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| author | djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> | 2018-07-03 11:39:54 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> | 2018-07-03 23:26:36 +1000 |
| commit | 4ba0d54794814ec0de1ec87987d0c3b89379b436 (patch) | |
| tree | b8d904880f8927374b377b2e4d5661213c1138b6 /ssherr.c | |
| parent | 95344c257412b51199ead18d54eaed5bafb75617 (diff) | |
| download | openssh-git-4ba0d54794814ec0de1ec87987d0c3b89379b436.tar.gz | |
upstream: Improve strictness and control over RSA-SHA2 signature
In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when
requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to
ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH
matches the one in the signature itself.
In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature.
Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms
(previously they selected supported key types). This allows these
options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2.
Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures
with certificate keys.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde
Diffstat (limited to 'ssherr.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssherr.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.c,v 1.7 2017/09/12 06:32:08 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.c,v 1.8 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * @@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ ssh_err(int n) return "Invalid key length"; case SSH_ERR_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE: return "number is too large"; + case SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED: + return "signature algorithm not supported"; default: return "unknown error"; } |