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Introduced in de4d456b40.
Reported-by: Erik Rijkers <er@xs4all.nl>
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Mainly move some detail from errmsg to errdetail, remove explicit
mention of superuser where appropriate, since that is implied in most
permission checks, and make messages more uniform.
Author: Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart@gmail.com>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20230316234701.GA903298@nathanxps13
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Author: Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart@gmail.com>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20230310000313.GA3992372%40nathanxps13
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Previously, a CREATEROLE user without SUPERUSER could not alter
REPLICATION users in any way, and could not set the BYPASSRLS
attribute. However, they could manipulate the CREATEDB property
even if they themselves did not possess it.
With this change, a CREATEROLE user without SUPERUSER can set or
clear the REPLICATION, BYPASSRLS, or CREATEDB property on a new
role or a role that they have rights to manage if and only if
that property is set for their own role.
This implements the standard idea that you can't give permissions
you don't have (but you can give the ones you do have). We might
in the future want to provide more powerful ways to constrain
what a CREATEROLE user can do - for example, to limit whether
CONNECTION LIMIT can be set or the values to which it can be set -
but that is left as future work.
Patch by me, reviewed by Nathan Bossart, Tushar Ahuja, and Neha
Sharma.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmobX=LHg_J5aT=0pi9gJy=JdtrUVGAu0zhr-i5v5nNbJDg@mail.gmail.com
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Can be set to the empty string, or to either or both of "set" or
"inherit". If set to a non-empty value, a non-superuser who creates
a role (necessarily by relying up the CREATEROLE privilege) will
grant that role back to themselves with the specified options.
This isn't a security feature, because the grant that this feature
triggers can also be performed explicitly. Instead, it's a user experience
feature. A superuser would necessarily inherit the privileges of any
created role and be able to access all such roles via SET ROLE;
with this patch, you can configure createrole_self_grant = 'set, inherit'
to provide a similar experience for a user who has CREATEROLE but not
SUPERUSER.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmobN59ct+Emmz6ig1Nua2Q-_o=r6DSD98KfU53kctq_kQw@mail.gmail.com
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Previously, CREATEROLE users were permitted to make nearly arbitrary
changes to roles that they didn't create, with certain exceptions,
particularly superuser roles. Instead, allow CREATEROLE users to make such
changes to roles for which they possess ADMIN OPTION, and to
grant membership only in roles for which they possess ADMIN OPTION.
When a CREATEROLE user who is not a superuser creates a role, grant
ADMIN OPTION on the newly-created role to the creator, so that they
can administer roles they create or for which they have been given
privileges.
With these changes, CREATEROLE users still have very significant
powers that unprivileged users do not receive: they can alter, rename,
drop, comment on, change the password for, and change security labels
on roles. However, they can now do these things only for roles for
which they possess appropriate privileges, rather than all
non-superuser roles; moreover, they cannot grant a role such as
pg_execute_server_program unless they themselves possess it.
Patch by me, reviewed by Mark Dilger.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmobN59ct+Emmz6ig1Nua2Q-_o=r6DSD98KfU53kctq_kQw@mail.gmail.com
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This is just refactoring; there should be no functonal change. It
might have the effect of slightly reducing the number of calls to
GetUserId(), but the real point is to facilitate future work in
this area.
Patch by me, reviewed by Mark Dilger.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmobFzTLkLwOquFrAcdsWBsOWDr-_H-jw+qBvfx-wSzMwDA@mail.gmail.com
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Instead of having checks in AddRoleMems() and DelRoleMems(), have
the callers perform checks where it's required. In some cases it
isn't, either because the caller has already performed a check for
the same condition, or because the check couldn't possibly fail.
The "Skip permission check if nothing to do" check in each of
AddRoleMems() and DelRoleMems() is pointless. Some call sites
can't pass an empty list. Others can, but in those cases, the role
being modified is one that the current user has just created.
Therefore, they must have permission to modify it, and so no
permission check is required at all.
This patch is intended to have no user-visible consequences. It is
intended to simplify future work in this area.
Patch by me, reviewed by Mark Dilger.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmobFzTLkLwOquFrAcdsWBsOWDr-_H-jw+qBvfx-wSzMwDA@mail.gmail.com
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Backpatch-through: 11
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This routine should not be called directly as mentioned at its top, so
replace it by GetNewOidWithIndex(). Issue introduced by 6566133 when
pg_auth_members.oid got added, so no backpatch is needed.
Author: Maciek Sakrejda
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAOtHd0Ckbih7Ur7XeVyLAJ26VZOfTNcq9qV403bNF4uTGtAN+Q@mail.gmail.com
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Similar to how the INHERIT option controls whether or not the
permissions of the granted role are automatically available to the
grantee, the new SET permission controls whether or not the grantee
may use the SET ROLE command to assume the privileges of the granted
role.
In addition, the new SET permission controls whether or not it
is possible to transfer ownership of objects to the target role
or to create new objects owned by the target role using commands
such as CREATE DATABASE .. OWNER. We could alternatively have made
this controlled by the INHERIT option, or allow it when either
option is given. An advantage of this approach is that if you
are granted a predefined role with INHERIT TRUE, SET FALSE, you
can't go and create objects owned by that role.
The underlying theory here is that the ability to create objects
as a target role is not a privilege per se, and thus does not
depend on whether you inherit the target role's privileges. However,
it's surely something you could do anyway if you could SET ROLE
to the target role, and thus making it contingent on whether you
have that ability is reasonable.
Design review by Nathan Bossat, Wolfgang Walther, Jeff Davis,
Peter Eisentraut, and Stephen Frost.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+Tgmob+zDSRS6JXYrgq0NWdzCXuTNzT5eK54Dn2hhgt17nm8A@mail.gmail.com
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Instead of dozens of mostly-duplicate pg_foo_ownercheck() functions,
write one common function object_ownercheck() that can handle almost
all of them. We already have all the information we need, such as
which system catalog corresponds to which catalog table and which
column is the owner column.
Reviewed-by: Corey Huinker <corey.huinker@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/95c30f96-4060-2f48-98b5-a4392d3b6066@enterprisedb.com
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This prevents marking the argument string for translation for gettext,
and it also prevents the given string (which is already translated) from
being translated at runtime.
Also, mark the strings used as arguments to check_rolespec_name for
translation.
Backpatch all the way back as appropriate. None of this is caught by
any tests (necessarily so), so I verified it manually.
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The GRANT statement can now specify WITH INHERIT TRUE or WITH
INHERIT FALSE to control whether the member inherits the granted
role's permissions. For symmetry, you can now likewise write
WITH ADMIN TRUE or WITH ADMIN FALSE to turn ADMIN OPTION on or off.
If a GRANT does not specify WITH INHERIT, the behavior based on
whether the member role is marked INHERIT or NOINHERIT. This means
that if all roles are marked INHERIT or NOINHERIT before any role
grants are performed, the behavior is identical to what we had before;
otherwise, it's different, because ALTER ROLE [NO]INHERIT now only
changes the default behavior of future grants, and has no effect on
existing ones.
Patch by me. Reviewed and testing by Nathan Bossart and Tushar Ahuja,
with design-level comments from various others.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+Tgmoa5Sf4PiWrfxA=sGzDKg0Ojo3dADw=wAHOhR9dggV=RmQ@mail.gmail.com
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Previously, membership of role A in role B could be recorded in the
catalog tables only once. This meant that a new grant of role A to
role B would overwrite the previous grant. For other object types, a
new grant of permission on an object - in this case role A - exists
along side the existing grant provided that the grantor is different.
Either grant can be revoked independently of the other, and
permissions remain so long as at least one grant remains. Make role
grants work similarly.
Previously, when granting membership in a role, the superuser could
specify any role whatsoever as the grantor, but for other object types,
the grantor of record must be either the owner of the object, or a
role that currently has privileges to perform a similar GRANT.
Implement the same scheme for role grants, treating the bootstrap
superuser as the role owner since roles do not have owners. This means
that attempting to revoke a grant, or admin option on a grant, can now
fail if there are dependent privileges, and that CASCADE can be used
to revoke these. It also means that you can't grant ADMIN OPTION on
a role back to a user who granted it directly or indirectly to you,
similar to how you can't give WITH GRANT OPTION on a privilege back
to a role which granted it directly or indirectly to you.
Previously, only the superuser could specify GRANTED BY with a user
other than the current user. Relax that rule to allow the grantor
to be any role whose privileges the current user posseses. This
doesn't improve compatibility with what we do for other object types,
where support for GRANTED BY is entirely vestigial, but it makes this
feature more usable and seems to make sense to change at the same time
we're changing related behaviors.
Along the way, fix "ALTER GROUP group_name ADD USER user_name" to
require the same privileges as "GRANT group_name TO user_name".
Previously, CREATEROLE privileges were sufficient for either, but
only the former form was permissible with ADMIN OPTION on the role.
Now, either CREATEROLE or ADMIN OPTION on the role suffices for
either spelling.
Patch by me, reviewed by Stephen Frost.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmoaFr-RZeQ+WoQ5nKPv97oT9+aDgK_a5+qWHSgbDsMp1Vg@mail.gmail.com
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Previously, "GRANT foo TO bar" or "GRANT foo TO bar GRANTED BY baz"
would record the OID of the grantor in pg_auth_members.grantor, but
that role could later be dropped without modifying or removing the
pg_auth_members record. That's not great, because we typically try
to avoid dangling references in catalog data.
Now, a role grant depends on the grantor, and the grantor can't be
dropped without removing the grant or changing the grantor. "DROP
OWNED BY" will remove the grant, just as it does for other kinds of
privileges. "REASSIGN OWNED BY" will not, again just like what we do
in other cases involving privileges.
pg_auth_members now has an OID column, because that is needed in order
for dependencies to work. It also now has an index on the grantor
column, because otherwise dropping a role would require a sequential
scan of the entire table to see whether the role's OID is in use as
a grantor. That probably wouldn't be too large a problem in practice,
but it seems better to have an index just in case.
A follow-on patch is planned with the goal of more thoroughly
rationalizing the behavior of role grants. This patch is just trying
to do enough to make sure that the data we store in the catalogs is at
some basic level valid.
Patch by me, reviewed by Stephen Frost
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmoaFr-RZeQ+WoQ5nKPv97oT9+aDgK_a5+qWHSgbDsMp1Vg@mail.gmail.com
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The BoolGetDatum() call ended up in the wrong place. It should be
applied when we, err, want to convert a bool to a datum.
Thanks to Tom Lane for noticing this.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/2511599.1658861964@sss.pgh.pa.us
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A bootstrap user who is not a superuser will still own many
important system objects, such as the pg_catalog schema, that
will likely allow that user to regain superuser status. Therefore,
allowing the superuser property to be removed from the superuser
creates a false perception of security where none exists.
Although removing superuser from the bootstrap user is also a bad idea
and should be considered unsupported in all released versions, no
back-patch, as this is a behavior change.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmoZirCwArJms_fgvLBFrC6b=HdxmG7iAhv+kt_=NBA7tEw@mail.gmail.com
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This replaces all MemSet() calls with struct initialization where that
is easily and obviously possible. (For example, some cases have to
worry about padding bits, so I left those.)
(The same could be done with appropriate memset() calls, but this
patch is part of an effort to phase out MemSet(), so it doesn't touch
memset() calls.)
Reviewed-by: Ranier Vilela <ranier.vf@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@alvh.no-ip.org>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/9847b13c-b785-f4e2-75c3-12ec77a3b05c@enterprisedb.com
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Run pgindent, pgperltidy, and reformat-dat-files.
I manually fixed a couple of comments that pgindent uglified.
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Commit f9fd1764615ed5d85fab703b0ffb0c323fe7dfd5 effectively gave
every role ADMIN OPTION on itself. However, this appears to be
something that happened accidentally as a result of refactoring
work rather than an intentional decision. Almost a decade later,
it was discovered that this was a security vulnerability. As a
result, commit fea164a72a7bfd50d77ba5fb418d357f8f2bb7d0 restricted
this implicit ADMIN OPTION privilege to be exercisable only when
the role being administered is the same as the session user and
when no security-restricted operation is in progress. That
commit also documented the existence of this implicit privilege
for what seems to be the first time.
The effect of the privilege is to allow a login role to grant
the privileges of that role, and optionally ADMIN OPTION on it,
to some other role. That's an unusual thing to do, because generally
membership is granted in roles used as groups, rather than roles
used as users. Therefore, it does not seem likely that removing
the privilege will break things for many PostgreSQL users.
However, it will make it easier to reason about the permissions
system. This is the only case where a user who has not been given any
special permission (superuser, or ADMIN OPTION on some role) can
modify role membership, so removing it makes things more consistent.
For example, if a superuser sets up role A and B and grants A to B
but no other privileges to anyone, she can now be sure that no one
else will be able to revoke that grant. Without this change, that
would have been true only if A was a non-login role.
Patch by me. Reviewed by Tom Lane and Stephen Frost.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+Tgmoawdt03kbA+dNyBcNWJpRxu0f4X=69Y3+DkXXZqmwMDLg@mail.gmail.com
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Before, SQL-level boolean constants were represented by a string with
a cast, and internal Boolean values in DDL commands were usually
represented by Integer nodes. This takes the place of both of these
uses, making the intent clearer and having some amount of type safety.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Stehule <pavel.stehule@gmail.com>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/8c1a2e37-c68d-703c-5a83-7a6077f4f997@enterprisedb.com
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Get rid of the three-valued logic for the Boolean variables to track
whether the value was been specified and what the new value should be.
Instead, we can use the "dfoo" variables to determine whether the
value was specified and should be applied. This was already done in
some cases, so this makes this more uniform and removes one layer of
indirection.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Stehule <pavel.stehule@gmail.com>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/8c1a2e37-c68d-703c-5a83-7a6077f4f997@enterprisedb.com
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The existing cryptohash facility was causing problems in some code paths
related to MD5 (frontend and backend) that relied on the fact that the
only type of error that could happen would be an OOM, as the MD5
implementation used in PostgreSQL ~13 (the in-core implementation is
used when compiling with or without OpenSSL in those older versions),
could fail only under this circumstance.
The new cryptohash facilities can fail for reasons other than OOMs, like
attempting MD5 when FIPS is enabled (upstream OpenSSL allows that up to
1.0.2, Fedora and Photon patch OpenSSL 1.1.1 to allow that), so this
would cause incorrect reports to show up.
This commit extends the cryptohash APIs so as callers of those routines
can fetch more context when an error happens, by using a new routine
called pg_cryptohash_error(). The error states are stored within each
implementation's internal context data, so as it is possible to extend
the logic depending on what's suited for an implementation. The default
implementation requires few error states, but OpenSSL could report
various issues depending on its internal state so more is needed in
cryptohash_openssl.c, and the code is shaped so as we are always able to
grab the necessary information.
The core code is changed to adapt to the new error routine, painting
more "const" across the call stack where the static errors are stored,
particularly in authentication code paths on variables that provide
log details. This way, any future changes would warn if attempting to
free these strings. The MD5 authentication code was also a bit blurry
about the handling of "logdetail" (LOG sent to the postmaster), so
improve the comments related that, while on it.
The origin of the problem is 87ae969, that introduced the centralized
cryptohash facility. Extra changes are done for pgcrypto in v14 for the
non-OpenSSL code path to cope with the improvements done by this
commit.
Reported-by: Michael Mühlbeyer
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Tom Lane
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/89B7F072-5BBE-4C92-903E-D83E865D9367@trivadis.com
Backpatch-through: 14
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Backpatch-through: 10
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The reverted commit attempted to fix SQL specification compliance for
the cases which 6aaaa76bb left. This however broke existing behavior
which takes precedence over spec compliance so revert. The introduced
tests are left after the revert since the codepath isn't well covered.
Per bug report 17346. Backpatch down to 14 where it was introduced.
Reported-by: Andrew Bille <andrewbille@gmail.com>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/17346-f72b28bd1a341060@postgresql.org
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Commit 6aaaa76bb added support for the GRANTED BY clause in GRANT and
REVOKE statements, but missed adding support for checking the role in
the REVOKE ROLE case. Fix by checking that the parsed role matches the
CURRENT_ROLE/CURRENT_USER requirement, and also add some tests for it.
Backpatch to v14 where GRANTED BY support was introduced.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/B7F6699A-A984-4943-B9BF-CEB84C003527@yesql.se
Backpatch-through: 14
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When reporting "conflicting or redundant options" errors, try to
ensure that errposition() is used, to help the user identify the
offending option.
Formerly, errposition() was invoked in less than 60% of cases. This
patch raises that to over 90%, but there remain a few places where the
ParseState is not readily available. Using errdetail() might improve
the error in such cases, but that is left as a task for the future.
Additionally, since this error is thrown from over 100 places in the
codebase, introduce a dedicated function to throw it, reducing code
duplication.
Extracted from a slightly larger patch by Vignesh C. Reviewed by
Bharath Rupireddy, Alvaro Herrera, Dilip Kumar, Hou Zhijie, Peter
Smith, Daniel Gustafsson, Julien Rouhaud and me.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CALDaNm33FFSS5tVyvmkoK2cCMuDVxcui=gFrjti9ROfynqSAGA@mail.gmail.com
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Commit c9c41c7a337d3e2deb0b2a193e9ecfb865d8f52b used two different
naming patterns. Standardize on the majority pattern, which was the
only pattern in the last reviewed version of that commit.
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The term 'default roles' wasn't quite apt as these roles aren't able to
be modified or removed after installation, so rename them to be
'Predefined Roles' instead, adding an entry into the newly added
Obsolete Appendix to help users of current releases find the new
documentation.
Bruce Momjian and Stephen Frost
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/157742545062.1149.11052653770497832538%40wrigleys.postgresql.org
and https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20201120211304.GG16415@tamriel.snowman.net
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Membership consists, implicitly, of the current database owner. Expect
use in template databases. Once pg_database_owner has rights within a
template, each owner of a database instantiated from that template will
exercise those rights.
Reviewed by John Naylor.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20201228043148.GA1053024@rfd.leadboat.com
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Backpatch-through: 9.5
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Clarify wording as per suggestion from Wolfgang Walther.
No back-patch; this doesn't seem worth thrashing translatable
strings in the back branches.
Tom Lane and Stephen Frost
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/a5548a9f-89ee-3167-129d-162b5985fcf8@technowledgy.de
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The intention in commit 491c029db was to require superuserness to
change the BYPASSRLS property, but the actual effect of the coding
in AlterRole() was to require superuserness to change anything at all
about a BYPASSRLS role. Other properties of a BYPASSRLS role should
be changeable under the same rules as for a normal role, though.
Fix that, and also take care of some documentation omissions related
to BYPASSRLS and REPLICATION role properties.
Tom Lane and Stephen Frost, per bug report from Wolfgang Walther.
Back-patch to all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/a5548a9f-89ee-3167-129d-162b5985fcf8@technowledgy.de
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Also, the legacy values on/true/yes/1 for password_encryption that
mapped to md5 are removed. The only valid values are now
scram-sha-256 and md5.
Reviewed-by: Jonathan S. Katz <jkatz@postgresql.org>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/d5b0ad33-7d94-bdd1-caac-43a1c782cab2%402ndquadrant.com
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CreateRole() was passing a Value node, not a RoleSpec node, for the
newly-created role name when adding the role as a member of existing
roles for the IN ROLE syntax.
This mistake went unnoticed because the node in question is used only
for error messages and is not accessed on non-error paths.
In older pg versions (such as 9.5 where this was found), this results
in an "unexpected node type" error in place of the real error. That
node type check was removed at some point, after which the code would
accidentally fail to fail on 64-bit platforms (on which accessing the
Value node as if it were a RoleSpec would be mostly harmless) or give
an "unexpected role type" error on 32-bit platforms.
Fix the code to pass the correct node type, and add an lfirst_node
assertion just in case.
Per report on irc from user m1chelangelo.
Backpatch all the way, because this error has been around for a long
time.
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These should've been dropped by a8bb8eb58, but evidently were
missed. Not important enough to back-patch.
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Cosmetic cleanup, not worth backpatching.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20200129200401.GA6303@alvherre.pgsql
Reviewed-by: Tom Lane, Michael Paquier
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Backpatch-through: update all files in master, backpatch legal files through 9.4
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This follows multiple complains from Peter Geoghegan, Andres Freund and
Alvaro Herrera that this issue ought to be dug more before actually
happening, if it happens.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20191226144606.GA5659@alvherre.pgsql
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The following renaming is done so as source files related to index
access methods are more consistent with table access methods (the
original names used for index AMs ware too generic, and could be
confused as including features related to table AMs):
- amapi.h -> indexam.h.
- amapi.c -> indexamapi.c. Here we have an equivalent with
backend/access/table/tableamapi.c.
- amvalidate.c -> indexamvalidate.c.
- amvalidate.h -> indexamvalidate.h.
- genam.c -> indexgenam.c.
- genam.h -> indexgenam.h.
This has been discussed during the development of v12 when table AM was
worked on, but the renaming never happened.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Fabien Coelho, Julien Rouhaud
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20191223053434.GF34339@paquier.xyz
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In commit 18555b132 we tentatively established a rule that regression
tests should use names containing "regression" for databases, and names
starting with "regress_" for all other globally-visible object names, so
as to circumscribe the side-effects that "make installcheck" could have
on an existing installation.
This commit adds a simple enforcement mechanism for that rule: if the code
is compiled with ENFORCE_REGRESSION_TEST_NAME_RESTRICTIONS defined, it
will emit a warning (not an error) whenever a database, role, tablespace,
subscription, or replication origin name is created that doesn't obey the
rule. Running one or more buildfarm members with that symbol defined
should be enough to catch new violations, at least in the regular
regression tests. Most TAP tests wouldn't notice such warnings, but
that's actually fine because TAP tests don't execute against an existing
server anyway.
Since it's already the case that running src/test/modules/ tests in
installcheck mode is deprecated, we can use that as a home for tests
that seem unsafe to run against an existing server, such as tests that
might have side-effects on existing roles. Document that (though this
commit doesn't in itself make it any less safe than before).
Update regress.sgml to define these restrictions more clearly, and
to clean up assorted lack-of-up-to-date-ness in its descriptions of
the available regression tests.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/16638.1468620817@sss.pgh.pa.us
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Switch to 2.1 version of pg_bsd_indent. This formats
multiline function declarations "correctly", that is with
additional lines of parameter declarations indented to match
where the first line's left parenthesis is.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAEepm=0P3FeTXRcU5B2W3jv3PgRVZ-kGUXLGfd42FFhUROO3ug@mail.gmail.com
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Most of these had been obsoleted by 568d4138c / the SnapshotNow
removal.
This is is preparation for moving most of tqual.[ch] into either
snapmgr.h or heapam.h, which in turn is in preparation for pluggable
table AMs.
Author: Andres Freund
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20180703070645.wchpu5muyto5n647@alap3.anarazel.de
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Author: Andres Freund
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20190111000539.xbv7s6w7ilcvm7dp@alap3.anarazel.de
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A lot of files only included heapam.h for relation_open, heap_open etc
- replace the heapam.h include in those files with the narrower
header.
Author: Andres Freund
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20190111000539.xbv7s6w7ilcvm7dp@alap3.anarazel.de
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Backpatch-through: certain files through 9.4
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Previously tables declared WITH OIDS, including a significant fraction
of the catalog tables, stored the oid column not as a normal column,
but as part of the tuple header.
This special column was not shown by default, which was somewhat odd,
as it's often (consider e.g. pg_class.oid) one of the more important
parts of a row. Neither pg_dump nor COPY included the contents of the
oid column by default.
The fact that the oid column was not an ordinary column necessitated a
significant amount of special case code to support oid columns. That
already was painful for the existing, but upcoming work aiming to make
table storage pluggable, would have required expanding and duplicating
that "specialness" significantly.
WITH OIDS has been deprecated since 2005 (commit ff02d0a05280e0).
Remove it.
Removing includes:
- CREATE TABLE and ALTER TABLE syntax for declaring the table to be
WITH OIDS has been removed (WITH (oids[ = true]) will error out)
- pg_dump does not support dumping tables declared WITH OIDS and will
issue a warning when dumping one (and ignore the oid column).
- restoring an pg_dump archive with pg_restore will warn when
restoring a table with oid contents (and ignore the oid column)
- COPY will refuse to load binary dump that includes oids.
- pg_upgrade will error out when encountering tables declared WITH
OIDS, they have to be altered to remove the oid column first.
- Functionality to access the oid of the last inserted row (like
plpgsql's RESULT_OID, spi's SPI_lastoid, ...) has been removed.
The syntax for declaring a table WITHOUT OIDS (or WITH (oids = false)
for CREATE TABLE) is still supported. While that requires a bit of
support code, it seems unnecessary to break applications / dumps that
do not use oids, and are explicit about not using them.
The biggest user of WITH OID columns was postgres' catalog. This
commit changes all 'magic' oid columns to be columns that are normally
declared and stored. To reduce unnecessary query breakage all the
newly added columns are still named 'oid', even if a table's column
naming scheme would indicate 'reloid' or such. This obviously
requires adapting a lot code, mostly replacing oid access via
HeapTupleGetOid() with access to the underlying Form_pg_*->oid column.
The bootstrap process now assigns oids for all oid columns in
genbki.pl that do not have an explicit value (starting at the largest
oid previously used), only oids assigned later by oids will be above
FirstBootstrapObjectId. As the oid column now is a normal column the
special bootstrap syntax for oids has been removed.
Oids are not automatically assigned during insertion anymore, all
backend code explicitly assigns oids with GetNewOidWithIndex(). For
the rare case that insertions into the catalog via SQL are called for
the new pg_nextoid() function can be used (which only works on catalog
tables).
The fact that oid columns on system tables are now normal columns
means that they will be included in the set of columns expanded
by * (i.e. SELECT * FROM pg_class will now include the table's oid,
previously it did not). It'd not technically be hard to hide oid
column by default, but that'd mean confusing behavior would either
have to be carried forward forever, or it'd cause breakage down the
line.
While it's not unlikely that further adjustments are needed, the
scope/invasiveness of the patch makes it worthwhile to get merge this
now. It's painful to maintain externally, too complicated to commit
after the code code freeze, and a dependency of a number of other
patches.
Catversion bump, for obvious reasons.
Author: Andres Freund, with contributions by John Naylor
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20180930034810.ywp2c7awz7opzcfr@alap3.anarazel.de
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AclObjectKind was basically just another enumeration for object types,
and we already have a preferred one for that. It's only used in
aclcheck_error. By using ObjectType instead, we can also give some more
precise error messages, for example "index" instead of "relation".
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
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Backpatch-through: certain files through 9.3
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