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Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/rand/md_rand.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/md_rand.c124
1 files changed, 86 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index 87fd9455e2..4e581f3917 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -145,18 +145,18 @@ static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
* holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND
* (to prevent double locking) */
/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
-static unsigned long locking_thread = 0; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
+static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
#ifdef PREDICT
int rand_predictable=0;
#endif
-const char *RAND_version="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void);
-static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
+static int ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+static int ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
static int ssleay_rand_status(void);
@@ -187,13 +187,14 @@ static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void)
initialized=0;
}
-static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
+static int ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
{
int i,j,k,st_idx;
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX m;
int do_not_lock;
+ int rv = 0;
/*
* (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
@@ -210,11 +211,14 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
* hash function.
*/
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
/* check if we already have the lock */
if (crypto_lock_rand)
{
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+ do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
}
else
@@ -254,26 +258,41 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)
{
j=(num-i);
j=(j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH:j;
- MD_Init(&m);
- MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (!MD_Init(&m))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
k=(st_idx+j)-STATE_SIZE;
if (k > 0)
{
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k);
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k))
+ goto err;
}
else
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j);
-
- MD_Update(&m,buf,j);
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
- MD_Final(&m,local_md);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,buf,j))
+ goto err;
+ /* We know that line may cause programs such as
+ purify and valgrind to complain about use of
+ uninitialized data. The problem is not, it's
+ with the caller. Removing that line will make
+ sure you get really bad randomness and thereby
+ other problems such as very insecure keys. */
+
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Final(&m,local_md))
+ goto err;
md_c[1]++;
buf=(const char *)buf + j;
@@ -293,7 +312,6 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
st_idx=0;
}
}
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
/* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that
@@ -311,11 +329,15 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
#endif
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
+ return rv;
}
-static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+static int ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
{
- ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
+ return ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
}
static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
@@ -372,7 +394,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
crypto_lock_rand = 1;
@@ -454,28 +476,43 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
/* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num;
num-=j;
- MD_Init(&m);
+ if (!MD_Init(&m))
+ goto err;
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
if (curr_pid) /* just in the first iteration to save time */
{
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid))
+ goto err;
curr_pid = 0;
}
#endif
- MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
-#ifndef PURIFY
- MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)))
+ goto err;
+
+#ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */
+ /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,buf,j))
+ goto err;
+ /* We know that line may cause programs such as
+ purify and valgrind to complain about use of
+ uninitialized data. */
#endif
+
k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num;
if (k > 0)
{
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k);
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k))
+ goto err;
}
else
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
- MD_Final(&m,local_md);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Final(&m,local_md))
+ goto err;
for (i=0; i<MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2; i++)
{
@@ -487,12 +524,16 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
}
}
- MD_Init(&m);
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
- MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (!MD_Init(&m)
+ || !MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c))
+ || !MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- MD_Final(&m,md);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(&m,md))
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ goto err;
+ }
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
@@ -505,6 +546,11 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
"http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html");
return(0);
}
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+
}
/* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not
@@ -520,22 +566,24 @@ static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
err = ERR_peek_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RAND &&
ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED)
- (void)ERR_get_error();
+ ERR_clear_error();
}
return (ret);
}
static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
{
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
int ret;
int do_not_lock;
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
/* check if we already have the lock
* (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */
if (crypto_lock_rand)
{
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+ do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
}
else
@@ -547,7 +595,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
crypto_lock_rand = 1;
}
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