_free) SECITEM_FreeItem(param_free,PR_TRUE); - return symKey; - } - /* fall through, maybe they incorrectly set CKF_DECRYPT */ - } - - /* get our key Structure */ - symKey = PK11_CreateSymKey(slot,target,wincx); - if (symKey == NULL) { - if (param_free) SECITEM_FreeItem(param_free,PR_TRUE); - return NULL; - } - - symKey->size = keySize; - symKey->origin = PK11_OriginUnwrap; - - pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_UnwrapKey(symKey->session,&mechanism,wrappingKey, - wrappedKey->data, wrappedKey->len, keyTemplate, templateCount, - &symKey->objectID); - pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey); - if (param_free) SECITEM_FreeItem(param_free,PR_TRUE); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - /* try hand Unwrapping */ - PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); - symKey = pk11_HandUnwrap(slot, wrappingKey, &mechanism, wrappedKey, - target, keyTemplate, templateCount, keySize, - wincx); - } - - return symKey; -} - -/* use a symetric key to unwrap another symetric key */ -PK11SymKey * -PK11_UnwrapSymKey( PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType, - SECItem *param, SECItem *wrappedKey, - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, - int keySize) -{ - return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(wrappingKey->slot, wrappingKey->objectID, - wrapType, param, wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize, - wrappingKey->cx, NULL, 0); -} - -/* use a symetric key to unwrap another symetric key */ -PK11SymKey * -PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType, - SECItem *param, SECItem *wrappedKey, - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, - int keySize, CK_FLAGS flags) -{ - CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE; - CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS]; - unsigned int templateCount; - - templateCount = pk11_FlagsToAttributes(flags, keyTemplate, &ckTrue); - return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(wrappingKey->slot, wrappingKey->objectID, - wrapType, param, wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize, - wrappingKey->cx, keyTemplate, templateCount); -} - - -/* unwrap a symetric key with a private key. */ -PK11SymKey * -PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *wrappingKey, SECItem *wrappedKey, - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize) -{ - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType = pk11_mapWrapKeyType(wrappingKey->keyType); - - PK11_HandlePasswordCheck(wrappingKey->pkcs11Slot,wrappingKey->wincx); - - return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(wrappingKey->pkcs11Slot, wrappingKey->pkcs11ID, - wrapType, NULL, wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize, - wrappingKey->wincx, NULL, 0); -} - -/* - * Recover the Signed data. We need this because our old verify can't - * figure out which hash algorithm to use until we decryptted this. - */ -SECStatus -PK11_VerifyRecover(SECKEYPublicKey *key, - SECItem *sig, SECItem *dsig, void *wincx) -{ - PK11SlotInfo *slot = key->pkcs11Slot; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id = key->pkcs11ID; - CK_MECHANISM mech = {0, NULL, 0 }; - PRBool owner = PR_TRUE; - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; - CK_ULONG len; - CK_RV crv; - - mech.mechanism = pk11_mapSignKeyType(key->keyType); - - if (slot == NULL) { - slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(mech.mechanism,wincx); - if (slot == NULL) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE ); - return SECFailure; - } - id = PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot,key,PR_FALSE); - } - - session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot,&owner); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_VerifyRecoverInit(session,&mech,id); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return SECFailure; - } - len = dsig->len; - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_VerifyRecover(session,sig->data, - sig->len, dsig->data, &len); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - dsig->len = len; - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return SECFailure; - } - return SECSuccess; -} - -/* - * verify a signature from its hash. - */ -SECStatus -PK11_Verify(SECKEYPublicKey *key, SECItem *sig, SECItem *hash, void *wincx) -{ - PK11SlotInfo *slot = key->pkcs11Slot; - PK11SlotInfo *tmpslot = key->pkcs11Slot; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id = key->pkcs11ID; - CK_MECHANISM mech = {0, NULL, 0 }; - PRBool owner = PR_TRUE; - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; - CK_RV crv; - - mech.mechanism = pk11_mapSignKeyType(key->keyType); - - if (slot == NULL) { - if (mech.mechanism == CKM_DSA) { - slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot(); /* use internal slot for - DSA verify */ - } else { - slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(mech.mechanism,wincx); - }; - - if (slot == NULL) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE ); - return SECFailure; - } - id = PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot,key,PR_FALSE); - - } - - session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot,&owner); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_VerifyInit(session,&mech,id); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return SECFailure; - } - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_Verify(session,hash->data, - hash->len, sig->data, sig->len); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return SECFailure; - } - return SECSuccess; -} - -/* - * sign a hash. The algorithm is determined by the key. - */ -SECStatus -PK11_Sign(SECKEYPrivateKey *key, SECItem *sig, SECItem *hash) -{ - PK11SlotInfo *slot = key->pkcs11Slot; - CK_MECHANISM mech = {0, NULL, 0 }; - PRBool owner = PR_TRUE; - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; - CK_ULONG len; - CK_RV crv; - - mech.mechanism = pk11_mapSignKeyType(key->keyType); - - PK11_HandlePasswordCheck(slot, key->wincx); - - session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot,&owner); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_SignInit(session,&mech,key->pkcs11ID); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return SECFailure; - } - len = sig->len; - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_Sign(session,hash->data, - hash->len, sig->data, &len); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - sig->len = len; - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return SECFailure; - } - return SECSuccess; -} - -/* - * Now SSL 2.0 uses raw RSA stuff. These next to functions *must* use - * RSA keys, or they'll fail. We do the checks up front. If anyone comes - * up with a meaning for rawdecrypt for any other public key operation, - * then we need to move this check into some of PK11_PubDecrypt callers, - * (namely SSL 2.0). - */ -SECStatus -PK11_PubDecryptRaw(SECKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *data, - unsigned *outLen, unsigned int maxLen, unsigned char *enc, - unsigned encLen) -{ - PK11SlotInfo *slot = key->pkcs11Slot; - CK_MECHANISM mech = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0 }; - CK_ULONG out = maxLen; - PRBool owner = PR_TRUE; - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; - CK_RV crv; - - if (key->keyType != rsaKey) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY ); - return SECFailure; - } - - /* Why do we do a PK11_handle check here? for simple - * decryption? .. because the user may have asked for 'ask always' - * and this is a private key operation. In practice, thought, it's mute - * since only servers wind up using this function */ - PK11_HandlePasswordCheck(slot, key->wincx); - session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot,&owner); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DecryptInit(session,&mech,key->pkcs11ID); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return SECFailure; - } - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_Decrypt(session,enc, encLen, - data, &out); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - *outLen = out; - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return SECFailure; - } - return SECSuccess; -} - -/* The encrypt version of the above function */ -SECStatus -PK11_PubEncryptRaw(SECKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *enc, - unsigned char *data, unsigned dataLen, void *wincx) -{ - PK11SlotInfo *slot; - CK_MECHANISM mech = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0 }; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id; - CK_ULONG out = dataLen; - PRBool owner = PR_TRUE; - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; - CK_RV crv; - - if (key->keyType != rsaKey) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY ); - return SECFailure; - } - - slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(mech.mechanism, wincx); - if (slot == NULL) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE ); - return SECFailure; - } - - id = PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot,key,PR_FALSE); - - session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot,&owner); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_EncryptInit(session,&mech,id); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return SECFailure; - } - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_Encrypt(session,data,dataLen,enc,&out); - if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); - pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return SECFailure; - } - return SECSuccess; -} - - -/********************************************************************** - * - * Now Deal with Crypto Contexts - * - **********************************************************************/ - -/* - * the monitors... - */ -void -PK11_EnterContextMonitor(PK11Context *cx) { - /* if we own the session and our slot is ThreadSafe, only monitor - * the Context */ - if ((cx->ownSession) && (cx->slot->isThreadSafe)) { - /* Should this use monitors instead? */ - PR_Lock(cx->sessionLock); - } else { - PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(cx->slot); - } -} - -void -PK11_ExitContextMonitor(PK11Context *cx) { - /* if we own the session and our slot is ThreadSafe, only monitor - * the Context */ - if ((cx->ownSession) && (cx->slot->isThreadSafe)) { - /* Should this use monitors instead? */ - PR_Unlock(cx->sessionLock); - } else { - PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(cx->slot); - } -} - -/* - * Free up a Cipher Context - */ -void -PK11_DestroyContext(PK11Context *context, PRBool freeit) -{ - pk11_CloseSession(context->slot,context->session,context->ownSession); - /* initialize the critical fields of the context */ - if (context->savedData != NULL ) PORT_Free(context->savedData); - if (context->key) PK11_FreeSymKey(context->key); - if (context->param) SECITEM_FreeItem(context->param, PR_TRUE); - if (context->sessionLock) PR_DestroyLock(context->sessionLock); - PK11_FreeSlot(context->slot); - if (freeit) PORT_Free(context); -} - -/* - * save the current context. Allocate Space if necessary. - */ -static void * -pk11_saveContextHelper(PK11Context *context, void *space, - unsigned long *savedLength, PRBool staticBuffer, PRBool recurse) -{ - CK_ULONG length; - CK_RV crv; - - if (staticBuffer) PORT_Assert(space != NULL); - - if (space == NULL) { - crv =PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_GetOperationState(context->session, - NULL,&length); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return NULL; - } - space = PORT_Alloc(length); - if (space == NULL) return NULL; - *savedLength = length; - } - crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_GetOperationState(context->session, - (CK_BYTE_PTR)space,savedLength); - if (!staticBuffer && !recurse && (crv == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) { - if (!staticBuffer) PORT_Free(space); - return pk11_saveContextHelper(context, NULL, - savedLength, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); - } - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - if (!staticBuffer) PORT_Free(space); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return NULL; - } - return space; -} - -void * -pk11_saveContext(PK11Context *context, void *space, unsigned long *savedLength) -{ - return pk11_saveContextHelper(context, space, - savedLength, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE); -} - -/* - * restore the current context - */ -SECStatus -pk11_restoreContext(PK11Context *context,void *space, unsigned long savedLength) -{ - CK_RV crv; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID = (context->key) ? context->key->objectID: - CK_INVALID_KEY; - - PORT_Assert(space != NULL); - if (space == NULL) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SetOperationState(context->session, - (CK_BYTE_PTR)space, savedLength, objectID, 0); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv)); - return SECFailure; - } - return SECSuccess; -} - -SECStatus pk11_Finalize(PK11Context *context); - -/* - * Context initialization. Used by all flavors of CreateContext - */ -static SECStatus -pk11_context_init(PK11Context *context, CK_MECHANISM *mech_info) -{ - CK_RV crv; - PK11SymKey *symKey = context->key; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - - switch (context->operation) { - case CKA_ENCRYPT: - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptInit(context->session, - mech_info, symKey->objectID); - break; - case CKA_DECRYPT: - if (context->fortezzaHack) { - CK_ULONG count = 0;; - /* generate the IV for fortezza */ - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptInit(context->session, - mech_info, symKey->objectID); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptFinal(context->session, - NULL, &count); - } - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptInit(context->session, - mech_info, symKey->objectID); - break; - case CKA_SIGN: - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignInit(context->session, - mech_info, symKey->objectID); - break; - case CKA_VERIFY: - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignInit(context->session, - mech_info, symKey->objectID); - break; - case CKA_DIGEST: - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestInit(context->session, - mech_info); - break; - default: - crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; - break; - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return SECFailure; - } - - /* - * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex - */ - if (!context->ownSession) { - context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context,context->savedData, - &context->savedLength); - if (context->savedData == NULL) rv = SECFailure; - /* clear out out session for others to use */ - pk11_Finalize(context); - } - return rv; -} - - -/* - * Common Helper Function do come up with a new context. - */ -static PK11Context *pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, - PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, PK11SymKey *symKey, - SECItem *param) -{ - CK_MECHANISM mech_info; - PK11Context *context; - SECStatus rv; - - context = (PK11Context *) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(PK11Context)); - if (context == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - /* now deal with the fortezza hack... the fortezza hack is an attempt - * to get around the issue of the card not allowing you to do a FORTEZZA - * LoadIV/Encrypt, which was added because such a combination could be - * use to circumvent the key escrow system. Unfortunately SSL needs to - * do this kind of operation, so in SSL we do a loadIV (to verify it), - * Then GenerateIV, and through away the first 8 bytes on either side - * of the connection.*/ - context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE; - if (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64) { - if (symKey->origin == PK11_OriginFortezzaHack) { - context->fortezzaHack = PR_TRUE; - } - } - - /* initialize the critical fields of the context */ - context->operation = operation; - context->key = symKey ? PK11_ReferenceSymKey(symKey) : NULL; - context->slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot); - context->session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot,&context->ownSession); - context->cx = symKey ? symKey->cx : NULL; - /* get our session */ - context->savedData = NULL; - - /* save the parameters so that some digesting stuff can do multiple - * begins on a single context */ - context->type = type; - context->param = SECITEM_DupItem(param); - context->init = PR_FALSE; - context->sessionLock = PR_NewLock(); - if ((context->param == NULL) || (context->sessionLock == NULL)) { - PK11_DestroyContext(context,PR_TRUE); - return NULL; - } - - mech_info.mechanism = type; - mech_info.pParameter = param->data; - mech_info.ulParameterLen = param->len; - PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); - rv = pk11_context_init(context,&mech_info); - PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); - - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PK11_DestroyContext(context,PR_TRUE); - return NULL; - } - context->init = PR_TRUE; - return context; -} - - -/* - * put together the various PK11_Create_Context calls used by different - * parts of libsec. - */ -PK11Context * -PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, - PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key, - SECItem *param, void *wincx) -{ - PK11SymKey *symKey; - PK11Context *context; - - /* first get a slot */ - if (slot == NULL) { - slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type,wincx); - if (slot == NULL) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE ); - return NULL; - } - } else { - PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot); - } - - /* now import the key */ - symKey = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, type, origin, operation, key, wincx); - if (symKey == NULL) return NULL; - - context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(type, operation, symKey, param); - - PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - - return context; -} - - -/* - * Create a context from a key. We really should make sure we aren't using - * the same key in multiple session! - */ -PK11Context * -PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, - PK11SymKey *symKey, SECItem *param) -{ - PK11SymKey *newKey; - PK11Context *context; - - /* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */ - newKey = pk11_ForceSlot(symKey,type,operation); - if (newKey == NULL) { - PK11_ReferenceSymKey(symKey); - } else { - symKey = newKey; - } - - - /* Context Adopts the symKey.... */ - context = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, symKey->slot, operation, symKey, - param); - PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); - return context; -} - -/* - * Digest contexts don't need keys, but the do need to find a slot. - * Macing should use PK11_CreateContextBySymKey. - */ -PK11Context * -PK11_CreateDigestContext(SECOidTag hashAlg) -{ - /* digesting has to work without authentication to the slot */ - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type; - PK11SlotInfo *slot; - PK11Context *context; - SECItem param; - - type = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(hashAlg); - slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, NULL); - if (slot == NULL) { - PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE ); - return NULL; - } - - /* maybe should really be PK11_GenerateNewParam?? */ - param.data = NULL; - param.len = 0; - - context = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, slot, CKA_DIGEST, NULL, ¶m); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - return context; -} - -/* - * create a new context which is the clone of the state of old context. - */ -PK11Context * PK11_CloneContext(PK11Context *old) -{ - PK11Context *newcx; - PRBool needFree = PR_FALSE; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - void *data; - unsigned long len; - - newcx = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(old->type, old->slot, old->operation, - old->key, old->param); - if (newcx == NULL) return NULL; - - /* now clone the save state. First we need to find the save state - * of the old session. If the old context owns it's session, - * the state needs to be saved, otherwise the state is in saveData. */ - if (old->ownSession) { - PK11_EnterContextMonitor(old); - data=pk11_saveContext(old,NULL,&len); - PK11_ExitContextMonitor(old); - needFree = PR_TRUE; - } else { - data = old->savedData; - len = old->savedLength; - } - - if (data == NULL) { - PK11_DestroyContext(newcx,PR_TRUE); - return NULL; - } - - /* now copy that state into our new context. Again we have different - * work if the new context owns it's own session. If it does, we - * restore the state gathered above. If it doesn't, we copy the - * saveData pointer... */ - if (newcx->ownSession) { - PK11_EnterContextMonitor(newcx); - rv = pk11_restoreContext(newcx,data,len); - PK11_ExitContextMonitor(newcx); - } else { - PORT_Assert(newcx->savedData != NULL); - if ((newcx->savedData == NULL) || (newcx->savedLength < len)) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; - } else { - PORT_Memcpy(newcx->savedData,data,len); - newcx->savedLength = len; - } - } - - if (needFree) PORT_Free(data); - - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PK11_DestroyContext(newcx,PR_TRUE); - return NULL; - } - return newcx; -} - -/* - * save the current context state into a variable. Required to make FORTEZZA - * work. - */ -SECStatus -PK11_SaveContext(PK11Context *cx,unsigned char *save,int *len, int saveLength) -{ - unsigned char * data = NULL; - CK_ULONG length = saveLength; - - if (cx->ownSession) { - PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx); - data = (unsigned char*)pk11_saveContextHelper(cx,save,&length, - PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE); - PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx); - if (data) *len = length; - } else if (saveLength >= cx->savedLength) { - data = (unsigned char*)cx->savedData; - if (cx->savedData) { - PORT_Memcpy(save,cx->savedData,cx->savedLength); - } - *len = cx->savedLength; - } - return (data != NULL) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure; -} - -/* - * restore the context state into a new running context. Also required for - * FORTEZZA . - */ -SECStatus -PK11_RestoreContext(PK11Context *cx,unsigned char *save,int len) -{ - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - if (cx->ownSession) { - PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx); - pk11_Finalize(cx); - rv = pk11_restoreContext(cx,save,len); - PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx); - } else { - PORT_Assert(cx->savedData != NULL); - if ((cx->savedData == NULL) || (cx->savedLength < (unsigned) len)) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; - } else { - PORT_Memcpy(cx->savedData,save,len); - cx->savedLength = len; - } - } - return rv; -} - -/* - * This is to get FIPS compliance until we can convert - * libjar to use PK11_ hashing functions. It returns PR_FALSE - * if we can't get a PK11 Context. - */ -PRBool -PK11_HashOK(SECOidTag algID) { - PK11Context *cx; - - cx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(algID); - if (cx == NULL) return PR_FALSE; - PK11_DestroyContext(cx, PR_TRUE); - return PR_TRUE; -} - - - -/* - * start a new digesting or Mac'ing operation on this context - */ -SECStatus PK11_DigestBegin(PK11Context *cx) -{ - CK_MECHANISM mech_info; - SECStatus rv; - - if (cx->init == PR_TRUE) { - return SECSuccess; - } - - /* - * make sure the old context is clear first - */ - PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx); - pk11_Finalize(cx); - - mech_info.mechanism = cx->type; - mech_info.pParameter = cx->param->data; - mech_info.ulParameterLen = cx->param->len; - rv = pk11_context_init(cx,&mech_info); - PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx); - - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return SECFailure; - } - cx->init = PR_TRUE; - return SECSuccess; -} - -SECStatus -PK11_HashBuf(SECOidTag hashAlg, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in, - int32 len) { - PK11Context *context; - unsigned int max_length; - unsigned int out_length; - SECStatus rv; - - context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hashAlg); - if (context == NULL) return SECFailure; - - rv = PK11_DigestBegin(context); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE); - return rv; - } - - rv = PK11_DigestOp(context, in, len); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE); - return rv; - } - - /* we need the output length ... maybe this should be table driven...*/ - switch (hashAlg) { - case SEC_OID_SHA1: max_length = SHA1_LENGTH; break; - case SEC_OID_MD2: max_length = MD2_LENGTH; break; - case SEC_OID_MD5: max_length = MD5_LENGTH; break; - default: max_length = 16; break; - } - - rv = PK11_DigestFinal(context,out,&out_length,max_length); - PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE); - return rv; -} - - -/* - * execute a bulk encryption operation - */ -SECStatus -PK11_CipherOp(PK11Context *context, unsigned char * out, int *outlen, - int maxout, unsigned char *in, int inlen) -{ - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - CK_ULONG length = maxout; - CK_ULONG offset =0; - PK11SymKey *symKey = context->key; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - unsigned char *saveOut = out; - unsigned char *allocOut = NULL; - - /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored - * state. - */ - PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); - if (!context->ownSession) { - rv = pk11_restoreContext(context,context->savedData, - context->savedLength); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); - return rv; - } - } - - /* - * The fortezza hack is to send 8 extra bytes on the first encrypted and - * loose them on the first decrypt. - */ - if (context->fortezzaHack) { - unsigned char random[8]; - if (context->operation == CKA_ENCRYPT) { - PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); - rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(random,sizeof(random)); - PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); - - /* since we are offseting the output, we can't encrypt back into - * the same buffer... allocate a temporary buffer just for this - * call. */ - allocOut = out = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(maxout); - if (out == NULL) { - PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); - return SECFailure; - } - crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptUpdate(context->session, - random,sizeof(random),out,&length); - - out += length; - maxout -= length; - offset = length; - } else if (context->operation == CKA_DECRYPT) { - length = sizeof(random); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptUpdate(context->session, - in,sizeof(random),random,&length); - inlen -= length; - in += length; - context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE; - } - } - - switch (context->operation) { - case CKA_ENCRYPT: - length = maxout; - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptUpdate(context->session, - in, inlen, out, &length); - length += offset; - break; - case CKA_DECRYPT: - length = maxout; - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptUpdate(context->session, - in, inlen, out, &length); - break; - default: - crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; - break; - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - *outlen = 0; - rv = SECFailure; - } else { - *outlen = length; - } - - if (context->fortezzaHack) { - if (context->operation == CKA_ENCRYPT) { - PORT_Assert(allocOut); - PORT_Memcpy(saveOut, allocOut, length); - PORT_Free(allocOut); - } - context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE; - } - - /* - * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex - */ - if (!context->ownSession) { - context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context,context->savedData, - &context->savedLength); - if (context->savedData == NULL) rv = SECFailure; - - /* clear out out session for others to use */ - pk11_Finalize(context); - } - PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); - return rv; -} - -/* - * execute a digest/signature operation - */ -SECStatus -PK11_DigestOp(PK11Context *context, const unsigned char * in, unsigned inLen) -{ - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - - /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored - * state. - */ - context->init = PR_FALSE; - PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); - if (!context->ownSession) { - rv = pk11_restoreContext(context,context->savedData, - context->savedLength); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); - return rv; - } - } - - switch (context->operation) { - /* also for MAC'ing */ - case CKA_SIGN: - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignUpdate(context->session, - (unsigned char *)in, - inLen); - break; - case CKA_VERIFY: - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyUpdate(context->session, - (unsigned char *)in, - inLen); - break; - case CKA_DIGEST: - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestUpdate(context->session, - (unsigned char *)in, - inLen); - break; - default: - crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; - break; - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - rv = SECFailure; - } - - /* - * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex - */ - if (!context->ownSession) { - context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context,context->savedData, - &context->savedLength); - if (context->savedData == NULL) rv = SECFailure; - - /* clear out out session for others to use */ - pk11_Finalize(context); - } - PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); - return rv; -} - -/* - * Digest a key if possible./ - */ -SECStatus -PK11_DigestKey(PK11Context *context, PK11SymKey *key) -{ - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL; - - /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored - * state. - */ - if (context->slot != key->slot) { - newKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(context->slot,CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC,CKA_SIGN,key); - } else { - newKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(key); - } - - context->init = PR_FALSE; - PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); - if (!context->ownSession) { - rv = pk11_restoreContext(context,context->savedData, - context->savedLength); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); - PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey); - return rv; - } - } - - - if (newKey == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - if (key->data.data) { - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestUpdate(context->session, - key->data.data,key->data.len); - } - } else { - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestKey(context->session, - newKey->objectID); - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - rv = SECFailure; - } - - /* - * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex - */ - if (!context->ownSession) { - context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context,context->savedData, - &context->savedLength); - if (context->savedData == NULL) rv = SECFailure; - - /* clear out out session for others to use */ - pk11_Finalize(context); - } - PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); - if (newKey) PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey); - return rv; -} - -/* - * externally callable version of the lowercase pk11_finalize(). - */ -SECStatus -PK11_Finalize(PK11Context *context) { - SECStatus rv; - - PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); - rv = pk11_Finalize(context); - PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); - return rv; -} - -/* - * clean up a cipher operation, so the session can be used by - * someone new. - */ -SECStatus -pk11_Finalize(PK11Context *context) -{ - CK_ULONG count = 0; - CK_RV crv; - - if (!context->ownSession) { - return SECSuccess; - } - - switch (context->operation) { - case CKA_ENCRYPT: - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptFinal(context->session, - NULL,&count); - break; - case CKA_DECRYPT: - crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptFinal(context->session, - NULL,&count); - break; - case CKA_SIGN: - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignFinal(context->session, - NULL,&count); - break; - case CKA_VERIFY: - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyFinal(context->session, - NULL,count); - break; - case CKA_DIGEST: - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestFinal(context->session, - NULL,&count); - break; - default: - crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; - break; - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return SECFailure; - } - return SECSuccess; -} - -/* - * Return the final digested or signed data... - * this routine can either take pre initialized data, or allocate data - * either out of an arena or out of the standard heap. - */ -SECStatus -PK11_DigestFinal(PK11Context *context,unsigned char *data, - unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int length) -{ - CK_ULONG len; - CK_RV crv; - SECStatus rv; - - - /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored - * state. - */ - PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); - if (!context->ownSession) { - rv = pk11_restoreContext(context,context->savedData, - context->savedLength); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); - return rv; - } - } - - len = length; - switch (context->operation) { - case CKA_SIGN: - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignFinal(context->session, - data,&len); - break; - case CKA_VERIFY: - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyFinal(context->session, - data,len); - break; - case CKA_DIGEST: - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestFinal(context->session, - data,&len); - break; - case CKA_ENCRYPT: - crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptFinal(context->session, - data, &len); - break; - case CKA_DECRYPT: - crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptFinal(context->session, - data, &len); - break; - default: - crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; - break; - } - PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); - - *outLen = (unsigned int) len; - context->init = PR_FALSE; /* allow Begin to start up again */ - - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return SECFailure; - } - return SECSuccess; -} - -/**************************************************************************** - * - * Now Do The PBE Functions Here... - * - ****************************************************************************/ - -SECAlgorithmID * -PK11_CreatePBEAlgorithmID(SECOidTag algorithm, int iteration, SECItem *salt) -{ - SECAlgorithmID *algid; - - algid = SEC_PKCS5CreateAlgorithmID(algorithm, salt, iteration); - return algid; -} - -PK11SymKey * -PK11_PBEKeyGen(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECAlgorithmID *algid, SECItem *pwitem, - PRBool faulty3DES, void *wincx) -{ - /* pbe stuff */ - CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type; - SECItem *mech; - PK11SymKey *symKey; - - mech = PK11_ParamFromAlgid(algid); - type = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(SECOID_FindOIDTag(&algid->algorithm)); - if(faulty3DES && (type == CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC)) { - type = CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_FAULTY_3DES_CBC; - } - if(mech == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)mech->data; - pbe_params->pPassword = (CK_CHAR_PTR)PORT_ZAlloc(pwitem->len); - if(pbe_params->pPassword != NULL) { - PORT_Memcpy(pbe_params->pPassword, pwitem->data, pwitem->len); - pbe_params->ulPasswordLen = pwitem->len; - } else { - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(mech, PR_TRUE); - return NULL; - } - - symKey = PK11_KeyGen(slot, type, mech, 0, wincx); - - PORT_ZFree(pbe_params->pPassword, pwitem->len); - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(mech, PR_TRUE); - return symKey; -} - - -SECStatus -PK11_ImportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo(PK11SlotInfo *slot, - SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *epki, SECItem *pwitem, - SECItem *nickname, SECItem *publicValue, PRBool isPerm, - PRBool isPrivate, KeyType keyType, unsigned int keyUsage, - void *wincx) -{ - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; - SECItem *pbe_param, crypto_param; - PK11SymKey *key = NULL; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - CK_MECHANISM cryptoMech, pbeMech; - CK_RV crv; - SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL; - PRBool faulty3DES = PR_FALSE; - int usageCount; - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; - CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE *usage; - CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE rsaUsage[] = { - CKA_UNWRAP, CKA_DECRYPT, CKA_SIGN, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER }; - CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE dsaUsage[] = { CKA_SIGN }; - CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE dhUsage[] = { CKA_DERIVE }; - - if((epki == NULL) || (pwitem == NULL)) - return SECFailure; - - crypto_param.data = NULL; - - mechanism = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(SECOID_FindOIDTag( - &epki->algorithm.algorithm)); - - switch (keyType) { - default: - case rsaKey: - key_type = CKK_RSA; - switch (keyUsage & (KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { - case KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT: - usage = rsaUsage; - usageCount = 2; - break; - case KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE: - usage = &rsaUsage[2]; - usageCount = 2; - break; - case KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE: - case 0: /* default to everything */ - usage = rsaUsage; - usageCount = 4; - break; - } - break; - case dhKey: - key_type = CKK_DH; - usage = dhUsage; - usageCount = sizeof(dhUsage)/sizeof(dhUsage[0]); - break; - case dsaKey: - key_type = CKK_DSA; - usage = dsaUsage; - usageCount = sizeof(dsaUsage)/sizeof(dsaUsage[0]); - break; - } - -try_faulty_3des: - pbe_param = PK11_ParamFromAlgid(&epki->algorithm); - - key = PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, &epki->algorithm, pwitem, faulty3DES, wincx); - if((key == NULL) || (pbe_param == NULL)) { - rv = SECFailure; - goto done; - } - - pbeMech.mechanism = mechanism; - pbeMech.pParameter = pbe_param->data; - pbeMech.ulParameterLen = pbe_param->len; - - crv = PK11_MapPBEMechanismToCryptoMechanism(&pbeMech, &cryptoMech, - pwitem, faulty3DES); - if(crv != CKR_OK) { - rv = SECFailure; - goto done; - } - - cryptoMech.mechanism = PK11_GetPadMechanism(cryptoMech.mechanism); - crypto_param.data = (unsigned char*)cryptoMech.pParameter; - crypto_param.len = cryptoMech.ulParameterLen; - - privKey = PK11_UnwrapPrivKey(slot, key, cryptoMech.mechanism, - &crypto_param, &epki->encryptedData, - nickname, publicValue, isPerm, isPrivate, - key_type, usage, usageCount, wincx); - if(privKey) { - SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); - privKey = NULL; - rv = SECSuccess; - goto done; - } - - /* if we are unable to import the key and the mechanism is - * CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC, then it is possible that - * the encrypted blob was created with a buggy key generation method - * which is described in the PKCS 12 implementation notes. So we - * need to try importing via that method. - */ - if((mechanism == CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC) && (!faulty3DES)) { - /* clean up after ourselves before redoing the key generation. */ - - PK11_FreeSymKey(key); - key = NULL; - - if(pbe_param) { - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(pbe_param, PR_TRUE); - pbe_param = NULL; - } - - if(crypto_param.data) { - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&crypto_param, PR_FALSE); - crypto_param.data = NULL; - cryptoMech.pParameter = NULL; - crypto_param.len = cryptoMech.ulParameterLen = 0; - } - - faulty3DES = PR_TRUE; - goto try_faulty_3des; - } - - /* key import really did fail */ - rv = SECFailure; - -done: - if(pbe_param != NULL) { - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(pbe_param, PR_TRUE); - pbe_param = NULL; - } - - if(crypto_param.data != NULL) { - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&crypto_param, PR_FALSE); - } - - if(key != NULL) { - PK11_FreeSymKey(key); - } - - return rv; -} - -/* - * import a private key info into the desired slot - */ -SECStatus -PK11_ImportPrivateKeyInfo(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki, - SECItem *nickname, SECItem *publicValue, PRBool isPerm, - PRBool isPrivate, unsigned int keyUsage, void *wincx) -{ - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; - CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; - CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RSA; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID; - CK_ATTRIBUTE theTemplate[20]; - int templateCount = 0; - SECStatus rv = SECFailure; - SECKEYLowPrivateKey *lpk = NULL; - const SEC_ASN1Template *keyTemplate, *paramTemplate; - void *paramDest = NULL; - PRArenaPool *arena; - CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs; - CK_ATTRIBUTE *signedattr = NULL; - int signedcount = 0; - CK_ATTRIBUTE *ap; - SECItem *ck_id = NULL; - - arena = PORT_NewArena(2048); - if(!arena) { - return SECFailure; - } - - /* need to change this to use RSA/DSA keys */ - lpk = (SECKEYLowPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, - sizeof(SECKEYLowPrivateKey)); - if(lpk == NULL) { - goto loser; - } - lpk->arena = arena; - - attrs = theTemplate; - switch(SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&pki->algorithm)) { - case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: - keyTemplate = SECKEY_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate; - paramTemplate = NULL; - paramDest = NULL; - lpk->keyType = rsaKey; - keyType = CKK_RSA; - break; - case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE: - if(!publicValue) { - goto loser; - } - keyTemplate = SECKEY_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate; - paramTemplate = SECKEY_PQGParamsTemplate; - paramDest = &(lpk->u.dsa.params); - lpk->keyType = dsaKey; - keyType = CKK_DSA; - break; - case SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY: - if(!publicValue) { - goto loser; - } - keyTemplate = SECKEY_DHPrivateKeyExportTemplate; - paramTemplate = NULL; - paramDest = NULL; - lpk->keyType = dhKey; - keyType = CKK_DH; - break; - - default: - keyTemplate = NULL; - paramTemplate = NULL; - paramDest = NULL; - break; - } - - if(!keyTemplate) { - goto loser; - } - - /* decode the private key and any algorithm parameters */ - rv = SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(arena, lpk, keyTemplate, &pki->privateKey); - if(rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; - } - if(paramDest && paramTemplate) { - rv = SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(arena, paramDest, paramTemplate, - &(pki->algorithm.parameters)); - if(rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; - } - } - - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass) ); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType) ); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, isPerm ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_SENSITIVE, isPrivate ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIVATE, isPrivate ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++; - - switch (lpk->keyType) { - case rsaKey: - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_UNWRAP, (keyUsage & KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT) ? - &cktrue : &ckfalse, sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_DECRYPT, (keyUsage & KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT) ? - &cktrue : &ckfalse, sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_SIGN, (keyUsage & KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) ? - &cktrue : &ckfalse, sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, - (keyUsage & KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) ? - &cktrue : &ckfalse, sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++; - ck_id = PK11_MakeIDFromPubKey(&lpk->u.rsa.modulus); - if (ck_id == NULL) { - goto loser; - } - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, ck_id->data,ck_id->len); attrs++; - if (nickname) { - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_LABEL, nickname->data, nickname->len); attrs++; - } - signedattr = attrs; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_MODULUS, lpk->u.rsa.modulus.data, - lpk->u.rsa.modulus.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, - lpk->u.rsa.publicExponent.data, - lpk->u.rsa.publicExponent.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, - lpk->u.rsa.privateExponent.data, - lpk->u.rsa.privateExponent.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME_1, - lpk->u.rsa.prime1.data, - lpk->u.rsa.prime1.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME_2, - lpk->u.rsa.prime2.data, - lpk->u.rsa.prime2.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EXPONENT_1, - lpk->u.rsa.exponent1.data, - lpk->u.rsa.exponent1.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EXPONENT_2, - lpk->u.rsa.exponent2.data, - lpk->u.rsa.exponent2.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_COEFFICIENT, - lpk->u.rsa.coefficient.data, - lpk->u.rsa.coefficient.len); attrs++; - break; - case dsaKey: - /* To make our intenal PKCS #11 module work correctly with - * our database, we need to pass in the public key value for - * this dsa key. We have a netscape only CKA_ value to do this. - * Only send it to internal slots */ - if (PK11_IsInternal(slot)) { - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB, - publicValue->data, publicValue->len); attrs++; - } - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++; - if(nickname) { - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_LABEL, nickname->data, nickname->len); - attrs++; - } - ck_id = PK11_MakeIDFromPubKey(publicValue); - if (ck_id == NULL) { - goto loser; - } - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, ck_id->data,ck_id->len); attrs++; - signedattr = attrs; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, lpk->u.dsa.params.prime.data, - lpk->u.dsa.params.prime.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs,CKA_SUBPRIME,lpk->u.dsa.params.subPrime.data, - lpk->u.dsa.params.subPrime.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, lpk->u.dsa.params.base.data, - lpk->u.dsa.params.base.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, lpk->u.dsa.privateValue.data, - lpk->u.dsa.privateValue.len); attrs++; - break; - case dhKey: - /* To make our intenal PKCS #11 module work correctly with - * our database, we need to pass in the public key value for - * this dh key. We have a netscape only CKA_ value to do this. - * Only send it to internal slots */ - if (PK11_IsInternal(slot)) { - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB, - publicValue->data, publicValue->len); attrs++; - } - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++; - if(nickname) { - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_LABEL, nickname->data, nickname->len); - attrs++; - } - ck_id = PK11_MakeIDFromPubKey(publicValue); - if (ck_id == NULL) { - goto loser; - } - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, ck_id->data,ck_id->len); attrs++; - signedattr = attrs; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, lpk->u.dh.prime.data, - lpk->u.dh.prime.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, lpk->u.dh.base.data, - lpk->u.dh.base.len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, lpk->u.dh.privateValue.data, - lpk->u.dh.privateValue.len); attrs++; - break; - /* what about fortezza??? */ - default: - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); - goto loser; - } - templateCount = attrs - theTemplate; - PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(theTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)); - signedcount = attrs - signedattr; - - for (ap=signedattr; signedcount; ap++, signedcount--) { - pk11_SignedToUnsigned(ap); - } - - rv = PK11_CreateNewObject(slot, CK_INVALID_SESSION, - theTemplate, templateCount, isPerm, &objectID); - - if (ck_id) { - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(ck_id, PR_TRUE); - } - -loser: - if (lpk!= NULL) { - SECKEY_LowDestroyPrivateKey(lpk); - } - - return rv; -} - -SECKEYPrivateKeyInfo * -PK11_ExportPrivateKeyInfo(CERTCertificate *cert, void *wincx) -{ - return NULL; -} - -static int -pk11_private_key_encrypt_buffer_length(SECKEYPrivateKey *key) - -{ - CK_ATTRIBUTE rsaTemplate = { CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 }; - CK_ATTRIBUTE dsaTemplate = { CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0 }; - CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate; - CK_RV crv; - int length; - - if(!key) { - return -1; - } - - switch (key->keyType) { - case rsaKey: - pTemplate = &rsaTemplate; - break; - case dsaKey: - case dhKey: - pTemplate = &dsaTemplate; - break; - case fortezzaKey: - default: - pTemplate = NULL; - } - - if(!pTemplate) { - return -1; - } - - crv = PK11_GetAttributes(NULL, key->pkcs11Slot, key->pkcs11ID, - pTemplate, 1); - if(crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return -1; - } - - length = pTemplate->ulValueLen; - length *= 10; - - if(pTemplate->pValue != NULL) { - PORT_Free(pTemplate->pValue); - } - - return length; -} - -SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo * -PK11_ExportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECOidTag algTag, - SECItem *pwitem, CERTCertificate *cert, int iteration, void *wincx) -{ - SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *epki = NULL; - SECKEYPrivateKey *pk; - PRArenaPool *arena = NULL; - SECAlgorithmID *algid; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; - SECItem *pbe_param = NULL, crypto_param; - PK11SymKey *key = NULL; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - CK_MECHANISM pbeMech, cryptoMech; - CK_RV crv; - SECItem encryptedKey = {siBuffer,NULL,0}; - int encryptBufLen; - - if(!pwitem) - return NULL; - - crypto_param.data = NULL; - - arena = PORT_NewArena(2048); - epki = (SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, - sizeof(SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo)); - if(epki == NULL) { - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - epki->arena = arena; - algid = SEC_PKCS5CreateAlgorithmID(algTag, NULL, iteration); - if(algid == NULL) { - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - - mechanism = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(SECOID_FindOIDTag(&algid->algorithm)); - pbe_param = PK11_ParamFromAlgid(algid); - pbeMech.mechanism = mechanism; - pbeMech.pParameter = pbe_param->data; - pbeMech.ulParameterLen = pbe_param->len; - key = PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, algid, pwitem, PR_FALSE, wincx); - - if((key == NULL) || (pbe_param == NULL)) { - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - - crv = PK11_MapPBEMechanismToCryptoMechanism(&pbeMech, &cryptoMech, - pwitem, PR_FALSE); - if(crv != CKR_OK) { - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - cryptoMech.mechanism = PK11_GetPadMechanism(cryptoMech.mechanism); - crypto_param.data = (unsigned char *)cryptoMech.pParameter; - crypto_param.len = cryptoMech.ulParameterLen; - - pk = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(cert, wincx); - if(pk == NULL) { - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - - encryptBufLen = pk11_private_key_encrypt_buffer_length(pk); - if(encryptBufLen == -1) { - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - encryptedKey.len = (unsigned int)encryptBufLen; - encryptedKey.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ZAlloc(encryptedKey.len); - if(!encryptedKey.data) { - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - - /* we are extracting an encrypted privateKey structure. - * which needs to be freed along with the buffer into which it is - * returned. eventually, we should retrieve an encrypted key using - * pkcs8/pkcs5. - */ - PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(pk->pkcs11Slot); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(pk->pkcs11Slot)->C_WrapKey(pk->pkcs11Slot->session, - &cryptoMech, key->objectID, pk->pkcs11ID, encryptedKey.data, - (CK_ULONG_PTR)(&encryptedKey.len)); - PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(pk->pkcs11Slot); - if(crv != CKR_OK) { - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - - if(!encryptedKey.len) { - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - - rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &epki->encryptedData, &encryptedKey); - if(rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; - } - - rv = SECOID_CopyAlgorithmID(arena, &epki->algorithm, algid); - -loser: - if(pbe_param != NULL) { - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(pbe_param, PR_TRUE); - pbe_param = NULL; - } - - if(crypto_param.data != NULL) { - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&crypto_param, PR_FALSE); - crypto_param.data = NULL; - } - - if(key != NULL) { - PK11_FreeSymKey(key); - } - - if(rv == SECFailure) { - if(arena != NULL) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE); - } - epki = NULL; - } - - return epki; -} - - -/* - * This is required to allow FORTEZZA_NULL and FORTEZZA_RC4 - * working. This function simply gets a valid IV for the keys. - */ -SECStatus -PK11_GenerateFortezzaIV(PK11SymKey *symKey,unsigned char *iv,int len) -{ - CK_MECHANISM mech_info; - CK_ULONG count = 0; - CK_RV crv; - SECStatus rv = SECFailure; - - mech_info.mechanism = CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64; - mech_info.pParameter = iv; - mech_info.ulParameterLen = len; - - /* generate the IV for fortezza */ - PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(symKey->slot); - crv=PK11_GETTAB(symKey->slot)->C_EncryptInit(symKey->slot->session, - &mech_info, symKey->objectID); - if (crv == CKR_OK) { - PK11_GETTAB(symKey->slot)->C_EncryptFinal(symKey->slot->session, - NULL, &count); - rv = SECSuccess; - } - PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(symKey->slot); - return rv; -} - -SECKEYPrivateKey * -PK11_UnwrapPrivKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType, SECItem *param, - SECItem *wrappedKey, SECItem *label, - SECItem *idValue, PRBool perm, PRBool sensitive, - CK_KEY_TYPE keyType, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE *usage, int usageCount, - void *wincx) -{ - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; - CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; - CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[15] ; - int templateCount = 0; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE privKeyID; - CK_MECHANISM mechanism; - CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate; - SECItem *param_free = NULL, *ck_id; - CK_RV crv; - CK_SESSION_HANDLE rwsession; - PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL; - int i; - - if(!slot || !wrappedKey || !idValue) { - /* SET AN ERROR!!! */ - return NULL; - } - - ck_id = PK11_MakeIDFromPubKey(idValue); - if(!ck_id) { - return NULL; - } - - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, perm ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(cktrue)); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass)); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIVATE, sensitive ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(cktrue)); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_SENSITIVE, sensitive ? &cktrue : &ckfalse, - sizeof(cktrue)); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_LABEL, label->data, label->len); attrs++; - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, ck_id->data, ck_id->len); attrs++; - for (i=0; i < usageCount; i++) { - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, usage[i], &cktrue, sizeof(cktrue)); attrs++; - } - - if (PK11_IsInternal(slot)) { - PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB, idValue->data, - idValue->len); attrs++; - } - - templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate; - PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= (sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)) ); - - mechanism.mechanism = wrapType; - if(!param) param = param_free= PK11_ParamFromIV(wrapType, NULL); - if(param) { - mechanism.pParameter = param->data; - mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len; - } else { - mechanism.pParameter = NULL; - mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0; - } - - if (wrappingKey->slot != slot) { - newKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(slot,wrapType,CKA_WRAP,wrappingKey); - } else { - newKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(wrappingKey); - } - - if (newKey) { - if (perm) { - rwsession = PK11_GetRWSession(slot); - } else { - rwsession = slot->session; - } - crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_UnwrapKey(rwsession, &mechanism, - newKey->objectID, - wrappedKey->data, - wrappedKey->len, keyTemplate, - templateCount, &privKeyID); - - if (perm) PK11_RestoreROSession(slot, rwsession); - PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey); - } else { - crv = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } - - if(ck_id) { - SECITEM_FreeItem(ck_id, PR_TRUE); - ck_id = NULL; - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - /* we couldn't unwrap the key, use the internal module to do the - * unwrap, then load the new key into the token */ - PK11SlotInfo *int_slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot(); - - if (int_slot && (slot != int_slot)) { - SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = PK11_UnwrapPrivKey(int_slot, - wrappingKey, wrapType, param, wrappedKey, label, - idValue, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE, - keyType, usage, usageCount, wincx); - if (privKey) { - SECKEYPrivateKey *newPrivKey = pk11_loadPrivKey(slot,privKey, - NULL,perm,sensitive); - SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); - PK11_FreeSlot(int_slot); - return newPrivKey; - } - } - if (int_slot) PK11_FreeSlot(int_slot); - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return NULL; - } - return PK11_MakePrivKey(slot, nullKey, PR_FALSE, privKeyID, wincx); -} - -#define ALLOC_BLOCK 10 - -/* - * Now we're going to wrap a SECKEYPrivateKey with a PK11SymKey - * The strategy is to get both keys to reside in the same slot, - * one that can perform the desired crypto mechanism and then - * call C_WrapKey after all the setup has taken place. - */ -SECStatus -PK11_WrapPrivKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, - SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType, - SECItem *param, SECItem *wrappedKey, void *wincx) -{ - PK11SlotInfo *privSlot = privKey->pkcs11Slot; /* The slot where - * the private key - * we are going to - * wrap lives. - */ - PK11SymKey *newSymKey = NULL; - SECKEYPrivateKey *newPrivKey = NULL; - SECItem *param_free = NULL; - CK_ULONG len = wrappedKey->len; - CK_MECHANISM mech; - CK_RV crv; - - if (!privSlot || !PK11_DoesMechanism(privSlot, wrapType)) { - /* Figure out a slot that does the mechanism and try to import - * the private key onto that slot. - */ - PK11SlotInfo *int_slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot(); - - privSlot = int_slot; /* The private key has a new home */ - newPrivKey = pk11_loadPrivKey(privSlot,privKey,NULL,PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE); - if (newPrivKey == NULL) { - PK11_FreeSlot (int_slot); - return SECFailure; - } - privKey = newPrivKey; - } - - if (privSlot != wrappingKey->slot) { - newSymKey = pk11_CopyToSlot (privSlot, wrapType, CKA_WRAP, - wrappingKey); - wrappingKey = newSymKey; - } - - if (wrappingKey == NULL) { - if (newPrivKey) { - SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(newPrivKey); - } - return SECFailure; - } - mech.mechanism = wrapType; - if (!param) { - param = param_free = PK11_ParamFromIV(wrapType, NULL); - } - if (param) { - mech.pParameter = param->data; - mech.ulParameterLen = param->len; - } else { - mech.pParameter = NULL; - mech.ulParameterLen = 0; - } - - PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(privSlot); - crv = PK11_GETTAB(privSlot)->C_WrapKey(privSlot->session, &mech, - wrappingKey->objectID, - privKey->pkcs11ID, - wrappedKey->data, &len); - PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(privSlot); - - if (newSymKey) { - PK11_FreeSymKey(newSymKey); - } - if (newPrivKey) { - SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(newPrivKey); - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) ); - return SECFailure; - } - - wrappedKey->len = len; - return SECSuccess; -} - -void -PK11_SetFortezzaHack(PK11SymKey *symKey) { - symKey->origin = PK11_OriginFortezzaHack; -} - |