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authordjm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>2015-01-14 20:05:27 +0000
committerDamien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>2015-01-15 21:37:34 +1100
commit141efe49542f7156cdbc2e4cd0a041d8b1aab622 (patch)
treea9142350f2b8689f4d42548ca272ed577b32a881
parent0088c57af302cda278bd26d8c3ae81d5b6f7c289 (diff)
downloadopenssh-git-141efe49542f7156cdbc2e4cd0a041d8b1aab622.tar.gz
upstream commit
move authfd.c and its tentacles to the new buffer/key API; ok markus@
-rw-r--r--authfd.c840
-rw-r--r--authfd.h60
-rw-r--r--clientloop.c20
-rw-r--r--monitor.c42
-rw-r--r--session.c10
-rw-r--r--ssh-add.c259
-rw-r--r--ssh.c11
-rw-r--r--sshconnect1.c72
-rw-r--r--sshconnect2.c171
-rw-r--r--sshd.c43
10 files changed, 846 insertions, 682 deletions
diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c
index 2d5a8dd5..5d9414fa 100644
--- a/authfd.c
+++ b/authfd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.93 2014/04/29 18:01:49 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.94 2015/01/14 20:05:27 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -47,124 +47,121 @@
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "rsa.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
-static int agent_present = 0;
-
-/* helper */
-int decode_reply(int type);
+#define MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES 2048 /* Max keys in agent reply */
+#define MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN (256 * 1024) /* Max bytes in agent reply */
/* macro to check for "agent failure" message */
#define agent_failed(x) \
- ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
+ ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || \
+ (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
(x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
-int
-ssh_agent_present(void)
+/* Convert success/failure response from agent to a err.h status */
+static int
+decode_reply(u_char type)
{
- int authfd;
-
- if (agent_present)
- return 1;
- if ((authfd = ssh_get_authentication_socket()) == -1)
+ if (agent_failed(type))
+ return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+ else if (type == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS)
return 0;
- else {
- ssh_close_authentication_socket(authfd);
- return 1;
- }
+ else
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
/* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */
-
int
-ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
+ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp)
{
const char *authsocket;
- int sock;
+ int sock, oerrno;
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+ if (fdp != NULL)
+ *fdp = -1;
+
authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
if (!authsocket)
- return -1;
+ return SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT;
memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
- sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (sock < 0)
- return -1;
+ if ((sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
/* close on exec */
- if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) {
+ if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1 ||
+ connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
+ oerrno = errno;
close(sock);
- return -1;
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
+ if (fdp != NULL)
+ *fdp = sock;
+ else
close(sock);
- return -1;
- }
- agent_present = 1;
- return sock;
+ return 0;
}
+/* Communicate with agent: send request and read reply */
static int
-ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
+ssh_request_reply(int sock, struct sshbuf *request, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
- u_int l, len;
+ int r;
+ size_t l, len;
char buf[1024];
/* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
- len = buffer_len(request);
+ len = sshbuf_len(request);
put_u32(buf, len);
/* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
- if (atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
- atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buffer_ptr(request),
- buffer_len(request)) != buffer_len(request)) {
- error("Error writing to authentication socket.");
- return 0;
- }
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, 4) != 4 ||
+ atomicio(vwrite, sock, (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(request),
+ sshbuf_len(request)) != sshbuf_len(request))
+ return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
/*
* Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the
* response packet.
*/
- if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4) {
- error("Error reading response length from authentication socket.");
- return 0;
- }
+ if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, 4) != 4)
+ return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
/* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
len = get_u32(buf);
- if (len > 256 * 1024)
- fatal("Authentication response too long: %u", len);
+ if (len > MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
/* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */
- buffer_clear(reply);
+ sshbuf_reset(reply);
while (len > 0) {
l = len;
if (l > sizeof(buf))
l = sizeof(buf);
- if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, l) != l) {
- error("Error reading response from authentication socket.");
- return 0;
- }
- buffer_append(reply, buf, l);
+ if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, l) != l)
+ return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(reply, buf, l)) != 0)
+ return r;
len -= l;
}
- return 1;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -172,7 +169,6 @@ ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply
* obtained). The argument must have been returned by
* ssh_get_authentication_socket().
*/
-
void
ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock)
{
@@ -180,80 +176,103 @@ ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock)
close(sock);
}
-/*
- * Opens and connects a private socket for communication with the
- * authentication agent. Returns the file descriptor (which must be
- * shut down and closed by the caller when no longer needed).
- * Returns NULL if an error occurred and the connection could not be
- * opened.
- */
-
-AuthenticationConnection *
-ssh_get_authentication_connection(void)
+/* Lock/unlock agent */
+int
+ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password)
{
- AuthenticationConnection *auth;
- int sock;
-
- sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
-
- /*
- * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection. This happens if we
- * exited due to a timeout.
- */
- if (sock < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- auth = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*auth));
- auth->fd = sock;
- buffer_init(&auth->identities);
- auth->howmany = 0;
-
- return auth;
+ int r;
+ u_char type = lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK;
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, password)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = decode_reply(type);
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return r;
}
-/*
- * Closes the connection to the authentication agent and frees any associated
- * memory.
- */
-
-void
-ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+static int
+deserialise_identity1(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
- buffer_free(&auth->identities);
- close(auth->fd);
- free(auth);
+ struct sshkey *key;
+ int r, keybits;
+ u_int32_t bits;
+ char *comment = NULL;
+
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(ids, &bits)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
+ /* XXX previously we just warned here. I think we should be strict */
+ if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (keyp != NULL) {
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL;
+ }
+ if (commentp != NULL) {
+ *commentp = comment;
+ comment = NULL;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ free(comment);
+ return r;
}
+#endif
-/* Lock/unlock agent */
-int
-ssh_lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int lock, const char *password)
+static int
+deserialise_identity2(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
- int type;
- Buffer msg;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, password);
-
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return 0;
+ int r;
+ char *comment = NULL;
+ const u_char *blob;
+ size_t blen;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(ids, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, keyp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (commentp != NULL) {
+ *commentp = comment;
+ comment = NULL;
}
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return decode_reply(type);
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(comment);
+ return r;
}
/*
- * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent.
+ * Fetch list of identities held by the agent.
*/
-
int
-ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
+ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, int version, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp)
{
- int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0;
- Buffer request;
+ u_char type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0;
+ u_int32_t num, i;
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ struct ssh_identitylist *idl = NULL;
+ int r;
+ /* Determine request and expected response types */
switch (version) {
case 1:
code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
@@ -264,238 +283,270 @@ ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
break;
default:
- return 0;
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
/*
* Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the
* identities it can represent.
*/
- buffer_init(&request);
- buffer_put_char(&request, code1);
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code1)) != 0)
+ goto out;
- buffer_clear(&auth->identities);
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &request, &auth->identities) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&request);
- return 0;
- }
- buffer_free(&request);
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+ goto out;
/* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */
- type = buffer_get_char(&auth->identities);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
if (agent_failed(type)) {
- return 0;
+ r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+ goto out;
} else if (type != code2) {
- fatal("Bad authentication reply message type: %d", type);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
}
/* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
- auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
- if ((u_int)auth->howmany > 1024)
- fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d",
- auth->howmany);
-
- return auth->howmany;
-}
-
-Key *
-ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
-{
- /* get number of identities and return the first entry (if any). */
- if (ssh_get_num_identities(auth, version) > 0)
- return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, comment, version);
- return NULL;
-}
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &num)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (num > MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (num == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES;
+ goto out;
+ }
-Key *
-ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
-{
+ /* Deserialise the response into a list of keys/comments */
+ if ((idl = calloc(1, sizeof(*idl))) == NULL ||
+ (idl->keys = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->keys))) == NULL ||
+ (idl->comments = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->comments))) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < num;) {
+ switch (version) {
+ case 1:
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
- int keybits;
- u_int bits;
+ if ((r = deserialise_identity1(msg,
+ &(idl->keys[i]), &(idl->comments[i]))) != 0)
+ goto out;
#endif
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
- Key *key = NULL;
-
- /* Return failure if no more entries. */
- if (auth->howmany <= 0)
- return NULL;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ if ((r = deserialise_identity2(msg,
+ &(idl->keys[i]), &(idl->comments[i]))) != 0) {
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
+ /* Gracefully skip unknown key types */
+ num--;
+ continue;
+ } else
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ i++;
+ }
+ idl->nkeys = num;
+ *idlp = idl;
+ idl = NULL;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ if (idl != NULL)
+ ssh_free_identitylist(idl);
+ return r;
+}
- /*
- * Get the next entry from the packet. These will abort with a fatal
- * error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data.
- */
- switch (version) {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
- case 1:
- key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
- bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
- buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e);
- buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n);
- *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
- keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
- if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits)
- logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
- BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
- break;
-#endif
- case 2:
- blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen);
- *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
- key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
- free(blob);
- break;
- default:
- return NULL;
+void
+ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (idl == NULL)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < idl->nkeys; i++) {
+ if (idl->keys != NULL)
+ sshkey_free(idl->keys[i]);
+ if (idl->comments != NULL)
+ free(idl->comments[i]);
}
- /* Decrement the number of remaining entries. */
- auth->howmany--;
- return key;
+ free(idl);
}
/*
- * Generates a random challenge, sends it to the agent, and waits for
- * response from the agent. Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the
- * correct answer, zero otherwise. Response type selects the style of
- * response desired, with 0 corresponding to protocol version 1.0 (no longer
- * supported) and 1 corresponding to protocol version 1.1.
+ * Sends a challenge (typically from a server via ssh(1)) to the agent,
+ * and waits for a response from the agent.
+ * Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the correct answer, zero
+ * otherwise.
*/
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
int
-ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
- Key* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
- u_char session_id[16],
- u_int response_type,
- u_char response[16])
+ssh_decrypt_challenge(int sock, struct sshkey* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
+ u_char session_id[16], u_char response[16])
{
- Buffer buffer;
- int success = 0;
- int i;
- int type;
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+ u_char type;
if (key->type != KEY_RSA1)
- return 0;
- if (response_type == 0) {
- logit("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
- return 0;
- }
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE);
- buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e);
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n);
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge);
- buffer_append(&buffer, session_id, 16);
- buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type);
-
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return 0;
- }
- type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
-
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, challenge)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(msg, session_id, 16)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 1)) != 0) /* Response type for proto 1.1 */
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
if (agent_failed(type)) {
- logit("Agent admitted failure to authenticate using the key.");
+ r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+ goto out;
} else if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
- fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
- } else {
- success = 1;
- /*
- * Get the response from the packet. This will abort with a
- * fatal error if the packet is corrupt.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- response[i] = (u_char)buffer_get_char(&buffer);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
}
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return success;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get(msg, response, 16)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return r;
}
#endif
-/* ask agent to sign data, returns -1 on error, 0 on success */
+/* ask agent to sign data, returns err.h code on error, 0 on success */
int
-ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
- Key *key,
- u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
- u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
+ u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
- extern int datafellows;
- Buffer msg;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
- int type, flags = 0;
- int ret = -1;
-
- if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
- return -1;
-
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB)
- flags = SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, flags);
- free(blob);
-
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return -1;
- }
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_char *blob = NULL, type;
+ size_t blen = 0, len = 0;
+ u_int flags = 0;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (sigp != NULL)
+ *sigp = NULL;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+
+ if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (compat & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB)
+ flags |= SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE;
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, flags)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg) != 0))
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
if (agent_failed(type)) {
- logit("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.");
+ r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+ goto out;
} else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
- fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
- } else {
- ret = 0;
- *sigp = buffer_get_string(&msg, lenp);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, sigp, &len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ *lenp = len;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ if (blob != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(blob, blen);
+ free(blob);
}
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return ret;
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return r;
}
/* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-static void
-ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
+static int
+ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(struct sshbuf *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
{
- buffer_put_int(b, BN_num_bits(key->n));
- buffer_put_bignum(b, key->n);
- buffer_put_bignum(b, key->e);
- buffer_put_bignum(b, key->d);
+ int r;
+
/* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */
- buffer_put_bignum(b, key->iqmp); /* ssh key->u */
- buffer_put_bignum(b, key->q); /* ssh key->p, SSL key->q */
- buffer_put_bignum(b, key->p); /* ssh key->q, SSL key->p */
- buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, BN_num_bits(key->n))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->q)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comment)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return 0;
}
#endif
-static void
-ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
+static int
+ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key,
+ const char *comment)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, b)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comment)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+encode_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, u_int life, u_int confirm)
{
- key_private_serialize(key, b);
- buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
+ int r;
+
+ if (life != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, life)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (confirm != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ return r;
}
/*
- * Adds an identity to the authentication server. This call is not meant to
- * be used by normal applications.
+ * Adds an identity to the authentication server.
+ * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
*/
-
int
-ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
- const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm)
+ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key, const char *comment,
+ u_int life, u_int confirm)
{
- Buffer msg;
- int type, constrained = (life || confirm);
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r, constrained = (life || confirm);
+ u_char type;
- buffer_init(&msg);
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
@@ -503,8 +554,9 @@ ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
type = constrained ?
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED :
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY;
- buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
- ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(&msg, key->rsa, comment);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(msg, key->rsa, comment)) != 0)
+ goto out;
break;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
@@ -522,77 +574,88 @@ ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
type = constrained ?
SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;
- buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
- ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(&msg, key, comment);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(msg, key, comment)) != 0)
+ goto out;
break;
default:
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return 0;
- }
- if (constrained) {
- if (life != 0) {
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
- }
- if (confirm != 0)
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
}
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return 0;
- }
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return decode_reply(type);
+ if (constrained &&
+ (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = decode_reply(type);
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return r;
}
/*
- * Removes an identity from the authentication server. This call is not
- * meant to be used by normal applications.
+ * Removes an identity from the authentication server.
+ * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
*/
-
int
-ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
+ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key)
{
- Buffer msg;
- int type;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+ u_char type, *blob = NULL;
+ size_t blen;
- buffer_init(&msg);
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
- buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e);
- buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg,
+ SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0)
+ goto out;
} else
#endif
if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) {
- key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
- free(blob);
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg,
+ SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
} else {
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return 0;
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
}
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return 0;
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = decode_reply(type);
+ out:
+ if (blob != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(blob, blen);
+ free(blob);
}
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return decode_reply(type);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return r;
}
+/*
+ * Add/remove an token-based identity from the authentication server.
+ * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
+ */
int
-ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add,
- const char *reader_id, const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm)
+ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin,
+ u_int life, u_int confirm)
{
- Buffer msg;
- int type, constrained = (life || confirm);
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r, constrained = (life || confirm);
+ u_char type;
if (add) {
type = constrained ?
@@ -601,69 +664,48 @@ ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add,
} else
type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY;
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, reader_id);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pin);
-
- if (constrained) {
- if (life != 0) {
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
- }
- if (confirm != 0)
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM);
- }
-
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return 0;
- }
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return decode_reply(type);
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, reader_id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (constrained &&
+ (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = decode_reply(type);
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return r;
}
/*
- * Removes all identities from the agent. This call is not meant to be used
- * by normal applications.
+ * Removes all identities from the agent.
+ * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
*/
-
-int
-ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- int type;
- int code = (version==1) ?
- SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES :
- SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, code);
-
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return 0;
- }
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return decode_reply(type);
-}
-
int
-decode_reply(int type)
+ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version)
{
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_AGENT_FAILURE:
- case SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE:
- case SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE:
- logit("SSH_AGENT_FAILURE");
- return 0;
- case SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS:
- return 1;
- default:
- fatal("Bad response from authentication agent: %d", type);
- }
- /* NOTREACHED */
- return 0;
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_char type = (version == 1) ?
+ SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES :
+ SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = decode_reply(type);
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return r;
}
diff --git a/authfd.h b/authfd.h
index 2582a27a..bea20c26 100644
--- a/authfd.h
+++ b/authfd.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.37 2009/08/27 17:44:52 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.38 2015/01/14 20:05:27 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -16,6 +16,33 @@
#ifndef AUTHFD_H
#define AUTHFD_H
+/* List of identities returned by ssh_fetch_identitylist() */
+struct ssh_identitylist {
+ size_t nkeys;
+ struct sshkey **keys;
+ char **comments;
+};
+
+int ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp);
+void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock);
+
+int ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password);
+int ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, int version,
+ struct ssh_identitylist **idlp);
+void ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl);
+int ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
+ const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm);
+int ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key);
+int ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id,
+ const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm);
+int ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version);
+
+int ssh_decrypt_challenge(int sock, struct sshkey* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
+ u_char session_id[16], u_char response[16]);
+int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
+ u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+
/* Messages for the authentication agent connection. */
#define SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1
#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2
@@ -60,35 +87,4 @@
#define SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE 0x01
-typedef struct {
- int fd;
- Buffer identities;
- int howmany;
-} AuthenticationConnection;
-
-int ssh_agent_present(void);
-int ssh_get_authentication_socket(void);
-void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int);
-
-AuthenticationConnection *ssh_get_authentication_connection(void);
-void ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *);
-int ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *, int);
-Key *ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, char **, int);
-Key *ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, char **, int);
-int ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *,
- const char *, u_int, u_int);
-int ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *);
-int ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *, int);
-int ssh_lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *, int, const char *);
-int ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *, int, const char *,
- const char *, u_int, u_int);
-
-int
-ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[16],
- u_int, u_char[16]);
-
-int
-ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *,
- u_int);
-
#endif /* AUTHFD_H */
diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
index 397c9653..2137a81c 100644
--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.261 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.262 2015/01/14 20:05:27 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@
#include "match.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "roaming.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
/* import options */
extern Options options;
@@ -1782,7 +1783,7 @@ static void
client_input_agent_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
- int remote_id, sock;
+ int r, remote_id, sock;
/* Read the remote channel number from the message. */
remote_id = packet_get_int();
@@ -1792,7 +1793,11 @@ client_input_agent_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
* Get a connection to the local authentication agent (this may again
* get forwarded).
*/
- sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock)) != 0 &&
+ r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
+ debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
/*
* If we could not connect the agent, send an error message back to
@@ -1910,7 +1915,7 @@ static Channel *
client_request_agent(const char *request_type, int rchan)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
- int sock;
+ int r, sock;
if (!options.forward_agent) {
error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding.");
@@ -1918,9 +1923,12 @@ client_request_agent(const char *request_type, int rchan)
"malicious server.");
return NULL;
}
- sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
- if (sock < 0)
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
+ debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
return NULL;
+ }
c = channel_new("authentication agent connection",
SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 5a28d1b3..6858478c 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.137 2015/01/13 07:39:19 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.138 2015/01/14 20:05:27 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@
#include "roaming.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "match.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
@@ -685,28 +686,28 @@ mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
}
#endif
-extern AuthenticationConnection *auth_conn;
-
int
mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
- Key *key;
+ extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
+ struct sshkey *key;
u_char *p;
u_char *signature;
- u_int siglen, datlen;
- int keyid;
+ size_t datlen, siglen;
+ int r, keyid;
debug3("%s", __func__);
- keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
- p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/*
* Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
* SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
*/
if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64)
- fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %zu", __func__, datlen);
/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
if (session_id2_len == 0) {
@@ -716,20 +717,25 @@ mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
}
if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
- if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
- fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen,
+ datafellows)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid)) != NULL &&
- auth_conn != NULL) {
- if (ssh_agent_sign(auth_conn, key, &signature, &siglen, p,
- datlen) < 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed", __func__);
+ auth_sock > 0) {
+ if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
+ p, datlen, datafellows)) != 0) {
+ fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
} else
fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
- debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen);
+ debug3("%s: signature %p(%zu)", __func__, signature, siglen);
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(p);
free(signature);
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index e12f6677..fbb921be 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.275 2014/12/22 07:55:51 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.276 2015/01/14 20:05:27 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
@@ -1620,11 +1620,11 @@ launch_login(struct passwd *pw, const char *hostname)
static void
child_close_fds(void)
{
- extern AuthenticationConnection *auth_conn;
+ extern int auth_sock;
- if (auth_conn) {
- ssh_close_authentication_connection(auth_conn);
- auth_conn = NULL;
+ if (auth_sock != -1) {
+ close(auth_sock);
+ auth_sock = -1;
}
if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out())
diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c
index 8f369be4..32add880 100644
--- a/ssh-add.c
+++ b/ssh-add.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.115 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.116 2015/01/14 20:05:27 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
@@ -56,8 +57,8 @@
#include "ssh.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "log.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
@@ -103,22 +104,22 @@ clear_pass(void)
}
static int
-delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only)
+delete_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only)
{
- Key *public = NULL, *cert = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *public, *cert = NULL;
char *certpath = NULL, *comment = NULL;
- int ret = -1;
+ int r, ret = -1;
- public = key_load_public(filename, &comment);
- if (public == NULL) {
- printf("Bad key file %s\n", filename);
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, &comment)) != 0) {
+ printf("Bad key file %s: %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
- if (ssh_remove_identity(ac, public)) {
+ if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, public)) == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment);
ret = 0;
} else
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity: %s\n", filename);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n",
+ filename, ssh_err(r));
if (key_only)
goto out;
@@ -127,13 +128,13 @@ delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only)
free(comment);
comment = NULL;
xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
- if ((cert = key_load_public(certpath, &comment)) == NULL)
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, &comment)) == 0)
goto out;
- if (!key_equal_public(cert, public))
+ if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, public))
fatal("Certificate %s does not match private key %s",
certpath, filename);
- if (ssh_remove_identity(ac, cert)) {
+ if (ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, cert)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", certpath,
comment);
ret = 0;
@@ -142,9 +143,9 @@ delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only)
out:
if (cert != NULL)
- key_free(cert);
+ sshkey_free(cert);
if (public != NULL)
- key_free(public);
+ sshkey_free(public);
free(certpath);
free(comment);
@@ -153,14 +154,15 @@ delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only)
/* Send a request to remove all identities. */
static int
-delete_all(AuthenticationConnection *ac)
+delete_all(int agent_fd)
{
int ret = -1;
- if (ssh_remove_all_identities(ac, 1))
+ if (ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 1) == 0)
ret = 0;
/* ignore error-code for ssh2 */
- ssh_remove_all_identities(ac, 2);
+ /* XXX revisit */
+ ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 2);
if (ret == 0)
fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n");
@@ -171,13 +173,13 @@ delete_all(AuthenticationConnection *ac)
}
static int
-add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only)
+add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only)
{
- Key *private, *cert;
+ struct sshkey *private, *cert;
char *comment = NULL;
char msg[1024], *certpath = NULL;
- int r, fd, perms_ok, ret = -1;
- Buffer keyblob;
+ int r, fd, ret = -1;
+ struct sshbuf *keyblob;
if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) {
fd = STDIN_FILENO;
@@ -192,30 +194,38 @@ add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only)
* will occur multiple times, so check perms first and bail if wrong.
*/
if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) {
- perms_ok = key_perm_ok(fd, filename);
- if (!perms_ok) {
+ if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) {
close(fd);
return -1;
}
}
- buffer_init(&keyblob);
- if (!key_load_file(fd, filename, &keyblob)) {
- buffer_free(&keyblob);
+ if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, keyblob)) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
+ filename, ssh_err(r));
+ sshbuf_free(keyblob);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
close(fd);
/* At first, try empty passphrase */
- if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(&keyblob, "", filename,
- &private, &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
- fatal("Cannot parse %s: %s", filename, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, "", filename,
+ &private, &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
+ filename, ssh_err(r));
+ goto fail_load;
+ }
/* try last */
if (private == NULL && pass != NULL) {
- if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(&keyblob, pass, filename,
+ if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, filename,
&private, &comment)) != 0 &&
- r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
- fatal("Cannot parse %s: %s", filename, ssh_err(r));
+ r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
+ filename, ssh_err(r));
+ goto fail_load;
+ }
}
if (comment == NULL)
comment = xstrdup(filename);
@@ -226,28 +236,30 @@ add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only)
comment);
for (;;) {
pass = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
- if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0) {
+ if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0)
+ goto fail_load;
+ if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass,
+ filename, &private, NULL)) == 0)
+ break;
+ else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
+ filename, ssh_err(r));
+ fail_load:
clear_pass();
free(comment);
- buffer_free(&keyblob);
+ sshbuf_free(keyblob);
return -1;
}
- if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(&keyblob,
- pass, filename, &private, NULL)) != 0 &&
- r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
- fatal("Cannot parse %s: %s",
- filename, ssh_err(r));
- if (private != NULL)
- break;
clear_pass();
snprintf(msg, sizeof msg,
"Bad passphrase, try again for %.200s: ", comment);
}
}
- buffer_free(&keyblob);
+ sshbuf_free(keyblob);
- if (ssh_add_identity_constrained(ac, private, comment, lifetime,
- confirm)) {
+ if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment,
+ lifetime, confirm)) == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment);
ret = 0;
if (lifetime != 0)
@@ -257,7 +269,8 @@ add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only)
fprintf(stderr,
"The user must confirm each use of the key\n");
} else {
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity: %s\n", filename);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity \"%s\": %s\n",
+ filename, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Skip trying to load the cert if requested */
@@ -266,29 +279,39 @@ add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only)
/* Now try to add the certificate flavour too */
xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
- if ((cert = key_load_public(certpath, NULL)) == NULL)
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, NULL)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT)
+ error("Failed to load certificate \"%s\": %s",
+ certpath, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
+ }
- if (!key_equal_public(cert, private)) {
+ if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, private)) {
error("Certificate %s does not match private key %s",
certpath, filename);
- key_free(cert);
+ sshkey_free(cert);
goto out;
}
/* Graft with private bits */
- if (key_to_certified(private, key_cert_is_legacy(cert)) != 0) {
- error("%s: key_to_certified failed", __func__);
- key_free(cert);
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(private,
+ sshkey_cert_is_legacy(cert))) != 0) {
+ error("%s: sshkey_to_certified: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshkey_free(cert);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, private)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: key_cert_copy: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshkey_free(cert);
goto out;
}
- key_cert_copy(cert, private);
- key_free(cert);
+ sshkey_free(cert);
- if (!ssh_add_identity_constrained(ac, private, comment,
- lifetime, confirm)) {
- error("Certificate %s (%s) add failed", certpath,
- private->cert->key_id);
+ if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment,
+ lifetime, confirm)) != 0) {
+ error("Certificate %s (%s) add failed: %s", certpath,
+ private->cert->key_id, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Certificate added: %s (%s)\n", certpath,
private->cert->key_id);
@@ -297,19 +320,18 @@ add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only)
if (confirm != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm each use of the key\n");
out:
- if (certpath != NULL)
- free(certpath);
+ free(certpath);
free(comment);
- key_free(private);
+ sshkey_free(private);
return ret;
}
static int
-update_card(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int add, const char *id)
+update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id)
{
char *pin = NULL;
- int ret = -1;
+ int r, ret = -1;
if (add) {
if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ",
@@ -317,14 +339,14 @@ update_card(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int add, const char *id)
return -1;
}
- if (ssh_update_card(ac, add, id, pin == NULL ? "" : pin,
- lifetime, confirm)) {
+ if ((r = ssh_update_card(agent_fd, add, id, pin == NULL ? "" : pin,
+ lifetime, confirm)) == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n",
add ? "added" : "removed", id);
ret = 0;
} else {
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s card: %s\n",
- add ? "add" : "remove", id);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s card \"%s\": %s\n",
+ add ? "add" : "remove", id, ssh_err(r));
ret = -1;
}
free(pin);
@@ -332,32 +354,42 @@ update_card(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int add, const char *id)
}
static int
-list_identities(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int do_fp)
+list_identities(int agent_fd, int do_fp)
{
- Key *key;
- char *comment, *fp;
- int had_identities = 0;
- int version;
+ char *fp;
+ int version, r, had_identities = 0;
+ struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
+ size_t i;
for (version = 1; version <= 2; version++) {
- for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, version);
- key != NULL;
- key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) {
+ if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, version,
+ &idlist)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
+ fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for "
+ "protocol %d: %s\n", version, ssh_err(r));
+ continue;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) {
had_identities = 1;
if (do_fp) {
- fp = key_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash,
- SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(idlist->keys[i],
+ fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n",
- key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key));
+ sshkey_size(idlist->keys[i]), fp,
+ idlist->comments[i],
+ sshkey_type(idlist->keys[i]));
free(fp);
} else {
- if (!key_write(key, stdout))
- fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed");
- fprintf(stdout, " %s\n", comment);
+ if ((r = sshkey_write(idlist->keys[i],
+ stdout)) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "sshkey_write: %s\n",
+ ssh_err(r));
+ continue;
+ }
+ fprintf(stdout, " %s\n", idlist->comments[i]);
}
- key_free(key);
- free(comment);
}
+ ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
}
if (!had_identities) {
printf("The agent has no identities.\n");
@@ -367,10 +399,10 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int do_fp)
}
static int
-lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int lock)
+lock_agent(int agent_fd, int lock)
{
char prompt[100], *p1, *p2;
- int passok = 1, ret = -1;
+ int r, passok = 1, ret = -1;
strlcpy(prompt, "Enter lock password: ", sizeof(prompt));
p1 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
@@ -384,24 +416,28 @@ lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int lock)
explicit_bzero(p2, strlen(p2));
free(p2);
}
- if (passok && ssh_lock_agent(ac, lock, p1)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Agent %slocked.\n", lock ? "" : "un");
- ret = 0;
- } else
- fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent.\n", lock ? "" : "un");
+ if (passok) {
+ if ((r = ssh_lock_agent(agent_fd, lock, p1)) == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Agent %slocked.\n", lock ? "" : "un");
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent: %s\n",
+ lock ? "" : "un", ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ }
explicit_bzero(p1, strlen(p1));
free(p1);
return (ret);
}
static int
-do_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int deleting, int key_only, char *file)
+do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file)
{
if (deleting) {
- if (delete_file(ac, file, key_only) == -1)
+ if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
- if (add_file(ac, file, key_only) == -1)
+ if (add_file(agent_fd, file, key_only) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
@@ -431,9 +467,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
{
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
- AuthenticationConnection *ac = NULL;
+ int agent_fd;
char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
- int i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0;
+ int r, i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0;
int xflag = 0, lflag = 0, Dflag = 0;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
@@ -448,13 +484,19 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
- /* At first, get a connection to the authentication agent. */
- ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
- if (ac == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Could not open a connection to your authentication agent.\n");
+ /* First, get a connection to the authentication agent. */
+ switch (r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT:
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not open a connection to your "
+ "authentication agent.\n");
+ exit(2);
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to agent: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
exit(2);
}
+
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "klLcdDxXE:e:s:t:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'E':
@@ -510,15 +552,15 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
if ((xflag != 0) + (lflag != 0) + (Dflag != 0) > 1)
fatal("Invalid combination of actions");
else if (xflag) {
- if (lock_agent(ac, xflag == 'x' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
+ if (lock_agent(agent_fd, xflag == 'x' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
ret = 1;
goto done;
} else if (lflag) {
- if (list_identities(ac, lflag == 'l' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
+ if (list_identities(agent_fd, lflag == 'l' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
ret = 1;
goto done;
} else if (Dflag) {
- if (delete_all(ac) == -1)
+ if (delete_all(agent_fd) == -1)
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
@@ -526,7 +568,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (pkcs11provider != NULL) {
- if (update_card(ac, !deleting, pkcs11provider) == -1)
+ if (update_card(agent_fd, !deleting, pkcs11provider) == -1)
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
@@ -548,7 +590,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
default_files[i]);
if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
continue;
- if (do_file(ac, deleting, key_only, buf) == -1)
+ if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, buf) == -1)
ret = 1;
else
count++;
@@ -557,13 +599,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
ret = 1;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
- if (do_file(ac, deleting, key_only, argv[i]) == -1)
+ if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only,
+ argv[i]) == -1)
ret = 1;
}
}
clear_pass();
done:
- ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
+ ssh_close_authentication_socket(agent_fd);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index 36416fa2..df7274f4 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.411 2015/01/08 10:15:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.412 2015/01/14 20:05:27 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "roaming.h"
#include "version.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
@@ -1502,10 +1503,16 @@ ssh_init_forwarding(void)
static void
check_agent_present(void)
{
+ int r;
+
if (options.forward_agent) {
/* Clear agent forwarding if we don't have an agent. */
- if (!ssh_agent_present())
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) != 0) {
options.forward_agent = 0;
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
+ debug("ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
+ ssh_err(r));
+ }
}
}
diff --git a/sshconnect1.c b/sshconnect1.c
index 08589f5e..016abbce 100644
--- a/sshconnect1.c
+++ b/sshconnect1.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.76 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.77 2015/01/14 20:05:27 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <errno.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
/* Session id for the current session. */
u_char session_id[16];
@@ -64,33 +66,38 @@ extern char *__progname;
static int
try_agent_authentication(void)
{
- int type;
- char *comment;
- AuthenticationConnection *auth;
+ int r, type, agent_fd, ret = 0;
u_char response[16];
- u_int i;
- Key *key;
+ size_t i;
BIGNUM *challenge;
+ struct ssh_identitylist *idlist = NULL;
/* Get connection to the agent. */
- auth = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
- if (!auth)
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
+ debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
return 0;
+ }
if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("try_agent_authentication: BN_new failed");
- /* Loop through identities served by the agent. */
- for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(auth, &comment, 1);
- key != NULL;
- key = ssh_get_next_identity(auth, &comment, 1)) {
+ /* Loop through identities served by the agent. */
+ if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, 1, &idlist)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
+ debug("%s: ssh_fetch_identitylist: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) {
/* Try this identity. */
- debug("Trying RSA authentication via agent with '%.100s'", comment);
- free(comment);
+ debug("Trying RSA authentication via agent with '%.100s'",
+ idlist->comments[i]);
/* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
- packet_put_bignum(key->rsa->n);
+ packet_put_bignum(idlist->keys[i]->rsa->n);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
@@ -101,7 +108,6 @@ try_agent_authentication(void)
does not support RSA authentication. */
if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
debug("Server refused our key.");
- key_free(key);
continue;
}
/* Otherwise it should have sent a challenge. */
@@ -115,16 +121,17 @@ try_agent_authentication(void)
debug("Received RSA challenge from server.");
/* Ask the agent to decrypt the challenge. */
- if (!ssh_decrypt_challenge(auth, key, challenge, session_id, 1, response)) {
+ if ((r = ssh_decrypt_challenge(agent_fd, idlist->keys[i],
+ challenge, session_id, response)) != 0) {
/*
* The agent failed to authenticate this identifier
* although it advertised it supports this. Just
* return a wrong value.
*/
- logit("Authentication agent failed to decrypt challenge.");
+ logit("Authentication agent failed to decrypt "
+ "challenge: %s", ssh_err(r));
explicit_bzero(response, sizeof(response));
}
- key_free(key);
debug("Sending response to RSA challenge.");
/* Send the decrypted challenge back to the server. */
@@ -137,22 +144,25 @@ try_agent_authentication(void)
/* Wait for response from the server. */
type = packet_read();
- /* The server returns success if it accepted the authentication. */
+ /*
+ * The server returns success if it accepted the
+ * authentication.
+ */
if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
- ssh_close_authentication_connection(auth);
- BN_clear_free(challenge);
debug("RSA authentication accepted by server.");
- return 1;
- }
- /* Otherwise it should return failure. */
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d",
- type);
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ } else if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth "
+ "response: %d", type);
}
- ssh_close_authentication_connection(auth);
+ if (ret != 1)
+ debug("RSA authentication using agent refused.");
+ out:
+ ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
+ ssh_close_authentication_socket(agent_fd);
BN_clear_free(challenge);
- debug("RSA authentication using agent refused.");
- return 0;
+ return ret;
}
/*
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index 6a7b6993..343ca745 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.213 2015/01/08 10:14:08 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.214 2015/01/14 20:05:27 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
@@ -131,10 +132,10 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
} while (0)
while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
- if ((ktype = key_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
+ if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
fatal("%s: unknown alg %s", __func__, alg);
if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
- key_type_plain(ktype), NULL))
+ sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL))
ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
else
ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
@@ -242,15 +243,15 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
* Authenticate user
*/
-typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
-typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
+typedef struct cauthctxt Authctxt;
+typedef struct cauthmethod Authmethod;
typedef struct identity Identity;
typedef struct idlist Idlist;
struct identity {
TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
- AuthenticationConnection *ac; /* set if agent supports key */
- Key *key; /* public/private key */
+ int agent_fd; /* >=0 if agent supports key */
+ struct sshkey *key; /* public/private key */
char *filename; /* comment for agent-only keys */
int tried;
int isprivate; /* key points to the private key */
@@ -258,17 +259,18 @@ struct identity {
};
TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity);
-struct Authctxt {
+struct cauthctxt {
const char *server_user;
const char *local_user;
const char *host;
const char *service;
- Authmethod *method;
+ struct cauthmethod *method;
sig_atomic_t success;
char *authlist;
+ int attempt;
/* pubkey */
- Idlist keys;
- AuthenticationConnection *agent;
+ struct idlist keys;
+ int agent_fd;
/* hostbased */
Sensitive *sensitive;
/* kbd-interactive */
@@ -276,7 +278,8 @@ struct Authctxt {
/* generic */
void *methoddata;
};
-struct Authmethod {
+
+struct cauthmethod {
char *name; /* string to compare against server's list */
int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt);
void (*cleanup)(Authctxt *authctxt);
@@ -582,7 +585,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
- fp = key_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
free(fp);
@@ -956,27 +959,29 @@ input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
}
static int
-identity_sign(Identity *id, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
- u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
Key *prv;
int ret;
/* the agent supports this key */
- if (id->ac)
- return (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, sigp, lenp,
- data, datalen));
+ if (id->agent_fd)
+ return ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp,
+ data, datalen, compat);
+
/*
* we have already loaded the private key or
* the private key is stored in external hardware
*/
if (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT))
- return (key_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen));
+ return (sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
+ compat));
/* load the private key from the file */
if ((prv = load_identity_file(id->filename, id->userprovided)) == NULL)
- return (-1);
- ret = key_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
- key_free(prv);
+ return (-1); /* XXX return decent error code */
+ ret = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
+ sshkey_free(prv);
return (ret);
}
@@ -985,7 +990,8 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
{
Buffer b;
u_char *blob, *signature;
- u_int bloblen, slen;
+ u_int bloblen;
+ size_t slen;
u_int skip = 0;
int ret = -1;
int have_sig = 1;
@@ -1026,8 +1032,8 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
/* generate signature */
ret = identity_sign(id, &signature, &slen,
- buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
- if (ret == -1) {
+ buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), datafellows);
+ if (ret != 0) {
free(blob);
buffer_free(&b);
return 0;
@@ -1102,7 +1108,7 @@ load_identity_file(char *filename, int userprovided)
{
Key *private;
char prompt[300], *passphrase;
- int perm_ok = 0, quit, i;
+ int r, perm_ok = 0, quit, i;
struct stat st;
if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) {
@@ -1110,33 +1116,49 @@ load_identity_file(char *filename, int userprovided)
filename, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
- private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, "", NULL, &perm_ok);
- if (!perm_ok) {
- if (private != NULL)
- key_free(private);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (private == NULL) {
- if (options.batch_mode)
- return NULL;
- snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt,
- "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", filename);
- for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt,
+ "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", filename);
+ for (i = 0; i <= options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+ if (i == 0)
+ passphrase = "";
+ else {
passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
- if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
- private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC,
- filename, passphrase, NULL, NULL);
- quit = 0;
- } else {
+ if (*passphrase == '\0') {
debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
+ free(passphrase);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ switch ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename,
+ passphrase, &private, NULL, &perm_ok))) {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE:
+ if (options.batch_mode) {
+ quit = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ debug2("bad passphrase given, try again...");
+ break;
+ case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
+ if (errno == ENOENT) {
+ debug2("Load key \"%s\": %s",
+ filename, ssh_err(r));
quit = 1;
+ break;
}
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ error("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r));
+ quit = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i > 0) {
explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
free(passphrase);
- if (private != NULL || quit)
- break;
- debug2("bad passphrase given, try again...");
}
+ if (private != NULL || quit)
+ break;
}
return private;
}
@@ -1150,12 +1172,12 @@ load_identity_file(char *filename, int userprovided)
static void
pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
- Identity *id, *id2, *tmp;
- Idlist agent, files, *preferred;
- Key *key;
- AuthenticationConnection *ac;
- char *comment;
- int i, found;
+ struct identity *id, *id2, *tmp;
+ struct idlist agent, files, *preferred;
+ struct sshkey *key;
+ int agent_fd, i, r, found;
+ size_t j;
+ struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
TAILQ_INIT(&agent); /* keys from the agent */
TAILQ_INIT(&files); /* keys from the config file */
@@ -1185,7 +1207,7 @@ pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
if (id2->key == NULL ||
(id2->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0)
continue;
- if (key_equal(id->key, id2->key)) {
+ if (sshkey_equal(id->key, id2->key)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
found = 1;
@@ -1200,37 +1222,48 @@ pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
}
}
/* list of keys supported by the agent */
- if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection())) {
- for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2);
- key != NULL;
- key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) {
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
+ debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ } else if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, 2, &idlist)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
+ debug("%s: ssh_fetch_identitylist: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ } else {
+ for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) {
found = 0;
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) {
- /* agent keys from the config file are preferred */
- if (key_equal(key, id->key)) {
- key_free(key);
- free(comment);
+ /*
+ * agent keys from the config file are
+ * preferred
+ */
+ if (sshkey_equal(idlist->keys[j], id->key)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
- id->ac = ac;
+ id->agent_fd = agent_fd;
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found && !options.identities_only) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
- id->key = key;
- id->filename = comment;
- id->ac = ac;
+ /* XXX "steals" key/comment from idlist */
+ id->key = idlist->keys[j];
+ id->filename = idlist->comments[j];
+ idlist->keys[j] = NULL;
+ idlist->comments[j] = NULL;
+ id->agent_fd = agent_fd;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&agent, id, next);
}
}
+ ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
/* append remaining agent keys */
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&agent, id, next);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
}
- authctxt->agent = ac;
+ authctxt->agent_fd = agent_fd;
}
/* append remaining keys from the config file */
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files)) {
@@ -1248,13 +1281,13 @@ pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Identity *id;
- if (authctxt->agent != NULL)
- ssh_close_authentication_connection(authctxt->agent);
+ if (authctxt->agent_fd != -1)
+ ssh_close_authentication_socket(authctxt->agent_fd);
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id;
id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
if (id->key)
- key_free(id->key);
+ sshkey_free(id->key);
free(id->filename);
free(id);
}
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 202e1706..4f97da82 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.431 2015/01/07 18:15:07 tedu Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.432 2015/01/14 20:05:27 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@
#include "roaming.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "version.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
#ifndef O_NOCTTY
#define O_NOCTTY 0
@@ -191,7 +192,7 @@ char *server_version_string = NULL;
Kex *xxx_kex;
/* Daemon's agent connection */
-AuthenticationConnection *auth_conn = NULL;
+int auth_sock = -1;
int have_agent = 0;
/*
@@ -655,7 +656,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
static int
privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
- int status;
+ int status, r;
pid_t pid;
struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL;
@@ -673,8 +674,14 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
- if (have_agent)
- auth_conn = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
+ if (have_agent) {
+ r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock);
+ if (r != 0) {
+ error("Could not get agent socket: %s",
+ ssh_err(r));
+ have_agent = 0;
+ }
+ }
if (box != NULL)
ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid);
monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor);
@@ -1397,7 +1404,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
{
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
- int opt, i, j, on = 1;
+ int r, opt, i, j, on = 1;
int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
const char *remote_ip;
int remote_port;
@@ -1706,7 +1713,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
options.host_key_agent, 1);
- have_agent = ssh_agent_present();
+ have_agent = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL);
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
@@ -2103,8 +2110,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if (use_privsep) {
if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
goto authenticated;
- } else if (compat20 && have_agent)
- auth_conn = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
+ } else if (compat20 && have_agent) {
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) {
+ error("Unable to get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ have_agent = -1;
+ }
+ }
/* perform the key exchange */
/* authenticate user and start session */
@@ -2425,6 +2436,8 @@ void
sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *privkey, Key *pubkey, u_char **signature, u_int *slen,
u_char *data, u_int dlen)
{
+ int r;
+
if (privkey) {
if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(privkey, signature, slen, data, dlen) < 0))
fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
@@ -2432,9 +2445,15 @@ sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *privkey, Key *pubkey, u_char **signature, u_int *slen,
if (mm_key_sign(pubkey, signature, slen, data, dlen) < 0)
fatal("%s: pubkey_sign failed", __func__);
} else {
- if (ssh_agent_sign(auth_conn, pubkey, signature, slen, data,
- dlen))
- fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed", __func__);
+ size_t xxx_slen;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey, signature, &xxx_slen,
+ data, dlen, datafellows)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ /* XXX: Old API is u_int; new size_t */
+ if (slen != NULL)
+ *slen = xxx_slen;
}
}