diff options
author | Anatol Belski <ab@php.net> | 2018-08-06 22:35:11 +0200 |
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committer | Anatol Belski <ab@php.net> | 2018-08-06 22:43:45 +0200 |
commit | b053beee7efb64b8e439fb3639de839e615ba89c (patch) | |
tree | c39ca5420abf95d49c4f06d25837a57ad22208c1 | |
parent | 3082600326c2492ef3f24682a1eee0d1b5695c47 (diff) | |
download | php-git-b053beee7efb64b8e439fb3639de839e615ba89c.tar.gz |
Fix stack underflow in phar
The checks can issue reads below and above the temporary buffer. A read
itself doesn't seem dangerous, but the condition result can be
arbitrary. Such reads have to be avoided. Likely this patch should be
backported.
-rw-r--r-- | ext/phar/phar.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/ext/phar/phar.c b/ext/phar/phar.c index 499eca457d..fd716b6038 100644 --- a/ext/phar/phar.c +++ b/ext/phar/phar.c @@ -1850,27 +1850,24 @@ static int phar_analyze_path(const char *fname, const char *ext, size_t ext_len, /* check for ".phar" in extension */ static int phar_check_str(const char *fname, const char *ext_str, size_t ext_len, int executable, int for_create) /* {{{ */ { - char test[51]; const char *pos; if (ext_len >= 50) { return FAILURE; } - if (executable == 1) { - /* copy "." as well */ - strlcpy(test, ext_str, ext_len + 1); - /* executable phars must contain ".phar" as a valid extension (phar://.pharmy/oops is invalid) */ /* (phar://hi/there/.phar/oops is also invalid) */ - pos = strstr(test, ".phar"); + pos = strstr(ext_str, ".phar"); - if (pos && (*(pos - 1) != '/') - && (pos += 5) && (*pos == '\0' || *pos == '/' || *pos == '.')) { - return phar_analyze_path(fname, ext_str, ext_len, for_create); - } else { + if (!pos + || pos != ext_str && (*(pos - 1) == '/') + || (ext_len - (pos - ext_str)) < 5 + || !(pos += 5) + || !(*pos == '\0' || *pos == '/' || *pos == '.')) { return FAILURE; } + return phar_analyze_path(fname, ext_str, ext_len, for_create); } /* data phars need only contain a single non-"." to be valid */ |