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-rw-r--r--trust/parser.c762
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 762 deletions
diff --git a/trust/parser.c b/trust/parser.c
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--- a/trust/parser.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,762 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat Inc.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above
- * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the
- * following disclaimer.
- * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the
- * above copyright notice, this list of conditions and
- * the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or
- * other materials provided with the distribution.
- * * The names of contributors to this software may not be
- * used to endorse or promote products derived from this
- * software without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
- * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
- * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
- * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
- * COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING,
- * BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS
- * OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED
- * AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
- * OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
- * THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
- * DAMAGE.
- *
- * Author: Stef Walter <stefw@redhat.com>
- */
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#include "array.h"
-#include "asn1.h"
-#include "attrs.h"
-#define P11_DEBUG_FLAG P11_DEBUG_TRUST
-#include "debug.h"
-#include "dict.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-#include "message.h"
-#include "module.h"
-#include "oid.h"
-#include "parser.h"
-#include "path.h"
-#include "pem.h"
-#include "pkcs11x.h"
-#include "persist.h"
-#include "x509.h"
-
-#include <libtasn1.h>
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-struct _p11_parser {
- p11_asn1_cache *asn1_cache;
- p11_dict *asn1_defs;
- bool asn1_owned;
- p11_persist *persist;
- char *basename;
- p11_array *parsed;
- p11_array *formats;
- int flags;
-};
-
-#define ID_LENGTH P11_DIGEST_SHA1_LEN
-
-typedef int (* parser_func) (p11_parser *parser,
- const unsigned char *data,
- size_t length);
-
-static CK_ATTRIBUTE *
-populate_trust (p11_parser *parser,
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs)
-{
- CK_BBOOL trustedv;
- CK_BBOOL distrustv;
-
- CK_ATTRIBUTE trusted = { CKA_TRUSTED, &trustedv, sizeof (trustedv) };
- CK_ATTRIBUTE distrust = { CKA_X_DISTRUSTED, &distrustv, sizeof (distrustv) };
-
- /*
- * If we're are parsing an anchor location, then warn about any ditsrusted
- * certificates there, but don't go ahead and automatically make them
- * trusted anchors.
- */
- if (parser->flags & P11_PARSE_FLAG_ANCHOR) {
- if (p11_attrs_find_bool (attrs, CKA_X_DISTRUSTED, &distrustv) && distrustv) {
- p11_message ("certificate with distrust in location for anchors: %s", parser->basename);
- return attrs;
-
- }
-
- trustedv = CK_TRUE;
- distrustv = CK_FALSE;
-
- /*
- * If we're parsing a blacklist location, then force all certificates to
- * be blacklisted, regardless of whether they contain anchor information.
- */
- } else if (parser->flags & P11_PARSE_FLAG_BLACKLIST) {
- if (p11_attrs_find_bool (attrs, CKA_TRUSTED, &trustedv) && trustedv)
- p11_message ("overriding trust for anchor in blacklist: %s", parser->basename);
-
- trustedv = CK_FALSE;
- distrustv = CK_TRUE;
-
- /*
- * If the location doesn't have a flag, then fill in trust attributes
- * if they are missing: neither an anchor or blacklist.
- */
- } else {
- trustedv = CK_FALSE;
- distrustv = CK_FALSE;
-
- if (p11_attrs_find_valid (attrs, CKA_TRUSTED))
- trusted.type = CKA_INVALID;
- if (p11_attrs_find_valid (attrs, CKA_X_DISTRUSTED))
- distrust.type = CKA_INVALID;
- }
-
- return p11_attrs_build (attrs, &trusted, &distrust, NULL);
-}
-
-static void
-sink_object (p11_parser *parser,
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs)
-{
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS klass;
-
- if (p11_attrs_find_ulong (attrs, CKA_CLASS, &klass) &&
- klass == CKO_CERTIFICATE) {
- attrs = populate_trust (parser, attrs);
- return_if_fail (attrs != NULL);
- }
-
- if (!p11_array_push (parser->parsed, attrs))
- return_if_reached ();
-}
-
-static CK_ATTRIBUTE *
-certificate_attrs (p11_parser *parser,
- const unsigned char *der,
- size_t der_len)
-{
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS klassv = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
- CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE x509 = CKC_X_509;
- CK_BBOOL modifiablev = CK_FALSE;
-
- CK_ATTRIBUTE modifiable = { CKA_MODIFIABLE, &modifiablev, sizeof (modifiablev) };
- CK_ATTRIBUTE klass = { CKA_CLASS, &klassv, sizeof (klassv) };
- CK_ATTRIBUTE certificate_type = { CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE, &x509, sizeof (x509) };
- CK_ATTRIBUTE value = { CKA_VALUE, (void *)der, der_len };
-
- return p11_attrs_build (NULL, &klass, &modifiable, &certificate_type, &value, NULL);
-}
-
-int
-p11_parser_format_x509 (p11_parser *parser,
- const unsigned char *data,
- size_t length)
-{
- char message[ASN1_MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_SIZE];
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *value;
- node_asn *cert;
-
- cert = p11_asn1_decode (parser->asn1_defs, "PKIX1.Certificate", data, length, message);
- if (cert == NULL)
- return P11_PARSE_UNRECOGNIZED;
-
- attrs = certificate_attrs (parser, data, length);
- return_val_if_fail (attrs != NULL, P11_PARSE_FAILURE);
-
- value = p11_attrs_find_valid (attrs, CKA_VALUE);
- return_val_if_fail (value != NULL, P11_PARSE_FAILURE);
- p11_asn1_cache_take (parser->asn1_cache, cert, "PKIX1.Certificate",
- value->pValue, value->ulValueLen);
-
- sink_object (parser, attrs);
- return P11_PARSE_SUCCESS;
-}
-
-static CK_ATTRIBUTE *
-extension_attrs (p11_parser *parser,
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *public_key_info,
- const char *oid_str,
- const unsigned char *oid_der,
- bool critical,
- const unsigned char *value,
- int length)
-{
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS klassv = CKO_X_CERTIFICATE_EXTENSION;
- CK_BBOOL modifiablev = CK_FALSE;
-
- CK_ATTRIBUTE klass = { CKA_CLASS, &klassv, sizeof (klassv) };
- CK_ATTRIBUTE modifiable = { CKA_MODIFIABLE, &modifiablev, sizeof (modifiablev) };
- CK_ATTRIBUTE oid = { CKA_OBJECT_ID, (void *)oid_der, p11_oid_length (oid_der) };
-
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
- node_asn *dest;
- unsigned char *der;
- size_t len;
- int ret;
-
- attrs = p11_attrs_build (NULL, public_key_info, &klass, &modifiable, &oid, NULL);
- return_val_if_fail (attrs != NULL, NULL);
-
- dest = p11_asn1_create (parser->asn1_defs, "PKIX1.Extension");
- return_val_if_fail (dest != NULL, NULL);
-
- ret = asn1_write_value (dest, "extnID", oid_str, 1);
- return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, NULL);
-
- if (critical)
- ret = asn1_write_value (dest, "critical", "TRUE", 1);
- return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, NULL);
-
- ret = asn1_write_value (dest, "extnValue", value, length);
- return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, NULL);
-
- der = p11_asn1_encode (dest, &len);
- return_val_if_fail (der != NULL, NULL);
-
- attrs = p11_attrs_take (attrs, CKA_VALUE, der, len);
- return_val_if_fail (attrs != NULL, NULL);
-
- /* An opmitization so that the builder can get at this without parsing */
- p11_asn1_cache_take (parser->asn1_cache, dest, "PKIX1.Extension", der, len);
- return attrs;
-}
-
-static CK_ATTRIBUTE *
-attached_attrs (p11_parser *parser,
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *public_key_info,
- const char *oid_str,
- const unsigned char *oid_der,
- bool critical,
- node_asn *ext)
-{
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
- unsigned char *der;
- size_t len;
-
- der = p11_asn1_encode (ext, &len);
- return_val_if_fail (der != NULL, NULL);
-
- attrs = extension_attrs (parser, public_key_info, oid_str, oid_der,
- critical, der, len);
- return_val_if_fail (attrs != NULL, NULL);
-
- free (der);
- return attrs;
-}
-
-static p11_dict *
-load_seq_of_oid_str (node_asn *node,
- const char *seqof)
-{
- p11_dict *oids;
- char field[128];
- char *oid;
- size_t len;
- int i;
-
- oids = p11_dict_new (p11_dict_str_hash, p11_dict_str_equal, free, NULL);
-
- for (i = 1; ; i++) {
- if (snprintf (field, sizeof (field), "%s.?%u", seqof, i) < 0)
- return_val_if_reached (NULL);
-
- oid = p11_asn1_read (node, field, &len);
- if (oid == NULL)
- break;
-
- if (!p11_dict_set (oids, oid, oid))
- return_val_if_reached (NULL);
- }
-
- return oids;
-}
-
-static CK_ATTRIBUTE *
-attached_eku_attrs (p11_parser *parser,
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *public_key_info,
- const char *oid_str,
- const unsigned char *oid_der,
- bool critical,
- p11_dict *oid_strs)
-{
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
- p11_dictiter iter;
- node_asn *dest;
- int count = 0;
- void *value;
- int ret;
-
- dest = p11_asn1_create (parser->asn1_defs, "PKIX1.ExtKeyUsageSyntax");
- return_val_if_fail (dest != NULL, NULL);
-
- p11_dict_iterate (oid_strs, &iter);
- while (p11_dict_next (&iter, NULL, &value)) {
- ret = asn1_write_value (dest, "", "NEW", 1);
- return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, NULL);
-
- ret = asn1_write_value (dest, "?LAST", value, -1);
- return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, NULL);
-
- count++;
- }
-
- /*
- * If no oids have been written, then we have to put in a reserved
- * value, due to the way that ExtendedKeyUsage is defined in RFC 5280.
- * There must be at least one purpose. This is important since *not*
- * having an ExtendedKeyUsage is very different than having one without
- * certain usages.
- *
- * We account for this in p11_parse_extended_key_usage(). However for
- * most callers this should not matter, as they only check whether a
- * given purpose is present, and don't make assumptions about ones
- * that they don't know about.
- */
-
- if (count == 0) {
- ret = asn1_write_value (dest, "", "NEW", 1);
- return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, NULL);
-
- ret = asn1_write_value (dest, "?LAST", P11_OID_RESERVED_PURPOSE_STR, -1);
- return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, NULL);
- }
-
-
- attrs = attached_attrs (parser, public_key_info, oid_str, oid_der, critical, dest);
- asn1_delete_structure (&dest);
-
- return attrs;
-}
-
-static CK_ATTRIBUTE *
-build_openssl_extensions (p11_parser *parser,
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *cert,
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *public_key_info,
- node_asn *aux,
- const unsigned char *aux_der,
- size_t aux_len)
-{
- CK_BBOOL trusted = CK_FALSE;
- CK_BBOOL distrust = CK_FALSE;
-
- CK_ATTRIBUTE trust_attrs[] = {
- { CKA_TRUSTED, &trusted, sizeof (trusted) },
- { CKA_X_DISTRUSTED, &distrust, sizeof (distrust) },
- { CKA_INVALID },
- };
-
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
- p11_dict *trust = NULL;
- p11_dict *reject = NULL;
- p11_dictiter iter;
- void *key;
- int start;
- int end;
- int ret;
- int num;
-
- /*
- * This will load an empty list if there is no OPTIONAL trust field.
- * OpenSSL assumes that for a TRUSTED CERTIFICATE a missing trust field
- * is identical to untrusted for all purposes.
- *
- * This is different from ExtendedKeyUsage, where a missing certificate
- * extension means that it is trusted for all purposes.
- */
- trust = load_seq_of_oid_str (aux, "trust");
-
- ret = asn1_number_of_elements (aux, "reject", &num);
- return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS || ret == ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND, NULL);
- if (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS)
- reject = load_seq_of_oid_str (aux, "reject");
-
- /* Remove all rejected oids from the trust set */
- if (trust && reject) {
- p11_dict_iterate (reject, &iter);
- while (p11_dict_next (&iter, &key, NULL))
- p11_dict_remove (trust, key);
- }
-
- /*
- * The trust field (or lack of it) becomes a standard ExtKeyUsageSyntax.
- *
- * critical: require that this is enforced
- */
-
- if (trust) {
- attrs = attached_eku_attrs (parser, public_key_info,
- P11_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_STR,
- P11_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE,
- true, trust);
- return_val_if_fail (attrs != NULL, NULL);
- sink_object (parser, attrs);
- }
-
- /*
- * For the reject field we use a custom defined extension. We track this
- * for completeness, although the above ExtendedKeyUsage extension handles
- * this data fine. See oid.h for more details. It uses ExtKeyUsageSyntax structure.
- *
- * non-critical: non-standard, and also covered by trusts
- */
-
- if (reject && p11_dict_size (reject) > 0) {
- attrs = attached_eku_attrs (parser, public_key_info,
- P11_OID_OPENSSL_REJECT_STR,
- P11_OID_OPENSSL_REJECT,
- false, reject);
- return_val_if_fail (attrs != NULL, NULL);
- sink_object (parser, attrs);
- }
-
- /*
- * OpenSSL model blacklists as anchors with all purposes being removed/rejected,
- * we account for that here. If there is an ExtendedKeyUsage without any
- * useful purposes, then treat like a blacklist.
- */
- if (trust && p11_dict_size (trust) == 0) {
- trusted = CK_FALSE;
- distrust = CK_TRUE;
-
- /*
- * Otherwise a 'TRUSTED CERTIFICATE' in an input directory is enough to
- * mark this as a trusted certificate.
- */
- } else if (trust && p11_dict_size (trust) > 0) {
- trusted = CK_TRUE;
- distrust = CK_FALSE;
- }
-
- /*
- * OpenSSL model blacklists as anchors with all purposes being removed/rejected,
- * we account for that here. If there is an ExtendedKeyUsage without any
- * useful purposes, then treat like a blacklist.
- */
-
- cert = p11_attrs_merge (cert, p11_attrs_dup (trust_attrs), true);
- return_val_if_fail (cert != NULL, NULL);
-
- p11_dict_free (trust);
- p11_dict_free (reject);
-
- /*
- * For the keyid field we use the SubjectKeyIdentifier extension. It
- * is already in the correct form, an OCTET STRING.
- *
- * non-critical: as recommended in RFC 5280
- */
-
- ret = asn1_der_decoding_startEnd (aux, aux_der, aux_len, "keyid", &start, &end);
- return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS || ret == ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND, NULL);
-
- if (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS) {
- attrs = extension_attrs (parser, public_key_info,
- P11_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_STR,
- P11_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
- false, aux_der + start, (end - start) + 1);
- return_val_if_fail (attrs != NULL, NULL);
- sink_object (parser, attrs);
- }
-
-
- return cert;
-}
-
-static int
-parse_openssl_trusted_certificate (p11_parser *parser,
- const unsigned char *data,
- size_t length)
-{
- char message[ASN1_MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_SIZE];
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE public_key_info = { CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO };
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *value;
- char *label = NULL;
- node_asn *cert;
- node_asn *aux = NULL;
- ssize_t cert_len;
- size_t len;
- int start;
- int end;
- int ret;
-
- /*
- * This OpenSSL format is weird. It's just two DER structures
- * placed end to end without any wrapping SEQ. So calculate the
- * length of the first DER TLV we see and try to parse that as
- * the X.509 certificate.
- */
-
- cert_len = p11_asn1_tlv_length (data, length);
- if (cert_len <= 0)
- return P11_PARSE_UNRECOGNIZED;
-
- cert = p11_asn1_decode (parser->asn1_defs, "PKIX1.Certificate", data, cert_len, message);
- if (cert == NULL)
- return P11_PARSE_UNRECOGNIZED;
-
- /* OpenSSL sometimes outputs TRUSTED CERTIFICATE format without the CertAux supplement */
- if (cert_len < length) {
- aux = p11_asn1_decode (parser->asn1_defs, "OPENSSL.CertAux", data + cert_len,
- length - cert_len, message);
- if (aux == NULL) {
- asn1_delete_structure (&cert);
- return P11_PARSE_UNRECOGNIZED;
- }
- }
-
- attrs = certificate_attrs (parser, data, cert_len);
- return_val_if_fail (attrs != NULL, P11_PARSE_FAILURE);
-
- /* Cache the parsed certificate ASN.1 for later use by the builder */
- value = p11_attrs_find_valid (attrs, CKA_VALUE);
- return_val_if_fail (value != NULL, P11_PARSE_FAILURE);
-
- /* Pull out the subject public key info */
- ret = asn1_der_decoding_startEnd (cert, data, cert_len,
- "tbsCertificate.subjectPublicKeyInfo", &start, &end);
- return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, P11_PARSE_FAILURE);
-
- public_key_info.pValue = (char *)data + start;
- public_key_info.ulValueLen = (end - start) + 1;
-
- p11_asn1_cache_take (parser->asn1_cache, cert, "PKIX1.Certificate",
- value->pValue, value->ulValueLen);
-
- /* Pull the label out of the CertAux */
- if (aux) {
- len = 0;
- label = p11_asn1_read (aux, "alias", &len);
- if (label != NULL) {
- attrs = p11_attrs_take (attrs, CKA_LABEL, label, strlen (label));
- return_val_if_fail (attrs != NULL, P11_PARSE_FAILURE);
- }
-
- attrs = build_openssl_extensions (parser, attrs, &public_key_info, aux,
- data + cert_len, length - cert_len);
- return_val_if_fail (attrs != NULL, P11_PARSE_FAILURE);
- }
-
- sink_object (parser, attrs);
- asn1_delete_structure (&aux);
-
- return P11_PARSE_SUCCESS;
-}
-
-static void
-on_pem_block (const char *type,
- const unsigned char *contents,
- size_t length,
- void *user_data)
-{
- p11_parser *parser = user_data;
- int ret;
-
- if (strcmp (type, "CERTIFICATE") == 0) {
- ret = p11_parser_format_x509 (parser, contents, length);
-
- } else if (strcmp (type, "TRUSTED CERTIFICATE") == 0) {
- ret = parse_openssl_trusted_certificate (parser, contents, length);
-
- } else {
- p11_debug ("Saw unsupported or unrecognized PEM block of type %s", type);
- ret = P11_PARSE_SUCCESS;
- }
-
- if (ret != P11_PARSE_SUCCESS)
- p11_message ("Couldn't parse PEM block of type %s", type);
-}
-
-int
-p11_parser_format_pem (p11_parser *parser,
- const unsigned char *data,
- size_t length)
-{
- int num;
-
- num = p11_pem_parse ((const char *)data, length, on_pem_block, parser);
-
- if (num == 0)
- return P11_PARSE_UNRECOGNIZED;
-
- return P11_PARSE_SUCCESS;
-}
-
-int
-p11_parser_format_persist (p11_parser *parser,
- const unsigned char *data,
- size_t length)
-{
- CK_BBOOL modifiablev = CK_TRUE;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
- p11_array *objects;
- bool ret;
- int i;
-
- CK_ATTRIBUTE modifiable = { CKA_MODIFIABLE, &modifiablev, sizeof (modifiablev) };
-
- if (!p11_persist_magic (data, length))
- return P11_PARSE_UNRECOGNIZED;
-
- if (!parser->persist) {
- parser->persist = p11_persist_new ();
- return_val_if_fail (parser->persist != NULL, P11_PARSE_UNRECOGNIZED);
- }
-
- objects = p11_array_new (NULL);
- return_val_if_fail (objects != NULL, P11_PARSE_FAILURE);
-
- ret = p11_persist_read (parser->persist, parser->basename, data, length, objects);
- if (ret) {
- for (i = 0; i < objects->num; i++) {
- attrs = p11_attrs_build (objects->elem[i], &modifiable, NULL);
- sink_object (parser, attrs);
- }
- }
-
- p11_array_free (objects);
- return ret ? P11_PARSE_SUCCESS : P11_PARSE_FAILURE;
-}
-
-p11_parser *
-p11_parser_new (p11_asn1_cache *asn1_cache)
-{
- p11_parser parser = { 0, };
-
- if (asn1_cache == NULL) {
- parser.asn1_owned = true;
- parser.asn1_defs = p11_asn1_defs_load ();
- } else {
- parser.asn1_defs = p11_asn1_cache_defs (asn1_cache);
- parser.asn1_cache = asn1_cache;
- parser.asn1_owned = false;
- }
-
- parser.parsed = p11_array_new (p11_attrs_free);
- return_val_if_fail (parser.parsed != NULL, NULL);
-
- return memdup (&parser, sizeof (parser));
-}
-
-void
-p11_parser_free (p11_parser *parser)
-{
- return_if_fail (parser != NULL);
- p11_persist_free (parser->persist);
- p11_array_free (parser->parsed);
- p11_array_free (parser->formats);
- if (parser->asn1_owned)
- p11_dict_free (parser->asn1_defs);
- free (parser);
-}
-
-p11_array *
-p11_parser_parsed (p11_parser *parser)
-{
- return_val_if_fail (parser != NULL, NULL);
- return parser->parsed;
-}
-
-void
-p11_parser_formats (p11_parser *parser,
- ...)
-{
- p11_array *formats;
- parser_func func;
- va_list va;
-
- formats = p11_array_new (NULL);
- return_if_fail (formats != NULL);
-
- va_start (va, parser);
- for (;;) {
- func = va_arg (va, parser_func);
- if (func == NULL)
- break;
- if (!p11_array_push (formats, func))
- return_if_reached ();
- }
- va_end (va);
-
- p11_array_free (parser->formats);
- parser->formats = formats;
-}
-
-int
-p11_parse_memory (p11_parser *parser,
- const char *filename,
- int flags,
- const unsigned char *data,
- size_t length)
-{
- int ret = P11_PARSE_UNRECOGNIZED;
- char *base;
- int i;
-
- return_val_if_fail (parser != NULL, P11_PARSE_FAILURE);
- return_val_if_fail (filename != NULL, P11_PARSE_FAILURE);
- return_val_if_fail (parser->formats != NULL, P11_PARSE_FAILURE);
-
- p11_array_clear (parser->parsed);
- base = p11_path_base (filename);
- parser->basename = base;
- parser->flags = flags;
-
- for (i = 0; ret == P11_PARSE_UNRECOGNIZED && i < parser->formats->num; i++)
- ret = ((parser_func)parser->formats->elem[i]) (parser, data, length);
-
- p11_asn1_cache_flush (parser->asn1_cache);
-
- free (base);
- parser->basename = NULL;
- parser->flags = 0;
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-int
-p11_parse_file (p11_parser *parser,
- const char *filename,
- struct stat *sb,
- int flags)
-{
- p11_mmap *map;
- void *data;
- size_t size;
- int ret;
-
- return_val_if_fail (parser != NULL, P11_PARSE_FAILURE);
- return_val_if_fail (filename != NULL, P11_PARSE_FAILURE);
-
- map = p11_mmap_open (filename, sb, &data, &size);
- if (map == NULL) {
- p11_message_err (errno, "couldn't open and map file: %s", filename);
- return P11_PARSE_FAILURE;
- }
-
- ret = p11_parse_memory (parser, filename, flags, data, size);
-
- p11_mmap_close (map);
- return ret;
-}