upstream: record when the host key checking code downgrades a

certificate host key to a plain key. This occurs when the user connects to a
host with a certificate host key but no corresponding CA key configured in
known_hosts; feedback and ok markus@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ada81853ff9ee7824c62f440bcf4ad62030c901

4 files changed, 57 insertions, 19 deletions

diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
index a5ae6ac0..07cec477 100644
--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.109 2019/09/06 05:23:55 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.110 2020/10/03 08:11:28 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -105,8 +105,10 @@ enum kex_exchange {
 	KEX_MAX
 };
 
-#define KEX_INIT_SENT	0x0001
-#define KEX_INITIAL	0x0002
+/* kex->flags values */
+#define KEX_INIT_SENT		0x0001 /* KEXINIT sent */
+#define KEX_INITIAL		0x0002 /* Initial KEX, not rekey */
+#define KEX_HOSTCERT_CONVERT	0x0004 /* Client downgraded hostcert->plain */
 
 struct sshenc {
 	char	*name;
diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
index 9ec0618a..3c80756b 100644
--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.332 2020/09/09 21:57:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.333 2020/10/03 08:11:28 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -707,6 +707,10 @@ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr,
 /*
  * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key
  * is not valid. user_hostfile[0] will not be updated if 'readonly' is true.
+ *
+ * If cert_fallbackp is not NULL then will attempt to convert certificate host
+ * keys to plain keys if no certificate match was found and will return
+ * non-zero via *cert_fallbackp if this fall-back was used.
  */
 #define RDRW	0
 #define RDONLY	1
@@ -715,7 +719,7 @@ static int
 check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
     struct sshkey *host_key, int readonly,
     char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles,
-    char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles)
+    char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles, int *cert_fallbackp)
 {
 	HostStatus host_status;
 	HostStatus ip_status;
@@ -726,12 +730,15 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
 	const char *type;
 	const struct hostkey_entry *host_found, *ip_found;
 	int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0, confirmed;
-	int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr);
+	int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr), cert_fallback = 0;
 	int r, want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0;
 	int hostkey_trusted = 0; /* Known or explicitly accepted by user */
 	struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys;
 	u_int i;
 
+	if (cert_fallbackp != NULL)
+		*cert_fallbackp = 0;
+
 	/*
 	 * Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The
 	 * problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple
@@ -847,9 +854,15 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
 		if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 &&
 		    port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) {
 			debug("checking without port identifier");
+			/*
+			 * NB. do not perform cert->key fallback in this
+			 * recursive call. Fallback will only be performed in
+			 * the top-level call.
+			 */
 			if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key,
 			    ROQUIET, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles,
-			    system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) == 0) {
+			    system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles,
+			    NULL) == 0) {
 				debug("found matching key w/out port");
 				break;
 			}
@@ -1126,10 +1139,13 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
 		free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
 	if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
 		free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
+	if (cert_fallbackp != NULL)
+		*cert_fallbackp = cert_fallback;
 	return 0;
 
 fail:
-	if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) {
+	if (cert_fallbackp != NULL && want_cert &&
+	    host_status != HOST_REVOKED) {
 		/*
 		 * No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and
 		 * search normally.
@@ -1141,6 +1157,7 @@ fail:
 		if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(raw_key)) != 0)
 			fatal("Couldn't drop certificate: %s", ssh_err(r));
 		host_key = raw_key;
+		cert_fallback = 1;
 		goto retry;
 	}
 	sshkey_free(raw_key);
@@ -1153,15 +1170,24 @@ fail:
 	return -1;
 }
 
-/* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */
+/*
+ * returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify.
+ *
+ * If the host key was a certificate that was downgraded to a plain key in
+ * the process of matching, then cert_fallbackp will be non-zero.
+ */
 int
-verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key)
+verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key,
+    int *cert_fallbackp)
 {
 	u_int i;
-	int r = -1, flags = 0;
+	int r = -1, flags = 0, cert_fallback = 0;
 	char valid[64], *fp = NULL, *cafp = NULL;
 	struct sshkey *plain = NULL;
 
+	if (cert_fallbackp != NULL)
+		*cert_fallbackp = 0;
+
 	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
 	    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
 		error("%s: fingerprint host key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
@@ -1252,15 +1278,20 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key)
 	}
 	r = check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW,
 	    options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles,
-	    options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles);
+	    options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles,
+	    &cert_fallback);
 
 out:
 	sshkey_free(plain);
 	free(fp);
 	free(cafp);
-	if (r == 0 && host_key != NULL) {
-		sshkey_free(previous_host_key);
-		r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &previous_host_key);
+	if (r == 0) {
+		if (host_key != NULL) {
+			sshkey_free(previous_host_key);
+			r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &previous_host_key);
+		}
+		if (r == 0 && cert_fallbackp != NULL)
+			*cert_fallbackp = cert_fallback;
 	}
 
 	return r;
diff --git a/sshconnect.h b/sshconnect.h
index 7c091e2b..6d63075e 100644
--- a/sshconnect.h
+++ b/sshconnect.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.40 2020/01/25 07:17:18 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.41 2020/10/03 08:11:28 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ void	 ssh_kill_proxy_command(void);
 void	 ssh_login(struct ssh *, Sensitive *, const char *,
     struct sockaddr *, u_short, struct passwd *, int);
 
-int	 verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *);
+int	 verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *, int *);
 
 void	 get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
     char **, char **);
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index f64aae66..44d7e682 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.326 2020/09/18 05:23:03 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.327 2020/10/03 08:11:28 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -97,8 +97,13 @@ struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr;
 static int
 verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
 {
-	if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1)
+	int cert_downgraded = 0;
+
+	if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey,
+	    &cert_downgraded) == -1)
 		fatal("Host key verification failed.");
+	if (cert_downgraded)
+		ssh->kex->flags |= KEX_HOSTCERT_CONVERT;
 	return 0;
 }