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-rw-r--r--ChangeLog4
-rw-r--r--ssh-add.19
-rw-r--r--ssh-agent.116
-rw-r--r--ssh.19
4 files changed, 24 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 67839e27..ef05cbe3 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@
- sobrado@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/10/17 12:10:39
[sftp-server.c]
sort flags.
+ - sobrado@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/10/22 12:35:53
+ [ssh.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-add.1]
+ use the UNIX-related macros (.At and .Ux) where appropriate.
+ ok jmc@
20091011
- (dtucker) [configure.ac sftp-client.c] Remove the gyrations required for
diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1
index 005041b6..c484e94a 100644
--- a/ssh-add.1
+++ b/ssh-add.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.46 2007/06/12 13:41:03 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.47 2009/10/22 12:35:53 sobrado Exp $
.\"
.\" -*- nroff -*-
.\"
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: June 12 2007 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: October 22 2009 $
.Dt SSH-ADD 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -148,8 +148,9 @@ may be necessary to redirect the input from
.Pa /dev/null
to make this work.)
.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
-Identifies the path of a unix-domain socket used to communicate with the
-agent.
+Identifies the path of a
+.Ux
+domain socket used to communicate with the agent.
.El
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds
diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
index 533cd6f6..bbae4af9 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/ssh-agent.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.47 2009/03/26 08:38:39 sobrado Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.48 2009/10/22 12:35:53 sobrado Exp $
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: March 26 2009 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: October 22 2009 $
.Dt SSH-AGENT 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -67,7 +67,9 @@ machines using
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl a Ar bind_address
-Bind the agent to the unix-domain socket
+Bind the agent to the
+.Ux
+domain socket
.Ar bind_address .
The default is
.Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt .
@@ -162,8 +164,9 @@ Instead, operations that require a private key will be performed
by the agent, and the result will be returned to the requester.
This way, private keys are not exposed to clients using the agent.
.Pp
-A unix-domain socket is created
-and the name of this socket is stored in the
+A
+.Ux
+domain socket is created and the name of this socket is stored in the
.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment
variable.
@@ -186,7 +189,8 @@ Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
.It Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt
-Unix-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the
+.Ux
+domain sockets used to contain the connection to the
authentication agent.
These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
index 8c3d32aa..9aca407a 100644
--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.284 2009/10/08 20:42:12 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: October 8 2009 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.285 2009/10/22 12:35:53 sobrado Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: October 22 2009 $
.Dt SSH 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -132,8 +132,9 @@ This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
.Pp
Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
-(for the agent's Unix-domain socket)
-can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
+(for the agent's
+.Ux
+domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.