diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ext/standard/password.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ext/standard/password.c | 30 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/ext/standard/password.c b/ext/standard/password.c index 5e1c26de54..3be8104df5 100644 --- a/ext/standard/password.c +++ b/ext/standard/password.c @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static char* php_password_get_algo_name(const php_password_algo algo) } } -static php_password_algo php_password_determine_algo(const char *hash, const size_t len) +static php_password_algo php_password_determine_algo(const char *hash, const size_t len) { if (len > 3 && hash[0] == '$' && hash[1] == '2' && hash[2] == 'y' && len == 60) { return PHP_PASSWORD_BCRYPT; @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static int php_password_make_salt(size_t length, char *ret) /* {{{ */ } } - result = safe_emalloc(length, 1, 1); + result = safe_emalloc(length, 1, 1); if (php_password_salt_to64(buffer, raw_length, length, result) == FAILURE) { php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Generated salt too short"); efree(buffer); @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(password_get_info) algo = php_password_determine_algo(hash, (size_t) hash_len); algo_name = php_password_get_algo_name(algo); - + switch (algo) { case PHP_PASSWORD_BCRYPT: { @@ -201,10 +201,10 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(password_get_info) } array_init(return_value); - + add_assoc_long(return_value, "algo", algo); add_assoc_string(return_value, "algoName", algo_name); - add_assoc_zval(return_value, "options", &options); + add_assoc_zval(return_value, "options", &options); } PHP_FUNCTION(password_needs_rehash) @@ -215,13 +215,13 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(password_needs_rehash) char *hash; HashTable *options = 0; zval *option_buffer; - + if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "sl|H", &hash, &hash_len, &new_algo, &options) == FAILURE) { return; } algo = php_password_determine_algo(hash, (size_t) hash_len); - + if (algo != new_algo) { RETURN_TRUE; } @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(password_needs_rehash) case PHP_PASSWORD_BCRYPT: { zend_long new_cost = PHP_PASSWORD_BCRYPT_COST, cost = 0; - + if (options && (option_buffer = zend_symtable_str_find(options, "cost", sizeof("cost")-1)) != NULL) { if (Z_TYPE_P(option_buffer) != IS_LONG) { zval cast_option_buffer; @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(password_verify) size_t password_len, hash_len; char *password, *hash; zend_string *ret; - + if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "ss", &password, &password_len, &hash, &hash_len) == FAILURE) { RETURN_FALSE; } @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(password_verify) zend_string_free(ret); RETURN_FALSE; } - + /* We're using this method instead of == in order to provide * resistance towards timing attacks. This is a constant time * equality check that will always check every byte of both @@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(password_verify) zend_string_free(ret); RETURN_BOOL(status == 0); - + } /* }}} */ @@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(password_hash) case PHP_PASSWORD_BCRYPT: { zend_long cost = PHP_PASSWORD_BCRYPT_COST; - + if (options && (option_buffer = zend_symtable_str_find(options, "cost", sizeof("cost")-1)) != NULL) { if (Z_TYPE_P(option_buffer) != IS_LONG) { zval cast_option_buffer; @@ -325,12 +325,12 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(password_hash) cost = Z_LVAL_P(option_buffer); } } - + if (cost < 4 || cost > 31) { php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Invalid bcrypt cost parameter specified: " ZEND_LONG_FMT, cost); RETURN_NULL(); } - + required_salt_len = 22; hash_format = emalloc(8); sprintf(hash_format, "$2y$%02ld$", (long) cost); @@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(password_hash) } salt_len = required_salt_len; } - + salt[salt_len] = 0; hash = safe_emalloc(salt_len + hash_format_len, 1, 1); |