Move protocol version specific code into separate files

Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18132)

12 files changed, 1360 insertions, 1288 deletions

diff --git a/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c b/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
index 52ebb08b8f..f18299315f 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ struct hmac_data_st {
     size_t tls_mac_out_size;
 };
 
-/* Defined in ssl/s3_cbc.c */
+/* Defined in ssl/record/methods/ssl3_cbc.c */
 int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
                            unsigned char *md_out,
                            size_t *md_out_size,
diff --git a/ssl/build.info b/ssl/build.info
index 8cde8b7e53..54fd963549 100644
--- a/ssl/build.info
+++ b/ssl/build.info
@@ -25,16 +25,15 @@ SOURCE[../libssl]=\
         bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c ssl_err_legacy.c tls_srp.c t1_trce.c ssl_utst.c \
         statem/statem.c \
         tls_depr.c $KTLSSRC
-# For shared builds we need to include the libcrypto packet.c and sources
-# needed in providers (s3_cbc.c) in libssl as well.
+
+# For shared builds we need to include the libcrypto packet.c and quic_vlint.c
+# in libssl as well.
 SHARED_SOURCE[../libssl]=../crypto/packet.c ../crypto/quic_vlint.c
+
 IF[{- !$disabled{'deprecated-3.0'} -}]
-  SHARED_SOURCE[../libssl]=s3_cbc.c
   SOURCE[../libssl]=ssl_rsa_legacy.c
 ENDIF
 
 IF[{- !$disabled{quic} -}]
   SOURCE[../libssl]=priority_queue.c event_queue.c
 ENDIF
-
-SOURCE[../providers/libdefault.a ../providers/libfips.a]=s3_cbc.c
diff --git a/ssl/record/methods/build.info b/ssl/record/methods/build.info
index 430a3a1fd5..dfe7d9c808 100644
--- a/ssl/record/methods/build.info
+++ b/ssl/record/methods/build.info
@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
-LIBS=../libssl
-
 SOURCE[../../../libssl]=\
-        tlsrecord.c
+        tls_common.c ssl3_meth.c tls1_meth.c tls13_meth.c tlsany_meth.c
+
+# For shared builds we need to include the sources needed in providers
+# (ssl3_cbc.c) in libssl as well.
+IF[{- !$disabled{'deprecated-3.0'} -}]
+  SHARED_SOURCE[../../../libssl]=ssl3_cbc.c
+ENDIF
+
+SOURCE[../../../providers/libdefault.a ../../../providers/libfips.a]=ssl3_cbc.c
diff --git a/ssl/record/methods/recmethod_local.h b/ssl/record/methods/recmethod_local.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ec4001587d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/record/methods/recmethod_local.h
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "../../ssl_local.h"
+#include "../record_local.h"
+
+/* Protocol version specific function pointers */
+struct record_functions_st
+{
+    int (*set_crypto_state)(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
+                            unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+                            unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
+                            unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
+                            const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+                            size_t taglen,
+                            /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
+                            int mactype,
+                            const EVP_MD *md,
+                            const SSL_COMP *comp,
+                            /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
+                            SSL_CONNECTION *s);
+    int (*cipher)(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
+                  int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs, size_t macsize,
+                  /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s);
+    int (*mac)(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
+               int sending, /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */SSL_CONNECTION *ssl);
+};
+
+struct ossl_record_layer_st
+{
+    OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx;
+    const char *propq;
+    int isdtls;
+    int version;
+    int role;
+    int direction;
+    BIO *bio;
+    /* Types match the equivalent structures in the SSL object */
+    uint64_t options;
+    /*
+     * TODO(RECLAYER): Should we take the opportunity to make this uint64_t
+     * even though upper layer continue to use uint32_t?
+     */
+    uint32_t mode;
+
+    /* read IO goes into here */
+    SSL3_BUFFER rbuf;
+    /* each decoded record goes in here */
+    SSL3_RECORD rrec[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+
+    /* How many records have we got available in the rrec bufer */
+    size_t num_recs;
+
+    /* The record number in the rrec buffer that can be read next */
+    size_t curr_rec;
+
+    /* The number of records that have been released via tls_release_record */
+    size_t num_released;
+
+    /* Set to true if this is the first record in a connection */
+    unsigned int is_first_record;
+
+    /* where we are when reading */
+    int rstate;
+
+    /* used internally to point at a raw packet */
+    unsigned char *packet;
+    size_t packet_length;
+
+    int alert;
+
+    /*
+     * Read as many input bytes as possible (for
+     * non-blocking reads)
+     * TODO(RECLAYER): Why isn't this just an option?
+     */
+    int read_ahead;
+
+    /* The number of consecutive empty records we have received */
+    size_t empty_record_count;
+
+    /* cryptographic state */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx;
+    /* TLSv1.3 static read IV */
+    unsigned char read_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+    /* used for mac generation */
+    EVP_MD_CTX *read_hash;
+    /* uncompress */
+    COMP_CTX *expand;
+
+    /* Only used by SSLv3 */
+    unsigned char mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+    /* TLSv1.3 static IV */
+    unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+
+    size_t taglen;
+
+    /* Function pointers for version specific functions */
+    /* Function pointers for version specific functions */
+    struct record_functions_st *funcs;
+};
+
+extern struct record_functions_st ssl_3_0_funcs;
+extern struct record_functions_st tls_1_funcs;
+extern struct record_functions_st tls_1_3_funcs;
+extern struct record_functions_st tls_any_funcs;
+
+void ossl_rlayer_fatal(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int al, int reason,
+                       const char *fmt, ...);
+
+# define RLAYERfatal(rl, al, r) RLAYERfatal_data((rl), (al), (r), NULL)
+# define RLAYERfatal_data                                          \
+    (ERR_new(),                                                    \
+     ERR_set_debug(OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE, OPENSSL_FUNC),      \
+     ossl_rlayer_fatal)
+
+int ossl_set_tls_provider_parameters(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl,
+                                     EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                     const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+                                     const EVP_MD *md,
+                                     SSL_CONNECTION *s);
+/* ssl3_cbc.c */
+__owur char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+__owur int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
+                                  unsigned char *md_out,
+                                  size_t *md_out_size,
+                                  const unsigned char *header,
+                                  const unsigned char *data,
+                                  size_t data_size,
+                                  size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+                                  const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+                                  size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
diff --git a/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ssl/record/methods/ssl3_cbc.c
index 85f296b807..a254489769 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_cbc.c
+++ b/ssl/record/methods/ssl3_cbc.c
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
  */
 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
 
+#include "recmethod_local.h"
+
 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 
@@ -32,17 +34,6 @@
 #endif
 #include <openssl/sha.h>
 
-char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
-                           unsigned char *md_out,
-                           size_t *md_out_size,
-                           const unsigned char *header,
-                           const unsigned char *data,
-                           size_t data_size,
-                           size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
-                           const unsigned char *mac_secret,
-                           size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
-
 # define l2n(l,c)        (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
                          *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
                          *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
diff --git a/ssl/record/methods/ssl3_meth.c b/ssl/record/methods/ssl3_meth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8ad3e3221d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/record/methods/ssl3_meth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include "../../ssl_local.h"
+#include "../record_local.h"
+#include "recmethod_local.h"
+
+/* TODO(RECLAYER): Handle OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
+static int ssl3_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
+                                 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+                                 unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
+                                 unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
+                                 const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+                                 size_t taglen,
+                                 /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
+                                 int mactype,
+                                 const EVP_MD *md,
+                                 const SSL_COMP *comp,
+                                 /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
+                                 SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
+
+    if (md == NULL) {
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((rl->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ciph_ctx = rl->enc_read_ctx;
+
+    rl->read_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (rl->read_hash == NULL) {
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    if (comp != NULL) {
+        rl->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+        if (rl->expand == NULL) {
+            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                        SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, iv)) {
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(ciph) != NULL
+            && !ossl_set_tls_provider_parameters(rl, ciph_ctx, ciph, md, s)) {
+        /* RLAYERfatal already called */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (mackeylen > sizeof(rl->mac_secret)) {
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    memcpy(rl->mac_secret, mackey, mackeylen);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl3_cipher encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|. Calls RLAYERfatal
+ * on internal error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller
+ * to report a bad_record_mac
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *    0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error
+ *    1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
+ */
+static int ssl3_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs,
+                       int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *mac, size_t macsize,
+                       /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+    SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
+    size_t l, i;
+    size_t bs;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+    int provided;
+
+    rec = inrecs;
+    /*
+     * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case
+     */
+    if (n_recs != 1)
+        return 0;
+    if (sending) {
+        ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
+        if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
+            enc = NULL;
+        else
+            enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+    } else {
+        ds = rl->enc_read_ctx;
+        if (rl->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
+            enc = NULL;
+        else
+            enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(rl->enc_read_ctx);
+    }
+
+    provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL);
+
+    l = rec->length;
+    bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ds);
+
+    /* COMPRESS */
+
+    if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
+        /*
+            * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
+            * padding on the provider side.
+            */
+        i = bs - (l % bs);
+
+        /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
+        l += i;
+        /*
+            * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the
+            * padding length.
+            */
+        memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
+        rec->length += i;
+        rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1);
+    }
+
+    if (!sending) {
+        if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) {
+            /* Publicly invalid */
+            return 0;
+        }
+        /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
+    }
+
+    if (provided) {
+        int outlen;
+
+        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, rec->data, &outlen, rec->input,
+                                (unsigned int)l))
+            return 0;
+        rec->length = outlen;
+
+        if (!sending && mac != NULL) {
+            /* Now get a pointer to the MAC */
+            OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
+
+            /* Get the MAC */
+            mac->alloced = 0;
+
+            *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
+                                                    (void **)&mac->mac,
+                                                    macsize);
+            *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+            if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
+                /* Shouldn't normally happen */
+                RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1) {
+            /* Shouldn't happen */
+            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (!sending)
+            return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&rec->length,
+                                        rec->orig_len,
+                                        rec->data,
+                                        (mac != NULL) ? &mac->mac : NULL,
+                                        (mac != NULL) ? &mac->alloced : NULL,
+                                        bs,
+                                        macsize,
+                                        rl->libctx);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = {
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = {
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
+};
+
+static int ssl3_mac(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
+                    int sending, SSL_CONNECTION *ssl)
+{
+    unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq;
+    const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
+    unsigned char *p, rec_char;
+    size_t md_size;
+    size_t npad;
+    int t;
+
+    if (sending) {
+        mac_sec = &(ssl->s3.write_mac_secret[0]);
+        seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
+        hash = ssl->write_hash;
+    } else {
+        mac_sec = &(rl->mac_secret[0]);
+        seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
+        hash = rl->read_hash;
+    }
+
+    t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
+    if (t < 0)
+        return 0;
+    md_size = t;
+    npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;
+
+    if (!sending
+        && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(rl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
+        && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+        return 0;
+#else
+        /*
+         * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+         * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
+         * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
+         */
+
+        /*-
+         * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
+         *   16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
+         *
+         * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
+         * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
+         * total size.
+         */
+        unsigned char header[75];
+        size_t j = 0;
+        memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
+        j += md_size;
+        memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
+        j += npad;
+        memcpy(header + j, seq, 8);
+        j += 8;
+        header[j++] = rec->type;
+        header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
+        header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
+
+        /* Final param == is SSLv3 */
+        if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(hash),
+                                   md, &md_size,
+                                   header, rec->input,
+                                   rec->length, rec->orig_len,
+                                   mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+#endif
+    } else {
+        unsigned int md_size_u;
+        /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
+        EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+
+        if (md_ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+        rec_char = rec->type;
+        p = md;
+        s2n(rec->length, p);
+        if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+            || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
+            EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+    }
+
+    ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+struct record_functions_st ssl_3_0_funcs = {
+    ssl3_set_crypto_state,
+    ssl3_cipher,
+    ssl3_mac
+};
diff --git a/ssl/record/methods/tls13_meth.c b/ssl/record/methods/tls13_meth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aaee322ae7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/record/methods/tls13_meth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include "../../ssl_local.h"
+#include "../record_local.h"
+#include "recmethod_local.h"
+
+static int tls13_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
+                                  unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+                                  unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
+                                  unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
+                                  const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+                                  size_t taglen,
+                                  /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
+                                  int mactype,
+                                  const EVP_MD *md,
+                                  const SSL_COMP *comp,
+                                  /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
+                                  SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
+    int mode;
+
+    if (ivlen > sizeof(rl->iv)) {
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    memcpy(rl->iv, iv, ivlen);
+
+    ciph_ctx = rl->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (ciph_ctx == NULL) {
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+    rl->taglen = taglen;
+
+    mode = EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph);
+
+    if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0
+        || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL) <= 0
+        || (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
+            && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,  taglen, NULL) <= 0)
+        || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL) <= 0) {
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls13_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
+                        int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *mac, size_t macsize,
+                        /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], recheader[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
+    size_t ivlen, offset, loop, hdrlen;
+    unsigned char *staticiv;
+    unsigned char *seq;
+    int lenu, lenf;
+    SSL3_RECORD *rec = &recs[0];
+    WPACKET wpkt;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+    int mode;
+
+    if (n_recs != 1) {
+        /* Should not happen */
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (sending) {
+        ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
+        staticiv = s->write_iv;
+        seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+    } else {
+        ctx = rl->enc_read_ctx;
+        staticiv = rl->iv;
+        seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+    }
+
+    cipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ctx);
+    if (cipher == NULL) {
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    mode = EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(cipher);
+
+    /*
+     * If we're sending an alert and ctx != NULL then we must be forcing
+     * plaintext alerts. If we're reading and ctx != NULL then we allow
+     * plaintext alerts at certain points in the handshake. If we've got this
+     * far then we have already validated that a plaintext alert is ok here.
+     */
+    if (ctx == NULL || rec->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+        memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
+        rec->input = rec->data;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
+
+    if (!sending) {
+        /*
+         * Take off tag. There must be at least one byte of content type as
+         * well as the tag
+         */
+        if (rec->length < rl->taglen + 1)
+            return 0;
+        rec->length -= rl->taglen;
+    }
+
+    /* Set up IV */
+    if (ivlen < SEQ_NUM_SIZE) {
+        /* Should not happen */
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    offset = ivlen - SEQ_NUM_SIZE;
+    memcpy(iv, staticiv, offset);
+    for (loop = 0; loop < SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop++)
+        iv[offset + loop] = staticiv[offset + loop] ^ seq[loop];
+
+    /* Increment the sequence counter */
+    for (loop = SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop > 0; loop--) {
+        ++seq[loop - 1];
+        if (seq[loop - 1] != 0)
+            break;
+    }
+    if (loop == 0) {
+        /* Sequence has wrapped */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv, sending) <= 0
+            || (!sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
+                                                rl->taglen,
+                                                rec->data + rec->length) <= 0)) {
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Set up the AAD */
+    if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&wpkt, recheader, sizeof(recheader), 0)
+            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt, rec->type)
+            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->rec_version)
+            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->length + rl->taglen)
+            || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &hdrlen)
+            || hdrlen != SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+            || !WPACKET_finish(&wpkt)) {
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        WPACKET_cleanup(&wpkt);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * For CCM we must explicitly set the total plaintext length before we add
+     * any AAD.
+     */
+    if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
+                 && EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, NULL,
+                                     (unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0)
+            || EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, recheader,
+                                sizeof(recheader)) <= 0
+            || EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, rec->data, &lenu, rec->input,
+                                (unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0
+            || EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, rec->data + lenu, &lenf) <= 0
+            || (size_t)(lenu + lenf) != rec->length) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (sending) {
+        /* Add the tag */
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, rl->taglen,
+                                rec->data + rec->length) <= 0) {
+            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        rec->length += rl->taglen;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+struct record_functions_st tls_1_3_funcs = {
+    tls13_set_crypto_state,
+    tls13_cipher,
+    NULL
+};
diff --git a/ssl/record/methods/tls1_meth.c b/ssl/record/methods/tls1_meth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9a77eec492
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/record/methods/tls1_meth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,599 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "../../ssl_local.h"
+#include "../record_local.h"
+#include "recmethod_local.h"
+
+/* TODO(RECLAYER): Handle OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
+static int tls1_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
+                                 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+                                 unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
+                                 unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
+                                 const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+                                 size_t taglen,
+                                 /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
+                                 int mactype,
+                                 const EVP_MD *md,
+                                 const SSL_COMP *comp,
+                                 /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
+                                 SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
+    EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
+
+    if (level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (s->ext.use_etm)
+        s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
+    else
+        s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
+
+    if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+        s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+    else
+        s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+
+    if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE)
+        s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE;
+    else
+        s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE;
+
+    if ((rl->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ciph_ctx = rl->enc_read_ctx;
+
+    rl->read_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (rl->read_hash == NULL) {
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    if (comp != NULL) {
+        rl->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+        if (rl->expand == NULL) {
+            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                        SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+    /*
+     * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
+     */
+    if (!rl->isdtls)
+        RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+
+    /*
+     * If we have an AEAD Cipher, then there is no separate MAC, so we can skip
+     * setting up the MAC key.
+     */
+    if (!(EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
+        if (mactype == EVP_PKEY_HMAC) {
+            mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(rl->libctx, "HMAC",
+                                                      rl->propq, mackey,
+                                                      mackeylen);
+        } else {
+            /*
+             * If its not HMAC then the only other types of MAC we support are
+             * the GOST MACs, so we need to use the old style way of creating
+             * a MAC key.
+             */
+            mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mactype, NULL, mackey,
+                                           (int)mackeylen);
+        }
+        if (mac_key == NULL
+            || EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(rl->read_hash, NULL, EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
+                                     rl->libctx, rl->propq, mac_key,
+                                     NULL) <= 0) {
+            EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+        if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, NULL)
+                || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
+                                        (int)ivlen, iv) <= 0) {
+            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+        if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL)
+                || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12,
+                                       NULL) <= 0
+                || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
+                                       (int)taglen, NULL) <= 0
+                || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
+                                       (int)ivlen, iv) <= 0
+                   /*
+                    * TODO(RECLAYER): Why do we defer setting the key until here?
+                    * why not in the initial EVP_DecryptInit_ex() call?
+                    */
+                || !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL)) {
+            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, iv)) {
+            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
+    if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0
+        && mackeylen != 0
+        && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
+                               (int)mackeylen, mackey) <= 0) {
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(ciph) != NULL
+            && !ossl_set_tls_provider_parameters(rl, ciph_ctx, ciph, md, s)) {
+        /* RLAYERfatal already called */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#define MAX_PADDING 256
+/*-
+ * tls1_cipher encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Calls SSLfatal on internal
+ * error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to report
+ * a bad_record_mac - if appropriate (DTLS just drops the record).
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *    0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
+ *       decryption failed, or Encrypt-then-mac decryption failed.
+ *    1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
+ */
+static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
+                       int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs, size_t macsize,
+                       /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
+    size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+    unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
+    int i, pad = 0, tmpr, provided;
+    size_t bs, ctr, padnum, loop;
+    unsigned char padval;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+    int tlstree_enc = sending ? (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE)
+                              : (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE);
+    SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
+    if (n_recs == 0) {
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (sending) {
+        int ivlen;
+
+        if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->write_hash)) {
+            int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(s->write_hash);
+            if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
+                RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+        ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
+        if (!ossl_assert(s->enc_write_ctx)) {
+            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+        /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
+        if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
+            && EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+            ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(enc);
+        else
+            ivlen = 0;
+        if (ivlen > 1) {
+            for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+                if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
+                    /*
+                        * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
+                        * happen?? (steve)
+                        */
+                    RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    return 0;
+                } else if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, recs[ctr].input,
+                                         ivlen, 0) <= 0) {
+                    RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(rl->read_hash)) {
+            int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(rl->read_hash);
+            if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
+                RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+        ds = rl->enc_read_ctx;
+        if (!ossl_assert(rl->enc_read_ctx)) {
+            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(rl->enc_read_ctx);
+    }
+
+    if ((s->session == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL);
+
+    bs = EVP_CIPHER_get_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds));
+
+    if (n_recs > 1) {
+        if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
+                & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) == 0) {
+            /*
+                * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
+                * cipher doesn't support pipelining
+                */
+            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+        reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length;
+
+        if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
+                    & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0) {
+            unsigned char *seq;
+
+            seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
+                : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+
+            if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+                /* DTLS does not support pipelining */
+                unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
+
+                s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) :
+                    DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p);
+                memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
+                memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8);
+            } else {
+                memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8);
+                for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
+                    ++seq[i];
+                    if (seq[i] != 0)
+                        break;
+                }
+            }
+
+            buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type;
+            buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(rl->version >> 8);
+            buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(rl->version);
+            buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8);
+            buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff);
+            pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
+                                        EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]);
+            if (pad <= 0) {
+                RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            if (sending) {
+                reclen[ctr] += pad;
+                recs[ctr].length += pad;
+            }
+
+        } else if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
+            /*
+                * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
+                * padding on the provider side.
+                */
+            padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
+
+            /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */
+
+            if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) {
+                RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */
+            padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1);
+            for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++)
+                recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval;
+            reclen[ctr] += padnum;
+            recs[ctr].length += padnum;
+        }
+
+        if (!sending) {
+            if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) {
+                /* Publicly invalid */
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (n_recs > 1) {
+        unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+
+        /* Set the output buffers */
+        for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+            data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data;
+        }
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS,
+                                (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) {
+            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        /* Set the input buffers */
+        for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+            data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input;
+        }
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS,
+                                (int)n_recs, data) <= 0
+            || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS,
+                                    (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) {
+            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && tlstree_enc) {
+        unsigned char *seq;
+        int decrement_seq = 0;
+
+        /*
+            * When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation.
+            * So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function.
+            * Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation
+            */
+        if (sending && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s))
+            decrement_seq = 1;
+
+        seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
+                        : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_TLSTREE, decrement_seq, seq) <= 0) {
+            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (provided) {
+        int outlen;
+
+        /* Provided cipher - we do not support pipelining on this path */
+        if (n_recs > 1)  {
+            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, recs[0].data, &outlen, recs[0].input,
+                                (unsigned int)reclen[0]))
+            return 0;
+        recs[0].length = outlen;
+
+        /*
+            * The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual
+            * payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over
+            * any explicit IV
+            */
+        if (!sending) {
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+                    recs[0].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                    recs[0].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+            } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+                    recs[0].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                    recs[0].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+            } else if (bs != 1 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
+                recs[0].data += bs;
+                recs[0].input += bs;
+                recs[0].orig_len -= bs;
+            }
+
+            /* Now get a pointer to the MAC (if applicable) */
+            if (macs != NULL) {
+                OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
+
+                /* Get the MAC */
+                macs[0].alloced = 0;
+
+                *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
+                                                        (void **)&macs[0].mac,
+                                                        macsize);
+                *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+                if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
+                    /* Shouldn't normally happen */
+                    RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                                ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        /* Legacy cipher */
+
+        tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input,
+                            (unsigned int)reclen[0]);
+        if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
+                & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) != 0
+            ? (tmpr < 0)
+            : (tmpr == 0)) {
+            /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (!sending) {
+            for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+                /* Adjust the record to remove the explicit IV/MAC/Tag */
+                if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+                    recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                    recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                    recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+                    recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                    recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                    recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                } else if (bs != 1 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
+                    if (recs[ctr].length < bs)
+                        return 0;
+                    recs[ctr].data += bs;
+                    recs[ctr].input += bs;
+                    recs[ctr].length -= bs;
+                    recs[ctr].orig_len -= bs;
+                }
+
+                /*
+                    * If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but
+                    * with a random MAC if padding is invalid
+                    */
+                if (!tls1_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&recs[ctr].length,
+                                        recs[ctr].orig_len,
+                                        recs[ctr].data,
+                                        (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].mac : NULL,
+                                        (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].alloced
+                                                    : NULL,
+                                        bs,
+                                        pad ? (size_t)pad : macsize,
+                                        (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(enc)
+                                        & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0,
+                                        sctx->libctx))
+                    return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls1_mac(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
+                    int sending, SSL_CONNECTION *ssl)
+{
+    unsigned char *seq;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
+    size_t md_size;
+    int i;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
+    unsigned char header[13];
+    int stream_mac = sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
+                             : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM);
+    int tlstree_mac = sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE)
+                              : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE);
+    int t;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (sending) {
+        seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
+        hash = ssl->write_hash;
+    } else {
+        seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
+        hash = rl->read_hash;
+    }
+
+    t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
+    if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0))
+        return 0;
+    md_size = t;
+
+    /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
+    if (stream_mac) {
+        mac_ctx = hash;
+    } else {
+        hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+        if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) {
+            goto end;
+        }
+        mac_ctx = hmac;
+    }
+
+    if (!rl->isdtls
+            && tlstree_mac
+            && EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_TLSTREE, 0, seq) <= 0) {
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (rl->isdtls) {
+        unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
+
+        s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) :
+            DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p);
+        memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
+
+        memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
+    } else
+        memcpy(header, seq, 8);
+
+    header[8] = rec->type;
+    header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
+    header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+    header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
+    header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
+
+    if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl)
+        && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(rl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
+        && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
+        OSSL_PARAM tls_hmac_params[2], *p = tls_hmac_params;
+
+        *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE,
+                                           &rec->orig_len);
+        *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+        if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(mac_ctx),
+                                     tls_hmac_params)) {
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
+        || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
+        || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "seq:\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, seq, 8, 4);
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "rec:\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rec->data, rec->length, 4);
+    } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+
+    if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+        for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
+            ++seq[i];
+            if (seq[i] != 0)
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "md:\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, md, md_size, 4);
+    } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+    ret = 1;
+ end:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 all use the same funcs */
+struct record_functions_st tls_1_funcs = {
+    tls1_set_crypto_state,
+    tls1_cipher,
+    tls1_mac
+};
diff --git a/ssl/record/methods/tlsrecord.c b/ssl/record/methods/tls_common.c
index d12b38ce39..b693fcf5db 100644
--- a/ssl/record/methods/tlsrecord.c
+++ b/ssl/record/methods/tls_common.c
@@ -11,113 +11,16 @@
 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include "internal/e_os.h"
 #include "internal/packet.h"
 #include "../../ssl_local.h"
 #include "../record_local.h"
-
-/* Protocol version specific function pointers */
-struct record_functions_st
-{
-    int (*set_crypto_state)(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
-                            unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
-                            unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
-                            unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
-                            const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
-                            size_t taglen,
-                            /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
-                            int mactype,
-                            const EVP_MD *md,
-                            const SSL_COMP *comp,
-                            /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
-                            SSL_CONNECTION *s);
-    int (*cipher)(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
-                  int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs, size_t macsize,
-                  /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s);
-    int (*mac)(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
-               int sending, /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */SSL_CONNECTION *ssl);
-};
-
-struct ossl_record_layer_st
-{
-    OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx;
-    const char *propq;
-    int isdtls;
-    int version;
-    int role;
-    int direction;
-    BIO *bio;
-    /* Types match the equivalent structures in the SSL object */
-    uint64_t options;
-    /*
-     * TODO(RECLAYER): Should we take the opportunity to make this uint64_t
-     * even though upper layer continue to use uint32_t?
-     */
-    uint32_t mode;
-
-    /* read IO goes into here */
-    SSL3_BUFFER rbuf;
-    /* each decoded record goes in here */
-    SSL3_RECORD rrec[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
-
-    /* How many records have we got available in the rrec bufer */
-    size_t num_recs;
-
-    /* The record number in the rrec buffer that can be read next */
-    size_t curr_rec;
-
-    /* The number of records that have been released via tls_release_record */
-    size_t num_released;
-
-    /* Set to true if this is the first record in a connection */
-    unsigned int is_first_record;
-
-    /* where we are when reading */
-    int rstate;
-
-    /* used internally to point at a raw packet */
-    unsigned char *packet;
-    size_t packet_length;
-
-    int alert;
-
-    /*
-     * Read as many input bytes as possible (for
-     * non-blocking reads)
-     * TODO(RECLAYER): Why isn't this just an option?
-     */
-    int read_ahead;
-
-    /* The number of consecutive empty records we have received */
-    size_t empty_record_count;
-
-    /* cryptographic state */
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx;
-    /* TLSv1.3 static read IV */
-    unsigned char read_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-    /* used for mac generation */
-    EVP_MD_CTX *read_hash;
-    /* uncompress */
-    COMP_CTX *expand;
-
-    /* Only used by SSLv3 */
-    unsigned char mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-
-    /* TLSv1.3 static IV */
-    unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-
-    size_t taglen;
-
-    /* Function pointers for version specific functions */
-    /* Function pointers for version specific functions */
-    struct record_functions_st *funcs;
-};
+#include "recmethod_local.h"
 
 # define SSL_AD_NO_ALERT    -1
 
-static void rlayer_fatal(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int al, int reason,
-                         const char *fmt, ...)
+void ossl_rlayer_fatal(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int al, int reason,
+                       const char *fmt, ...)
 {
     va_list args;
 
@@ -128,18 +31,11 @@ static void rlayer_fatal(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int al, int reason,
     rl->alert = al;
 }
 
-
-# define RLAYERfatal(rl, al, r) RLAYERfatal_data((rl), (al), (r), NULL)
-# define RLAYERfatal_data                                          \
-    (ERR_new(),                                                    \
-     ERR_set_debug(OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE, OPENSSL_FUNC),      \
-     rlayer_fatal)
-
-static int tls_provider_set_tls_parameters(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl,
-                                           EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-                                           const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
-                                           const EVP_MD *md,
-                                           SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+int ossl_set_tls_provider_parameters(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl,
+                                     EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                     const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+                                     const EVP_MD *md,
+                                     SSL_CONNECTION *s)
 {
     /*
      * Provided cipher, the TLS padding/MAC removal is performed provider
@@ -174,1136 +70,25 @@ static int tls_provider_set_tls_parameters(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl,
     return 1;
 }
 
-static int tls_any_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
-                                    unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
-                                    unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
-                                    unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
-                                    const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
-                                    size_t taglen,
-                                    /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
-                                    int mactype,
-                                    const EVP_MD *md,
-                                    const SSL_COMP *comp,
-                                    /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
-                                    SSL_CONNECTION *s)
-{
-    if (level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE) {
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /* No crypto protection at the "NONE" level so nothing to be done */
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-/* TODO(RECLAYER): Handle OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
-static int ssl3_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
-                                 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
-                                 unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
-                                 unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
-                                 const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
-                                 size_t taglen,
-                                 /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
-                                 int mactype,
-                                 const EVP_MD *md,
-                                 const SSL_COMP *comp,
-                                 /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
-                                 SSL_CONNECTION *s)
-{
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
-
-    if (md == NULL) {
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if ((rl->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    ciph_ctx = rl->enc_read_ctx;
-
-    rl->read_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-    if (rl->read_hash == NULL) {
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return 0;
-    }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-    if (comp != NULL) {
-        rl->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
-        if (rl->expand == NULL) {
-            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-                        SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-#endif
-
-    if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, iv)) {
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(ciph) != NULL
-            && !tls_provider_set_tls_parameters(rl, ciph_ctx, ciph, md, s)) {
-        /* RLAYERfatal already called */
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (mackeylen > sizeof(rl->mac_secret)) {
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    memcpy(rl->mac_secret, mackey, mackeylen);
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-/* TODO(RECLAYER): Handle OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
-static int tls1_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
-                                 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
-                                 unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
-                                 unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
-                                 const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
-                                 size_t taglen,
-                                 /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
-                                 int mactype,
-                                 const EVP_MD *md,
-                                 const SSL_COMP *comp,
-                                 /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
-                                 SSL_CONNECTION *s)
-{
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
-    EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
-
-    if (level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION)
-        return 0;
-
-    if (s->ext.use_etm)
-        s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
-    else
-        s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
-
-    if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
-        s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
-    else
-        s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
-
-    if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE)
-        s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE;
-    else
-        s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE;
-
-    if ((rl->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    ciph_ctx = rl->enc_read_ctx;
-
-    rl->read_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-    if (rl->read_hash == NULL) {
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return 0;
-    }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-    if (comp != NULL) {
-        rl->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
-        if (rl->expand == NULL) {
-            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-                        SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-#endif
-    /*
-     * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
-     */
-    if (!rl->isdtls)
-        RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
-
-    /*
-     * If we have an AEAD Cipher, then there is no separate MAC, so we can skip
-     * setting up the MAC key.
-     */
-    if (!(EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
-        if (mactype == EVP_PKEY_HMAC) {
-            mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(rl->libctx, "HMAC",
-                                                      rl->propq, mackey,
-                                                      mackeylen);
-        } else {
-            /*
-             * If its not HMAC then the only other types of MAC we support are
-             * the GOST MACs, so we need to use the old style way of creating
-             * a MAC key.
-             */
-            mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mactype, NULL, mackey,
-                                           (int)mackeylen);
-        }
-        if (mac_key == NULL
-            || EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(rl->read_hash, NULL, EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
-                                     rl->libctx, rl->propq, mac_key,
-                                     NULL) <= 0) {
-            EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
-            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
-    }
-
-    if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
-        if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, NULL)
-                || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
-                                        (int)ivlen, iv)) {
-            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
-        if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL)
-                || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12,
-                                        NULL)
-                || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
-                                        (int)taglen, NULL)
-                || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
-                                        (int)ivlen, iv)
-                   /*
-                    * TODO(RECLAYER): Why do we defer setting the key until here?
-                    * why not in the initial EVP_DecryptInit_ex() call?
-                    */
-                || !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL)) {
-            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    } else {
-        if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, iv)) {
-            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-    /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
-    if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0
-        && mackeylen != 0
-        && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
-                                (int)mackeylen, mackey)) {
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(ciph) != NULL
-            && !tls_provider_set_tls_parameters(rl, ciph_ctx, ciph, md, s)) {
-        /* RLAYERfatal already called */
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int tls13_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
-                                  unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
-                                  unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
-                                  unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
-                                  const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
-                                  size_t taglen,
-                                  /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
-                                  int mactype,
-                                  const EVP_MD *md,
-                                  const SSL_COMP *comp,
-                                  /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
-                                  SSL_CONNECTION *s)
-{
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
-    int mode;
-
-    if (ivlen > sizeof(rl->iv)) {
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    memcpy(rl->iv, iv, ivlen);
-
-    ciph_ctx = rl->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
-    if (ciph_ctx == NULL) {
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
-    rl->taglen = taglen;
-
-    mode = EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph);
-
-    if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0
-        || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL)
-        || (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
-            && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,  taglen, NULL))
-        || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL) <= 0) {
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int tls_any_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
-                          int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs, size_t macsize,
-                          /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
-{
-    size_t ctr;
-
-    for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
-        memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length);
-        recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data;
-    }
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-/*-
- * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|. Calls SSLfatal on
- * internal error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to
- * report a bad_record_mac
- *
- * Returns:
- *    0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error
- *    1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
- */
-static int ssl3_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs,
-                       int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *mac, size_t macsize,
-                       /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
-{
-    SSL3_RECORD *rec;
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
-    size_t l, i;
-    size_t bs;
-    const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
-    int provided;
-
-    rec = inrecs;
-    /*
-     * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case
-     */
-    if (n_recs != 1)
-        return 0;
-    if (sending) {
-        ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
-        if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
-            enc = NULL;
-        else
-            enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
-    } else {
-        ds = rl->enc_read_ctx;
-        if (rl->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
-            enc = NULL;
-        else
-            enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(rl->enc_read_ctx);
-    }
-
-    provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL);
-
-    l = rec->length;
-    bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ds);
-
-    /* COMPRESS */
-
-    if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
-        /*
-            * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
-            * padding on the provider side.
-            */
-        i = bs - (l % bs);
-
-        /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
-        l += i;
-        /*
-            * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the
-            * padding length.
-            */
-        memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
-        rec->length += i;
-        rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1);
-    }
-
-    if (!sending) {
-        if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) {
-            /* Publicly invalid */
-            return 0;
-        }
-        /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
-    }
-
-    if (provided) {
-        int outlen;
-
-        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, rec->data, &outlen, rec->input,
-                                (unsigned int)l))
-            return 0;
-        rec->length = outlen;
-
-        if (!sending && mac != NULL) {
-            /* Now get a pointer to the MAC */
-            OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
-
-            /* Get the MAC */
-            mac->alloced = 0;
-
-            *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
-                                                    (void **)&mac->mac,
-                                                    macsize);
-            *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
-
-            if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
-                /* Shouldn't normally happen */
-                RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-                return 0;
-            }
-        }
-    } else {
-        if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1) {
-            /* Shouldn't happen */
-            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        if (!sending)
-            return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&rec->length,
-                                        rec->orig_len,
-                                        rec->data,
-                                        (mac != NULL) ? &mac->mac : NULL,
-                                        (mac != NULL) ? &mac->alloced : NULL,
-                                        bs,
-                                        macsize,
-                                        rl->libctx);
-    }
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-#define MAX_PADDING 256
-/*-
- * tls1_cipher encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Calls SSLfatal on internal
- * error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to report
- * a bad_record_mac - if appropriate (DTLS just drops the record).
- *
- * Returns:
- *    0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
- *       decryption failed, or Encrypt-then-mac decryption failed.
- *    1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
+/*
+ * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
+ * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports.
  */
-static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
-                       int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs, size_t macsize,
-                       /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
-{
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
-    size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
-    unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
-    int i, pad = 0, tmpr, provided;
-    size_t bs, ctr, padnum, loop;
-    unsigned char padval;
-    const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
-    int tlstree_enc = sending ? (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE)
-                              : (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE);
-    SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
-
-    if (n_recs == 0) {
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (sending) {
-        int ivlen;
-
-        if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->write_hash)) {
-            int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(s->write_hash);
-            if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
-                RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-                return 0;
-            }
-        }
-        ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
-        if (!ossl_assert(s->enc_write_ctx)) {
-            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
-        /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
-        if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
-            && EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
-            ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(enc);
-        else
-            ivlen = 0;
-        if (ivlen > 1) {
-            for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
-                if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
-                    /*
-                        * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
-                        * happen?? (steve)
-                        */
-                    RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-                    return 0;
-                } else if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, recs[ctr].input,
-                                            ivlen, 0) <= 0) {
-                    RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-                    return 0;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    } else {
-        if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(rl->read_hash)) {
-            int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(rl->read_hash);
-            if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
-                RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-                return 0;
-            }
-        }
-        ds = rl->enc_read_ctx;
-        if (!ossl_assert(rl->enc_read_ctx)) {
-            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(rl->enc_read_ctx);
-    }
-
-    if ((s->session == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL);
-
-    bs = EVP_CIPHER_get_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds));
-
-    if (n_recs > 1) {
-        if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
-                & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) == 0) {
-            /*
-                * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
-                * cipher doesn't support pipelining
-                */
-            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-    for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
-        reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length;
-
-        if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
-                    & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0) {
-            unsigned char *seq;
-
-            seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
-                : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
-
-            if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-                /* DTLS does not support pipelining */
-                unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
-
-                s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) :
-                    DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p);
-                memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
-                memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8);
-            } else {
-                memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8);
-                for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
-                    ++seq[i];
-                    if (seq[i] != 0)
-                        break;
-                }
-            }
-
-            buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type;
-            buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(rl->version >> 8);
-            buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(rl->version);
-            buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8);
-            buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff);
-            pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
-                                        EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]);
-            if (pad <= 0) {
-                RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-                return 0;
-            }
-
-            if (sending) {
-                reclen[ctr] += pad;
-                recs[ctr].length += pad;
-            }
-
-        } else if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
-            /*
-                * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
-                * padding on the provider side.
-                */
-            padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
-
-            /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */
-
-            if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) {
-                RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-                return 0;
-            }
-            /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */
-            padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1);
-            for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++)
-                recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval;
-            reclen[ctr] += padnum;
-            recs[ctr].length += padnum;
-        }
-
-        if (!sending) {
-            if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) {
-                /* Publicly invalid */
-                return 0;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    if (n_recs > 1) {
-        unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
-
-        /* Set the output buffers */
-        for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
-            data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data;
-        }
-        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS,
-                                (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) {
-            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        /* Set the input buffers */
-        for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
-            data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input;
-        }
-        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS,
-                                (int)n_recs, data) <= 0
-            || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS,
-                                    (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) {
-            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && tlstree_enc) {
-        unsigned char *seq;
-        int decrement_seq = 0;
-
-        /*
-            * When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation.
-            * So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function.
-            * Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation
-            */
-        if (sending && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s))
-            decrement_seq = 1;
-
-        seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
-                        : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
-        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_TLSTREE, decrement_seq, seq) <= 0) {
-            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (provided) {
-        int outlen;
-
-        /* Provided cipher - we do not support pipelining on this path */
-        if (n_recs > 1)  {
-            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, recs[0].data, &outlen, recs[0].input,
-                                (unsigned int)reclen[0]))
-            return 0;
-        recs[0].length = outlen;
-
-        /*
-            * The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual
-            * payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over
-            * any explicit IV
-            */
-        if (!sending) {
-            if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
-                    recs[0].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                    recs[0].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-            } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
-                    recs[0].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                    recs[0].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-            } else if (bs != 1 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
-                recs[0].data += bs;
-                recs[0].input += bs;
-                recs[0].orig_len -= bs;
-            }
-
-            /* Now get a pointer to the MAC (if applicable) */
-            if (macs != NULL) {
-                OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
-
-                /* Get the MAC */
-                macs[0].alloced = 0;
-
-                *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
-                                                        (void **)&macs[0].mac,
-                                                        macsize);
-                *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
-
-                if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
-                    /* Shouldn't normally happen */
-                    RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-                                ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-                    return 0;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    } else {
-        /* Legacy cipher */
-
-        tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input,
-                            (unsigned int)reclen[0]);
-        if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
-                & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) != 0
-            ? (tmpr < 0)
-            : (tmpr == 0)) {
-            /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        if (!sending) {
-            for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
-                /* Adjust the record to remove the explicit IV/MAC/Tag */
-                if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
-                    recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                    recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                    recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
-                    recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                    recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                    recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                } else if (bs != 1 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
-                    if (recs[ctr].length < bs)
-                        return 0;
-                    recs[ctr].data += bs;
-                    recs[ctr].input += bs;
-                    recs[ctr].length -= bs;
-                    recs[ctr].orig_len -= bs;
-                }
-
-                /*
-                    * If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but
-                    * with a random MAC if padding is invalid
-                    */
-                if (!tls1_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&recs[ctr].length,
-                                        recs[ctr].orig_len,
-                                        recs[ctr].data,
-                                        (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].mac : NULL,
-                                        (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].alloced
-                                                    : NULL,
-                                        bs,
-                                        pad ? (size_t)pad : macsize,
-                                        (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(enc)
-                                        & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0,
-                                        sctx->libctx))
-                    return 0;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int tls13_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
-                        int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *mac, size_t macsize,
-                        /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
 {
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
-    unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], recheader[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
-    size_t ivlen, offset, loop, hdrlen;
-    unsigned char *staticiv;
-    unsigned char *seq;
-    int lenu, lenf;
-    SSL3_RECORD *rec = &recs[0];
-    WPACKET wpkt;
-    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
-    int mode;
-
-    if (n_recs != 1) {
-        /* Should not happen */
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (sending) {
-        ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
-        staticiv = s->write_iv;
-        seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
-    } else {
-        ctx = rl->enc_read_ctx;
-        staticiv = rl->iv;
-        seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
-    }
-
-    cipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ctx);
-    if (cipher == NULL) {
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    mode = EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(cipher);
-
-    /*
-     * If we're sending an alert and ctx != NULL then we must be forcing
-     * plaintext alerts. If we're reading and ctx != NULL then we allow
-     * plaintext alerts at certain points in the handshake. If we've got this
-     * far then we have already validated that a plaintext alert is ok here.
-     */
-    if (ctx == NULL || rec->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
-        memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
-        rec->input = rec->data;
+    switch (EVP_MD_CTX_get_type(ctx)) {
+    case NID_md5:
+    case NID_sha1:
+    case NID_sha224:
+    case NID_sha256:
+    case NID_sha384:
+    case NID_sha512:
         return 1;
-    }
-
-    ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
-
-    if (!sending) {
-        /*
-         * Take off tag. There must be at least one byte of content type as
-         * well as the tag
-         */
-        if (rec->length < rl->taglen + 1)
-            return 0;
-        rec->length -= rl->taglen;
-    }
-
-    /* Set up IV */
-    if (ivlen < SEQ_NUM_SIZE) {
-        /* Should not happen */
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    offset = ivlen - SEQ_NUM_SIZE;
-    memcpy(iv, staticiv, offset);
-    for (loop = 0; loop < SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop++)
-        iv[offset + loop] = staticiv[offset + loop] ^ seq[loop];
-
-    /* Increment the sequence counter */
-    for (loop = SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop > 0; loop--) {
-        ++seq[loop - 1];
-        if (seq[loop - 1] != 0)
-            break;
-    }
-    if (loop == 0) {
-        /* Sequence has wrapped */
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv, sending) <= 0
-            || (!sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
-                                                rl->taglen,
-                                                rec->data + rec->length) <= 0)) {
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /* Set up the AAD */
-    if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&wpkt, recheader, sizeof(recheader), 0)
-            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt, rec->type)
-            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->rec_version)
-            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->length + rl->taglen)
-            || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &hdrlen)
-            || hdrlen != SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
-            || !WPACKET_finish(&wpkt)) {
-        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        WPACKET_cleanup(&wpkt);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * For CCM we must explicitly set the total plaintext length before we add
-     * any AAD.
-     */
-    if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
-                 && EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, NULL,
-                                     (unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0)
-            || EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, recheader,
-                                sizeof(recheader)) <= 0
-            || EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, rec->data, &lenu, rec->input,
-                                (unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0
-            || EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, rec->data + lenu, &lenf) <= 0
-            || (size_t)(lenu + lenf) != rec->length) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (sending) {
-        /* Add the tag */
-        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, rl->taglen,
-                                rec->data + rec->length) <= 0) {
-            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        rec->length += rl->taglen;
-    }
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = {
-    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
-    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
-    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
-    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
-    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
-    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
-};
-
-static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = {
-    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
-    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
-    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
-    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
-    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
-    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
-};
-
-static int ssl3_mac(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
-                    int sending, SSL_CONNECTION *ssl)
-{
-    unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq;
-    const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
-    unsigned char *p, rec_char;
-    size_t md_size;
-    size_t npad;
-    int t;
-
-    if (sending) {
-        mac_sec = &(ssl->s3.write_mac_secret[0]);
-        seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
-        hash = ssl->write_hash;
-    } else {
-        mac_sec = &(rl->mac_secret[0]);
-        seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
-        hash = rl->read_hash;
-    }
-
-    t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
-    if (t < 0)
-        return 0;
-    md_size = t;
-    npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;
-
-    if (!sending
-        && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(rl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
-        && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
-        return 0;
-#else
-        /*
-         * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
-         * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
-         * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
-         */
-
-        /*-
-         * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
-         *   16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
-         *
-         * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
-         * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
-         * total size.
-         */
-        unsigned char header[75];
-        size_t j = 0;
-        memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
-        j += md_size;
-        memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
-        j += npad;
-        memcpy(header + j, seq, 8);
-        j += 8;
-        header[j++] = rec->type;
-        header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
-        header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
-
-        /* Final param == is SSLv3 */
-        if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(hash),
-                                   md, &md_size,
-                                   header, rec->input,
-                                   rec->length, rec->orig_len,
-                                   mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
-            return 0;
-#endif
-    } else {
-        unsigned int md_size_u;
-        /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
-        EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-
-        if (md_ctx == NULL)
-            return 0;
-
-        rec_char = rec->type;
-        p = md;
-        s2n(rec->length, p);
-        if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
-            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
-            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
-            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
-            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
-            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
-            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
-            || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
-            || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
-            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
-            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
-            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
-            || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
-            EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
-    }
-
-    ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int tls1_mac(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
-                    int sending, SSL_CONNECTION *ssl)
-{
-    unsigned char *seq;
-    EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
-    size_t md_size;
-    int i;
-    EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
-    unsigned char header[13];
-    int stream_mac = sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
-                             : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM);
-    int tlstree_mac = sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE)
-                              : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE);
-    int t;
-    int ret = 0;
-
-    if (sending) {
-        seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
-        hash = ssl->write_hash;
-    } else {
-        seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
-        hash = rl->read_hash;
-    }
-
-    t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
-    if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0))
+    default:
         return 0;
-    md_size = t;
-
-    /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
-    if (stream_mac) {
-        mac_ctx = hash;
-    } else {
-        hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-        if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) {
-            goto end;
-        }
-        mac_ctx = hmac;
     }
-
-    if (!rl->isdtls
-            && tlstree_mac
-            && EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_TLSTREE, 0, seq) <= 0) {
-        goto end;
-    }
-
-    if (rl->isdtls) {
-        unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
-
-        s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) :
-            DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p);
-        memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
-
-        memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
-    } else
-        memcpy(header, seq, 8);
-
-    header[8] = rec->type;
-    header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
-    header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
-    header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
-    header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
-
-    if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl)
-        && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(rl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
-        && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
-        OSSL_PARAM tls_hmac_params[2], *p = tls_hmac_params;
-
-        *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE,
-                                           &rec->orig_len);
-        *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
-
-        if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(mac_ctx),
-                                     tls_hmac_params)) {
-            goto end;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
-        || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
-        || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
-        goto end;
-    }
-
-    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
-        BIO_printf(trc_out, "seq:\n");
-        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, seq, 8, 4);
-        BIO_printf(trc_out, "rec:\n");
-        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rec->data, rec->length, 4);
-    } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
-
-    if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
-        for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
-            ++seq[i];
-            if (seq[i] != 0)
-                break;
-        }
-    }
-    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
-        BIO_printf(trc_out, "md:\n");
-        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, md, md_size, 4);
-    } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
-    ret = 1;
- end:
-    EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
-    return ret;
 }
 
-struct record_functions_st tls_any_funcs = {
-    tls_any_set_crypto_state,
-    tls_any_cipher,
-    NULL
-};
-
-struct record_functions_st tls_1_3_funcs = {
-    tls13_set_crypto_state,
-    tls13_cipher,
-    NULL
-};
-
-struct record_functions_st tls_1_2_funcs = {
-    tls1_set_crypto_state,
-    tls1_cipher,
-    tls1_mac
-};
-
-struct record_functions_st tls_1_1_funcs = {
-    tls1_set_crypto_state,
-    tls1_cipher,
-    tls1_mac
-};
-
-struct record_functions_st tls_1_0_funcs = {
-    tls1_set_crypto_state,
-    tls1_cipher,
-    tls1_mac
-};
-
-struct record_functions_st ssl_3_0_funcs = {
-    ssl3_set_crypto_state,
-    ssl3_cipher,
-    ssl3_mac
-};
-
 static int tls_set1_bio(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, BIO *bio);
 
 static int rlayer_allow_compression(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl)
@@ -2396,13 +1181,9 @@ static OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *tls_new_record_layer(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
         rl->funcs = &tls_1_3_funcs;
         break;
     case TLS1_2_VERSION:
-        rl->funcs = &tls_1_2_funcs;
-        break;
     case TLS1_1_VERSION:
-        rl->funcs = &tls_1_1_funcs;
-        break;
     case TLS1_VERSION:
-        rl->funcs = &tls_1_0_funcs;
+        rl->funcs = &tls_1_funcs;
         break;
     case SSL3_VERSION:
         rl->funcs = &ssl_3_0_funcs;
diff --git a/ssl/record/methods/tlsany_meth.c b/ssl/record/methods/tlsany_meth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..12273549ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/record/methods/tlsany_meth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "../../ssl_local.h"
+#include "../record_local.h"
+#include "recmethod_local.h"
+
+static int tls_any_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
+                                    unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+                                    unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
+                                    unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
+                                    const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+                                    size_t taglen,
+                                    /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
+                                    int mactype,
+                                    const EVP_MD *md,
+                                    const SSL_COMP *comp,
+                                    /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
+                                    SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+    if (level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE) {
+        RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* No crypto protection at the "NONE" level so nothing to be done */
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls_any_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs,
+                          size_t n_recs, int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs,
+                          size_t macsize,
+                          /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+struct record_functions_st tls_any_funcs = {
+    tls_any_set_crypto_state,
+    tls_any_cipher,
+    NULL
+};
diff --git a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
index fa9ef0e2c0..87bfd62bd9 100644
--- a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
+++ b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
@@ -604,23 +604,19 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending,
 }
 
 /*
- * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
- * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports.
+ * TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me: now declared in
+ * ssl/record/methods/recmethod_local.h
  */
-char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    switch (EVP_MD_CTX_get_type(ctx)) {
-    case NID_md5:
-    case NID_sha1:
-    case NID_sha224:
-    case NID_sha256:
-    case NID_sha384:
-    case NID_sha512:
-        return 1;
-    default:
-        return 0;
-    }
-}
+char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
+                           unsigned char *md_out,
+                           size_t *md_out_size,
+                           const unsigned char *header,
+                           const unsigned char *data,
+                           size_t data_size,
+                           size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+                           const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+                           size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
 
 int n_ssl3_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
                int sending)
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_local.h b/ssl/ssl_local.h
index 3af39c8cc7..5648014f18 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_local.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl_local.h
@@ -2869,18 +2869,6 @@ int ktls_configure_crypto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
                           size_t mac_secret_size);
 #  endif
 
-/* s3_cbc.c */
-__owur char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-__owur int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
-                                  unsigned char *md_out,
-                                  size_t *md_out_size,
-                                  const unsigned char *header,
-                                  const unsigned char *data,
-                                  size_t data_size,
-                                  size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
-                                  const unsigned char *mac_secret,
-                                  size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
-
 __owur int srp_generate_server_master_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
 __owur int srp_generate_client_master_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
 __owur int srp_verify_server_param(SSL_CONNECTION *s);