diff options
| author | Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> | 2010-07-16 13:57:51 +1000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> | 2010-07-16 13:57:51 +1000 |
| commit | 8a0268f1b3f62292d4124f8d158e0587c4f7c330 (patch) | |
| tree | 43493a3202569a2939f5616127d9de8689613a7b /jpake.c | |
| parent | d0244d498ba970b9d9348429eaf7a4a0ef2b903c (diff) | |
| download | openssh-git-8a0268f1b3f62292d4124f8d158e0587c4f7c330.tar.gz | |
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 11:52:06
[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c]
[packet.c ssh-rsa.c]
implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking
timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for
some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was
readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@
Diffstat (limited to 'jpake.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | jpake.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: jpake.c,v 1.2 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: jpake.c,v 1.3 2010/07/13 11:52:06 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * @@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k, if (peer_confirm_hash_len != expected_confirm_hash_len) error("%s: confirmation length mismatch (my %u them %u)", __func__, expected_confirm_hash_len, peer_confirm_hash_len); - else if (memcmp(peer_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash, + else if (timing_safe_cmp(peer_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash_len) == 0) success = 1; bzero(expected_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash_len); |