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authorEivind Næss <eivnaes@yahoo.com>2021-06-24 16:06:11 -0700
committerEivind Næss <eivnaes@yahoo.com>2021-09-27 09:17:32 -0700
commit789e867f6e51b2d3e7f6ebe723f43764d5d8b595 (patch)
tree4b58142260936a5647fe24309c678783e666bede /pppd
parent4e2c49755175d05f7f4a3c1c70a42d2eef9d7839 (diff)
downloadppp-789e867f6e51b2d3e7f6ebe723f43764d5d8b595.tar.gz
Improve the PEAP contribution by Rustam Kovhaev
These changes adds to his contribution by * Adding options to perform CA/CRL checking and certificate validation consistent with what is already been done for EAP-TLS * Certificate validation is now in line with what is already been done for EAP-TLS. Users can now set "remotename" and "tls-verify-method" to control these. * Validation of certificate purpose and extended key usage is controlled by the option "tls-verify-key-usage". * Fixing up MPPE key generation to use the new API for handling MPPE keys * Man page is updated where appropriate for the new options. * Added unit-tests for the PEAP code in case of crypto or parameters would change in the future. * Added the peap feature to configure scripts. Users can now control the feature by specifying --enable-peap/--disable-peap. To acheive feature parity with the EAP-TLS change, the EAP-TLS common code was refactored into tls.c/.h such that it could be re-used in both instances. Using PEAP/MSCHAPv2 is now supported in PPPD with this change. Signed-off-by: Eivind Næss <eivnaes@yahoo.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'pppd')
-rw-r--r--pppd/Makefile.am60
-rw-r--r--pppd/auth.c53
-rw-r--r--pppd/eap-tls.c446
-rw-r--r--pppd/eap-tls.h7
-rw-r--r--pppd/eap.c28
-rw-r--r--pppd/eap.h3
-rw-r--r--pppd/mppe.c3
-rw-r--r--pppd/peap.c587
-rw-r--r--pppd/peap.h49
-rw-r--r--pppd/pppd.833
-rw-r--r--pppd/pppd.h14
-rw-r--r--pppd/tls.c447
-rw-r--r--pppd/tls.h88
13 files changed, 1193 insertions, 625 deletions
diff --git a/pppd/Makefile.am b/pppd/Makefile.am
index 2244507..1397088 100644
--- a/pppd/Makefile.am
+++ b/pppd/Makefile.am
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
sbin_PROGRAMS = pppd
dist_man8_MANS = pppd.8
-check_PROGRAMS = \
- utest_chap
+check_PROGRAMS =
utest_chap_SOURCES = chap_ms.c pppcrypt.c utils.c
utest_chap_CPPFLAGS = -DUNIT_TEST
utest_chap_LDFLAGS =
-TESTS = $(check_PROGRAMS)
+utest_peap_SOURCES = peap.c utils.c mppe.c
+utest_peap_CPPFLAGS = -DUNIT_TEST -I${top_srcdir}/include
+utest_peap_LDFLAGS =
if WITH_SRP
sbin_PROGRAMS += srp-entry
@@ -37,14 +38,16 @@ pppd_include_HEADERS = \
md4.h \
md5.h \
mppe.h \
- pppdconf.h \
patchlevel.h \
pathnames.h \
+ peap.h \
pppcrypt.h \
pppd.h \
+ pppdconf.h \
session.h \
sha1.h \
spinlock.h \
+ tls.h \
tdb.h \
upap.h
@@ -84,6 +87,7 @@ endif
if WITH_CHAPMS
pppd_SOURCES += chap_ms.c
pppd_SOURCES += pppcrypt.c
+check_PROGRAMS += utest_chap
else
if WITH_SRP
pppd_SOURCES += pppcrypt.c
@@ -133,35 +137,42 @@ pppd_LIBS += -lpam -ldl
endif
if WITH_EAPTLS
-pppd_SOURCES += eap-tls.c
+pppd_SOURCES += eap-tls.c tls.c
+else
+if WITH_PEAP
+pppd_SOURCES += tls.c
+endif
endif
-if !WITH_OPENSSL
-pppd_SOURCES += md5.c md4.c sha1.c
-utest_chap_SOURCES += md5.c md4.c sha1.c
-else
-pppd_CPPFLAGS += $(OPENSSL_INCLUDES)
-pppd_LDFLAGS += $(OPENSSL_LDFLAGS)
+if WITH_PEAP
+pppd_SOURCES += peap.c
+check_PROGRAMS += utest_peap
+endif
-utest_chap_CPPFLAGS += $(OPENSSL_INCLUDES)
-utest_chap_LDFLAGS += $(OPENSSL_LDFLAGS)
-utest_chap_LDADD = $(OPENSSL_LIBS)
+noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libppp_crypt.la
+libppp_crypt_la_SOURCES=
-pppd_LIBS += $(OPENSSL_LIBS)
+if !WITH_OPENSSL
+libppp_crypt_la_SOURCES += md4.c md5.c sha1.c
+else
+libppp_crypt_la_CPPFLAGS=$(OPENSSL_INCLUDES)
+libppp_crypt_la_LDFLAGS=$(OPENSSL_LDFLAGS)
+libppp_crypt_la_LIBADD=$(OPENSSL_LIBS)
if !OPENSSL_HAVE_SHA
-pppd_SOURCES += sha1.c
-utest_chap_SOURCES += sha1.c
-endif
-if !OPENSSL_HAVE_MD4
-pppd_SOURCES += md4.c
-utest_chap_SOURCES += md4.c
+libppp_crypt_la_SOURCES += sha1.c
endif
if !OPENSSL_HAVE_MD5
-pppd_SOURCES += md5.c
-utest_chap_SOURCES += md5.c
+libppp_crypt_la_SOURCES += md5.c
+endif
+if !OPENSSL_HAVE_MD4
+libppp_crypt_la_SOURCES += md4.c
endif
endif
+utest_peap_LDADD = libppp_crypt.la
+utest_chap_LDADD = libppp_crypt.la
+pppd_LIBS += libppp_crypt.la
+
if WITH_SYSTEMD
pppd_LIBS += -lsystemd
endif
@@ -181,3 +192,6 @@ pppd_LDADD = $(pppd_LIBS)
EXTRA_DIST = \
ppp.pam
+
+TESTS = $(check_PROGRAMS)
+
diff --git a/pppd/auth.c b/pppd/auth.c
index 7500352..01ece57 100644
--- a/pppd/auth.c
+++ b/pppd/auth.c
@@ -258,20 +258,23 @@ bool explicit_remote = 0; /* User specified explicit remote name */
bool explicit_user = 0; /* Set if "user" option supplied */
bool explicit_passwd = 0; /* Set if "password" option supplied */
char remote_name[MAXNAMELEN]; /* Peer's name for authentication */
-#ifdef USE_EAPTLS
-char *cacert_file = NULL; /* CA certificate file (pem format) */
-char *ca_path = NULL; /* directory with CA certificates */
-char *cert_file = NULL; /* client certificate file (pem format) */
-char *privkey_file = NULL; /* client private key file (pem format) */
-char *pkcs12_file = NULL; /* client private key envelope file (pkcs12 format) */
-char *crl_dir = NULL; /* directory containing CRL files */
-char *crl_file = NULL; /* Certificate Revocation List (CRL) file (pem format) */
-char *max_tls_version = NULL; /* Maximum TLS protocol version (default=1.2) */
-char *tls_verify_method = NULL;
-bool tls_verify_key_usage = 0;
-bool need_peer_eap = 0; /* Require peer to authenticate us */
+
+#if defined(USE_EAPTLS) || defined(USE_PEAP)
+char *cacert_file = NULL; /* CA certificate file (pem format) */
+char *ca_path = NULL; /* Directory with CA certificates */
+char *crl_dir = NULL; /* Directory containing CRL files */
+char *crl_file = NULL; /* Certificate Revocation List (CRL) file (pem format) */
+char *max_tls_version = NULL; /* Maximum TLS protocol version (default=1.2) */
+char *tls_verify_method = NULL; /* Verify certificate method */
+bool tls_verify_key_usage = 0; /* Verify peer certificate key usage */
+#endif
+
+#if defined(USE_EAPTLS)
+char *cert_file = NULL; /* Client certificate file (pem format) */
+char *privkey_file = NULL; /* Client private key file (pem format) */
+char *pkcs12_file = NULL; /* Client private key envelope file (pkcs12 format) */
+bool need_peer_eap = 0; /* Require peer to authenticate us */
#endif
-bool tls_verify_cert = 0; /* Do not verify server's SSL certificate */
static char *uafname; /* name of most recent +ua file */
@@ -446,26 +449,26 @@ option_t auth_options[] = {
"Set telephone number(s) which are allowed to connect",
OPT_PRIV | OPT_A2LIST },
- { "tls-verify-certificate", o_bool, &tls_verify_cert,
- "Enable server's SSL certificate validation", 1 },
-
-#ifdef USE_EAPTLS
- { "ca", o_string, &cacert_file, "EAP-TLS CA certificate in PEM format" },
- { "capath", o_string, &ca_path, "EAP-TLS CA certificate directory" },
- { "cert", o_string, &cert_file, "EAP-TLS client certificate in PEM format" },
- { "key", o_string, &privkey_file, "EAP-TLS client private key in PEM format" },
- { "crl-dir", o_string, &crl_dir, "Use CRLs in directory" },
- { "crl", o_string, &crl_file, "Use specific CRL file" },
- { "pkcs12", o_string, &pkcs12_file, "EAP-TLS client credentials in PKCS12 format" },
+#if defined(USE_EAPTLS) || defined(USE_PEAP)
+ { "ca", o_string, &cacert_file, "CA certificate in PEM format" },
+ { "capath", o_string, &ca_path, "TLS CA certificate directory" },
+ { "crl-dir", o_string, &crl_dir, "Use CRLs in directory" },
+ { "crl", o_string, &crl_file, "Use specific CRL file" },
{ "max-tls-version", o_string, &max_tls_version,
"Maximum TLS version (1.0/1.1/1.2 (default)/1.3)" },
{ "tls-verify-key-usage", o_bool, &tls_verify_key_usage,
"Verify certificate type and extended key usage" },
{ "tls-verify-method", o_string, &tls_verify_method,
"Verify peer by method (none|subject|name|suffix)" },
+#endif
+
+#if defined(USE_EAPTLS)
+ { "cert", o_string, &cert_file, "client certificate in PEM format" },
+ { "key", o_string, &privkey_file, "client private key in PEM format" },
+ { "pkcs12", o_string, &pkcs12_file, "EAP-TLS client credentials in PKCS12 format" },
{ "need-peer-eap", o_bool, &need_peer_eap,
"Require the peer to authenticate us", 1 },
-#endif /* USE_EAPTLS */
+#endif
{ NULL }
};
diff --git a/pppd/eap-tls.c b/pppd/eap-tls.c
index b15d801..b9bab84 100644
--- a/pppd/eap-tls.c
+++ b/pppd/eap-tls.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/ui.h>
@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@
#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
#include "pppd.h"
+#include "tls.h"
#include "eap.h"
#include "eap-tls.h"
#include "fsm.h"
@@ -59,6 +61,10 @@
#include "mppe.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+#define SSL3_RT_HEADER 0x100
+#endif
+
typedef struct pw_cb_data
{
const void *password;
@@ -75,55 +81,10 @@ static ENGINE *pkey_engine = NULL;
/* TLSv1.3 do we have a session ticket ? */
static int have_session_ticket = 0;
-int ssl_verify_callback(int, X509_STORE_CTX *);
void ssl_msg_callback(int write_p, int version, int ct, const void *buf,
size_t len, SSL * ssl, void *arg);
int ssl_new_session_cb(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *sess);
-X509 *get_X509_from_file(char *filename);
-int ssl_cmp_certs(char *filename, X509 * a);
-
-/*
- * OpenSSL 1.1+ introduced a generic TLS_method()
- * For older releases we substitute the appropriate method
- */
-
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
-
-#define TLS_method SSLv23_method
-
-#define SSL3_RT_HEADER 0x100
-
-#ifndef SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version
-/** Mimics SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version for OpenSSL < 1.1 */
-static inline int SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, long tls_ver_max)
-{
- long sslopt = 0;
-
- if (tls_ver_max < TLS1_VERSION)
- {
- sslopt |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
- }
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
- if (tls_ver_max < TLS1_1_VERSION)
- {
- sslopt |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
- }
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
- if (tls_ver_max < TLS1_2_VERSION)
- {
- sslopt |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
- }
-#endif
- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, sslopt);
-
- return 1;
-}
-#endif /* SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version */
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L */
-
#ifdef MPPE
#define EAPTLS_MPPE_KEY_LEN 32
@@ -178,20 +139,6 @@ void eaptls_gen_mppe_keys(struct eaptls_session *ets, int client)
#endif /* MPPE */
-
-void log_ssl_errors( void )
-{
- unsigned long ssl_err = ERR_get_error();
-
- if (ssl_err != 0)
- dbglog("EAP-TLS SSL error stack:");
- while (ssl_err != 0) {
- dbglog( ERR_error_string( ssl_err, NULL ) );
- ssl_err = ERR_get_error();
- }
-}
-
-
int password_callback (char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u)
{
if (buf)
@@ -230,7 +177,7 @@ CONF *eaptls_ssl_load_config( void )
if (CONF_modules_load( config, NULL, 0 ) <= 0 )
{
warn( "EAP-TLS: Error loading OpenSSL modules" );
- log_ssl_errors();
+ tls_log_sslerr();
config = NULL;
}
@@ -257,7 +204,7 @@ ENGINE *eaptls_ssl_load_engine( char *engine_name )
|| !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "LOAD", NULL, 0))
{
warn( "EAP-TLS: Error loading dynamic engine '%s'", engine_name );
- log_ssl_errors();
+ tls_log_sslerr();
ENGINE_free(e);
e = NULL;
}
@@ -274,7 +221,7 @@ ENGINE *eaptls_ssl_load_engine( char *engine_name )
if(!ENGINE_set_default(e, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL))
{
warn( "EAP-TLS: Cannot use that engine" );
- log_ssl_errors();
+ tls_log_sslerr();
ENGINE_free(e);
e = NULL;
}
@@ -307,7 +254,7 @@ static int eaptls_UI_reader(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) {
* for client or server use can be loaded.
*/
SSL_CTX *eaptls_init_ssl(int init_server, char *cacertfile, char *capath,
- char *certfile, char *peer_certfile, char *privkeyfile, char *pkcs12)
+ char *certfile, char *privkeyfile, char *pkcs12)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
char *cert_engine_name = NULL;
@@ -316,8 +263,6 @@ SSL_CTX *eaptls_init_ssl(int init_server, char *cacertfile, char *capath,
#endif
SSL_CTX *ctx;
SSL *ssl;
- X509_STORE *certstore;
- X509_LOOKUP *lookup;
X509 *tmp;
X509 *cert = NULL;
PKCS12 *p12 = NULL;
@@ -326,13 +271,6 @@ SSL_CTX *eaptls_init_ssl(int init_server, char *cacertfile, char *capath,
BIO *input;
int ret;
int reason;
-#if defined(TLS1_2_VERSION)
- long tls_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
-#elif defined(TLS1_1_VERSION)
- long tls_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
-#else
- long tls_version = TLS1_VERSION;
-#endif
/*
* Without these can't continue
@@ -358,8 +296,7 @@ SSL_CTX *eaptls_init_ssl(int init_server, char *cacertfile, char *capath,
}
}
- SSL_library_init();
- SSL_load_error_strings();
+ tls_init();
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/* load the openssl config file only once and load it before triggering
@@ -369,8 +306,7 @@ SSL_CTX *eaptls_init_ssl(int init_server, char *cacertfile, char *capath,
ssl_config = eaptls_ssl_load_config();
#endif
- ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method());
-
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(tls_method());
if (!ctx) {
error("EAP-TLS: Cannot initialize SSL CTX context");
goto fail;
@@ -451,14 +387,7 @@ SSL_CTX *eaptls_init_ssl(int init_server, char *cacertfile, char *capath,
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb (ctx, password_callback);
- if (strlen(cacertfile) == 0) cacertfile = NULL;
- if (strlen(capath) == 0) capath = NULL;
-
- if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, cacertfile, capath))
- {
- error("EAP-TLS: Cannot load verify locations");
- if (cacertfile) dbglog("CA certificate file = [%s]", cacertfile);
- if (capath) dbglog("CA certificate path = [%s]", capath);
+ if (tls_set_ca(ctx, capath, cacertfile) != 0) {
goto fail;
}
@@ -492,7 +421,7 @@ SSL_CTX *eaptls_init_ssl(int init_server, char *cacertfile, char *capath,
else
{
warn("EAP-TLS: Cannot load key with URI: '%s'", certfile );
- log_ssl_errors();
+ tls_log_sslerr();
}
}
else
@@ -645,21 +574,8 @@ SSL_CTX *eaptls_init_ssl(int init_server, char *cacertfile, char *capath,
goto fail;
}
- /* Explicitly set the NO_TICKETS flag to support Win7/Win8 clients */
- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
- | SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
-#endif
- );
-
- /* OpenSSL 1.1.1+ does not include RC4 ciphers by default.
- * This causes totally obsolete WinXP clients to fail. If you really
- * need ppp+EAP-TLS+openssl 1.1.1+WinXP then enable RC4 cipers and
- * make sure that you use an OpenSSL that supports them
-
- SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, "RC4");
- */
-
+ /* Configure the default options */
+ tls_set_opts(ctx);
/* Set up a SSL Session cache with a callback. This is needed for TLSv1.3+.
* During the initial handshake the server signals to the client early on
@@ -671,94 +587,17 @@ SSL_CTX *eaptls_init_ssl(int init_server, char *cacertfile, char *capath,
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE);
SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, ssl_new_session_cb);
- /* As EAP-TLS+TLSv1.3 is highly experimental we offer the user a chance to override */
- if (max_tls_version)
- {
- if (strncmp(max_tls_version, "1.0", 3) == 0)
- tls_version = TLS1_VERSION;
- else if (strncmp(max_tls_version, "1.1", 3) == 0)
- tls_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
- else if (strncmp(max_tls_version, "1.2", 3) == 0)
-#ifdef TLS1_2_VERSION
- tls_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
-#else
- {
- warn("TLSv1.2 not available. Defaulting to TLSv1.1");
- tls_version = TLS_1_1_VERSION;
- }
-#endif
- else if (strncmp(max_tls_version, "1.3", 3) == 0)
-#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
- tls_version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
-#else
- warn("TLSv1.3 not available.");
-#endif
- }
-
- dbglog("EAP-TLS: Setting max protocol version to 0x%X", tls_version);
- SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, tls_version);
-
- SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(ctx, 5);
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx,
- SSL_VERIFY_PEER |
- SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
- &ssl_verify_callback);
-
- if (crl_dir) {
- if (!(certstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx))) {
- error("EAP-TLS: Failed to get certificate store");
- goto fail;
- }
-
- if (!(lookup =
- X509_STORE_add_lookup(certstore, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir()))) {
- error("EAP-TLS: Store lookup for CRL failed");
-
- goto fail;
- }
-
- X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, crl_dir, X509_FILETYPE_PEM);
- X509_STORE_set_flags(certstore, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
- }
-
- if (crl_file) {
- FILE *fp = NULL;
- X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
-
- fp = fopen(crl_file, "r");
- if (!fp) {
- error("EAP-TLS: Cannot open CRL file '%s'", crl_file);
- goto fail;
- }
-
- crl = PEM_read_X509_CRL(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- if (!crl) {
- error("EAP-TLS: Cannot read CRL file '%s'", crl_file);
- goto fail;
- }
-
- if (!(certstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx))) {
- error("EAP-TLS: Failed to get certificate store");
- goto fail;
- }
- if (!X509_STORE_add_crl(certstore, crl)) {
- error("EAP-TLS: Cannot add CRL to certificate store");
- goto fail;
- }
- X509_STORE_set_flags(certstore, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
+ /* Configure the maximum SSL version */
+ tls_set_version(ctx, max_tls_version);
+ /* Configure the callback */
+ if (tls_set_verify(ctx, 5)) {
+ goto fail;
}
- /*
- * If a peer certificate file was specified, it must be valid, else fail
- */
- if (peer_certfile[0]) {
- if (!(tmp = get_X509_from_file(peer_certfile))) {
- error("EAP-TLS: Error loading client certificate from file %s",
- peer_certfile);
- goto fail;
- }
- X509_free(tmp);
+ /* Configure CRL check (if any) */
+ if (tls_set_crl(ctx, crl_dir, crl_file)) {
+ goto fail;
}
return ctx;
@@ -774,7 +613,7 @@ fail:
if (chain)
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
- log_ssl_errors();
+ tls_log_sslerr();
SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
return NULL;
}
@@ -821,15 +660,12 @@ int eaptls_init_ssl_server(eap_state * esp)
if (!esp->es_server.ea_session)
fatal("Allocation error");
ets = esp->es_server.ea_session;
- ets->client = 0;
if (!esp->es_server.ea_peer) {
error("EAP-TLS: Error: client name not set (BUG)");
return 0;
}
- strlcpy(ets->peer, esp->es_server.ea_peer, MAXWORDLEN-1);
-
dbglog( "getting eaptls secret" );
if (!get_eaptls_secret(esp->es_unit, esp->es_server.ea_peer,
esp->es_server.ea_name, clicertfile,
@@ -841,13 +677,17 @@ int eaptls_init_ssl_server(eap_state * esp)
ets->mtu = eaptls_get_mtu(esp->es_unit);
- ets->ctx = eaptls_init_ssl(1, cacertfile, capath, servcertfile, clicertfile, pkfile, pkcs12);
+ ets->ctx = eaptls_init_ssl(1, cacertfile, capath, servcertfile, pkfile, pkcs12);
if (!ets->ctx)
goto fail;
if (!(ets->ssl = SSL_new(ets->ctx)))
goto fail;
+ if (tls_set_verify_info(ets->ssl, esp->es_server.ea_peer,
+ clicertfile, 0, &ets->info))
+ goto fail;
+
/*
* Set auto-retry to avoid timeouts on BIO_read
*/
@@ -863,12 +703,6 @@ int eaptls_init_ssl_server(eap_state * esp)
SSL_set_msg_callback(ets->ssl, ssl_msg_callback);
SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ets->ssl, ets);
- /*
- * Attach the session struct to the connection, so we can later
- * retrieve it when doing certificate verification
- */
- SSL_set_ex_data(ets->ssl, 0, ets);
-
SSL_set_accept_state(ets->ssl);
ets->tls_v13 = 0;
@@ -877,16 +711,6 @@ int eaptls_init_ssl_server(eap_state * esp)
ets->datalen = 0;
ets->alert_sent = 0;
ets->alert_recv = 0;
-
- /*
- * If we specified the client certificate file, store it in ets->peercertfile,
- * so we can check it later in ssl_verify_callback()
- */
- if (clicertfile[0])
- strlcpy(&ets->peercertfile[0], clicertfile, MAXWORDLEN);
- else
- ets->peercertfile[0] = 0;
-
return 1;
fail:
@@ -914,38 +738,30 @@ int eaptls_init_ssl_client(eap_state * esp)
if (!esp->es_client.ea_session)
fatal("Allocation error");
ets = esp->es_client.ea_session;
- ets->client = 1;
-
- /*
- * If available, copy server name in ets; it will be used in cert
- * verify
- */
- if (esp->es_client.ea_peer)
- strlcpy(ets->peer, esp->es_client.ea_peer, MAXWORDLEN-1);
- else
- ets->peer[0] = 0;
-
ets->mtu = eaptls_get_mtu(esp->es_unit);
dbglog( "calling get_eaptls_secret" );
if (!get_eaptls_secret(esp->es_unit, esp->es_client.ea_name,
- ets->peer, clicertfile,
+ esp->es_client.ea_peer, clicertfile,
servcertfile, cacertfile, capath, pkfile, pkcs12, 0)) {
error( "EAP-TLS: Cannot get secret/password for client \"%s\", server \"%s\"",
- esp->es_client.ea_name, ets->peer );
+ esp->es_client.ea_name, esp->es_client.ea_peer);
return 0;
}
dbglog( "calling eaptls_init_ssl" );
- ets->ctx = eaptls_init_ssl(0, cacertfile, capath, clicertfile, servcertfile, pkfile, pkcs12);
+ ets->ctx = eaptls_init_ssl(0, cacertfile, capath, clicertfile, pkfile, pkcs12);
if (!ets->ctx)
goto fail;
ets->ssl = SSL_new(ets->ctx);
-
if (!ets->ssl)
goto fail;
+ if (tls_set_verify_info(ets->ssl, esp->es_client.ea_peer,
+ servcertfile, 0, &ets->info))
+ goto fail;
+
/*
* Initialize the BIOs we use to read/write to ssl engine
*/
@@ -956,13 +772,6 @@ int eaptls_init_ssl_client(eap_state * esp)
SSL_set_msg_callback(ets->ssl, ssl_msg_callback);
SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ets->ssl, ets);
-
- /*
- * Attach the session struct to the connection, so we can later
- * retrieve it when doing certificate verification
- */
- SSL_set_ex_data(ets->ssl, 0, ets);
-
SSL_set_connect_state(ets->ssl);
ets->tls_v13 = 0;
@@ -971,17 +780,6 @@ int eaptls_init_ssl_client(eap_state * esp)
ets->datalen = 0;
ets->alert_sent = 0;
ets->alert_recv = 0;
-
- /*
- * If we specified the server certificate file, store it in
- * ets->peercertfile, so we can check it later in
- * ssl_verify_callback()
- */
- if (servcertfile[0])
- strlcpy(ets->peercertfile, servcertfile, MAXWORDLEN);
- else
- ets->peercertfile[0] = 0;
-
return 1;
fail:
@@ -999,6 +797,9 @@ void eaptls_free_session(struct eaptls_session *ets)
if (ets->ctx)
SSL_CTX_free(ets->ctx);
+ if (ets->info)
+ tls_free_verify_info(&ets->info);
+
free(ets);
}
@@ -1108,7 +909,7 @@ int eaptls_receive(struct eaptls_session *ets, u_char * inp, int len)
}
if (BIO_write(ets->into_ssl, ets->data, ets->datalen) == -1)
- log_ssl_errors();
+ tls_log_sslerr();
SSL_read(ets->ssl, dummy, 65536);
@@ -1224,171 +1025,6 @@ void eaptls_retransmit(struct eaptls_session *ets, u_char ** outp)
}
/*
- * Verify a certificate.
- * Most of the work (signatures and issuer attributes checking)
- * is done by ssl; we check the CN in the peer certificate
- * against the peer name.
- */
-int ssl_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)
-{
- char subject[256];
- char cn_str[256];
- X509 *peer_cert;
- int err, depth;
- SSL *ssl;
- struct eaptls_session *ets;
- char *ptr1 = NULL, *ptr2 = NULL;
-
- peer_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
- err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
- depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
-
- dbglog("certificate verify depth: %d", depth);
-
- if (auth_required && !ok) {
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert),
- subject, 256);
-
- X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert),
- NID_commonName, cn_str, 256);
-
- dbglog("Certificate verification error:\n depth: %d CN: %s"
- "\n err: %d (%s)\n", depth, cn_str, err,
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
-
- return 0;
- }
-
- ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
- SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
-
- ets = (struct eaptls_session *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, 0);
-
- if (ets == NULL) {
- error("Error: SSL_get_ex_data returned NULL");
- return 0;
- }
-
- log_ssl_errors();
-
- if (!depth)
- {
- /* Verify certificate based on certificate type and extended key usage */
- if (tls_verify_key_usage) {
- int purpose = ets->client ? X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER : X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT ;
- if (X509_check_purpose(peer_cert, purpose, 0) == 0) {
- error("Certificate verification error: nsCertType mismatch");
- return 0;
- }
-
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
- int flags = ets->client ? XKU_SSL_SERVER : XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
- if (!(X509_get_extended_key_usage(peer_cert) & flags)) {
- error("Certificate verification error: invalid extended key usage");
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
- info("Certificate key usage: OK");
- }
-
- /*
- * If acting as client and the name of the server wasn't specified
- * explicitely, we can't verify the server authenticity
- */
- if (!tls_verify_method)
- tls_verify_method = TLS_VERIFY_NONE;
-
- if (!ets->peer[0] || !strcmp(TLS_VERIFY_NONE, tls_verify_method)) {
- warn("Certificate verication disabled or no peer name was specified");
- return ok;
- }
-
- /* This is the peer certificate */
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert),
- subject, 256);
-
- X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert),
- NID_commonName, cn_str, 256);
-
- /* Verify based on subject name */
- ptr1 = ets->peer;
- if (!strcmp(TLS_VERIFY_SUBJECT, tls_verify_method)) {
- ptr2 = subject;
- }
-
- /* Verify based on common name (default) */
- if (strlen(tls_verify_method) == 0 ||
- !strcmp(TLS_VERIFY_NAME, tls_verify_method)) {
- ptr2 = cn_str;
- }
-
- /* Match the suffix of common name */
- if (!strcmp(TLS_VERIFY_SUFFIX, tls_verify_method)) {
- int len = strlen(ptr1);
- int off = strlen(cn_str) - len;
- ptr2 = cn_str;
- if (off > 0) {
- ptr2 = cn_str + off;
- }
- }
-
- if (strcmp(ptr1, ptr2)) {
- error("Certificate verification error: CN (%s) != %s", ptr1, ptr2);
- return 0;
- }
-
- info("Certificate CN: %s, peer name %s", cn_str, ets->peer);
-
- /*
- * If a peer certificate file was specified, here we check it
- */
- if (ets->peercertfile[0]) {
- if (ssl_cmp_certs(&ets->peercertfile[0], peer_cert)
- != 0) {
- error
- ("Peer certificate doesn't match stored certificate");
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
- return ok;
-}
-
-/*
- * Compare a certificate with the one stored in a file
- */
-int ssl_cmp_certs(char *filename, X509 * a)
-{
- X509 *b;
- int ret;
-
- if (!(b = get_X509_from_file(filename)))
- return 1;
-
- ret = X509_cmp(a, b);
- X509_free(b);
-
- return ret;
-
-}
-
-X509 *get_X509_from_file(char *filename)
-{
- FILE *fp;
- X509 *ret;
-
- if (!(fp = fopen(filename, "r")))
- return NULL;
-
- ret = PEM_read_X509(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-
- fclose(fp);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
* Every sent & received message this callback function is invoked,
* so we know when alert messages have arrived or are sent and
* we can print debug information about TLS handshake.
diff --git a/pppd/eap-tls.h b/pppd/eap-tls.h
index d0c80b6..9c56687 100644
--- a/pppd/eap-tls.h
+++ b/pppd/eap-tls.h
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@
#define EAP_TLS_MAX_LEN 65536 /* max eap tls packet size */
+struct tls_info;
+
struct eaptls_session
{
u_char *data; /* buffered data */
@@ -58,7 +60,6 @@ struct eaptls_session
SSL *ssl; /* ssl connection */
BIO *from_ssl;
BIO *into_ssl;
- char peer[MAXWORDLEN]; /* peer name */
char peercertfile[MAXWORDLEN];
bool alert_sent;
u_char alert_sent_desc;
@@ -67,12 +68,12 @@ struct eaptls_session
char rtx[EAP_TLS_MAX_LEN]; /* retransmission buffer */
int rtx_len;
int mtu; /* unit mtu */
- bool client;
+ struct tls_info *info;
};
SSL_CTX *eaptls_init_ssl(int init_server, char *cacertfile, char *capath,
- char *certfile, char *peer_certfile, char *privkeyfile, char *pkcs12);
+ char *certfile, char *privkeyfile, char *pkcs12);
int eaptls_init_ssl_server(eap_state * esp);
int eaptls_init_ssl_client(eap_state * esp);
void eaptls_free_session(struct eaptls_session *ets);
diff --git a/pppd/eap.c b/pppd/eap.c
index b758711..54c3d42 100644
--- a/pppd/eap.c
+++ b/pppd/eap.c
@@ -2221,7 +2221,24 @@ eap_request(eap_state *esp, u_char *inp, int id, int len)
#endif /* CHAPMS */
#ifdef USE_PEAP
case EAPT_PEAP:
- peap_process(esp, id, inp, len, rhostname);
+
+ /* Initialize the PEAP context (if not already initialized) */
+ if (!esp->ea_peap) {
+ rhostname[0] = '\0';
+ if (explicit_remote || (remote_name[0] != '\0')) {
+ strlcpy(rhostname, remote_name, sizeof (rhostname));
+ }
+ if (peap_init(&esp->ea_peap, rhostname)) {
+ eap_send_nak(esp, id, EAPT_TLS);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Process the PEAP packet */
+ if (peap_process(esp, id, inp, len)) {
+ eap_send_nak(esp, id, EAPT_TLS);
+ }
+
break;
#endif /* USE_PEAP */
@@ -2777,6 +2794,10 @@ eap_success(eap_state *esp, u_char *inp, int id, int len)
PRINTMSG(inp, len);
}
+#ifdef USE_PEAP
+ peap_finish(&esp->ea_peap);
+#endif
+
esp->es_client.ea_state = eapOpen;
auth_withpeer_success(esp->es_unit, PPP_EAP, 0);
}
@@ -2811,6 +2832,11 @@ eap_failure(eap_state *esp, u_char *inp, int id, int len)
esp->es_client.ea_state = eapBadAuth;
error("EAP: peer reports authentication failure");
+
+#ifdef USE_PEAP
+ peap_finish(&esp->ea_peap);
+#endif
+
auth_withpeer_fail(esp->es_unit, PPP_EAP);
}
diff --git a/pppd/eap.h b/pppd/eap.h
index 956b2ea..5d582bc 100644
--- a/pppd/eap.h
+++ b/pppd/eap.h
@@ -169,6 +169,9 @@ typedef struct eap_state {
int es_unit; /* Interface unit number */
struct eap_auth es_client; /* Client (authenticatee) data */
struct eap_auth es_server; /* Server (authenticator) data */
+#ifdef USE_PEAP
+ struct peap_state *ea_peap; /* Client PEAP (authenticator) data */
+#endif
int es_savedtime; /* Saved timeout */
int es_rechallenge; /* EAP rechallenge interval */
int es_lwrechallenge; /* SRP lightweight rechallenge inter */
diff --git a/pppd/mppe.c b/pppd/mppe.c
index d2ba0eb..f1b7abf 100644
--- a/pppd/mppe.c
+++ b/pppd/mppe.c
@@ -220,6 +220,8 @@ mppe_set_chapv2(u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE],
mppe_set_keys(SendKey, RecvKey, SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
}
+#ifndef UNIT_TEST
+
/*
* Set MPPE options from plugins.
*/
@@ -251,3 +253,4 @@ mppe_set_enc_types(int policy, int types)
}
}
+#endif
diff --git a/pppd/peap.c b/pppd/peap.c
index e8d1a19..fb9af3e 100644
--- a/pppd/peap.c
+++ b/pppd/peap.c
@@ -1,14 +1,36 @@
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2011
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Rustam Kovhaev. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2021 Eivind Næss. All rights reserved.
*
- * Authors:
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
*
- * Rustam Kovhaev <rkovhaev@gmail.com>
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
+ * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN
+ * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * NOTES:
*
* PEAP has 2 phases,
* 1 - Outer EAP, where TLS session gets established
- * 2 - Inner EAP, where inside TLS session with EAP MSCHAPV2 auth, or any
- * other auth
+ * 2 - Inner EAP, where inside TLS session with EAP MSCHAPV2 auth, or any other auth
*
* And so protocols encapsulation looks like this:
* Outer EAP -> TLS -> Inner EAP -> MSCHAPV2
@@ -21,6 +43,8 @@
* b) Inner EAP fragmentation
* c) Any other auth other than MSCHAPV2
*
+ * For details on the PEAP protocol, look to Microsoft:
+ * https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-peap
*/
#include <stdio.h>
@@ -32,18 +56,27 @@
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <net/ppp_defs.h>
+
#include "pppd.h"
#include "eap.h"
+#include "tls.h"
#include "chap-new.h"
#include "chap_ms.h"
+#include "mppe.h"
#include "peap.h"
+#ifdef UNIT_TEST
+#define novm(x)
+#endif
+
struct peap_state {
SSL_CTX *ctx;
SSL *ssl;
BIO *in_bio;
BIO *out_bio;
+ int phase;
int written, read;
u_char *in_buf;
u_char *out_buf;
@@ -51,21 +84,11 @@ struct peap_state {
u_char ipmk[PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN];
u_char tk[PEAP_TLV_TK_LEN];
u_char nonce[PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN];
-};
-
-static struct peap_state *psm;
-static int peap_phase;
-extern bool tls_verify_cert;
-static bool init;
-
-static void ssl_init()
-{
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
- SSL_library_init();
- SSL_load_error_strings();
+ struct tls_info *info;
+#ifdef CHAPMS
+ struct chap_digest_type *chap;
#endif
- init = 1;
-}
+};
/*
* K = Key, S = Seed, LEN = output length
@@ -85,11 +108,11 @@ static void peap_prfplus(u_char *seed, size_t seed_len, u_char *key, size_t key_
size_t max_iter, i, j, k;
u_int len;
- max_iter = (pfr_len + SHA_HASH_LEN - 1) / SHA_HASH_LEN;
- buf = malloc(seed_len + max_iter * SHA_HASH_LEN);
+ max_iter = (pfr_len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1) / SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ buf = malloc(seed_len + max_iter * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
if (!buf)
novm("pfr buffer");
- hash = malloc(pfr_len + SHA_HASH_LEN);
+ hash = malloc(pfr_len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
if (!hash)
novm("hash buffer");
@@ -98,7 +121,7 @@ static void peap_prfplus(u_char *seed, size_t seed_len, u_char *key, size_t key_
k = 0;
if (i > 0)
- j = SHA_HASH_LEN;
+ j = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
for (k = 0; k < seed_len; k++)
buf[j + k] = seed[k];
pos = j + k;
@@ -108,17 +131,17 @@ static void peap_prfplus(u_char *seed, size_t seed_len, u_char *key, size_t key_
pos++;
buf[pos] = 0x00;
pos++;
- if (!HMAC(EVP_sha1(), key, key_len, buf, pos, (hash + i * SHA_HASH_LEN), &len))
+ if (!HMAC(EVP_sha1(), key, key_len, buf, pos, (hash + i * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH), &len))
fatal("HMAC() failed");
- for (j = 0; j < SHA_HASH_LEN; j++)
- buf[j] = hash[i * SHA_HASH_LEN + j];
+ for (j = 0; j < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; j++)
+ buf[j] = hash[i * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + j];
}
BCOPY(hash, out_buf, pfr_len);
free(hash);
free(buf);
}
-static void generate_cmk(u_char *tempkey, u_char *nonce, u_char *tlv_response_out, int client)
+static void generate_cmk(u_char *ipmk, u_char *tempkey, u_char *nonce, u_char *tlv_response_out, int client)
{
const char *label = PEAP_TLV_IPMK_SEED_LABEL;
u_char data_tlv[PEAP_TLV_DATA_LEN] = {0};
@@ -129,8 +152,6 @@ static void generate_cmk(u_char *tempkey, u_char *nonce, u_char *tlv_response_ou
u_char compound_mac[PEAP_TLV_COMP_MAC_LEN] = {0};
u_int len;
- if (debug)
- info("PEAP CB: generate compound mac");
/* format outgoing CB TLV response packet */
data_tlv[1] = PEAP_TLV_TYPE;
data_tlv[3] = PEAP_TLV_LENGTH_FIELD;
@@ -141,15 +162,17 @@ static void generate_cmk(u_char *tempkey, u_char *nonce, u_char *tlv_response_ou
BCOPY(nonce, (data_tlv + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN), PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN);
data_tlv[60] = EAPT_PEAP;
- BCOPY(mppe_send_key, isk, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN);
- BCOPY(mppe_recv_key, isk + MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN);
+#ifdef MPPE
+ mppe_get_send_key(isk, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN);
+ mppe_get_recv_key(isk + MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN);
+#endif
BCOPY(label, ipmkseed, strlen(label));
BCOPY(isk, ipmkseed + strlen(label), PEAP_TLV_ISK_LEN);
peap_prfplus(ipmkseed, PEAP_TLV_IPMKSEED_LEN,
tempkey, PEAP_TLV_TEMPKEY_LEN, buf, PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN + PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN);
- BCOPY(buf, psm->ipmk, PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN);
+ BCOPY(buf, ipmk, PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN);
BCOPY(buf + PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN, cmk, PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN);
if (!HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cmk, PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN, data_tlv, PEAP_TLV_DATA_LEN, compound_mac, &len))
fatal("HMAC() failed");
@@ -158,28 +181,30 @@ static void generate_cmk(u_char *tempkey, u_char *nonce, u_char *tlv_response_ou
BCOPY(data_tlv, tlv_response_out, PEAP_TLV_DATA_LEN - 1);
}
-static void verify_compound_mac(u_char *in_buf)
+static void verify_compound_mac(struct peap_state *psm, u_char *in_buf)
{
u_char nonce[PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN] = {0};
u_char out_buf[PEAP_TLV_LEN] = {0};
BCOPY(in_buf, nonce, PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN);
- generate_cmk(psm->tk, nonce, out_buf, 0);
+ generate_cmk(psm->ipmk, psm->tk, nonce, out_buf, 0);
if (memcmp((in_buf + PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN), (out_buf + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN), PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN))
fatal("server's CMK does not match client's CMK, potential MiTM");
}
-static void generate_mppe_keys(void)
+#ifdef MPPE
+#define PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN 32
+
+static void generate_mppe_keys(u_char *ipmk, int client)
{
const char *label = PEAP_TLV_CSK_SEED_LABEL;
u_char csk[PEAP_TLV_CSK_LEN] = {0};
size_t len;
- if (debug)
- info("PEAP CB: generate mppe keys");
+ dbglog("PEAP CB: generate mppe keys");
len = strlen(label);
len++; /* CSK requires NULL byte in seed */
- peap_prfplus((u_char *)label, len, psm->ipmk, PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN, csk, PEAP_TLV_CSK_LEN);
+ peap_prfplus((u_char *)label, len, ipmk, PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN, csk, PEAP_TLV_CSK_LEN);
/*
* The first 64 bytes of the CSK are split into two MPPE keys, as follows.
@@ -190,19 +215,16 @@ static void generate_mppe_keys(void)
* | MS-MPPE-Send-Key | MS-MPPE-Recv-Key |
* +-----------------------+------------------------+
*/
- BCOPY(csk, mppe_send_key, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN);
- BCOPY(csk + 32, mppe_recv_key, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN);
+ if (client) {
+ mppe_set_keys(csk, csk + PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN, PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN);
+ } else {
+ mppe_set_keys(csk + PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN, csk, PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN);
+ }
}
-static void dump(u_char *buf, int len)
-{
- int i = 0;
+#endif
- dbglog("len: %d bytes", len);
- for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
- printf("%02x ", buf[i]);
- printf("\n");
-}
+#ifndef UNIT_TEST
static void peap_ack(eap_state *esp, u_char id)
{
@@ -221,6 +243,7 @@ static void peap_ack(eap_state *esp, u_char id)
static void peap_response(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *buf, int len)
{
+ struct peap_state *psm = esp->ea_peap;
u_char *outp;
int peap_len;
@@ -230,7 +253,7 @@ static void peap_response(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *buf, int len)
PUTCHAR(id, outp);
esp->es_client.ea_id = id;
- if (peap_phase == PEAP_PHASE_1)
+ if (psm->phase == PEAP_PHASE_1)
peap_len = PEAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD + len;
else
peap_len = PEAP_HEADERLEN + len;
@@ -238,7 +261,7 @@ static void peap_response(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *buf, int len)
PUTSHORT(peap_len, outp);
PUTCHAR(EAPT_PEAP, outp);
- if (peap_phase == PEAP_PHASE_1) {
+ if (psm->phase == PEAP_PHASE_1) {
PUTCHAR(PEAP_L_FLAG_SET, outp);
PUTLONG(len, outp);
} else
@@ -248,24 +271,20 @@ static void peap_response(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *buf, int len)
output(esp->es_unit, outpacket_buf, PPP_HDRLEN + peap_len);
}
-void do_inner_eap(u_char *in_buf, int in_len, eap_state *esp, int id,
- char *rhostname, u_char *out_buf, int *out_len)
+void peap_do_inner_eap(u_char *in_buf, int in_len, eap_state *esp, int id,
+ u_char *out_buf, int *out_len)
{
- if (debug)
- dump(in_buf, in_len);
- int used;
- u_char *outp;
+ struct peap_state *psm = esp->ea_peap;
+ int used = 0;
+ int typenum;
+ int secret_len;
+ char secret[MAXSECRETLEN + 1];
+ char rhostname[MAXWORDLEN];
+ u_char *outp = out_buf;
- used = 0;
- outp = out_buf;
+ dbglog("PEAP: EAP (in): %.*B", in_len, in_buf);
- if (*in_buf == EAPT_IDENTITY && in_len == 1) {
- PUTCHAR(EAPT_IDENTITY, outp);
- used++;
- BCOPY(esp->es_client.ea_name, outp,
- esp->es_client.ea_namelen);
- used += esp->es_client.ea_namelen;
- } else if (*(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN) == PEAP_CAPABILITIES_TYPE &&
+ if (*(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN) == PEAP_CAPABILITIES_TYPE &&
in_len == (EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_CAPABILITIES_LEN)) {
/* use original packet as template for response */
BCOPY(in_buf, outp, EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_CAPABILITIES_LEN);
@@ -274,57 +293,15 @@ void do_inner_eap(u_char *in_buf, int in_len, eap_state *esp, int id,
/* change last byte to 0 to disable fragmentation */
*(outp + PEAP_CAPABILITIES_LEN + 1) = 0x00;
used = EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_CAPABILITIES_LEN;
- } else if (*in_buf == EAPT_TLS && in_len == 2) {
- /* send NAK to EAP_TLS request */
- PUTCHAR(EAPT_NAK, outp);
- used++;
- PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
- used++;
- } else if (*in_buf == EAPT_MSCHAPV2 && *(in_buf + 1) == CHAP_CHALLENGE) {
- /* MSCHAPV2 auth */
- int secret_len;
- char secret[MAXSECRETLEN + 1];
- char *user;
- u_char user_len;
- u_char response[MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN];
- u_char auth_response[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 1];
- u_char chap_id;
- u_char rchallenge[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN];
-
- user = esp->es_client.ea_name;
- user_len = esp->es_client.ea_namelen;
- chap_id = *(in_buf + 2);
- BCOPY((in_buf + 6), rchallenge, MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN);
- if (!get_secret(esp->es_unit, esp->es_client.ea_name,
- rhostname, secret, &secret_len, 0))
- fatal("Can't read password file");
- /* MSCHAPV2 response */
- ChapMS2(rchallenge, NULL, esp->es_client.ea_name,
- secret, secret_len, response, auth_response, MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATEE);
- PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
- PUTCHAR(CHAP_RESPONSE, outp);
- PUTCHAR(chap_id, outp);
- PUTCHAR(0, outp);
- PUTCHAR(5 + user_len + MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN, outp);
- PUTCHAR(MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN, outp)
- BCOPY(response, outp, MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN);
- outp = outp + MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN;
- BCOPY(user, outp, user_len);
- used = 5 + user_len + MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN + 1;
- } else if (*in_buf == EAPT_MSCHAPV2 && *(in_buf + 1) == CHAP_SUCCESS) {
- PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
- used++;
- PUTCHAR(CHAP_SUCCESS, outp);
- used++;
- auth_peer_success(esp->es_unit, PPP_CHAP, CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2,
- esp->es_server.ea_peer, esp->es_server.ea_peerlen);
- } else if (*(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN) == PEAP_TLV_TYPE &&
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (*(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN) == PEAP_TLV_TYPE &&
in_len == PEAP_TLV_LEN) {
/* PEAP TLV message, do cryptobinding */
SSL_export_keying_material(psm->ssl, psm->tk, PEAP_TLV_TK_LEN,
PEAP_TLV_TK_SEED_LABEL, strlen(PEAP_TLV_TK_SEED_LABEL), NULL, 0, 0);
/* verify server's CMK */
- verify_compound_mac(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_RESULT_LEN + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN);
+ verify_compound_mac(psm, in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_RESULT_LEN + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN);
/* generate client's CMK with new nonce */
PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp);
PUTCHAR(id, outp);
@@ -332,26 +309,169 @@ void do_inner_eap(u_char *in_buf, int in_len, eap_state *esp, int id,
BCOPY(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN, outp, PEAP_TLV_RESULT_LEN);
outp = outp + PEAP_TLV_RESULT_LEN;
RAND_bytes(psm->nonce, PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN);
- generate_cmk(psm->tk, psm->nonce, outp, 1);
+ generate_cmk(psm->ipmk, psm->tk, psm->nonce, outp, 1);
+#ifdef MPPE
/* set mppe keys */
- generate_mppe_keys();
+ generate_mppe_keys(psm->ipmk, 1);
+#endif
used = PEAP_TLV_LEN;
- } else {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ GETCHAR(typenum, in_buf);
+ in_len--;
+
+ switch (typenum) {
+ case EAPT_IDENTITY:
+ /* Respond with our identity to the peer */
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_IDENTITY, outp);
+ BCOPY(esp->es_client.ea_name, outp,
+ esp->es_client.ea_namelen);
+ used += (esp->es_client.ea_namelen + 1);
+ break;
+
+ case EAPT_TLS:
+ /* Send NAK to EAP_TLS request */
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_NAK, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
+ used += 2;
+ break;
+
+#if CHAPMS
+ case EAPT_MSCHAPV2: {
+
+ // Must have at least 4 more bytes to process CHAP header
+ if (in_len < 4) {
+ error("PEAP: received invalid MSCHAPv2 packet, too short");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ u_char opcode;
+ GETCHAR(opcode, in_buf);
+
+ u_char chap_id;
+ GETCHAR(chap_id, in_buf);
+
+ short mssize;
+ GETSHORT(mssize, in_buf);
+
+ // Validate the CHAP packet (including header)
+ if (in_len != mssize) {
+ error("PEAP: received invalid MSCHAPv2 packet, invalid length");
+ break;
+ }
+ in_len -= 4;
+
+ switch (opcode) {
+ case CHAP_CHALLENGE: {
+
+ u_char *challenge = in_buf; // VLEN + VALUE
+ u_char vsize;
+
+ GETCHAR(vsize, in_buf);
+ in_len -= 1;
+
+ if (vsize != MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN || in_len < MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN) {
+ error("PEAP: received invalid MSCHAPv2 packet, invalid value-length: %d", vsize);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ INCPTR(MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN, in_buf);
+ in_len -= MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN;
+
+ // Copy the provided remote host name
+ rhostname[0] = '\0';
+ if (in_len > 0) {
+ if (in_len >= sizeof(rhostname)) {
+ dbglog("PEAP: trimming really long peer name down");
+ in_len = sizeof(rhostname) - 1;
+ }
+ BCOPY(in_buf, rhostname, in_len);
+ rhostname[in_len] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ // In case the remote doesn't give us his name, or user explictly specified remotename is config
+ if (explicit_remote || (remote_name[0] != '\0' && in_len == 0))
+ strlcpy(rhostname, remote_name, sizeof(rhostname));
+
+ // Get the scrert for authenticating ourselves with the specified host
+ if (get_secret(esp->es_unit, esp->es_client.ea_name,
+ rhostname, secret, &secret_len, 0)) {
+
+ u_char response[MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN+1];
+ u_char user_len = esp->es_client.ea_namelen;
+ char *user = esp->es_client.ea_name;
+
+ psm->chap->make_response(response, chap_id, user,
+ challenge, secret, secret_len, NULL);
+
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(CHAP_RESPONSE, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(chap_id, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(0, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(5 + user_len + MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN, outp);
+ BCOPY(response, outp, MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN+1); // VLEN + VALUE
+ INCPTR(MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN+1, outp);
+ BCOPY(user, outp, user_len);
+ used = 5 + user_len + MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN + 1;
+
+ } else {
+ dbglog("PEAP: no CHAP secret for auth to %q", rhostname);
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_NAK, outp);
+ ++used;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ case CHAP_SUCCESS: {
+
+ u_char status = CHAP_FAILURE;
+ if (psm->chap->check_success(chap_id, in_buf, in_len)) {
+ info("Chap authentication succeeded! %.*v", in_len, in_buf);
+ status = CHAP_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(status, outp);
+ used += 2;
+ break;
+ }
+ case CHAP_FAILURE: {
+
+ psm->chap->handle_failure(in_buf, in_len);
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(status, outp);
+ used += 2;
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ } // EAPT_MSCHAPv2
+#endif
+ default:
+
/* send compressed EAP NAK for any unknown packet */
PUTCHAR(EAPT_NAK, outp);
++used;
}
- if (debug)
- dump(psm->out_buf, used);
+done:
+
+ dbglog("PEAP: EAP (out): %.*B", used, psm->out_buf);
*out_len = used;
}
-void allocate_buffers(void)
+int peap_init(struct peap_state **ctx, const char *rhostname)
{
const SSL_METHOD *method;
- psm = malloc(sizeof(*psm));
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -1;
+
+ tls_init();
+
+ struct peap_state *psm = malloc(sizeof(*psm));
if (!psm)
novm("peap psm struct");
psm->in_buf = malloc(TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
@@ -360,20 +480,31 @@ void allocate_buffers(void)
psm->out_buf = malloc(TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
if (!psm->out_buf)
novm("peap tls buffer");
- method = TLS_method();
+ method = tls_method();
if (!method)
novm("TLS_method() failed");
psm->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method);
if (!psm->ctx)
novm("SSL_CTX_new() failed");
- if (!tls_verify_cert)
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(psm->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
- else
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(psm->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL);
- info("PEAP: SSL certificate validation is %s", tls_verify_cert ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+ /* Configure the default options */
+ tls_set_opts(psm->ctx);
+
+ /* Configure the max TLS version */
+ tls_set_version(psm->ctx, max_tls_version);
- SSL_CTX_set_options(psm->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 | SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION);
+ /* Configure the peer certificate callback */
+ tls_set_verify(psm->ctx, 5);
+
+ /* Configure CA locations */
+ if (tls_set_ca(psm->ctx, ca_path, cacert_file)) {
+ fatal("Could not set CA verify locations");
+ }
+
+ /* Configure CRL check (if any) */
+ if (tls_set_crl(psm->ctx, crl_dir, crl_file)) {
+ fatal("Could not set CRL verify locations");
+ }
psm->out_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
psm->in_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
@@ -382,27 +513,49 @@ void allocate_buffers(void)
psm->ssl = SSL_new(psm->ctx);
SSL_set_bio(psm->ssl, psm->in_bio, psm->out_bio);
SSL_set_connect_state(psm->ssl);
- peap_phase = PEAP_PHASE_1;
+ psm->phase = PEAP_PHASE_1;
+ tls_set_verify_info(psm->ssl, explicit_remote ? rhostname : NULL, NULL, 1, &psm->info);
+ psm->chap = chap_find_digest(CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2);
+ *ctx = psm;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void peap_finish(struct peap_state **psm) {
+
+ if (psm && *psm) {
+ struct peap_state *tmp = *psm;
+
+ if (tmp->ssl)
+ SSL_free(tmp->ssl);
+
+ if (tmp->ctx)
+ SSL_CTX_free(tmp->ctx);
+
+ if (tmp->info)
+ tls_free_verify_info(&tmp->info);
+
+ // NOTE: BIO and memory is freed as a part of SSL_free()
+
+ free(*psm);
+ *psm = NULL;
+ }
}
-void peap_process(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *inp, int len, char *rhostname)
+int peap_process(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *inp, int len)
{
int ret;
int out_len;
- if (!init)
- ssl_init();
+ struct peap_state *psm = esp->ea_peap;
if (esp->es_client.ea_id == id) {
info("PEAP: retransmits are not supported..");
- return;
+ return -1;
}
switch (*inp) {
case PEAP_S_FLAG_SET:
- allocate_buffers();
- if (debug)
- info("PEAP: S bit is set, starting PEAP phase 1");
+ dbglog("PEAP: S bit is set, starting PEAP phase 1");
ret = SSL_do_handshake(psm->ssl);
if (ret != 1) {
ret = SSL_get_error(psm->ssl, ret);
@@ -415,16 +568,14 @@ void peap_process(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *inp, int len, char *rhostna
break;
case PEAP_LM_FLAG_SET:
- if (debug)
- info("PEAP TLS: LM bits are set, need to get more TLS fragments");
+ dbglog("PEAP TLS: LM bits are set, need to get more TLS fragments");
inp = inp + PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD + PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD;
psm->written = BIO_write(psm->in_bio, inp, len - PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD - PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD);
peap_ack(esp, id);
break;
case PEAP_M_FLAG_SET:
- if (debug)
- info("PEAP TLS: M bit is set, need to get more TLS fragments");
+ dbglog("PEAP TLS: M bit is set, need to get more TLS fragments");
inp = inp + PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD;
psm->written = BIO_write(psm->in_bio, inp, len - PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD);
peap_ack(esp, id);
@@ -433,20 +584,17 @@ void peap_process(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *inp, int len, char *rhostna
case PEAP_L_FLAG_SET:
case PEAP_NO_FLAGS:
if (*inp == PEAP_L_FLAG_SET) {
- if (debug)
- info("PEAP TLS: L bit is set");
+ dbglog("PEAP TLS: L bit is set");
inp = inp + PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD + PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD;
psm->written = BIO_write(psm->in_bio, inp, len - PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD - PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD);
} else {
- if (debug)
- info("PEAP TLS: all bits are off");
+ dbglog("PEAP TLS: all bits are off");
inp = inp + PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD;
psm->written = BIO_write(psm->in_bio, inp, len - PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD);
}
- if (peap_phase == PEAP_PHASE_1) {
- if (debug)
- info("PEAP TLS: continue handshake");
+ if (psm->phase == PEAP_PHASE_1) {
+ dbglog("PEAP TLS: continue handshake");
ret = SSL_do_handshake(psm->ssl);
if (ret != 1) {
ret = SSL_get_error(psm->ssl, ret);
@@ -454,7 +602,7 @@ void peap_process(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *inp, int len, char *rhostna
fatal("SSL_do_handshake(): %s", ERR_error_string(ret, NULL));
}
if (SSL_is_init_finished(psm->ssl))
- peap_phase = PEAP_PHASE_2;
+ psm->phase = PEAP_PHASE_2;
if (BIO_ctrl_pending(psm->out_bio) == 0) {
peap_ack(esp, id);
break;
@@ -468,12 +616,153 @@ void peap_process(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *inp, int len, char *rhostna
psm->read = SSL_read(psm->ssl, psm->in_buf,
TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
out_len = TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE;
- do_inner_eap(psm->in_buf, psm->read, esp, id, rhostname,
+ peap_do_inner_eap(psm->in_buf, psm->read, esp, id,
psm->out_buf, &out_len);
- psm->written = SSL_write(psm->ssl, psm->out_buf, out_len);
- psm->read = BIO_read(psm->out_bio, psm->out_buf,
+ if (out_len > 0) {
+ psm->written = SSL_write(psm->ssl, psm->out_buf, out_len);
+ psm->read = BIO_read(psm->out_bio, psm->out_buf,
TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
- peap_response(esp, id, psm->out_buf, psm->read);
+ peap_response(esp, id, psm->out_buf, psm->read);
+ }
break;
}
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#else
+
+u_char outpacket_buf[255];
+int debug = 1;
+int error_count = 0;
+int unsuccess = 0;
+
+/**
+ * Using the example in MS-PEAP, section 4.4.1.
+ * see https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-peap/5308642b-90c9-4cc4-beec-fb367325c0f9
+ */
+int test_cmk(u_char *ipmk) {
+ u_char nonce[PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN] = {
+ 0x6C, 0x6B, 0xA3, 0x87, 0x84, 0x23, 0x74, 0x57,
+ 0xCC, 0xC9, 0x0B, 0x1A, 0x90, 0x8C, 0xBD, 0xF4,
+ 0x71, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x99, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0x8D,
+ 0x3D, 0xB4, 0x4E, 0xCB, 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x37, 0xE9
+ };
+
+ u_char tmpkey[PEAP_TLV_TEMPKEY_LEN] = {
+ 0x73, 0x8B, 0xB5, 0xF4, 0x62, 0xD5, 0x8E, 0x7E,
+ 0xD8, 0x44, 0xE1, 0xF0, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0xBE, 0x50,
+ 0xC5, 0x0A, 0x20, 0x50, 0xDE, 0x11, 0x99, 0x77,
+ 0x10, 0xD6, 0x5F, 0x45, 0xFB, 0x5F, 0xBA, 0xB7,
+ 0xE3, 0x18, 0x1E, 0x92, 0x4F, 0x42, 0x97, 0x38,
+ // 0xDE, 0x40, 0xC8, 0x46, 0xCD, 0xF5, 0x0B, 0xCB,
+ // 0xF9, 0xCE, 0xDB, 0x1E, 0x85, 0x1D, 0x22, 0x52,
+ // 0x45, 0x3B, 0xDF, 0x63
+ };
+
+ u_char expected[60] = {
+ 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x38, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x6C, 0x6B, 0xA3, 0x87, 0x84, 0x23, 0x74, 0x57,
+ 0xCC, 0xC9, 0x0B, 0x1A, 0x90, 0x8C, 0xBD, 0xF4,
+ 0x71, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x99, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0x8D,
+ 0x3D, 0xB4, 0x4E, 0xCB, 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x37, 0xE9,
+ 0x42, 0xE0, 0x86, 0x07, 0x1D, 0x1C, 0x8B, 0x8C,
+ 0x8E, 0x45, 0x8F, 0x70, 0x21, 0xF0, 0x6A, 0x6E,
+ 0xAB, 0x16, 0xB6, 0x46
+ };
+
+ u_char inner_mppe_keys[32] = {
+ 0x67, 0x3E, 0x96, 0x14, 0x01, 0xBE, 0xFB, 0xA5,
+ 0x60, 0x71, 0x7B, 0x3B, 0x5D, 0xDD, 0x40, 0x38,
+ 0x65, 0x67, 0xF9, 0xF4, 0x16, 0xFD, 0x3E, 0x9D,
+ 0xFC, 0x71, 0x16, 0x3B, 0xDF, 0xF2, 0xFA, 0x95
+ };
+
+ u_char response[60] = {};
+
+ // Set the inner MPPE keys (e.g. from CHAPv2)
+ mppe_set_keys(inner_mppe_keys, inner_mppe_keys + 16, 16);
+
+ // Generate and compare the response
+ generate_cmk(ipmk, tmpkey, nonce, response, 1);
+ if (memcmp(expected, response, sizeof(response)) != 0) {
+ dbglog("Failed CMK key generation\n");
+ dbglog("%.*B", sizeof(response), response);
+ dbglog("%.*B", sizeof(expected), expected);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int test_mppe(u_char *ipmk) {
+ u_char outer_mppe_send_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_SIZE] = {
+ 0x6A, 0x02, 0xD7, 0x82, 0x20, 0x1B, 0xC7, 0x13,
+ 0x8B, 0xF8, 0xEF, 0xF7, 0x33, 0xB4, 0x96, 0x97,
+ 0x0D, 0x7C, 0xAB, 0x30, 0x0A, 0xC9, 0x57, 0x72,
+ 0x78, 0xE1, 0xDD, 0xD5, 0xAE, 0xF7, 0x66, 0x97
+ };
+
+ u_char outer_mppe_recv_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_SIZE] = {
+ 0x17, 0x52, 0xD4, 0xE5, 0x84, 0xA1, 0xC8, 0x95,
+ 0x03, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0x05, 0xE3, 0xBC, 0x9A, 0x84,
+ 0x84, 0xDD, 0xC2, 0xAA, 0x6E, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0x62,
+ 0x76, 0x5C, 0x40, 0x68, 0xBF, 0xF6, 0x5A, 0x45
+ };
+
+ u_char result[MPPE_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+ int len;
+
+ mppe_clear_keys();
+
+ generate_mppe_keys(ipmk, 1);
+
+ len = mppe_get_recv_key(result, sizeof(result));
+ if (len != sizeof(result)) {
+ dbglog("Invalid length of resulting MPPE recv key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(result, outer_mppe_recv_key, len) != 0) {
+ dbglog("Invalid result for outer mppe recv key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ len = mppe_get_send_key(result, sizeof(result));
+ if (len != sizeof(result)) {
+ dbglog("Invalid length of resulting MPPE send key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(result, outer_mppe_send_key, len) != 0) {
+ dbglog("Invalid result for outer mppe send key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ u_char ipmk[PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN] = {
+ 0x3A, 0x91, 0x1C, 0x25, 0x54, 0x73, 0xE8, 0x3E,
+ 0x9A, 0x0C, 0xC3, 0x33, 0xAE, 0x1F, 0x8A, 0x35,
+ 0xCD, 0xC7, 0x41, 0x63, 0xE7, 0xF6, 0x0F, 0x6C,
+ 0x65, 0xEF, 0x71, 0xC2, 0x64, 0x42, 0xAA, 0xAC,
+ 0xA2, 0xB6, 0xF1, 0xEB, 0x4F, 0x25, 0xEC, 0xA3,
+ };
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ ret = test_cmk(ipmk);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = test_mppe(ipmk);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/pppd/peap.h b/pppd/peap.h
index fd002d2..49e28e8 100644
--- a/pppd/peap.h
+++ b/pppd/peap.h
@@ -1,16 +1,35 @@
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2011
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Rustam Kovhaev. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2021 Eivind Næss. All rights reserved.
*
- * Authors:
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
*
- * Rustam Kovhaev <rkovhaev@gmail.com>
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
+ * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN
+ * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef PPP_PEAP_H
#define PPP_PEAP_H
-#define EAPT_MSCHAPV2 26
-
#define PEAP_PHASE_1 1
#define PEAP_PHASE_2 2
@@ -22,8 +41,6 @@
#define PEAP_CAPABILITIES_TYPE 254
#define PEAP_CAPABILITIES_LEN 12
-#define SHA_HASH_LEN 20
-
#define PEAP_TLV_TYPE 12
#define PEAP_TLV_LENGTH_FIELD 56
#define PEAP_TLV_SUBTYPE_REQUEST 0
@@ -60,7 +77,21 @@
#define EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN 0x40
#define TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE 0x4000
-void peap_process(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *inp,
- int len, char *rhostname);
+struct peap_state;
+
+/**
+ * Initialize the PEAP structure
+ */
+int peap_init(struct peap_state** psm, const char *remote_name);
+
+/**
+ * Process a PEAP packet
+ */
+int peap_process(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *inp, int len);
+
+/**
+ * Clean up the PEAP structure
+ */
+void peap_finish(struct peap_state **psm);
#endif /* PPP_PEAP_H */
diff --git a/pppd/pppd.8 b/pppd/pppd.8
index cd4b9eb..b007406 100644
--- a/pppd/pppd.8
+++ b/pppd/pppd.8
@@ -260,10 +260,16 @@ compression in the corresponding direction. Use \fInobsdcomp\fR or
\fIbsdcomp 0\fR to disable BSD-Compress compression entirely.
.TP
.B ca \fIca-file
-(EAP-TLS) Use the file \fIca-file\fR as the X.509 Certificate Authority
+(EAP-TLS, or PEAP) Use the file \fIca-file\fR as the X.509 Certificate Authority
(CA) file (in PEM format), needed for setting up an EAP-TLS connection.
This option is used on the client-side in conjunction with the \fBcert\fR
-and \fBkey\fR options.
+and \fBkey\fR options. Either \fIca\fR, or \fIcapath\fR options are required
+for PEAP. EAP-TLS may also use the entry in eaptls-client or eaptls-server
+for a CA certificate associated with a particular peer.
+.TP
+.B capath \fIpath
+(EAP-TLS, or PEAP) Specify a location that contains public CA certificates.
+Either \fIca\fR, or \fIcapath\fR options are required for PEAP.
.TP
.B cdtrcts
Use a non-standard hardware flow control (i.e. DTR/CTS) to control
@@ -320,15 +326,15 @@ negotiation by sending its first LCP packet. The default value is
or \fBpty\fR option is used.
.TP
.B crl \fIfilename
-(EAP-TLS) Use the file \fIfilename\fR as the Certificate Revocation List
+(EAP-TLS, or PEAP) Use the file \fIfilename\fR as the Certificate Revocation List
to check for the validity of the peer's certificate. This option is not
-mandatory for setting up an EAP-TLS connection. Also see the \fBcrl-dir\fR
+mandatory for setting up a TLS connection. Also see the \fBcrl-dir\fR
option.
.TP
.B crl-dir \fIdirectory
-(EAP-TLS) Use the directory \fIdirectory\fR to scan for CRL files in
+(EAP-TLS, or PEAP) Use the directory \fIdirectory\fR to scan for CRL files in
has format ($hash.r0) to check for the validity of the peer's certificate.
-This option is not mandatory for setting up an EAP-TLS connection.
+This option is not mandatory for setting up a TLS connection.
Also see the \fBcrl\fR option.
.TP
.B debug
@@ -724,6 +730,11 @@ network control protocol comes up).
Terminate after \fIn\fR consecutive failed connection attempts. A
value of 0 means no limit. The default value is 10.
.TP
+.B max-tls-version \fIstring
+(EAP-TLS, or PEAP) Configures the max allowed TLS version used during
+negotiation with a peer. The default value for this is \fI1.2\fR. Values
+allowed for this option is \fI1.0.\fR, \fI1.1\fR, \fI1.2\fR, \fI1.3\fR.
+.TP
.B modem
Use the modem control lines. This option is the default. With this
option, pppd will wait for the CD (Carrier Detect) signal from the
@@ -1173,6 +1184,16 @@ The device used by pppd with this option must have sync support.
Currently supports Microgate SyncLink adapters
under Linux and FreeBSD 2.2.8 and later.
.TP
+.B tls-verify-method \fIstring
+(EAP-TLS, or PEAP) Match the value specified for \fIremotename\fR to that that
+of the X509 certificates subject name, common name, or suffix of the common
+name. Respective values allowed for this option is: \fInone\fR, \fIsubject\fR,
+\fIname\fR, or \fIsuffix\fR. The default value for this option is \fIname\fR.
+.TP
+.B tls-verify-key-usage
+(EAP-TLS, or PEAP) Enables examination of peer certificate's purpose, and
+extended key usage attributes.
+.TP
.B unit \fInum
Sets the ppp unit number (for a ppp0 or ppp1 etc interface name) for outbound
connections. If the unit is already in use a dynamically allocated number will
diff --git a/pppd/pppd.h b/pppd/pppd.h
index ba62ca5..ab8f674 100644
--- a/pppd/pppd.h
+++ b/pppd/pppd.h
@@ -336,19 +336,25 @@ extern bool dump_options; /* print out option values */
extern bool dryrun; /* check everything, print options, exit */
extern int child_wait; /* # seconds to wait for children at end */
-#ifdef USE_EAPTLS
+#if defined(USE_EAPTLS) || defined(USE_PEAP)
#define TLS_VERIFY_NONE "none"
#define TLS_VERIFY_NAME "name"
#define TLS_VERIFY_SUBJECT "subject"
#define TLS_VERIFY_SUFFIX "suffix"
-extern char *crl_dir;
-extern char *crl_file;
-extern char *pkcs12_file;
+extern char *crl_dir;
+extern char *crl_file;
+extern char *ca_path;
+extern char *cacert_file;
+
extern char *max_tls_version;
extern bool tls_verify_key_usage;
extern char *tls_verify_method;
+#endif /* USE_EAPTLS || USE_PEAP */
+
+#ifdef USE_EAPTLS
+extern char *pkcs12_file;
#endif /* USE_EAPTLS */
#ifdef MAXOCTETS
diff --git a/pppd/tls.c b/pppd/tls.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..28c2e57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pppd/tls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,447 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2021 Eivind Næss. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
+ * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN
+ * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "pppd.h"
+#include "tls.h"
+
+/**
+ * Structure used in verifying the peer certificate
+ */
+struct tls_info
+{
+ char *peer_name;
+ X509 *peer_cert;
+ bool client;
+};
+
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL 1.1+ introduced a generic TLS_method()
+ * For older releases we substitute the appropriate method
+ */
+#define TLS_method SSLv23_method
+
+#ifndef SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version
+/** Mimics SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version for OpenSSL < 1.1 */
+static inline int SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, long tls_ver_max)
+{
+ long sslopt = 0;
+
+ if (tls_ver_max < TLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ sslopt |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+ if (tls_ver_max < TLS1_1_VERSION)
+ {
+ sslopt |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
+ if (tls_ver_max < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ {
+ sslopt |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
+ }
+#endif
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, sslopt);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif /* SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version */
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L */
+
+
+/*
+ * Verify a certificate. Most of the work (signatures and issuer attributes checking)
+ * is done by ssl; we check the CN in the peer certificate against the peer name.
+ */
+static int tls_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ char subject[256];
+ char cn_str[256];
+ X509 *peer_cert;
+ int err, depth;
+ SSL *ssl;
+ struct tls_info *inf;
+ char *ptr1 = NULL, *ptr2 = NULL;
+
+ peer_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+ err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+ depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
+
+ dbglog("certificate verify depth: %d", depth);
+
+ if (auth_required && !ok) {
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert),
+ subject, 256);
+
+ X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert),
+ NID_commonName, cn_str, 256);
+
+ dbglog("Certificate verification error:\n depth: %d CN: %s"
+ "\n err: %d (%s)\n", depth, cn_str, err,
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
+ SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
+
+ inf = (struct tls_info*) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, 0);
+ if (inf == NULL) {
+ error("Error: SSL_get_ex_data returned NULL");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ tls_log_sslerr();
+
+ if (!depth)
+ {
+ /* Verify certificate based on certificate type and extended key usage */
+ if (tls_verify_key_usage) {
+ int purpose = inf->client ? X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER : X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT ;
+ if (X509_check_purpose(peer_cert, purpose, 0) == 0) {
+ error("Certificate verification error: nsCertType mismatch");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ int flags = inf->client ? XKU_SSL_SERVER : XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
+ if (!(X509_get_extended_key_usage(peer_cert) & flags)) {
+ error("Certificate verification error: invalid extended key usage");
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ info("Certificate key usage: OK");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If acting as client and the name of the server wasn't specified
+ * explicitely, we can't verify the server authenticity
+ */
+ if (!tls_verify_method)
+ tls_verify_method = TLS_VERIFY_NONE;
+
+ if (!inf->peer_name || !strcmp(TLS_VERIFY_NONE, tls_verify_method)) {
+ warn("Certificate verication disabled or no peer name was specified");
+ return ok;
+ }
+
+ /* This is the peer certificate */
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert),
+ subject, 256);
+
+ X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert),
+ NID_commonName, cn_str, 256);
+
+ /* Verify based on subject name */
+ ptr1 = inf->peer_name;
+ if (!strcmp(TLS_VERIFY_SUBJECT, tls_verify_method)) {
+ ptr2 = subject;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify based on common name (default) */
+ if (strlen(tls_verify_method) == 0 ||
+ !strcmp(TLS_VERIFY_NAME, tls_verify_method)) {
+ ptr2 = cn_str;
+ }
+
+ /* Match the suffix of common name */
+ if (!strcmp(TLS_VERIFY_SUFFIX, tls_verify_method)) {
+ int len = strlen(ptr1);
+ int off = strlen(cn_str) - len;
+ ptr2 = cn_str;
+ if (off > 0) {
+ ptr2 = cn_str + off;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(ptr1, ptr2)) {
+ error("Certificate verification error: CN (%s) != %s", ptr1, ptr2);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (inf->peer_cert) {
+ if (X509_cmp(inf->peer_cert, peer_cert) != 0) {
+ error("Peer certificate doesn't match stored certificate");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ info("Certificate CN: %s, peer name %s", cn_str, inf->peer_name);
+ }
+
+ return ok;
+}
+
+int tls_init()
+{
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ SSL_library_init();
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tls_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth)
+{
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(ctx, depth);
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx,
+ SSL_VERIFY_PEER |
+ SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
+ &tls_verify_callback);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tls_set_verify_info(SSL *ssl, const char *peer_name, const char *peer_cert,
+ bool client, struct tls_info **out)
+{
+ if (out != NULL) {
+ struct tls_info *tmp = calloc(sizeof(struct tls_info), 1);
+ if (!tmp) {
+ fatal("Allocation error");
+ }
+
+ tmp->client = client;
+ if (peer_name) {
+ tmp->peer_name = strdup(peer_name);
+ }
+
+ if (peer_cert && strlen(peer_cert) > 0) {
+ FILE *fp = fopen(peer_cert, "r");
+ if (fp) {
+ tmp->peer_cert = PEM_read_X509(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ fclose(fp);
+ }
+
+ if (!tmp->peer_cert) {
+ error("EAP-TLS: Error loading client certificate from file %s",
+ peer_cert);
+ tls_free_verify_info(&tmp);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, 0, tmp);
+ *out = tmp;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+void tls_free_verify_info(struct tls_info **in) {
+ if (in && *in) {
+ struct tls_info *tmp = *in;
+ if (tmp->peer_name) {
+ free(tmp->peer_name);
+ }
+ if (tmp->peer_cert) {
+ X509_free(tmp->peer_cert);
+ }
+ free(tmp);
+ *in = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD* tls_method() {
+ return TLS_method();
+}
+
+int tls_set_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *max_version)
+{
+#if defined(TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ long tls_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+#elif defined(TLS1_1_VERSION)
+ long tls_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+#else
+ long tls_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+#endif
+
+ /* As EAP-TLS+TLSv1.3 is highly experimental we offer the user a chance to override */
+ if (max_version) {
+ if (strncmp(max_version, "1.0", 3) == 0) {
+ tls_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+ }
+ else if (strncmp(max_version, "1.1", 3) == 0) {
+ tls_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ }
+ else if (strncmp(max_version, "1.2", 3) == 0) {
+#ifdef TLS1_2_VERSION
+ tls_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+#else
+ warn("TLSv1.2 not available. Defaulting to TLSv1.1");
+ tls_version = TLS_1_1_VERSION;
+#endif
+ }
+ else if (strncmp(max_version, "1.3", 3) == 0) {
+#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
+ tls_version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
+#else
+ warn("TLSv1.3 not available.");
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ dbglog("Setting max protocol version to 0x%X", tls_version);
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, tls_version)) {
+ error("Could not set max protocol version");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tls_set_opts(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+
+ /* Explicitly set the NO_TICKETS flag to support Win7/Win8 clients */
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+ | SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+#endif
+ | SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+ );
+
+ /* OpenSSL 1.1.1+ does not include RC4 ciphers by default.
+ * This causes totally obsolete WinXP clients to fail. If you really
+ * need ppp+EAP-TLS+openssl 1.1.1+WinXP then enable RC4 cipers and
+ * make sure that you use an OpenSSL that supports them
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, "RC4");
+ */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tls_set_crl(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *crl_dir, const char *crl_file)
+{
+ X509_STORE *certstore = NULL;
+ X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL;
+ FILE *fp = NULL;
+ int status = -1;
+
+ if (crl_dir) {
+ if (!(certstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx))) {
+ error("Failed to get certificate store");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (!(lookup =
+ X509_STORE_add_lookup(certstore, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir()))) {
+ error("Store lookup for CRL failed");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, crl_dir, X509_FILETYPE_PEM);
+ X509_STORE_set_flags(certstore, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
+ }
+
+ if (crl_file) {
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+
+ fp = fopen(crl_file, "r");
+ if (!fp) {
+ error("Cannot open CRL file '%s'", crl_file);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ crl = PEM_read_X509_CRL(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (!crl) {
+ error("Cannot read CRL file '%s'", crl_file);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (!(certstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx))) {
+ error("Failed to get certificate store");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (!X509_STORE_add_crl(certstore, crl)) {
+ error("Cannot add CRL to certificate store");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ X509_STORE_set_flags(certstore, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
+ }
+
+ status = 0;
+
+done:
+
+ if (fp != NULL) {
+ fclose(fp);
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+int tls_set_ca(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *ca_dir, const char *ca_file)
+{
+ if (ca_file && strlen(ca_file) == 0) {
+ ca_file = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ca_dir && strlen(ca_dir) == 0) {
+ ca_dir = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, ca_file, ca_dir)) {
+
+ error("Cannot load verify locations");
+ if (ca_file) {
+ dbglog("CA certificate file = [%s]", ca_file);
+ }
+
+ if (ca_dir) {
+ dbglog("CA certificate path = [%s]", ca_dir);
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void tls_log_sslerr( void )
+{
+ unsigned long ssl_err = ERR_get_error();
+
+ if (ssl_err != 0)
+ dbglog("EAP-TLS SSL error stack:");
+ while (ssl_err != 0) {
+ dbglog( ERR_error_string( ssl_err, NULL ) );
+ ssl_err = ERR_get_error();
+ }
+}
+
diff --git a/pppd/tls.h b/pppd/tls.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39fdef7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pppd/tls.h
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2021 Eivind Næss. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
+ * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN
+ * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef TLS_H
+#define TLS_H
+
+/**
+ * Structure used in verifying the peer certificate
+ */
+struct tls_info;
+
+/**
+ * Initialize the SSL library
+ */
+int tls_init();
+
+/**
+ * Get the SSL_METHOD
+ */
+const SSL_METHOD* tls_method();
+
+/**
+ * Configure the SSL options
+ */
+int tls_set_opts(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * Configure the SSL context's max TLS version
+ */
+int tls_set_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *max_version);
+
+/**
+ * Configure the SSL context's verify callback
+ */
+int tls_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth);
+
+/**
+ * Configure the SSL verify information
+ */
+int tls_set_verify_info(SSL *ssl, const char *peer_name, const char *peer_cert_file,
+ bool client, struct tls_info **out);
+
+/**
+ * Free the tls_info structure and it's members
+ */
+void tls_free_verify_info(struct tls_info **in);
+
+/**
+ * Configure the SSL context's CRL details
+ */
+int tls_set_crl(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *crl_dir, const char *crl_file);
+
+/**
+ * Configure the SSL context's CA verify locations
+ */
+int tls_set_ca(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *ca_dir, const char *ca_file);
+
+/**
+ * Log all errors from ssl library
+ */
+void tls_log_sslerr( void );
+
+#endif /* TLS_H */
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