diff options
| author | djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> | 2021-01-08 02:57:24 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> | 2021-01-08 13:58:27 +1100 |
| commit | 4c7af01f9dcc1606dec033e7665a042cb0d8ec52 (patch) | |
| tree | f9dbad713d5cb623ba0698ee5081cdc0461a1628 /sshconnect2.c | |
| parent | 64ddd0fe68c4a7acf99b78624f8af45e919cd317 (diff) | |
| download | openssh-git-4c7af01f9dcc1606dec033e7665a042cb0d8ec52.tar.gz | |
upstream: If a signature operation on a FIDO key fails with a
"incorrect PIN" reason and no PIN was initially requested from the user, then
request a PIN and retry the operation.
This smoothes over a few corner cases including FIDO devices that
require PINs for all hosted credentials, biometric FIDO devices that
fall back to requiring PIN when reading the biometric failed, devices
that don't implement reading credProtect status for downloaded keys
and probably a few more cases that I haven't though of yet.
ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 176db8518933d6a5bbf81a2e3cf62447158dc878
Diffstat (limited to 'sshconnect2.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | sshconnect2.c | 15 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c index 08e984f9..108fd970 100644 --- a/sshconnect2.c +++ b/sshconnect2.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.340 2020/12/29 00:59:15 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.341 2021/01/08 02:57:24 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, const char *alg) { struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL, *prv = NULL; - int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + int retried = 0, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL; char *fp = NULL, *pin = NULL, *prompt = NULL; @@ -1255,6 +1255,7 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, if (sshkey_is_sk(sign_key)) { if ((sign_key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) { + retry_pin: xasprintf(&prompt, "Enter PIN for %s key %s: ", sshkey_type(sign_key), id->filename); pin = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); @@ -1275,8 +1276,16 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0) { debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign"); + if (pin == NULL && !retried && sshkey_is_sk(sign_key) && + r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { + notify_complete(notifier, NULL); + notifier = NULL; + retried = 1; + goto retry_pin; + } goto out; } + /* * PKCS#11 tokens may not support all signature algorithms, * so check what we get back. @@ -1291,7 +1300,7 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, free(prompt); if (pin != NULL) freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); - notify_complete(notifier, "User presence confirmed"); + notify_complete(notifier, r == 0 ? "User presence confirmed" : NULL); sshkey_free(prv); return r; } |