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* upstream: make sure that UseDNS hostname lookup happens in the monitordjm@openbsd.org2022-06-161-3/+3
| | | | | | | and not in the pledge(2)'d unprivileged process; fixes regression caused by recent refactoring spotted by henning@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a089870b95101cd8881a2dff65b2f1627d13e88d
* upstream: refactor authorized_keys/principals handlingdjm@openbsd.org2022-05-271-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | remove "struct ssh *" from arguments - this was only used to pass the remote host/address. These can be passed in instead and the resulting code is less tightly coupled to ssh_api.[ch] ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d4373d013edc4cc4b5c21a599e1837ac31dda0d
* upstream: do not pass file/func to monitor; noted by Ilja van Sprundel;markus@openbsd.org2021-04-161-3/+2
| | | | | | ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85ae5c063845c410283cbdce685515dcd19479fa
* upstream: revised log infrastructure for OpenSSHdjm@openbsd.org2020-10-171-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | log functions receive function, filename and line number of caller. We can use this to selectively enable logging via pattern-lists. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 51a472610cbe37834ce6ce4a3f0e0b1ccc95a349
* upstream: support for user-verified FIDO keysdjm@openbsd.org2020-08-271-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | FIDO2 supports a notion of "user verification" where the user is required to demonstrate their identity to the token before particular operations (e.g. signing). Typically this is done by authenticating themselves using a PIN that has been set on the token. This adds support for generating and using user verified keys where the verification happens via PIN (other options might be added in the future, but none are in common use now). Practically, this adds another key generation option "verify-required" that yields a key that requires a PIN before each authentication. feedback markus@ and Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57fd461e4366f87c47502c5614ec08573e6d6a15
* upstream: Add new structure for signature optionsdjm@openbsd.org2019-11-251-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | This is populated during signature verification with additional fields that are present in and covered by the signature. At the moment, it is only used to record security key-specific options, especially the flags field. with and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 338a1f0e04904008836130bedb9ece4faafd4e49
* upstream: Refactor signing - use sshkey_sign for everything,djm@openbsd.org2019-11-011-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | including the new U2F signatures. Don't use sshsk_ecdsa_sign() directly, instead make it reachable via sshkey_sign() like all other signature operations. This means that we need to add a provider argument to sshkey_sign(), so most of this change is mechanically adding that. Suggested by / ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5193a03fcfa895085d91b2b83d984a9fde76c8c
* upstream: fixes for !WITH_OPENSSL compilation; ok dtucker@djm@openbsd.org2019-09-061-1/+3
| | | | OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fd68eaa9e0f7482b5d4c7e8d740aed4770a839f
* last bits of old packet API / active_state globalDamien Miller2019-01-201-1/+1
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* remove PAM dependencies on old packet APIDamien Miller2019-01-201-1/+1
| | | | | Requires some caching of values, because the PAM code isn't always called with packet context.
* upstream: remove last references to active_statedjm@openbsd.org2019-01-201-6/+5
| | | | | | with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78619a50ea7e4ca2f3b54d4658b3227277490ba2
* upstream: convert monitor.c to new packet APIdjm@openbsd.org2019-01-201-3/+1
| | | | | | with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61ecd154bd9804461a0cf5f495a29d919e0014d5
* upstream: convert auth.c to new packet APIdjm@openbsd.org2019-01-201-2/+3
| | | | | | with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e10359f614ff522b52a3f05eec576257794e8e4
* Remove support for S/KeyDamien Miller2018-07-311-4/+0
| | | | | | Most people will 1) be using modern multi-factor authentication methods like TOTP/OATH etc and 2) be getting support for multi-factor authentication via PAM or BSD Auth.
* upstream: remove legacy key emulation layer; ok djm@markus@openbsd.org2018-07-121-3/+3
| | | | OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b1f9619259e222bbd4fe9a8d3a0973eafb9dd8d
* upstream: switch over to the new authorized_keys options API anddjm@openbsd.org2018-03-031-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | remove the legacy one. Includes a fairly big refactor of auth2-pubkey.c to retain less state between key file lines. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dece6cae0f47751b9892080eb13d6625599573df
* upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org2017-12-191-2/+2
| | | | | | | | pass negotiated signing algorithm though to sshkey_verify() and check that the negotiated algorithm matches the type in the signature (only matters for RSA SHA1/SHA2 sigs). ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 735fb15bf4adc060d3bee9d047a4bcaaa81b1af9
* upstream commitmarkus@openbsd.org2017-06-011-2/+2
| | | | | | clear session keys from memory; ok djm@ Upstream-ID: ecd178819868975affd5fd6637458b7c712b6a0f
* upstream commitmarkus@openbsd.org2017-05-311-2/+3
| | | | | | switch auth2-pubkey.c to modern APIs; with & ok djm@ Upstream-ID: 8f08d4316eb1b0c4ffe4a206c05cdd45ed1daf07
* upstream commitmarkus@openbsd.org2017-05-311-6/+8
| | | | | | switch from Key typedef with struct sshkey; ok djm@ Upstream-ID: 3067d33e04efbe5131ce8f70668c47a58e5b7a1f
* upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org2016-09-291-4/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf. multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface. Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the required attack surface considerably larger. Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security check in the shared memory manager found by Stack (http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@ NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd for >10 years. Upstream-ID: 32af9771788d45a0779693b41d06ec199d849caf
* upstream commitmarkus@openbsd.org2016-08-141-11/+2
| | | | | | remove ssh1 server code; ok djm@ Upstream-ID: c24c0c32c49b91740d5a94ae914fb1898ea5f534
* upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org2016-03-081-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | refactor canohost.c: move functions that cache results closer to the places that use them (authn and session code). After this, no state is cached in canohost.c feedback and ok markus@ Upstream-ID: 5f2e4df88d4803fc8ec59ec53629105e23ce625e
* upstream commitmarkus@openbsd.org2015-12-071-2/+2
| | | | | | | | implement SHA2-{256,512} for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures (user and host auth) based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt; with & ok djm@ Upstream-ID: cf82ce532b2733e5c4b34bb7b7c94835632db309
* revert 7d4c7513: bring back S/Key prototypesDamien Miller2015-11-301-0/+4
| | | | (but leave RCSID changes)
* upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org2015-11-161-5/+1
| | | | | | | remove prototypes for long-gone s/key support; ok dtucker@ Upstream-ID: db5bed3c57118af986490ab23d399df807359a79
* upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org2015-05-101-3/+3
| | | | | | prevent authorized_keys options picked up on public key tests without a corresponding private key authentication being applied to other authentication methods. Reported by halex@, ok markus@
* upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org2015-02-171-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | Revise hostkeys@openssh.com hostkey learning extension. The client will not ask the server to prove ownership of the private halves of any hitherto-unseen hostkeys it offers to the client. Allow UpdateHostKeys option to take an 'ask' argument to let the user manually review keys offered. ok markus@
* upstream commitmarkus@openbsd.org2015-01-201-5/+2
| | | | | | | | update packet.c & isolate, introduce struct ssh a) switch packet.c to buffer api and isolate per-connection info into struct ssh b) (de)serialization of the state is moved from monitor to packet.c c) the old packet.c API is implemented in opacket.[ch] d) compress.c/h is removed and integrated into packet.c with and ok djm@
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 06:18:35Damien Miller2014-02-041-21/+1
| | | | | | | [Makefile.in auth.h auth2-jpake.c auth2.c jpake.c jpake.h monitor.c] [monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h readconf.c readconf.h] [schnorr.c schnorr.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c] remove experimental, never-enabled JPAKE code; ok markus@
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/06/17 21:44:31Damien Miller2011-06-201-1/+2
| | | | | | [log.c log.h monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h sshd.c] make the pre-auth privsep slave log via a socketpair shared with the monitor rather than /var/empty/dev/log; ok dtucker@ deraadt@ markus@
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/03/05 07:18:19Damien Miller2009-03-061-5/+5
| | | | | | | [auth2-jpake.c jpake.c jpake.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h schnorr.c] [sshconnect2.c] refactor the (disabled) Schnorr proof code to make it a little more generally useful
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/04 08:22:13Damien Miller2008-11-051-1/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [auth.h auth2.c monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h] [readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh2.h ssh_config.5] [sshconnect2.c sshd_config.5 jpake.c jpake.h schnorr.c auth2-jpake.c] [Makefile.in] Add support for an experimental zero-knowledge password authentication method using the J-PAKE protocol described in F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008. This method allows password-based authentication without exposing the password to the server. Instead, the client and server exchange cryptographic proofs to demonstrate of knowledge of the password while revealing nothing useful to an attacker or compromised endpoint. This is experimental, work-in-progress code and is presently compiled-time disabled (turn on -DJPAKE in Makefile.inc). "just commit it. It isn't too intrusive." deraadt@
* - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42Damien Miller2006-08-051-9/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
* - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/14 01:15:28Damien Miller2006-07-241-2/+1
| | | | | | [monitor_wrap.h] don't need incompletely-typed 'struct passwd' now with #include <pwd.h>; ok markus@
* - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/06 17:36:37Damien Miller2006-07-101-2/+2
| | | | | [monitor_wrap.h] typo in comment
* - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/06 16:03:53Damien Miller2006-07-101-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c] [auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth2-hostbased.c] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c includes.h misc.c misc.h monitor.c] [monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h scp.c serverloop.c session.c] [session.h sftp-common.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshd.c sshpty.c sshpty.h uidswap.c] [uidswap.h] move #include <pwd.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 22:22:43Damien Miller2006-03-261-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | [atomicio.h auth-options.h auth.h auth2-gss.c authfd.h authfile.h] [bufaux.h buffer.h canohost.h channels.h cipher.h clientloop.h] [compat.h compress.h crc32.c crc32.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h] [dns.c dns.h getput.h groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c] [gss-serv.c hostfile.h includes.h kex.h key.h log.h mac.h match.h] [misc.h monitor.h monitor_fdpass.h monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.h msg.h] [myproposal.h packet.h pathnames.h progressmeter.h readconf.h rsa.h] [scard.h servconf.h serverloop.h session.h sftp-common.h sftp.h] [ssh-gss.h ssh.h ssh1.h ssh2.h sshconnect.h sshlogin.h sshpty.h] [ttymodes.h uidswap.h uuencode.h xmalloc.h] standardise spacing in $OpenBSD$ tags; requested by deraadt@
* - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 18:14:02Damien Miller2006-03-261-2/+2
| | | | | [monitor_wrap.h sshpty.h] sprinkle u_int throughout pty subsystem, ok markus
* - (dtucker) [audit.c audit.h auth.c auth1.c auth2.c loginrec.c monitor.cDarren Tucker2005-02-081-1/+1
| | | | | | monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h session.c sshd.c]: Prepend all of the audit defines and enums with SSH_ to prevent namespace collisions on some platforms (eg AIX).
* - (dtucker) [Makefile.in auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c loginrec.c monitor.cDarren Tucker2005-02-031-0/+6
| | | | | | monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h session.c sshd.c] Bug #125: (first stage) Add audit instrumentation to sshd, currently disabled by default. with suggestions from and djm@
* - avsm@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/06/21 17:36:31Darren Tucker2004-06-221-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [auth-rsa.c auth2-gss.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c canohost.c channels.c cipher.c dns.c kex.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c scp.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c] make ssh -Wshadow clean, no functional changes markus@ ok There are also some portable-specific -Wshadow warnings to be fixed in monitor.c and montior_wrap.c.
* - (dtucker) [auth-pam.c auth-pam.h auth1.c auth2.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.cDarren Tucker2004-03-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | monitor_wrap.h] Bug #808: Ensure force_pwchange is correctly initialized even if keyboard-interactive is not used by the client. Prevents segfaults in some cases where the user's password is expired (note this is not considered a security exposure). ok djm@
* - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/11/17 11:06:07Damien Miller2003-11-171-1/+2
| | | | | | | [auth2-gss.c gss-genr.c gss-serv.c monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h sshconnect2.c ssh-gss.h] replace "gssapi" with "gssapi-with-mic"; from Simon Wilkinson; test + ok jakob.
* - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/09/23 20:17:11Darren Tucker2003-10-021-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | [Makefile.in auth1.c auth2.c auth.c auth.h auth-krb5.c canohost.c cleanup.c clientloop.c fatal.c gss-serv.c log.c log.h monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h packet.c serverloop.c session.c session.h ssh-agent.c sshd.c] replace fatal_cleanup() and linked list of fatal callbacks with static cleanup_exit() function. re-refine cleanup_exit() where appropriate, allocate sshd's authctxt eary to allow simpler cleanup in sshd. tested by many, ok deraadt@
* - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/08/28 12:54:34Damien Miller2003-09-021-8/+1
| | | | | | | | [auth-krb5.c auth.h auth1.c monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h readconf.c servconf.c session.c ssh_config.5] [sshconnect1.c sshd.c sshd_config sshd_config.5] remove kerberos support from ssh1, since it has been replaced with GSSAPI; but keep kerberos passwd auth for ssh1 and 2; ok djm, hin, henning, ...
* - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/08/22 10:56:09Darren Tucker2003-08-261-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | [auth2.c auth2-gss.c auth.h compat.c compat.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c session.h ssh-gss.h ssh_config.5 sshconnect2.c sshd_config sshd_config.5] support GSS API user authentication; patches from Simon Wilkinson, stripped down and tested by Jakob and myself.
* - (djm) Bug #564: Perform PAM account checks for all authentications whenDamien Miller2003-08-251-0/+1
| | | | UsePAM=yes; ok dtucker
* - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS SyncPOST_KRB4_REMOVALDarren Tucker2003-08-021-4/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/07/22 13:35:22 [auth1.c auth.h auth-passwd.c monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshconnect1.c sshd.c sshd_config.5 ssh.h] remove (already disabled) KRB4/AFS support, re-enable -k in ssh(1); test+ok henning@ - (dtucker) [Makefile.in acconfig.h configure.ac] Remove KRB4/AFS support. - (dtucker) [auth-krb4.c radix.c radix.h] Remove KRB4/AFS specific files. I hope I got this right....
* - (dtucker) [monitor.h monitor_wrap.h] Remove excess ident tags.PRE_KRB4_REMOVALDarren Tucker2003-08-021-1/+0
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