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authordjm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>2020-08-27 01:06:18 +0000
committerDamien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>2020-08-27 11:28:36 +1000
commit9b8ad93824c682ce841f53f3b5762cef4e7cc4dc (patch)
treed4523956d4623b19bf5904d1b92afeb2307f69d3 /sshconnect2.c
parent1196d7f49d4fbc90f37e550de3056561613b0960 (diff)
downloadopenssh-git-9b8ad93824c682ce841f53f3b5762cef4e7cc4dc.tar.gz
upstream: support for user-verified FIDO keys
FIDO2 supports a notion of "user verification" where the user is required to demonstrate their identity to the token before particular operations (e.g. signing). Typically this is done by authenticating themselves using a PIN that has been set on the token. This adds support for generating and using user verified keys where the verification happens via PIN (other options might be added in the future, but none are in common use now). Practically, this adds another key generation option "verify-required" that yields a key that requires a PIN before each authentication. feedback markus@ and Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57fd461e4366f87c47502c5614ec08573e6d6a15
Diffstat (limited to 'sshconnect2.c')
-rw-r--r--sshconnect2.c37
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index 74946da0..347e348c 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.324 2020/06/27 13:39:09 bket Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.325 2020/08/27 01:06:18 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
@@ -1175,7 +1175,7 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL, *prv = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
- char *fp = NULL;
+ char *fp = NULL, *pin = NULL, *prompt = NULL;
*sigp = NULL;
*lenp = 0;
@@ -1204,20 +1204,28 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
goto out;
}
sign_key = prv;
- if (sshkey_is_sk(sign_key) &&
- (sign_key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
- /* XXX match batch mode should just skip these keys? */
- if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key,
- options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint", __func__);
- notifier = notify_start(options.batch_mode,
- "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
- sshkey_type(sign_key), fp);
- free(fp);
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(sign_key)) {
+ if ((sign_key->sk_flags &
+ SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) {
+ xasprintf(&prompt, "Enter PIN for %s key %s: ",
+ sshkey_type(sign_key), id->filename);
+ pin = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+ }
+ if ((sign_key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+ /* XXX should batch mode just skip these? */
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: fingerprint", __func__);
+ notifier = notify_start(options.batch_mode,
+ "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
+ sshkey_type(sign_key), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ }
}
}
if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
- alg, options.sk_provider, compat)) != 0) {
+ alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0) {
debug("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
@@ -1232,6 +1240,9 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
+ free(prompt);
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
notify_complete(notifier);
sshkey_free(prv);
return r;